Merge tag 'arm64-fixes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/arm64/linux

Pull arm64 fixes from Will Deacon:

 - Fix bogus KASAN splat on EFI runtime stack

 - Select JUMP_LABEL unconditionally to avoid boot failure with pKVM and
   the legacy implementation of static keys

 - Avoid touching GCS registers when 'arm64.nogcs' has been passed on
   the command-line

 - Move a 'cpumask_t' off the stack in smp_send_stop()

 - Don't advertise SME-related hwcaps to userspace when ID_AA64PFR1_EL1
   indicates that SME is not implemented

 - Always check the VMA when handling an Overlay fault

 - Avoid corrupting TCR2_EL1 during boot

* tag 'arm64-fixes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/arm64/linux:
  arm64/mm: Drop wrong writes into TCR2_EL1
  arm64: poe: Handle spurious Overlay faults
  arm64: Filter out SME hwcaps when FEAT_SME isn't implemented
  arm64: move smp_send_stop() cpu mask off stack
  arm64/gcs: Don't try to access GCS registers if arm64.nogcs is enabled
  arm64: Unconditionally select CONFIG_JUMP_LABEL
  arm64: efi: Fix KASAN false positive for EFI runtime stack
This commit is contained in:
Linus Torvalds
2025-07-09 08:37:48 -07:00
9 changed files with 76 additions and 53 deletions

View File

@@ -256,6 +256,7 @@ config ARM64
select HOTPLUG_SMT if HOTPLUG_CPU
select IRQ_DOMAIN
select IRQ_FORCED_THREADING
select JUMP_LABEL
select KASAN_VMALLOC if KASAN
select LOCK_MM_AND_FIND_VMA
select MODULES_USE_ELF_RELA

View File

@@ -287,17 +287,6 @@
.Lskip_fgt2_\@:
.endm
.macro __init_el2_gcs
mrs_s x1, SYS_ID_AA64PFR1_EL1
ubfx x1, x1, #ID_AA64PFR1_EL1_GCS_SHIFT, #4
cbz x1, .Lskip_gcs_\@
/* Ensure GCS is not enabled when we start trying to do BLs */
msr_s SYS_GCSCR_EL1, xzr
msr_s SYS_GCSCRE0_EL1, xzr
.Lskip_gcs_\@:
.endm
/**
* Initialize EL2 registers to sane values. This should be called early on all
* cores that were booted in EL2. Note that everything gets initialised as
@@ -319,7 +308,6 @@
__init_el2_cptr
__init_el2_fgt
__init_el2_fgt2
__init_el2_gcs
.endm
#ifndef __KVM_NVHE_HYPERVISOR__
@@ -371,6 +359,13 @@
msr_s SYS_MPAMHCR_EL2, xzr // clear TRAP_MPAMIDR_EL1 -> EL2
.Lskip_mpam_\@:
check_override id_aa64pfr1, ID_AA64PFR1_EL1_GCS_SHIFT, .Linit_gcs_\@, .Lskip_gcs_\@, x1, x2
.Linit_gcs_\@:
msr_s SYS_GCSCR_EL1, xzr
msr_s SYS_GCSCRE0_EL1, xzr
.Lskip_gcs_\@:
check_override id_aa64pfr0, ID_AA64PFR0_EL1_SVE_SHIFT, .Linit_sve_\@, .Lskip_sve_\@, x1, x2
.Linit_sve_\@: /* SVE register access */

View File

@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ obj-y := debug-monitors.o entry.o irq.o fpsimd.o \
cpufeature.o alternative.o cacheinfo.o \
smp.o smp_spin_table.o topology.o smccc-call.o \
syscall.o proton-pack.o idle.o patching.o pi/ \
rsi.o
rsi.o jump_label.o
obj-$(CONFIG_COMPAT) += sys32.o signal32.o \
sys_compat.o
@@ -47,7 +47,6 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS) += perf_regs.o perf_callchain.o
obj-$(CONFIG_HARDLOCKUP_DETECTOR_PERF) += watchdog_hld.o
obj-$(CONFIG_HAVE_HW_BREAKPOINT) += hw_breakpoint.o
obj-$(CONFIG_CPU_PM) += sleep.o suspend.o
obj-$(CONFIG_JUMP_LABEL) += jump_label.o
obj-$(CONFIG_KGDB) += kgdb.o
obj-$(CONFIG_EFI) += efi.o efi-rt-wrapper.o
obj-$(CONFIG_PCI) += pci.o

View File

@@ -3135,6 +3135,13 @@ static bool has_sve_feature(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *cap, int scope)
}
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_SME
static bool has_sme_feature(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *cap, int scope)
{
return system_supports_sme() && has_user_cpuid_feature(cap, scope);
}
#endif
static const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities arm64_elf_hwcaps[] = {
HWCAP_CAP(ID_AA64ISAR0_EL1, AES, PMULL, CAP_HWCAP, KERNEL_HWCAP_PMULL),
HWCAP_CAP(ID_AA64ISAR0_EL1, AES, AES, CAP_HWCAP, KERNEL_HWCAP_AES),
@@ -3223,31 +3230,31 @@ static const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities arm64_elf_hwcaps[] = {
HWCAP_CAP(ID_AA64ISAR2_EL1, BC, IMP, CAP_HWCAP, KERNEL_HWCAP_HBC),
#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_SME
HWCAP_CAP(ID_AA64PFR1_EL1, SME, IMP, CAP_HWCAP, KERNEL_HWCAP_SME),
HWCAP_CAP(ID_AA64SMFR0_EL1, FA64, IMP, CAP_HWCAP, KERNEL_HWCAP_SME_FA64),
HWCAP_CAP(ID_AA64SMFR0_EL1, LUTv2, IMP, CAP_HWCAP, KERNEL_HWCAP_SME_LUTV2),
HWCAP_CAP(ID_AA64SMFR0_EL1, SMEver, SME2p2, CAP_HWCAP, KERNEL_HWCAP_SME2P2),
HWCAP_CAP(ID_AA64SMFR0_EL1, SMEver, SME2p1, CAP_HWCAP, KERNEL_HWCAP_SME2P1),
HWCAP_CAP(ID_AA64SMFR0_EL1, SMEver, SME2, CAP_HWCAP, KERNEL_HWCAP_SME2),
HWCAP_CAP(ID_AA64SMFR0_EL1, I16I64, IMP, CAP_HWCAP, KERNEL_HWCAP_SME_I16I64),
HWCAP_CAP(ID_AA64SMFR0_EL1, F64F64, IMP, CAP_HWCAP, KERNEL_HWCAP_SME_F64F64),
HWCAP_CAP(ID_AA64SMFR0_EL1, I16I32, IMP, CAP_HWCAP, KERNEL_HWCAP_SME_I16I32),
HWCAP_CAP(ID_AA64SMFR0_EL1, B16B16, IMP, CAP_HWCAP, KERNEL_HWCAP_SME_B16B16),
HWCAP_CAP(ID_AA64SMFR0_EL1, F16F16, IMP, CAP_HWCAP, KERNEL_HWCAP_SME_F16F16),
HWCAP_CAP(ID_AA64SMFR0_EL1, F8F16, IMP, CAP_HWCAP, KERNEL_HWCAP_SME_F8F16),
HWCAP_CAP(ID_AA64SMFR0_EL1, F8F32, IMP, CAP_HWCAP, KERNEL_HWCAP_SME_F8F32),
HWCAP_CAP(ID_AA64SMFR0_EL1, I8I32, IMP, CAP_HWCAP, KERNEL_HWCAP_SME_I8I32),
HWCAP_CAP(ID_AA64SMFR0_EL1, F16F32, IMP, CAP_HWCAP, KERNEL_HWCAP_SME_F16F32),
HWCAP_CAP(ID_AA64SMFR0_EL1, B16F32, IMP, CAP_HWCAP, KERNEL_HWCAP_SME_B16F32),
HWCAP_CAP(ID_AA64SMFR0_EL1, BI32I32, IMP, CAP_HWCAP, KERNEL_HWCAP_SME_BI32I32),
HWCAP_CAP(ID_AA64SMFR0_EL1, F32F32, IMP, CAP_HWCAP, KERNEL_HWCAP_SME_F32F32),
HWCAP_CAP(ID_AA64SMFR0_EL1, SF8FMA, IMP, CAP_HWCAP, KERNEL_HWCAP_SME_SF8FMA),
HWCAP_CAP(ID_AA64SMFR0_EL1, SF8DP4, IMP, CAP_HWCAP, KERNEL_HWCAP_SME_SF8DP4),
HWCAP_CAP(ID_AA64SMFR0_EL1, SF8DP2, IMP, CAP_HWCAP, KERNEL_HWCAP_SME_SF8DP2),
HWCAP_CAP(ID_AA64SMFR0_EL1, SBitPerm, IMP, CAP_HWCAP, KERNEL_HWCAP_SME_SBITPERM),
HWCAP_CAP(ID_AA64SMFR0_EL1, AES, IMP, CAP_HWCAP, KERNEL_HWCAP_SME_AES),
HWCAP_CAP(ID_AA64SMFR0_EL1, SFEXPA, IMP, CAP_HWCAP, KERNEL_HWCAP_SME_SFEXPA),
HWCAP_CAP(ID_AA64SMFR0_EL1, STMOP, IMP, CAP_HWCAP, KERNEL_HWCAP_SME_STMOP),
HWCAP_CAP(ID_AA64SMFR0_EL1, SMOP4, IMP, CAP_HWCAP, KERNEL_HWCAP_SME_SMOP4),
HWCAP_CAP_MATCH_ID(has_sme_feature, ID_AA64SMFR0_EL1, FA64, IMP, CAP_HWCAP, KERNEL_HWCAP_SME_FA64),
HWCAP_CAP_MATCH_ID(has_sme_feature, ID_AA64SMFR0_EL1, LUTv2, IMP, CAP_HWCAP, KERNEL_HWCAP_SME_LUTV2),
HWCAP_CAP_MATCH_ID(has_sme_feature, ID_AA64SMFR0_EL1, SMEver, SME2p2, CAP_HWCAP, KERNEL_HWCAP_SME2P2),
HWCAP_CAP_MATCH_ID(has_sme_feature, ID_AA64SMFR0_EL1, SMEver, SME2p1, CAP_HWCAP, KERNEL_HWCAP_SME2P1),
HWCAP_CAP_MATCH_ID(has_sme_feature, ID_AA64SMFR0_EL1, SMEver, SME2, CAP_HWCAP, KERNEL_HWCAP_SME2),
HWCAP_CAP_MATCH_ID(has_sme_feature, ID_AA64SMFR0_EL1, I16I64, IMP, CAP_HWCAP, KERNEL_HWCAP_SME_I16I64),
HWCAP_CAP_MATCH_ID(has_sme_feature, ID_AA64SMFR0_EL1, F64F64, IMP, CAP_HWCAP, KERNEL_HWCAP_SME_F64F64),
HWCAP_CAP_MATCH_ID(has_sme_feature, ID_AA64SMFR0_EL1, I16I32, IMP, CAP_HWCAP, KERNEL_HWCAP_SME_I16I32),
HWCAP_CAP_MATCH_ID(has_sme_feature, ID_AA64SMFR0_EL1, B16B16, IMP, CAP_HWCAP, KERNEL_HWCAP_SME_B16B16),
HWCAP_CAP_MATCH_ID(has_sme_feature, ID_AA64SMFR0_EL1, F16F16, IMP, CAP_HWCAP, KERNEL_HWCAP_SME_F16F16),
HWCAP_CAP_MATCH_ID(has_sme_feature, ID_AA64SMFR0_EL1, F8F16, IMP, CAP_HWCAP, KERNEL_HWCAP_SME_F8F16),
HWCAP_CAP_MATCH_ID(has_sme_feature, ID_AA64SMFR0_EL1, F8F32, IMP, CAP_HWCAP, KERNEL_HWCAP_SME_F8F32),
HWCAP_CAP_MATCH_ID(has_sme_feature, ID_AA64SMFR0_EL1, I8I32, IMP, CAP_HWCAP, KERNEL_HWCAP_SME_I8I32),
HWCAP_CAP_MATCH_ID(has_sme_feature, ID_AA64SMFR0_EL1, F16F32, IMP, CAP_HWCAP, KERNEL_HWCAP_SME_F16F32),
HWCAP_CAP_MATCH_ID(has_sme_feature, ID_AA64SMFR0_EL1, B16F32, IMP, CAP_HWCAP, KERNEL_HWCAP_SME_B16F32),
HWCAP_CAP_MATCH_ID(has_sme_feature, ID_AA64SMFR0_EL1, BI32I32, IMP, CAP_HWCAP, KERNEL_HWCAP_SME_BI32I32),
HWCAP_CAP_MATCH_ID(has_sme_feature, ID_AA64SMFR0_EL1, F32F32, IMP, CAP_HWCAP, KERNEL_HWCAP_SME_F32F32),
HWCAP_CAP_MATCH_ID(has_sme_feature, ID_AA64SMFR0_EL1, SF8FMA, IMP, CAP_HWCAP, KERNEL_HWCAP_SME_SF8FMA),
HWCAP_CAP_MATCH_ID(has_sme_feature, ID_AA64SMFR0_EL1, SF8DP4, IMP, CAP_HWCAP, KERNEL_HWCAP_SME_SF8DP4),
HWCAP_CAP_MATCH_ID(has_sme_feature, ID_AA64SMFR0_EL1, SF8DP2, IMP, CAP_HWCAP, KERNEL_HWCAP_SME_SF8DP2),
HWCAP_CAP_MATCH_ID(has_sme_feature, ID_AA64SMFR0_EL1, SBitPerm, IMP, CAP_HWCAP, KERNEL_HWCAP_SME_SBITPERM),
HWCAP_CAP_MATCH_ID(has_sme_feature, ID_AA64SMFR0_EL1, AES, IMP, CAP_HWCAP, KERNEL_HWCAP_SME_AES),
HWCAP_CAP_MATCH_ID(has_sme_feature, ID_AA64SMFR0_EL1, SFEXPA, IMP, CAP_HWCAP, KERNEL_HWCAP_SME_SFEXPA),
HWCAP_CAP_MATCH_ID(has_sme_feature, ID_AA64SMFR0_EL1, STMOP, IMP, CAP_HWCAP, KERNEL_HWCAP_SME_STMOP),
HWCAP_CAP_MATCH_ID(has_sme_feature, ID_AA64SMFR0_EL1, SMOP4, IMP, CAP_HWCAP, KERNEL_HWCAP_SME_SMOP4),
#endif /* CONFIG_ARM64_SME */
HWCAP_CAP(ID_AA64FPFR0_EL1, F8CVT, IMP, CAP_HWCAP, KERNEL_HWCAP_F8CVT),
HWCAP_CAP(ID_AA64FPFR0_EL1, F8FMA, IMP, CAP_HWCAP, KERNEL_HWCAP_F8FMA),

View File

@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
#include <asm/efi.h>
#include <asm/stacktrace.h>
#include <asm/vmap_stack.h>
static bool region_is_misaligned(const efi_memory_desc_t *md)
{
@@ -214,9 +215,13 @@ static int __init arm64_efi_rt_init(void)
if (!efi_enabled(EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES))
return 0;
p = __vmalloc_node(THREAD_SIZE, THREAD_ALIGN, GFP_KERNEL,
NUMA_NO_NODE, &&l);
l: if (!p) {
if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_VMAP_STACK)) {
clear_bit(EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES, &efi.flags);
return -ENOMEM;
}
p = arch_alloc_vmap_stack(THREAD_SIZE, NUMA_NO_NODE);
if (!p) {
pr_warn("Failed to allocate EFI runtime stack\n");
clear_bit(EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES, &efi.flags);
return -ENOMEM;

View File

@@ -673,6 +673,11 @@ static void permission_overlay_switch(struct task_struct *next)
current->thread.por_el0 = read_sysreg_s(SYS_POR_EL0);
if (current->thread.por_el0 != next->thread.por_el0) {
write_sysreg_s(next->thread.por_el0, SYS_POR_EL0);
/*
* No ISB required as we can tolerate spurious Overlay faults -
* the fault handler will check again based on the new value
* of POR_EL0.
*/
}
}

View File

@@ -1143,7 +1143,7 @@ static inline unsigned int num_other_online_cpus(void)
void smp_send_stop(void)
{
static unsigned long stop_in_progress;
cpumask_t mask;
static cpumask_t mask;
unsigned long timeout;
/*

View File

@@ -487,17 +487,29 @@ static void do_bad_area(unsigned long far, unsigned long esr,
}
}
static bool fault_from_pkey(unsigned long esr, struct vm_area_struct *vma,
unsigned int mm_flags)
static bool fault_from_pkey(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned int mm_flags)
{
unsigned long iss2 = ESR_ELx_ISS2(esr);
if (!system_supports_poe())
return false;
if (esr_fsc_is_permission_fault(esr) && (iss2 & ESR_ELx_Overlay))
return true;
/*
* We do not check whether an Overlay fault has occurred because we
* cannot make a decision based solely on its value:
*
* - If Overlay is set, a fault did occur due to POE, but it may be
* spurious in those cases where we update POR_EL0 without ISB (e.g.
* on context-switch). We would then need to manually check POR_EL0
* against vma_pkey(vma), which is exactly what
* arch_vma_access_permitted() does.
*
* - If Overlay is not set, we may still need to report a pkey fault.
* This is the case if an access was made within a mapping but with no
* page mapped, and POR_EL0 forbids the access (according to
* vma_pkey()). Such access will result in a SIGSEGV regardless
* because core code checks arch_vma_access_permitted(), but in order
* to report the correct error code - SEGV_PKUERR - we must handle
* that case here.
*/
return !arch_vma_access_permitted(vma,
mm_flags & FAULT_FLAG_WRITE,
mm_flags & FAULT_FLAG_INSTRUCTION,
@@ -635,7 +647,7 @@ static int __kprobes do_page_fault(unsigned long far, unsigned long esr,
goto bad_area;
}
if (fault_from_pkey(esr, vma, mm_flags)) {
if (fault_from_pkey(vma, mm_flags)) {
pkey = vma_pkey(vma);
vma_end_read(vma);
fault = 0;
@@ -679,7 +691,7 @@ retry:
goto bad_area;
}
if (fault_from_pkey(esr, vma, mm_flags)) {
if (fault_from_pkey(vma, mm_flags)) {
pkey = vma_pkey(vma);
mmap_read_unlock(mm);
fault = 0;

View File

@@ -518,7 +518,6 @@ alternative_else_nop_endif
msr REG_PIR_EL1, x0
orr tcr2, tcr2, TCR2_EL1_PIE
msr REG_TCR2_EL1, x0
.Lskip_indirection: