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mirror of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git synced 2025-09-04 20:19:47 +08:00
linux/arch/x86/coco/sev/shared.c
Linus Torvalds 5b7f7234ff x86/boot changes for v6.14:
- A large and involved preparatory series to pave the way to add exception
    handling for relocate_kernel - which will be a debugging facility that
    has aided in the field to debug an exceptionally hard to debug early boot bug.
    Plus assorted cleanups and fixes that were discovered along the way,
    by David Woodhouse:
 
       - Clean up and document register use in relocate_kernel_64.S
       - Use named labels in swap_pages in relocate_kernel_64.S
       - Only swap pages for ::preserve_context mode
       - Allocate PGD for x86_64 transition page tables separately
       - Copy control page into place in machine_kexec_prepare()
       - Invoke copy of relocate_kernel() instead of the original
       - Move relocate_kernel to kernel .data section
       - Add data section to relocate_kernel
       - Drop page_list argument from relocate_kernel()
       - Eliminate writes through kernel mapping of relocate_kernel page
       - Clean up register usage in relocate_kernel()
       - Mark relocate_kernel page as ROX instead of RWX
       - Disable global pages before writing to control page
       - Ensure preserve_context flag is set on return to kernel
       - Use correct swap page in swap_pages function
       - Fix stack and handling of re-entry point for ::preserve_context
       - Mark machine_kexec() with __nocfi
       - Cope with relocate_kernel() not being at the start of the page
       - Use typedef for relocate_kernel_fn function prototype
       - Fix location of relocate_kernel with -ffunction-sections (fix by Nathan Chancellor)
 
  - A series to remove the last remaining absolute symbol references from
    .head.text, and enforce this at build time, by Ard Biesheuvel:
 
       - Avoid WARN()s and panic()s in early boot code
       - Don't hang but terminate on failure to remap SVSM CA
       - Determine VA/PA offset before entering C code
       - Avoid intentional absolute symbol references in .head.text
       - Disable UBSAN in early boot code
       - Move ENTRY_TEXT to the start of the image
       - Move .head.text into its own output section
       - Reject absolute references in .head.text
 
  - Which build-time enforcement uncovered a handful of bugs of essentially
    non-working code, and a wrokaround for a toolchain bug, fixed by
    Ard Biesheuvel as well:
 
       - Fix spurious undefined reference when CONFIG_X86_5LEVEL=n, on GCC-12
       - Disable UBSAN on SEV code that may execute very early
       - Disable ftrace branch profiling in SEV startup code
 
  - And miscellaneous cleanups:
 
        - kexec_core: Add and update comments regarding the KEXEC_JUMP flow (Rafael J. Wysocki)
        - x86/sysfs: Constify 'struct bin_attribute' (Thomas Weißschuh)
 
 Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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Merge tag 'x86-boot-2025-01-21' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip

Pull x86 boot updates from Ingo Molnar:

 - A large and involved preparatory series to pave the way to add
   exception handling for relocate_kernel - which will be a debugging
   facility that has aided in the field to debug an exceptionally hard
   to debug early boot bug. Plus assorted cleanups and fixes that were
   discovered along the way, by David Woodhouse:

      - Clean up and document register use in relocate_kernel_64.S
      - Use named labels in swap_pages in relocate_kernel_64.S
      - Only swap pages for ::preserve_context mode
      - Allocate PGD for x86_64 transition page tables separately
      - Copy control page into place in machine_kexec_prepare()
      - Invoke copy of relocate_kernel() instead of the original
      - Move relocate_kernel to kernel .data section
      - Add data section to relocate_kernel
      - Drop page_list argument from relocate_kernel()
      - Eliminate writes through kernel mapping of relocate_kernel page
      - Clean up register usage in relocate_kernel()
      - Mark relocate_kernel page as ROX instead of RWX
      - Disable global pages before writing to control page
      - Ensure preserve_context flag is set on return to kernel
      - Use correct swap page in swap_pages function
      - Fix stack and handling of re-entry point for ::preserve_context
      - Mark machine_kexec() with __nocfi
      - Cope with relocate_kernel() not being at the start of the page
      - Use typedef for relocate_kernel_fn function prototype
      - Fix location of relocate_kernel with -ffunction-sections (fix by Nathan Chancellor)

 - A series to remove the last remaining absolute symbol references from
   .head.text, and enforce this at build time, by Ard Biesheuvel:

      - Avoid WARN()s and panic()s in early boot code
      - Don't hang but terminate on failure to remap SVSM CA
      - Determine VA/PA offset before entering C code
      - Avoid intentional absolute symbol references in .head.text
      - Disable UBSAN in early boot code
      - Move ENTRY_TEXT to the start of the image
      - Move .head.text into its own output section
      - Reject absolute references in .head.text

 - The above build-time enforcement uncovered a handful of bugs of
   essentially non-working code, and a wrokaround for a toolchain bug,
   fixed by Ard Biesheuvel as well:

      - Fix spurious undefined reference when CONFIG_X86_5LEVEL=n, on GCC-12
      - Disable UBSAN on SEV code that may execute very early
      - Disable ftrace branch profiling in SEV startup code

 - And miscellaneous cleanups:

      - kexec_core: Add and update comments regarding the KEXEC_JUMP flow (Rafael J. Wysocki)
      - x86/sysfs: Constify 'struct bin_attribute' (Thomas Weißschuh)"

* tag 'x86-boot-2025-01-21' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (33 commits)
  x86/sev: Disable ftrace branch profiling in SEV startup code
  x86/kexec: Use typedef for relocate_kernel_fn function prototype
  x86/kexec: Cope with relocate_kernel() not being at the start of the page
  kexec_core: Add and update comments regarding the KEXEC_JUMP flow
  x86/kexec: Mark machine_kexec() with __nocfi
  x86/kexec: Fix location of relocate_kernel with -ffunction-sections
  x86/kexec: Fix stack and handling of re-entry point for ::preserve_context
  x86/kexec: Use correct swap page in swap_pages function
  x86/kexec: Ensure preserve_context flag is set on return to kernel
  x86/kexec: Disable global pages before writing to control page
  x86/sev: Don't hang but terminate on failure to remap SVSM CA
  x86/sev: Disable UBSAN on SEV code that may execute very early
  x86/boot/64: Fix spurious undefined reference when CONFIG_X86_5LEVEL=n, on GCC-12
  x86/sysfs: Constify 'struct bin_attribute'
  x86/kexec: Mark relocate_kernel page as ROX instead of RWX
  x86/kexec: Clean up register usage in relocate_kernel()
  x86/kexec: Eliminate writes through kernel mapping of relocate_kernel page
  x86/kexec: Drop page_list argument from relocate_kernel()
  x86/kexec: Add data section to relocate_kernel
  x86/kexec: Move relocate_kernel to kernel .data section
  ...
2025-01-24 05:54:26 -08:00

1730 lines
44 KiB
C

// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
/*
* AMD Encrypted Register State Support
*
* Author: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
*
* This file is not compiled stand-alone. It contains code shared
* between the pre-decompression boot code and the running Linux kernel
* and is included directly into both code-bases.
*/
#include <asm/setup_data.h>
#ifndef __BOOT_COMPRESSED
#define error(v) pr_err(v)
#define has_cpuflag(f) boot_cpu_has(f)
#define sev_printk(fmt, ...) printk(fmt, ##__VA_ARGS__)
#define sev_printk_rtl(fmt, ...) printk_ratelimited(fmt, ##__VA_ARGS__)
#else
#undef WARN
#define WARN(condition, format...) (!!(condition))
#define sev_printk(fmt, ...)
#define sev_printk_rtl(fmt, ...)
#undef vc_forward_exception
#define vc_forward_exception(c) panic("SNP: Hypervisor requested exception\n")
#endif
/*
* SVSM related information:
* When running under an SVSM, the VMPL that Linux is executing at must be
* non-zero. The VMPL is therefore used to indicate the presence of an SVSM.
*
* During boot, the page tables are set up as identity mapped and later
* changed to use kernel virtual addresses. Maintain separate virtual and
* physical addresses for the CAA to allow SVSM functions to be used during
* early boot, both with identity mapped virtual addresses and proper kernel
* virtual addresses.
*/
u8 snp_vmpl __ro_after_init;
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(snp_vmpl);
static struct svsm_ca *boot_svsm_caa __ro_after_init;
static u64 boot_svsm_caa_pa __ro_after_init;
static struct svsm_ca *svsm_get_caa(void);
static u64 svsm_get_caa_pa(void);
static int svsm_perform_call_protocol(struct svsm_call *call);
/* I/O parameters for CPUID-related helpers */
struct cpuid_leaf {
u32 fn;
u32 subfn;
u32 eax;
u32 ebx;
u32 ecx;
u32 edx;
};
/*
* Individual entries of the SNP CPUID table, as defined by the SNP
* Firmware ABI, Revision 0.9, Section 7.1, Table 14.
*/
struct snp_cpuid_fn {
u32 eax_in;
u32 ecx_in;
u64 xcr0_in;
u64 xss_in;
u32 eax;
u32 ebx;
u32 ecx;
u32 edx;
u64 __reserved;
} __packed;
/*
* SNP CPUID table, as defined by the SNP Firmware ABI, Revision 0.9,
* Section 8.14.2.6. Also noted there is the SNP firmware-enforced limit
* of 64 entries per CPUID table.
*/
#define SNP_CPUID_COUNT_MAX 64
struct snp_cpuid_table {
u32 count;
u32 __reserved1;
u64 __reserved2;
struct snp_cpuid_fn fn[SNP_CPUID_COUNT_MAX];
} __packed;
/*
* Since feature negotiation related variables are set early in the boot
* process they must reside in the .data section so as not to be zeroed
* out when the .bss section is later cleared.
*
* GHCB protocol version negotiated with the hypervisor.
*/
static u16 ghcb_version __ro_after_init;
/* Copy of the SNP firmware's CPUID page. */
static struct snp_cpuid_table cpuid_table_copy __ro_after_init;
/*
* These will be initialized based on CPUID table so that non-present
* all-zero leaves (for sparse tables) can be differentiated from
* invalid/out-of-range leaves. This is needed since all-zero leaves
* still need to be post-processed.
*/
static u32 cpuid_std_range_max __ro_after_init;
static u32 cpuid_hyp_range_max __ro_after_init;
static u32 cpuid_ext_range_max __ro_after_init;
static bool __init sev_es_check_cpu_features(void)
{
if (!has_cpuflag(X86_FEATURE_RDRAND)) {
error("RDRAND instruction not supported - no trusted source of randomness available\n");
return false;
}
return true;
}
static void __head __noreturn
sev_es_terminate(unsigned int set, unsigned int reason)
{
u64 val = GHCB_MSR_TERM_REQ;
/* Tell the hypervisor what went wrong. */
val |= GHCB_SEV_TERM_REASON(set, reason);
/* Request Guest Termination from Hypervisor */
sev_es_wr_ghcb_msr(val);
VMGEXIT();
while (true)
asm volatile("hlt\n" : : : "memory");
}
/*
* The hypervisor features are available from GHCB version 2 onward.
*/
static u64 get_hv_features(void)
{
u64 val;
if (ghcb_version < 2)
return 0;
sev_es_wr_ghcb_msr(GHCB_MSR_HV_FT_REQ);
VMGEXIT();
val = sev_es_rd_ghcb_msr();
if (GHCB_RESP_CODE(val) != GHCB_MSR_HV_FT_RESP)
return 0;
return GHCB_MSR_HV_FT_RESP_VAL(val);
}
static void snp_register_ghcb_early(unsigned long paddr)
{
unsigned long pfn = paddr >> PAGE_SHIFT;
u64 val;
sev_es_wr_ghcb_msr(GHCB_MSR_REG_GPA_REQ_VAL(pfn));
VMGEXIT();
val = sev_es_rd_ghcb_msr();
/* If the response GPA is not ours then abort the guest */
if ((GHCB_RESP_CODE(val) != GHCB_MSR_REG_GPA_RESP) ||
(GHCB_MSR_REG_GPA_RESP_VAL(val) != pfn))
sev_es_terminate(SEV_TERM_SET_LINUX, GHCB_TERM_REGISTER);
}
static bool sev_es_negotiate_protocol(void)
{
u64 val;
/* Do the GHCB protocol version negotiation */
sev_es_wr_ghcb_msr(GHCB_MSR_SEV_INFO_REQ);
VMGEXIT();
val = sev_es_rd_ghcb_msr();
if (GHCB_MSR_INFO(val) != GHCB_MSR_SEV_INFO_RESP)
return false;
if (GHCB_MSR_PROTO_MAX(val) < GHCB_PROTOCOL_MIN ||
GHCB_MSR_PROTO_MIN(val) > GHCB_PROTOCOL_MAX)
return false;
ghcb_version = min_t(size_t, GHCB_MSR_PROTO_MAX(val), GHCB_PROTOCOL_MAX);
return true;
}
static __always_inline void vc_ghcb_invalidate(struct ghcb *ghcb)
{
ghcb->save.sw_exit_code = 0;
__builtin_memset(ghcb->save.valid_bitmap, 0, sizeof(ghcb->save.valid_bitmap));
}
static bool vc_decoding_needed(unsigned long exit_code)
{
/* Exceptions don't require to decode the instruction */
return !(exit_code >= SVM_EXIT_EXCP_BASE &&
exit_code <= SVM_EXIT_LAST_EXCP);
}
static enum es_result vc_init_em_ctxt(struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt,
struct pt_regs *regs,
unsigned long exit_code)
{
enum es_result ret = ES_OK;
memset(ctxt, 0, sizeof(*ctxt));
ctxt->regs = regs;
if (vc_decoding_needed(exit_code))
ret = vc_decode_insn(ctxt);
return ret;
}
static void vc_finish_insn(struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt)
{
ctxt->regs->ip += ctxt->insn.length;
}
static enum es_result verify_exception_info(struct ghcb *ghcb, struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt)
{
u32 ret;
ret = ghcb->save.sw_exit_info_1 & GENMASK_ULL(31, 0);
if (!ret)
return ES_OK;
if (ret == 1) {
u64 info = ghcb->save.sw_exit_info_2;
unsigned long v = info & SVM_EVTINJ_VEC_MASK;
/* Check if exception information from hypervisor is sane. */
if ((info & SVM_EVTINJ_VALID) &&
((v == X86_TRAP_GP) || (v == X86_TRAP_UD)) &&
((info & SVM_EVTINJ_TYPE_MASK) == SVM_EVTINJ_TYPE_EXEPT)) {
ctxt->fi.vector = v;
if (info & SVM_EVTINJ_VALID_ERR)
ctxt->fi.error_code = info >> 32;
return ES_EXCEPTION;
}
}
return ES_VMM_ERROR;
}
static inline int svsm_process_result_codes(struct svsm_call *call)
{
switch (call->rax_out) {
case SVSM_SUCCESS:
return 0;
case SVSM_ERR_INCOMPLETE:
case SVSM_ERR_BUSY:
return -EAGAIN;
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
}
/*
* Issue a VMGEXIT to call the SVSM:
* - Load the SVSM register state (RAX, RCX, RDX, R8 and R9)
* - Set the CA call pending field to 1
* - Issue VMGEXIT
* - Save the SVSM return register state (RAX, RCX, RDX, R8 and R9)
* - Perform atomic exchange of the CA call pending field
*
* - See the "Secure VM Service Module for SEV-SNP Guests" specification for
* details on the calling convention.
* - The calling convention loosely follows the Microsoft X64 calling
* convention by putting arguments in RCX, RDX, R8 and R9.
* - RAX specifies the SVSM protocol/callid as input and the return code
* as output.
*/
static __always_inline void svsm_issue_call(struct svsm_call *call, u8 *pending)
{
register unsigned long rax asm("rax") = call->rax;
register unsigned long rcx asm("rcx") = call->rcx;
register unsigned long rdx asm("rdx") = call->rdx;
register unsigned long r8 asm("r8") = call->r8;
register unsigned long r9 asm("r9") = call->r9;
call->caa->call_pending = 1;
asm volatile("rep; vmmcall\n\t"
: "+r" (rax), "+r" (rcx), "+r" (rdx), "+r" (r8), "+r" (r9)
: : "memory");
*pending = xchg(&call->caa->call_pending, *pending);
call->rax_out = rax;
call->rcx_out = rcx;
call->rdx_out = rdx;
call->r8_out = r8;
call->r9_out = r9;
}
static int svsm_perform_msr_protocol(struct svsm_call *call)
{
u8 pending = 0;
u64 val, resp;
/*
* When using the MSR protocol, be sure to save and restore
* the current MSR value.
*/
val = sev_es_rd_ghcb_msr();
sev_es_wr_ghcb_msr(GHCB_MSR_VMPL_REQ_LEVEL(0));
svsm_issue_call(call, &pending);
resp = sev_es_rd_ghcb_msr();
sev_es_wr_ghcb_msr(val);
if (pending)
return -EINVAL;
if (GHCB_RESP_CODE(resp) != GHCB_MSR_VMPL_RESP)
return -EINVAL;
if (GHCB_MSR_VMPL_RESP_VAL(resp))
return -EINVAL;
return svsm_process_result_codes(call);
}
static int svsm_perform_ghcb_protocol(struct ghcb *ghcb, struct svsm_call *call)
{
struct es_em_ctxt ctxt;
u8 pending = 0;
vc_ghcb_invalidate(ghcb);
/*
* Fill in protocol and format specifiers. This can be called very early
* in the boot, so use rip-relative references as needed.
*/
ghcb->protocol_version = RIP_REL_REF(ghcb_version);
ghcb->ghcb_usage = GHCB_DEFAULT_USAGE;
ghcb_set_sw_exit_code(ghcb, SVM_VMGEXIT_SNP_RUN_VMPL);
ghcb_set_sw_exit_info_1(ghcb, 0);
ghcb_set_sw_exit_info_2(ghcb, 0);
sev_es_wr_ghcb_msr(__pa(ghcb));
svsm_issue_call(call, &pending);
if (pending)
return -EINVAL;
switch (verify_exception_info(ghcb, &ctxt)) {
case ES_OK:
break;
case ES_EXCEPTION:
vc_forward_exception(&ctxt);
fallthrough;
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
return svsm_process_result_codes(call);
}
static enum es_result sev_es_ghcb_hv_call(struct ghcb *ghcb,
struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt,
u64 exit_code, u64 exit_info_1,
u64 exit_info_2)
{
/* Fill in protocol and format specifiers */
ghcb->protocol_version = ghcb_version;
ghcb->ghcb_usage = GHCB_DEFAULT_USAGE;
ghcb_set_sw_exit_code(ghcb, exit_code);
ghcb_set_sw_exit_info_1(ghcb, exit_info_1);
ghcb_set_sw_exit_info_2(ghcb, exit_info_2);
sev_es_wr_ghcb_msr(__pa(ghcb));
VMGEXIT();
return verify_exception_info(ghcb, ctxt);
}
static int __sev_cpuid_hv(u32 fn, int reg_idx, u32 *reg)
{
u64 val;
sev_es_wr_ghcb_msr(GHCB_CPUID_REQ(fn, reg_idx));
VMGEXIT();
val = sev_es_rd_ghcb_msr();
if (GHCB_RESP_CODE(val) != GHCB_MSR_CPUID_RESP)
return -EIO;
*reg = (val >> 32);
return 0;
}
static int __sev_cpuid_hv_msr(struct cpuid_leaf *leaf)
{
int ret;
/*
* MSR protocol does not support fetching non-zero subfunctions, but is
* sufficient to handle current early-boot cases. Should that change,
* make sure to report an error rather than ignoring the index and
* grabbing random values. If this issue arises in the future, handling
* can be added here to use GHCB-page protocol for cases that occur late
* enough in boot that GHCB page is available.
*/
if (cpuid_function_is_indexed(leaf->fn) && leaf->subfn)
return -EINVAL;
ret = __sev_cpuid_hv(leaf->fn, GHCB_CPUID_REQ_EAX, &leaf->eax);
ret = ret ? : __sev_cpuid_hv(leaf->fn, GHCB_CPUID_REQ_EBX, &leaf->ebx);
ret = ret ? : __sev_cpuid_hv(leaf->fn, GHCB_CPUID_REQ_ECX, &leaf->ecx);
ret = ret ? : __sev_cpuid_hv(leaf->fn, GHCB_CPUID_REQ_EDX, &leaf->edx);
return ret;
}
static int __sev_cpuid_hv_ghcb(struct ghcb *ghcb, struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt, struct cpuid_leaf *leaf)
{
u32 cr4 = native_read_cr4();
int ret;
ghcb_set_rax(ghcb, leaf->fn);
ghcb_set_rcx(ghcb, leaf->subfn);
if (cr4 & X86_CR4_OSXSAVE)
/* Safe to read xcr0 */
ghcb_set_xcr0(ghcb, xgetbv(XCR_XFEATURE_ENABLED_MASK));
else
/* xgetbv will cause #UD - use reset value for xcr0 */
ghcb_set_xcr0(ghcb, 1);
ret = sev_es_ghcb_hv_call(ghcb, ctxt, SVM_EXIT_CPUID, 0, 0);
if (ret != ES_OK)
return ret;
if (!(ghcb_rax_is_valid(ghcb) &&
ghcb_rbx_is_valid(ghcb) &&
ghcb_rcx_is_valid(ghcb) &&
ghcb_rdx_is_valid(ghcb)))
return ES_VMM_ERROR;
leaf->eax = ghcb->save.rax;
leaf->ebx = ghcb->save.rbx;
leaf->ecx = ghcb->save.rcx;
leaf->edx = ghcb->save.rdx;
return ES_OK;
}
static int sev_cpuid_hv(struct ghcb *ghcb, struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt, struct cpuid_leaf *leaf)
{
return ghcb ? __sev_cpuid_hv_ghcb(ghcb, ctxt, leaf)
: __sev_cpuid_hv_msr(leaf);
}
/*
* This may be called early while still running on the initial identity
* mapping. Use RIP-relative addressing to obtain the correct address
* while running with the initial identity mapping as well as the
* switch-over to kernel virtual addresses later.
*/
static const struct snp_cpuid_table *snp_cpuid_get_table(void)
{
return &RIP_REL_REF(cpuid_table_copy);
}
/*
* The SNP Firmware ABI, Revision 0.9, Section 7.1, details the use of
* XCR0_IN and XSS_IN to encode multiple versions of 0xD subfunctions 0
* and 1 based on the corresponding features enabled by a particular
* combination of XCR0 and XSS registers so that a guest can look up the
* version corresponding to the features currently enabled in its XCR0/XSS
* registers. The only values that differ between these versions/table
* entries is the enabled XSAVE area size advertised via EBX.
*
* While hypervisors may choose to make use of this support, it is more
* robust/secure for a guest to simply find the entry corresponding to the
* base/legacy XSAVE area size (XCR0=1 or XCR0=3), and then calculate the
* XSAVE area size using subfunctions 2 through 64, as documented in APM
* Volume 3, Rev 3.31, Appendix E.3.8, which is what is done here.
*
* Since base/legacy XSAVE area size is documented as 0x240, use that value
* directly rather than relying on the base size in the CPUID table.
*
* Return: XSAVE area size on success, 0 otherwise.
*/
static u32 __head snp_cpuid_calc_xsave_size(u64 xfeatures_en, bool compacted)
{
const struct snp_cpuid_table *cpuid_table = snp_cpuid_get_table();
u64 xfeatures_found = 0;
u32 xsave_size = 0x240;
int i;
for (i = 0; i < cpuid_table->count; i++) {
const struct snp_cpuid_fn *e = &cpuid_table->fn[i];
if (!(e->eax_in == 0xD && e->ecx_in > 1 && e->ecx_in < 64))
continue;
if (!(xfeatures_en & (BIT_ULL(e->ecx_in))))
continue;
if (xfeatures_found & (BIT_ULL(e->ecx_in)))
continue;
xfeatures_found |= (BIT_ULL(e->ecx_in));
if (compacted)
xsave_size += e->eax;
else
xsave_size = max(xsave_size, e->eax + e->ebx);
}
/*
* Either the guest set unsupported XCR0/XSS bits, or the corresponding
* entries in the CPUID table were not present. This is not a valid
* state to be in.
*/
if (xfeatures_found != (xfeatures_en & GENMASK_ULL(63, 2)))
return 0;
return xsave_size;
}
static bool __head
snp_cpuid_get_validated_func(struct cpuid_leaf *leaf)
{
const struct snp_cpuid_table *cpuid_table = snp_cpuid_get_table();
int i;
for (i = 0; i < cpuid_table->count; i++) {
const struct snp_cpuid_fn *e = &cpuid_table->fn[i];
if (e->eax_in != leaf->fn)
continue;
if (cpuid_function_is_indexed(leaf->fn) && e->ecx_in != leaf->subfn)
continue;
/*
* For 0xD subfunctions 0 and 1, only use the entry corresponding
* to the base/legacy XSAVE area size (XCR0=1 or XCR0=3, XSS=0).
* See the comments above snp_cpuid_calc_xsave_size() for more
* details.
*/
if (e->eax_in == 0xD && (e->ecx_in == 0 || e->ecx_in == 1))
if (!(e->xcr0_in == 1 || e->xcr0_in == 3) || e->xss_in)
continue;
leaf->eax = e->eax;
leaf->ebx = e->ebx;
leaf->ecx = e->ecx;
leaf->edx = e->edx;
return true;
}
return false;
}
static void snp_cpuid_hv(struct ghcb *ghcb, struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt, struct cpuid_leaf *leaf)
{
if (sev_cpuid_hv(ghcb, ctxt, leaf))
sev_es_terminate(SEV_TERM_SET_LINUX, GHCB_TERM_CPUID_HV);
}
static int __head
snp_cpuid_postprocess(struct ghcb *ghcb, struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt,
struct cpuid_leaf *leaf)
{
struct cpuid_leaf leaf_hv = *leaf;
switch (leaf->fn) {
case 0x1:
snp_cpuid_hv(ghcb, ctxt, &leaf_hv);
/* initial APIC ID */
leaf->ebx = (leaf_hv.ebx & GENMASK(31, 24)) | (leaf->ebx & GENMASK(23, 0));
/* APIC enabled bit */
leaf->edx = (leaf_hv.edx & BIT(9)) | (leaf->edx & ~BIT(9));
/* OSXSAVE enabled bit */
if (native_read_cr4() & X86_CR4_OSXSAVE)
leaf->ecx |= BIT(27);
break;
case 0x7:
/* OSPKE enabled bit */
leaf->ecx &= ~BIT(4);
if (native_read_cr4() & X86_CR4_PKE)
leaf->ecx |= BIT(4);
break;
case 0xB:
leaf_hv.subfn = 0;
snp_cpuid_hv(ghcb, ctxt, &leaf_hv);
/* extended APIC ID */
leaf->edx = leaf_hv.edx;
break;
case 0xD: {
bool compacted = false;
u64 xcr0 = 1, xss = 0;
u32 xsave_size;
if (leaf->subfn != 0 && leaf->subfn != 1)
return 0;
if (native_read_cr4() & X86_CR4_OSXSAVE)
xcr0 = xgetbv(XCR_XFEATURE_ENABLED_MASK);
if (leaf->subfn == 1) {
/* Get XSS value if XSAVES is enabled. */
if (leaf->eax & BIT(3)) {
unsigned long lo, hi;
asm volatile("rdmsr" : "=a" (lo), "=d" (hi)
: "c" (MSR_IA32_XSS));
xss = (hi << 32) | lo;
}
/*
* The PPR and APM aren't clear on what size should be
* encoded in 0xD:0x1:EBX when compaction is not enabled
* by either XSAVEC (feature bit 1) or XSAVES (feature
* bit 3) since SNP-capable hardware has these feature
* bits fixed as 1. KVM sets it to 0 in this case, but
* to avoid this becoming an issue it's safer to simply
* treat this as unsupported for SNP guests.
*/
if (!(leaf->eax & (BIT(1) | BIT(3))))
return -EINVAL;
compacted = true;
}
xsave_size = snp_cpuid_calc_xsave_size(xcr0 | xss, compacted);
if (!xsave_size)
return -EINVAL;
leaf->ebx = xsave_size;
}
break;
case 0x8000001E:
snp_cpuid_hv(ghcb, ctxt, &leaf_hv);
/* extended APIC ID */
leaf->eax = leaf_hv.eax;
/* compute ID */
leaf->ebx = (leaf->ebx & GENMASK(31, 8)) | (leaf_hv.ebx & GENMASK(7, 0));
/* node ID */
leaf->ecx = (leaf->ecx & GENMASK(31, 8)) | (leaf_hv.ecx & GENMASK(7, 0));
break;
default:
/* No fix-ups needed, use values as-is. */
break;
}
return 0;
}
/*
* Returns -EOPNOTSUPP if feature not enabled. Any other non-zero return value
* should be treated as fatal by caller.
*/
static int __head
snp_cpuid(struct ghcb *ghcb, struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt, struct cpuid_leaf *leaf)
{
const struct snp_cpuid_table *cpuid_table = snp_cpuid_get_table();
if (!cpuid_table->count)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
if (!snp_cpuid_get_validated_func(leaf)) {
/*
* Some hypervisors will avoid keeping track of CPUID entries
* where all values are zero, since they can be handled the
* same as out-of-range values (all-zero). This is useful here
* as well as it allows virtually all guest configurations to
* work using a single SNP CPUID table.
*
* To allow for this, there is a need to distinguish between
* out-of-range entries and in-range zero entries, since the
* CPUID table entries are only a template that may need to be
* augmented with additional values for things like
* CPU-specific information during post-processing. So if it's
* not in the table, set the values to zero. Then, if they are
* within a valid CPUID range, proceed with post-processing
* using zeros as the initial values. Otherwise, skip
* post-processing and just return zeros immediately.
*/
leaf->eax = leaf->ebx = leaf->ecx = leaf->edx = 0;
/* Skip post-processing for out-of-range zero leafs. */
if (!(leaf->fn <= RIP_REL_REF(cpuid_std_range_max) ||
(leaf->fn >= 0x40000000 && leaf->fn <= RIP_REL_REF(cpuid_hyp_range_max)) ||
(leaf->fn >= 0x80000000 && leaf->fn <= RIP_REL_REF(cpuid_ext_range_max))))
return 0;
}
return snp_cpuid_postprocess(ghcb, ctxt, leaf);
}
/*
* Boot VC Handler - This is the first VC handler during boot, there is no GHCB
* page yet, so it only supports the MSR based communication with the
* hypervisor and only the CPUID exit-code.
*/
void __head do_vc_no_ghcb(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long exit_code)
{
unsigned int subfn = lower_bits(regs->cx, 32);
unsigned int fn = lower_bits(regs->ax, 32);
u16 opcode = *(unsigned short *)regs->ip;
struct cpuid_leaf leaf;
int ret;
/* Only CPUID is supported via MSR protocol */
if (exit_code != SVM_EXIT_CPUID)
goto fail;
/* Is it really a CPUID insn? */
if (opcode != 0xa20f)
goto fail;
leaf.fn = fn;
leaf.subfn = subfn;
ret = snp_cpuid(NULL, NULL, &leaf);
if (!ret)
goto cpuid_done;
if (ret != -EOPNOTSUPP)
goto fail;
if (__sev_cpuid_hv_msr(&leaf))
goto fail;
cpuid_done:
regs->ax = leaf.eax;
regs->bx = leaf.ebx;
regs->cx = leaf.ecx;
regs->dx = leaf.edx;
/*
* This is a VC handler and the #VC is only raised when SEV-ES is
* active, which means SEV must be active too. Do sanity checks on the
* CPUID results to make sure the hypervisor does not trick the kernel
* into the no-sev path. This could map sensitive data unencrypted and
* make it accessible to the hypervisor.
*
* In particular, check for:
* - Availability of CPUID leaf 0x8000001f
* - SEV CPUID bit.
*
* The hypervisor might still report the wrong C-bit position, but this
* can't be checked here.
*/
if (fn == 0x80000000 && (regs->ax < 0x8000001f))
/* SEV leaf check */
goto fail;
else if ((fn == 0x8000001f && !(regs->ax & BIT(1))))
/* SEV bit */
goto fail;
/* Skip over the CPUID two-byte opcode */
regs->ip += 2;
return;
fail:
/* Terminate the guest */
sev_es_terminate(SEV_TERM_SET_GEN, GHCB_SEV_ES_GEN_REQ);
}
static enum es_result vc_insn_string_check(struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt,
unsigned long address,
bool write)
{
if (user_mode(ctxt->regs) && fault_in_kernel_space(address)) {
ctxt->fi.vector = X86_TRAP_PF;
ctxt->fi.error_code = X86_PF_USER;
ctxt->fi.cr2 = address;
if (write)
ctxt->fi.error_code |= X86_PF_WRITE;
return ES_EXCEPTION;
}
return ES_OK;
}
static enum es_result vc_insn_string_read(struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt,
void *src, char *buf,
unsigned int data_size,
unsigned int count,
bool backwards)
{
int i, b = backwards ? -1 : 1;
unsigned long address = (unsigned long)src;
enum es_result ret;
ret = vc_insn_string_check(ctxt, address, false);
if (ret != ES_OK)
return ret;
for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
void *s = src + (i * data_size * b);
char *d = buf + (i * data_size);
ret = vc_read_mem(ctxt, s, d, data_size);
if (ret != ES_OK)
break;
}
return ret;
}
static enum es_result vc_insn_string_write(struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt,
void *dst, char *buf,
unsigned int data_size,
unsigned int count,
bool backwards)
{
int i, s = backwards ? -1 : 1;
unsigned long address = (unsigned long)dst;
enum es_result ret;
ret = vc_insn_string_check(ctxt, address, true);
if (ret != ES_OK)
return ret;
for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
void *d = dst + (i * data_size * s);
char *b = buf + (i * data_size);
ret = vc_write_mem(ctxt, d, b, data_size);
if (ret != ES_OK)
break;
}
return ret;
}
#define IOIO_TYPE_STR BIT(2)
#define IOIO_TYPE_IN 1
#define IOIO_TYPE_INS (IOIO_TYPE_IN | IOIO_TYPE_STR)
#define IOIO_TYPE_OUT 0
#define IOIO_TYPE_OUTS (IOIO_TYPE_OUT | IOIO_TYPE_STR)
#define IOIO_REP BIT(3)
#define IOIO_ADDR_64 BIT(9)
#define IOIO_ADDR_32 BIT(8)
#define IOIO_ADDR_16 BIT(7)
#define IOIO_DATA_32 BIT(6)
#define IOIO_DATA_16 BIT(5)
#define IOIO_DATA_8 BIT(4)
#define IOIO_SEG_ES (0 << 10)
#define IOIO_SEG_DS (3 << 10)
static enum es_result vc_ioio_exitinfo(struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt, u64 *exitinfo)
{
struct insn *insn = &ctxt->insn;
size_t size;
u64 port;
*exitinfo = 0;
switch (insn->opcode.bytes[0]) {
/* INS opcodes */
case 0x6c:
case 0x6d:
*exitinfo |= IOIO_TYPE_INS;
*exitinfo |= IOIO_SEG_ES;
port = ctxt->regs->dx & 0xffff;
break;
/* OUTS opcodes */
case 0x6e:
case 0x6f:
*exitinfo |= IOIO_TYPE_OUTS;
*exitinfo |= IOIO_SEG_DS;
port = ctxt->regs->dx & 0xffff;
break;
/* IN immediate opcodes */
case 0xe4:
case 0xe5:
*exitinfo |= IOIO_TYPE_IN;
port = (u8)insn->immediate.value & 0xffff;
break;
/* OUT immediate opcodes */
case 0xe6:
case 0xe7:
*exitinfo |= IOIO_TYPE_OUT;
port = (u8)insn->immediate.value & 0xffff;
break;
/* IN register opcodes */
case 0xec:
case 0xed:
*exitinfo |= IOIO_TYPE_IN;
port = ctxt->regs->dx & 0xffff;
break;
/* OUT register opcodes */
case 0xee:
case 0xef:
*exitinfo |= IOIO_TYPE_OUT;
port = ctxt->regs->dx & 0xffff;
break;
default:
return ES_DECODE_FAILED;
}
*exitinfo |= port << 16;
switch (insn->opcode.bytes[0]) {
case 0x6c:
case 0x6e:
case 0xe4:
case 0xe6:
case 0xec:
case 0xee:
/* Single byte opcodes */
*exitinfo |= IOIO_DATA_8;
size = 1;
break;
default:
/* Length determined by instruction parsing */
*exitinfo |= (insn->opnd_bytes == 2) ? IOIO_DATA_16
: IOIO_DATA_32;
size = (insn->opnd_bytes == 2) ? 2 : 4;
}
switch (insn->addr_bytes) {
case 2:
*exitinfo |= IOIO_ADDR_16;
break;
case 4:
*exitinfo |= IOIO_ADDR_32;
break;
case 8:
*exitinfo |= IOIO_ADDR_64;
break;
}
if (insn_has_rep_prefix(insn))
*exitinfo |= IOIO_REP;
return vc_ioio_check(ctxt, (u16)port, size);
}
static enum es_result vc_handle_ioio(struct ghcb *ghcb, struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt)
{
struct pt_regs *regs = ctxt->regs;
u64 exit_info_1, exit_info_2;
enum es_result ret;
ret = vc_ioio_exitinfo(ctxt, &exit_info_1);
if (ret != ES_OK)
return ret;
if (exit_info_1 & IOIO_TYPE_STR) {
/* (REP) INS/OUTS */
bool df = ((regs->flags & X86_EFLAGS_DF) == X86_EFLAGS_DF);
unsigned int io_bytes, exit_bytes;
unsigned int ghcb_count, op_count;
unsigned long es_base;
u64 sw_scratch;
/*
* For the string variants with rep prefix the amount of in/out
* operations per #VC exception is limited so that the kernel
* has a chance to take interrupts and re-schedule while the
* instruction is emulated.
*/
io_bytes = (exit_info_1 >> 4) & 0x7;
ghcb_count = sizeof(ghcb->shared_buffer) / io_bytes;
op_count = (exit_info_1 & IOIO_REP) ? regs->cx : 1;
exit_info_2 = min(op_count, ghcb_count);
exit_bytes = exit_info_2 * io_bytes;
es_base = insn_get_seg_base(ctxt->regs, INAT_SEG_REG_ES);
/* Read bytes of OUTS into the shared buffer */
if (!(exit_info_1 & IOIO_TYPE_IN)) {
ret = vc_insn_string_read(ctxt,
(void *)(es_base + regs->si),
ghcb->shared_buffer, io_bytes,
exit_info_2, df);
if (ret)
return ret;
}
/*
* Issue an VMGEXIT to the HV to consume the bytes from the
* shared buffer or to have it write them into the shared buffer
* depending on the instruction: OUTS or INS.
*/
sw_scratch = __pa(ghcb) + offsetof(struct ghcb, shared_buffer);
ghcb_set_sw_scratch(ghcb, sw_scratch);
ret = sev_es_ghcb_hv_call(ghcb, ctxt, SVM_EXIT_IOIO,
exit_info_1, exit_info_2);
if (ret != ES_OK)
return ret;
/* Read bytes from shared buffer into the guest's destination. */
if (exit_info_1 & IOIO_TYPE_IN) {
ret = vc_insn_string_write(ctxt,
(void *)(es_base + regs->di),
ghcb->shared_buffer, io_bytes,
exit_info_2, df);
if (ret)
return ret;
if (df)
regs->di -= exit_bytes;
else
regs->di += exit_bytes;
} else {
if (df)
regs->si -= exit_bytes;
else
regs->si += exit_bytes;
}
if (exit_info_1 & IOIO_REP)
regs->cx -= exit_info_2;
ret = regs->cx ? ES_RETRY : ES_OK;
} else {
/* IN/OUT into/from rAX */
int bits = (exit_info_1 & 0x70) >> 1;
u64 rax = 0;
if (!(exit_info_1 & IOIO_TYPE_IN))
rax = lower_bits(regs->ax, bits);
ghcb_set_rax(ghcb, rax);
ret = sev_es_ghcb_hv_call(ghcb, ctxt, SVM_EXIT_IOIO, exit_info_1, 0);
if (ret != ES_OK)
return ret;
if (exit_info_1 & IOIO_TYPE_IN) {
if (!ghcb_rax_is_valid(ghcb))
return ES_VMM_ERROR;
regs->ax = lower_bits(ghcb->save.rax, bits);
}
}
return ret;
}
static int vc_handle_cpuid_snp(struct ghcb *ghcb, struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt)
{
struct pt_regs *regs = ctxt->regs;
struct cpuid_leaf leaf;
int ret;
leaf.fn = regs->ax;
leaf.subfn = regs->cx;
ret = snp_cpuid(ghcb, ctxt, &leaf);
if (!ret) {
regs->ax = leaf.eax;
regs->bx = leaf.ebx;
regs->cx = leaf.ecx;
regs->dx = leaf.edx;
}
return ret;
}
static enum es_result vc_handle_cpuid(struct ghcb *ghcb,
struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt)
{
struct pt_regs *regs = ctxt->regs;
u32 cr4 = native_read_cr4();
enum es_result ret;
int snp_cpuid_ret;
snp_cpuid_ret = vc_handle_cpuid_snp(ghcb, ctxt);
if (!snp_cpuid_ret)
return ES_OK;
if (snp_cpuid_ret != -EOPNOTSUPP)
return ES_VMM_ERROR;
ghcb_set_rax(ghcb, regs->ax);
ghcb_set_rcx(ghcb, regs->cx);
if (cr4 & X86_CR4_OSXSAVE)
/* Safe to read xcr0 */
ghcb_set_xcr0(ghcb, xgetbv(XCR_XFEATURE_ENABLED_MASK));
else
/* xgetbv will cause #GP - use reset value for xcr0 */
ghcb_set_xcr0(ghcb, 1);
ret = sev_es_ghcb_hv_call(ghcb, ctxt, SVM_EXIT_CPUID, 0, 0);
if (ret != ES_OK)
return ret;
if (!(ghcb_rax_is_valid(ghcb) &&
ghcb_rbx_is_valid(ghcb) &&
ghcb_rcx_is_valid(ghcb) &&
ghcb_rdx_is_valid(ghcb)))
return ES_VMM_ERROR;
regs->ax = ghcb->save.rax;
regs->bx = ghcb->save.rbx;
regs->cx = ghcb->save.rcx;
regs->dx = ghcb->save.rdx;
return ES_OK;
}
static enum es_result vc_handle_rdtsc(struct ghcb *ghcb,
struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt,
unsigned long exit_code)
{
bool rdtscp = (exit_code == SVM_EXIT_RDTSCP);
enum es_result ret;
/*
* The hypervisor should not be intercepting RDTSC/RDTSCP when Secure
* TSC is enabled. A #VC exception will be generated if the RDTSC/RDTSCP
* instructions are being intercepted. If this should occur and Secure
* TSC is enabled, guest execution should be terminated as the guest
* cannot rely on the TSC value provided by the hypervisor.
*/
if (sev_status & MSR_AMD64_SNP_SECURE_TSC)
return ES_VMM_ERROR;
ret = sev_es_ghcb_hv_call(ghcb, ctxt, exit_code, 0, 0);
if (ret != ES_OK)
return ret;
if (!(ghcb_rax_is_valid(ghcb) && ghcb_rdx_is_valid(ghcb) &&
(!rdtscp || ghcb_rcx_is_valid(ghcb))))
return ES_VMM_ERROR;
ctxt->regs->ax = ghcb->save.rax;
ctxt->regs->dx = ghcb->save.rdx;
if (rdtscp)
ctxt->regs->cx = ghcb->save.rcx;
return ES_OK;
}
struct cc_setup_data {
struct setup_data header;
u32 cc_blob_address;
};
/*
* Search for a Confidential Computing blob passed in as a setup_data entry
* via the Linux Boot Protocol.
*/
static __head
struct cc_blob_sev_info *find_cc_blob_setup_data(struct boot_params *bp)
{
struct cc_setup_data *sd = NULL;
struct setup_data *hdr;
hdr = (struct setup_data *)bp->hdr.setup_data;
while (hdr) {
if (hdr->type == SETUP_CC_BLOB) {
sd = (struct cc_setup_data *)hdr;
return (struct cc_blob_sev_info *)(unsigned long)sd->cc_blob_address;
}
hdr = (struct setup_data *)hdr->next;
}
return NULL;
}
/*
* Initialize the kernel's copy of the SNP CPUID table, and set up the
* pointer that will be used to access it.
*
* Maintaining a direct mapping of the SNP CPUID table used by firmware would
* be possible as an alternative, but the approach is brittle since the
* mapping needs to be updated in sync with all the changes to virtual memory
* layout and related mapping facilities throughout the boot process.
*/
static void __head setup_cpuid_table(const struct cc_blob_sev_info *cc_info)
{
const struct snp_cpuid_table *cpuid_table_fw, *cpuid_table;
int i;
if (!cc_info || !cc_info->cpuid_phys || cc_info->cpuid_len < PAGE_SIZE)
sev_es_terminate(SEV_TERM_SET_LINUX, GHCB_TERM_CPUID);
cpuid_table_fw = (const struct snp_cpuid_table *)cc_info->cpuid_phys;
if (!cpuid_table_fw->count || cpuid_table_fw->count > SNP_CPUID_COUNT_MAX)
sev_es_terminate(SEV_TERM_SET_LINUX, GHCB_TERM_CPUID);
cpuid_table = snp_cpuid_get_table();
memcpy((void *)cpuid_table, cpuid_table_fw, sizeof(*cpuid_table));
/* Initialize CPUID ranges for range-checking. */
for (i = 0; i < cpuid_table->count; i++) {
const struct snp_cpuid_fn *fn = &cpuid_table->fn[i];
if (fn->eax_in == 0x0)
RIP_REL_REF(cpuid_std_range_max) = fn->eax;
else if (fn->eax_in == 0x40000000)
RIP_REL_REF(cpuid_hyp_range_max) = fn->eax;
else if (fn->eax_in == 0x80000000)
RIP_REL_REF(cpuid_ext_range_max) = fn->eax;
}
}
static inline void __pval_terminate(u64 pfn, bool action, unsigned int page_size,
int ret, u64 svsm_ret)
{
WARN(1, "PVALIDATE failure: pfn: 0x%llx, action: %u, size: %u, ret: %d, svsm_ret: 0x%llx\n",
pfn, action, page_size, ret, svsm_ret);
sev_es_terminate(SEV_TERM_SET_LINUX, GHCB_TERM_PVALIDATE);
}
static void svsm_pval_terminate(struct svsm_pvalidate_call *pc, int ret, u64 svsm_ret)
{
unsigned int page_size;
bool action;
u64 pfn;
pfn = pc->entry[pc->cur_index].pfn;
action = pc->entry[pc->cur_index].action;
page_size = pc->entry[pc->cur_index].page_size;
__pval_terminate(pfn, action, page_size, ret, svsm_ret);
}
static void __head svsm_pval_4k_page(unsigned long paddr, bool validate)
{
struct svsm_pvalidate_call *pc;
struct svsm_call call = {};
unsigned long flags;
u64 pc_pa;
int ret;
/*
* This can be called very early in the boot, use native functions in
* order to avoid paravirt issues.
*/
flags = native_local_irq_save();
call.caa = svsm_get_caa();
pc = (struct svsm_pvalidate_call *)call.caa->svsm_buffer;
pc_pa = svsm_get_caa_pa() + offsetof(struct svsm_ca, svsm_buffer);
pc->num_entries = 1;
pc->cur_index = 0;
pc->entry[0].page_size = RMP_PG_SIZE_4K;
pc->entry[0].action = validate;
pc->entry[0].ignore_cf = 0;
pc->entry[0].pfn = paddr >> PAGE_SHIFT;
/* Protocol 0, Call ID 1 */
call.rax = SVSM_CORE_CALL(SVSM_CORE_PVALIDATE);
call.rcx = pc_pa;
ret = svsm_perform_call_protocol(&call);
if (ret)
sev_es_terminate(SEV_TERM_SET_LINUX, GHCB_TERM_PVALIDATE);
native_local_irq_restore(flags);
}
static void __head pvalidate_4k_page(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long paddr,
bool validate)
{
int ret;
/*
* This can be called very early during boot, so use rIP-relative
* references as needed.
*/
if (RIP_REL_REF(snp_vmpl)) {
svsm_pval_4k_page(paddr, validate);
} else {
ret = pvalidate(vaddr, RMP_PG_SIZE_4K, validate);
if (ret)
sev_es_terminate(SEV_TERM_SET_LINUX, GHCB_TERM_PVALIDATE);
}
}
static void pval_pages(struct snp_psc_desc *desc)
{
struct psc_entry *e;
unsigned long vaddr;
unsigned int size;
unsigned int i;
bool validate;
u64 pfn;
int rc;
for (i = 0; i <= desc->hdr.end_entry; i++) {
e = &desc->entries[i];
pfn = e->gfn;
vaddr = (unsigned long)pfn_to_kaddr(pfn);
size = e->pagesize ? RMP_PG_SIZE_2M : RMP_PG_SIZE_4K;
validate = e->operation == SNP_PAGE_STATE_PRIVATE;
rc = pvalidate(vaddr, size, validate);
if (!rc)
continue;
if (rc == PVALIDATE_FAIL_SIZEMISMATCH && size == RMP_PG_SIZE_2M) {
unsigned long vaddr_end = vaddr + PMD_SIZE;
for (; vaddr < vaddr_end; vaddr += PAGE_SIZE, pfn++) {
rc = pvalidate(vaddr, RMP_PG_SIZE_4K, validate);
if (rc)
__pval_terminate(pfn, validate, RMP_PG_SIZE_4K, rc, 0);
}
} else {
__pval_terminate(pfn, validate, size, rc, 0);
}
}
}
static u64 svsm_build_ca_from_pfn_range(u64 pfn, u64 pfn_end, bool action,
struct svsm_pvalidate_call *pc)
{
struct svsm_pvalidate_entry *pe;
/* Nothing in the CA yet */
pc->num_entries = 0;
pc->cur_index = 0;
pe = &pc->entry[0];
while (pfn < pfn_end) {
pe->page_size = RMP_PG_SIZE_4K;
pe->action = action;
pe->ignore_cf = 0;
pe->pfn = pfn;
pe++;
pfn++;
pc->num_entries++;
if (pc->num_entries == SVSM_PVALIDATE_MAX_COUNT)
break;
}
return pfn;
}
static int svsm_build_ca_from_psc_desc(struct snp_psc_desc *desc, unsigned int desc_entry,
struct svsm_pvalidate_call *pc)
{
struct svsm_pvalidate_entry *pe;
struct psc_entry *e;
/* Nothing in the CA yet */
pc->num_entries = 0;
pc->cur_index = 0;
pe = &pc->entry[0];
e = &desc->entries[desc_entry];
while (desc_entry <= desc->hdr.end_entry) {
pe->page_size = e->pagesize ? RMP_PG_SIZE_2M : RMP_PG_SIZE_4K;
pe->action = e->operation == SNP_PAGE_STATE_PRIVATE;
pe->ignore_cf = 0;
pe->pfn = e->gfn;
pe++;
e++;
desc_entry++;
pc->num_entries++;
if (pc->num_entries == SVSM_PVALIDATE_MAX_COUNT)
break;
}
return desc_entry;
}
static void svsm_pval_pages(struct snp_psc_desc *desc)
{
struct svsm_pvalidate_entry pv_4k[VMGEXIT_PSC_MAX_ENTRY];
unsigned int i, pv_4k_count = 0;
struct svsm_pvalidate_call *pc;
struct svsm_call call = {};
unsigned long flags;
bool action;
u64 pc_pa;
int ret;
/*
* This can be called very early in the boot, use native functions in
* order to avoid paravirt issues.
*/
flags = native_local_irq_save();
/*
* The SVSM calling area (CA) can support processing 510 entries at a
* time. Loop through the Page State Change descriptor until the CA is
* full or the last entry in the descriptor is reached, at which time
* the SVSM is invoked. This repeats until all entries in the descriptor
* are processed.
*/
call.caa = svsm_get_caa();
pc = (struct svsm_pvalidate_call *)call.caa->svsm_buffer;
pc_pa = svsm_get_caa_pa() + offsetof(struct svsm_ca, svsm_buffer);
/* Protocol 0, Call ID 1 */
call.rax = SVSM_CORE_CALL(SVSM_CORE_PVALIDATE);
call.rcx = pc_pa;
for (i = 0; i <= desc->hdr.end_entry;) {
i = svsm_build_ca_from_psc_desc(desc, i, pc);
do {
ret = svsm_perform_call_protocol(&call);
if (!ret)
continue;
/*
* Check if the entry failed because of an RMP mismatch (a
* PVALIDATE at 2M was requested, but the page is mapped in
* the RMP as 4K).
*/
if (call.rax_out == SVSM_PVALIDATE_FAIL_SIZEMISMATCH &&
pc->entry[pc->cur_index].page_size == RMP_PG_SIZE_2M) {
/* Save this entry for post-processing at 4K */
pv_4k[pv_4k_count++] = pc->entry[pc->cur_index];
/* Skip to the next one unless at the end of the list */
pc->cur_index++;
if (pc->cur_index < pc->num_entries)
ret = -EAGAIN;
else
ret = 0;
}
} while (ret == -EAGAIN);
if (ret)
svsm_pval_terminate(pc, ret, call.rax_out);
}
/* Process any entries that failed to be validated at 2M and validate them at 4K */
for (i = 0; i < pv_4k_count; i++) {
u64 pfn, pfn_end;
action = pv_4k[i].action;
pfn = pv_4k[i].pfn;
pfn_end = pfn + 512;
while (pfn < pfn_end) {
pfn = svsm_build_ca_from_pfn_range(pfn, pfn_end, action, pc);
ret = svsm_perform_call_protocol(&call);
if (ret)
svsm_pval_terminate(pc, ret, call.rax_out);
}
}
native_local_irq_restore(flags);
}
static void pvalidate_pages(struct snp_psc_desc *desc)
{
if (snp_vmpl)
svsm_pval_pages(desc);
else
pval_pages(desc);
}
static int vmgexit_psc(struct ghcb *ghcb, struct snp_psc_desc *desc)
{
int cur_entry, end_entry, ret = 0;
struct snp_psc_desc *data;
struct es_em_ctxt ctxt;
vc_ghcb_invalidate(ghcb);
/* Copy the input desc into GHCB shared buffer */
data = (struct snp_psc_desc *)ghcb->shared_buffer;
memcpy(ghcb->shared_buffer, desc, min_t(int, GHCB_SHARED_BUF_SIZE, sizeof(*desc)));
/*
* As per the GHCB specification, the hypervisor can resume the guest
* before processing all the entries. Check whether all the entries
* are processed. If not, then keep retrying. Note, the hypervisor
* will update the data memory directly to indicate the status, so
* reference the data->hdr everywhere.
*
* The strategy here is to wait for the hypervisor to change the page
* state in the RMP table before guest accesses the memory pages. If the
* page state change was not successful, then later memory access will
* result in a crash.
*/
cur_entry = data->hdr.cur_entry;
end_entry = data->hdr.end_entry;
while (data->hdr.cur_entry <= data->hdr.end_entry) {
ghcb_set_sw_scratch(ghcb, (u64)__pa(data));
/* This will advance the shared buffer data points to. */
ret = sev_es_ghcb_hv_call(ghcb, &ctxt, SVM_VMGEXIT_PSC, 0, 0);
/*
* Page State Change VMGEXIT can pass error code through
* exit_info_2.
*/
if (WARN(ret || ghcb->save.sw_exit_info_2,
"SNP: PSC failed ret=%d exit_info_2=%llx\n",
ret, ghcb->save.sw_exit_info_2)) {
ret = 1;
goto out;
}
/* Verify that reserved bit is not set */
if (WARN(data->hdr.reserved, "Reserved bit is set in the PSC header\n")) {
ret = 1;
goto out;
}
/*
* Sanity check that entry processing is not going backwards.
* This will happen only if hypervisor is tricking us.
*/
if (WARN(data->hdr.end_entry > end_entry || cur_entry > data->hdr.cur_entry,
"SNP: PSC processing going backward, end_entry %d (got %d) cur_entry %d (got %d)\n",
end_entry, data->hdr.end_entry, cur_entry, data->hdr.cur_entry)) {
ret = 1;
goto out;
}
}
out:
return ret;
}
static enum es_result vc_check_opcode_bytes(struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt,
unsigned long exit_code)
{
unsigned int opcode = (unsigned int)ctxt->insn.opcode.value;
u8 modrm = ctxt->insn.modrm.value;
switch (exit_code) {
case SVM_EXIT_IOIO:
case SVM_EXIT_NPF:
/* handled separately */
return ES_OK;
case SVM_EXIT_CPUID:
if (opcode == 0xa20f)
return ES_OK;
break;
case SVM_EXIT_INVD:
if (opcode == 0x080f)
return ES_OK;
break;
case SVM_EXIT_MONITOR:
/* MONITOR and MONITORX instructions generate the same error code */
if (opcode == 0x010f && (modrm == 0xc8 || modrm == 0xfa))
return ES_OK;
break;
case SVM_EXIT_MWAIT:
/* MWAIT and MWAITX instructions generate the same error code */
if (opcode == 0x010f && (modrm == 0xc9 || modrm == 0xfb))
return ES_OK;
break;
case SVM_EXIT_MSR:
/* RDMSR */
if (opcode == 0x320f ||
/* WRMSR */
opcode == 0x300f)
return ES_OK;
break;
case SVM_EXIT_RDPMC:
if (opcode == 0x330f)
return ES_OK;
break;
case SVM_EXIT_RDTSC:
if (opcode == 0x310f)
return ES_OK;
break;
case SVM_EXIT_RDTSCP:
if (opcode == 0x010f && modrm == 0xf9)
return ES_OK;
break;
case SVM_EXIT_READ_DR7:
if (opcode == 0x210f &&
X86_MODRM_REG(ctxt->insn.modrm.value) == 7)
return ES_OK;
break;
case SVM_EXIT_VMMCALL:
if (opcode == 0x010f && modrm == 0xd9)
return ES_OK;
break;
case SVM_EXIT_WRITE_DR7:
if (opcode == 0x230f &&
X86_MODRM_REG(ctxt->insn.modrm.value) == 7)
return ES_OK;
break;
case SVM_EXIT_WBINVD:
if (opcode == 0x90f)
return ES_OK;
break;
default:
break;
}
sev_printk(KERN_ERR "Wrong/unhandled opcode bytes: 0x%x, exit_code: 0x%lx, rIP: 0x%lx\n",
opcode, exit_code, ctxt->regs->ip);
return ES_UNSUPPORTED;
}
/*
* Maintain the GPA of the SVSM Calling Area (CA) in order to utilize the SVSM
* services needed when not running in VMPL0.
*/
static bool __head svsm_setup_ca(const struct cc_blob_sev_info *cc_info)
{
struct snp_secrets_page *secrets_page;
struct snp_cpuid_table *cpuid_table;
unsigned int i;
u64 caa;
BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(*secrets_page) != PAGE_SIZE);
/*
* Check if running at VMPL0.
*
* Use RMPADJUST (see the rmpadjust() function for a description of what
* the instruction does) to update the VMPL1 permissions of a page. If
* the guest is running at VMPL0, this will succeed and implies there is
* no SVSM. If the guest is running at any other VMPL, this will fail.
* Linux SNP guests only ever run at a single VMPL level so permission mask
* changes of a lesser-privileged VMPL are a don't-care.
*
* Use a rip-relative reference to obtain the proper address, since this
* routine is running identity mapped when called, both by the decompressor
* code and the early kernel code.
*/
if (!rmpadjust((unsigned long)&RIP_REL_REF(boot_ghcb_page), RMP_PG_SIZE_4K, 1))
return false;
/*
* Not running at VMPL0, ensure everything has been properly supplied
* for running under an SVSM.
*/
if (!cc_info || !cc_info->secrets_phys || cc_info->secrets_len != PAGE_SIZE)
sev_es_terminate(SEV_TERM_SET_LINUX, GHCB_TERM_SECRETS_PAGE);
secrets_page = (struct snp_secrets_page *)cc_info->secrets_phys;
if (!secrets_page->svsm_size)
sev_es_terminate(SEV_TERM_SET_LINUX, GHCB_TERM_NO_SVSM);
if (!secrets_page->svsm_guest_vmpl)
sev_es_terminate(SEV_TERM_SET_LINUX, GHCB_TERM_SVSM_VMPL0);
RIP_REL_REF(snp_vmpl) = secrets_page->svsm_guest_vmpl;
caa = secrets_page->svsm_caa;
/*
* An open-coded PAGE_ALIGNED() in order to avoid including
* kernel-proper headers into the decompressor.
*/
if (caa & (PAGE_SIZE - 1))
sev_es_terminate(SEV_TERM_SET_LINUX, GHCB_TERM_SVSM_CAA);
/*
* The CA is identity mapped when this routine is called, both by the
* decompressor code and the early kernel code.
*/
RIP_REL_REF(boot_svsm_caa) = (struct svsm_ca *)caa;
RIP_REL_REF(boot_svsm_caa_pa) = caa;
/* Advertise the SVSM presence via CPUID. */
cpuid_table = (struct snp_cpuid_table *)snp_cpuid_get_table();
for (i = 0; i < cpuid_table->count; i++) {
struct snp_cpuid_fn *fn = &cpuid_table->fn[i];
if (fn->eax_in == 0x8000001f)
fn->eax |= BIT(28);
}
return true;
}