Commit Graph

48374 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
James Bottomley
bd07bd12f2 bpf: Fix key serial argument of bpf_lookup_user_key()
The underlying lookup_user_key() function uses a signed 32 bit integer
for key serial numbers because legitimate serial numbers are positive
(and > 3) and keyrings are negative.  Using a u32 for the keyring in
the bpf function doesn't currently cause any conversion problems but
will start to trip the signed to unsigned conversion warnings when the
kernel enables them, so convert the argument to signed (and update the
tests accordingly) before it acquires more users.

Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Reviewed-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/84cdb0775254d297d75e21f577089f64abdfbd28.camel@HansenPartnership.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2025-06-17 18:15:27 -07:00
Al Viro
f5527f0171 bpf: Get rid of redundant 3rd argument of prepare_seq_file()
Remove 3rd argument in prepare_seq_file() to clean up the code a bit.

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Acked-by: Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250615004719.GE3011112@ZenIV
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2025-06-17 17:19:41 -07:00
Luis Gerhorst
f66b4aaff2 bpf: Remove redundant free_verifier_state()/pop_stack()
This patch removes duplicated code.

Eduard points out [1]:

    Same cleanup cycles are done in push_stack() and push_async_cb(),
    both functions are only reachable from do_check_common() via
    do_check() -> do_check_insn().

    Hence, I think that cur state should not be freed in push_*()
    functions and pop_stack() loop there is not needed.

This would also fix the 'symptom' for [2], but the issue also has a
simpler fix which was sent separately. This fix also makes sure the
push_*() callers always return an error for which
error_recoverable_with_nospec(err) is false. This is required because
otherwise we try to recover and access the stale `state`.

Moving free_verifier_state() and pop_stack(..., pop_log=false) to happen
after the bpf_vlog_reset() call in do_check_common() is fine because the
pop_stack() call that is moved does not call bpf_vlog_reset() with the
pop_log=false parameter.

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/b6931bd0dd72327c55287862f821ca6c4c3eb69a.camel@gmail.com/
[2] https://lore.kernel.org/all/68497853.050a0220.33aa0e.036a.GAE@google.com/

Reported-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/b6931bd0dd72327c55287862f821ca6c4c3eb69a.camel@gmail.com/
Acked-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Luis Gerhorst <luis.gerhorst@fau.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250613090157.568349-2-luis.gerhorst@fau.de
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2025-06-13 14:59:30 -07:00
Eduard Zingerman
3157f7e299 bpf: handle jset (if a & b ...) as a jump in CFG computation
BPF_JSET is a conditional jump and currently verifier.c:can_jump()
does not know about that. This can lead to incorrect live registers
and SCC computation.

E.g. in the following example:

   1: r0 = 1;
   2: r2 = 2;
   3: if r1 & 0x7 goto +1;
   4: exit;
   5: r0 = r2;
   6: exit;

W/o this fix insn_successors(3) will return only (4), a jump to (5)
would be missed and r2 won't be marked as alive at (3).

Fixes: 14c8552db6 ("bpf: simple DFA-based live registers analysis")
Reported-by: syzbot+a36aac327960ff474804@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Suggested-by: Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250613175331.3238739-1-eddyz87@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2025-06-13 11:51:19 -07:00
Eduard Zingerman
43736ec3e0 bpf: Include verifier memory allocations in memcg statistics
This commit adds __GFP_ACCOUNT flag to verifier induced memory
allocations. The intent is to account for all allocations reachable
from BPF_PROG_LOAD command, which is needed to track verifier memory
consumption in veristat. This includes allocations done in verifier.c,
and some allocations in btf.c, functions in log.c do not allocate.

There is also a utility function bpf_memcg_flags() which selectively
adds GFP_ACCOUNT flag depending on the `cgroup.memory=nobpf` option.
As far as I understand [1], the idea is to remove bpf_prog instances
and maps from memcg accounting as these objects do not strictly belong
to cgroup, hence it should not apply here.

(btf_parse_fields() is reachable from both program load and map
 creation, but allocated record is not persistent as is freed as soon
 as map_check_btf() exits).

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230210154734.4416-1-laoar.shao@gmail.com/

Signed-off-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20250613072147.3938139-2-eddyz87@gmail.com
2025-06-13 10:29:45 -07:00
Song Liu
fa6932577c bpf: Initialize used but uninit variable in propagate_liveness()
With input changed == NULL, a local variable is used for "changed".
Initialize tmp properly, so that it can be used in the following:
   *changed |= err > 0;

Otherwise, UBSAN will complain:

UBSAN: invalid-load in kernel/bpf/verifier.c:18924:4
load of value <some random value> is not a valid value for type '_Bool'

Fixes: dfb2d4c64b ("bpf: set 'changed' status if propagate_liveness() did any updates")
Signed-off-by: Song Liu <song@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250612221100.2153401-1-song@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2025-06-12 16:53:40 -07:00
Luis Gerhorst
3d71b8b9ab bpf: Fix state use-after-free on push_stack() err
Without this, `state->speculative` is used after the cleanup cycles in
push_stack() or push_async_cb() freed `env->cur_state` (i.e., `state`).
Avoid this by relying on the short-circuit logic to only access `state`
if the error is recoverable (and make sure it never is after push_*()
failed).

push_*() callers must always return an error for which
error_recoverable_with_nospec(err) is false if push_*() returns NULL,
otherwise we try to recover and access the stale `state`. This is only
violated by sanitize_ptr_alu(), thus also fix this case to return
-ENOMEM.

state->speculative does not make sense if the error path of push_*()
ran. In that case, `state->speculative &&
error_recoverable_with_nospec(err)` as a whole should already never
evaluate to true (because all cases where push_stack() fails must return
-ENOMEM/-EFAULT). As mentioned, this is only violated by the
push_stack() call in sanitize_speculative_path() which returns -EACCES
without [1] (through REASON_STACK in sanitize_err() after
sanitize_ptr_alu()). To fix this, return -ENOMEM for REASON_STACK (which
is also the behavior we will have after [1]).

Checked that it fixes the syzbot reproducer as expected.

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250603213232.339242-1-luis.gerhorst@fau.de/

Fixes: d6f1c85f22 ("bpf: Fall back to nospec for Spectre v1")
Reported-by: syzbot+b5eb72a560b8149a1885@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/38862a832b91382cddb083dddd92643bed0723b8.camel@gmail.com/
Signed-off-by: Luis Gerhorst <luis.gerhorst@fau.de>
Acked-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250611210728.266563-1-luis.gerhorst@fau.de
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2025-06-12 16:52:43 -07:00
Eduard Zingerman
0f54ff5470 bpf: include backedges in peak_states stat
Count states accumulated in bpf_scc_visit->backedges in
env->peak_states.

Signed-off-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250611200836.4135542-10-eddyz87@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2025-06-12 16:52:43 -07:00
Eduard Zingerman
0e0da5f901 bpf: remove {update,get}_loop_entry functions
The previous patch switched read and precision tracking for
iterator-based loops from state-graph-based loop tracking to
control-flow-graph-based loop tracking.

This patch removes the now-unused `update_loop_entry()` and
`get_loop_entry()` functions, which were part of the state-graph-based
logic.

Signed-off-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250611200836.4135542-9-eddyz87@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2025-06-12 16:52:43 -07:00
Eduard Zingerman
c9e31900b5 bpf: propagate read/precision marks over state graph backedges
Current loop_entry-based exact states comparison logic does not handle
the following case:

 .-> A --.  Assume the states are visited in the order A, B, C.
 |   |   |  Assume that state B reaches a state equivalent to state A.
 |   v   v  At this point, state C is not processed yet, so state A
 '-- B   C  has not received any read or precision marks from C.
            As a result, these marks won't be propagated to B.

If B has incomplete marks, it is unsafe to use it in states_equal()
checks.

This commit replaces the existing logic with the following:
- Strongly connected components (SCCs) are computed over the program's
  control flow graph (intraprocedurally).
- When a verifier state enters an SCC, that state is recorded as the
  SCC entry point.
- When a verifier state is found equivalent to another (e.g., B to A
  in the example), it is recorded as a states graph backedge.
  Backedges are accumulated per SCC.
- When an SCC entry state reaches `branches == 0`, read and precision
  marks are propagated through the backedges (e.g., from A to B, from
  C to A, and then again from A to B).

To support nested subprogram calls, the entry state and backedge list
are associated not with the SCC itself but with an object called
`bpf_scc_callchain`. A callchain is a tuple `(callsite*, scc_id)`,
where `callsite` is the index of a call instruction for each frame
except the last.

See the comments added in `is_state_visited()` and
`compute_scc_callchain()` for more details.

Fixes: 2a0992829e ("bpf: correct loop detection for iterators convergence")
Signed-off-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250611200836.4135542-8-eddyz87@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2025-06-12 16:52:43 -07:00
Eduard Zingerman
b5c677d8d9 bpf: move REG_LIVE_DONE check to clean_live_states()
The next patch would add some relatively heavy-weight operation to
clean_live_states(), this operation can be skipped if REG_LIVE_DONE
is set. Move the check from clean_verifier_state() to
clean_verifier_state() as a small refactoring commit.

Signed-off-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250611200836.4135542-7-eddyz87@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2025-06-12 16:52:43 -07:00
Eduard Zingerman
dfb2d4c64b bpf: set 'changed' status if propagate_liveness() did any updates
Add an out parameter to `propagate_liveness()` to record whether any
new liveness bits were set during its execution.

Signed-off-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250611200836.4135542-6-eddyz87@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2025-06-12 16:52:43 -07:00
Eduard Zingerman
23b37d6165 bpf: set 'changed' status if propagate_precision() did any updates
Add an out parameter to `propagate_precision()` to record whether any
new precision bits were set during its execution.

Signed-off-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250611200836.4135542-5-eddyz87@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2025-06-12 16:52:43 -07:00
Eduard Zingerman
9a2a0d7924 bpf: starting_state parameter for __mark_chain_precision()
Allow `mark_chain_precision()` to run from an arbitrary starting state
by replacing direct references to `env->cur_state` with a parameter.

Signed-off-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250611200836.4135542-4-eddyz87@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2025-06-12 16:52:42 -07:00
Eduard Zingerman
13f843c017 bpf: frame_insn_idx() utility function
A function to return IP for a given frame in a call stack of a state.
Will be used by a next patch.

The `state->insn_idx = env->insn_idx;` assignment in the do_check()
allows to use frame_insn_idx with env->cur_state.
At the moment bpf_verifier_state->insn_idx is set when new cached
state is added in is_state_visited() and accessed only in the contexts
when the state is already in the cache. Hence this assignment does not
change verifier behaviour.

Signed-off-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250611200836.4135542-3-eddyz87@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2025-06-12 16:52:42 -07:00
Eduard Zingerman
96c6aa4c63 bpf: compute SCCs in program control flow graph
Compute strongly connected components in the program CFG.
Assign an SCC number to each instruction, recorded in
env->insn_aux[*].scc. Use Tarjan's algorithm for SCC computation
adapted to run non-recursively.

For debug purposes print out computed SCCs as a part of full program
dump in compute_live_registers() at log level 2, e.g.:

  func#0 @0
  Live regs before insn:
        0: .......... (b4) w6 = 10
    2   1: ......6... (18) r1 = 0xffff88810bbb5565
    2   3: .1....6... (b4) w2 = 2
    2   4: .12...6... (85) call bpf_trace_printk#6
    2   5: ......6... (04) w6 += -1
    2   6: ......6... (56) if w6 != 0x0 goto pc-6
        7: .......... (b4) w6 = 5
    1   8: ......6... (18) r1 = 0xffff88810bbb5567
    1  10: .1....6... (b4) w2 = 2
    1  11: .12...6... (85) call bpf_trace_printk#6
    1  12: ......6... (04) w6 += -1
    1  13: ......6... (56) if w6 != 0x0 goto pc-6
       14: .......... (b4) w0 = 0
       15: 0......... (95) exit
   ^^^
  SCC number for the instruction

Signed-off-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250611200836.4135542-2-eddyz87@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2025-06-12 16:52:42 -07:00
Eduard Zingerman
baaebe0928 Revert "bpf: use common instruction history across all states"
This reverts commit 96a30e469c.
Next patches in the series modify propagate_precision() to allow
arbitrary starting state. Precision propagation requires access to
jump history, and arbitrary states represent history not belonging to
`env->cur_state`.

Signed-off-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250611200836.4135542-1-eddyz87@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2025-06-12 16:52:42 -07:00
Luis Gerhorst
d6f1c85f22 bpf: Fall back to nospec for Spectre v1
This implements the core of the series and causes the verifier to fall
back to mitigating Spectre v1 using speculation barriers. The approach
was presented at LPC'24 [1] and RAID'24 [2].

If we find any forbidden behavior on a speculative path, we insert a
nospec (e.g., lfence speculation barrier on x86) before the instruction
and stop verifying the path. While verifying a speculative path, we can
furthermore stop verification of that path whenever we encounter a
nospec instruction.

A minimal example program would look as follows:

	A = true
	B = true
	if A goto e
	f()
	if B goto e
	unsafe()
e:	exit

There are the following speculative and non-speculative paths
(`cur->speculative` and `speculative` referring to the value of the
push_stack() parameters):

- A = true
- B = true
- if A goto e
  - A && !cur->speculative && !speculative
    - exit
  - !A && !cur->speculative && speculative
    - f()
    - if B goto e
      - B && cur->speculative && !speculative
        - exit
      - !B && cur->speculative && speculative
        - unsafe()

If f() contains any unsafe behavior under Spectre v1 and the unsafe
behavior matches `state->speculative &&
error_recoverable_with_nospec(err)`, do_check() will now add a nospec
before f() instead of rejecting the program:

	A = true
	B = true
	if A goto e
	nospec
	f()
	if B goto e
	unsafe()
e:	exit

Alternatively, the algorithm also takes advantage of nospec instructions
inserted for other reasons (e.g., Spectre v4). Taking the program above
as an example, speculative path exploration can stop before f() if a
nospec was inserted there because of Spectre v4 sanitization.

In this example, all instructions after the nospec are dead code (and
with the nospec they are also dead code speculatively).

For this, it relies on the fact that speculation barriers generally
prevent all later instructions from executing if the speculation was not
correct:

* On Intel x86_64, lfence acts as full speculation barrier, not only as
  a load fence [3]:

    An LFENCE instruction or a serializing instruction will ensure that
    no later instructions execute, even speculatively, until all prior
    instructions complete locally. [...] Inserting an LFENCE instruction
    after a bounds check prevents later operations from executing before
    the bound check completes.

  This was experimentally confirmed in [4].

* On AMD x86_64, lfence is dispatch-serializing [5] (requires MSR
  C001_1029[1] to be set if the MSR is supported, this happens in
  init_amd()). AMD further specifies "A dispatch serializing instruction
  forces the processor to retire the serializing instruction and all
  previous instructions before the next instruction is executed" [8]. As
  dispatch is not specific to memory loads or branches, lfence therefore
  also affects all instructions there. Also, if retiring a branch means
  it's PC change becomes architectural (should be), this means any
  "wrong" speculation is aborted as required for this series.

* ARM's SB speculation barrier instruction also affects "any instruction
  that appears later in the program order than the barrier" [6].

* PowerPC's barrier also affects all subsequent instructions [7]:

    [...] executing an ori R31,R31,0 instruction ensures that all
    instructions preceding the ori R31,R31,0 instruction have completed
    before the ori R31,R31,0 instruction completes, and that no
    subsequent instructions are initiated, even out-of-order, until
    after the ori R31,R31,0 instruction completes. The ori R31,R31,0
    instruction may complete before storage accesses associated with
    instructions preceding the ori R31,R31,0 instruction have been
    performed

Regarding the example, this implies that `if B goto e` will not execute
before `if A goto e` completes. Once `if A goto e` completes, the CPU
should find that the speculation was wrong and continue with `exit`.

If there is any other path that leads to `if B goto e` (and therefore
`unsafe()`) without going through `if A goto e`, then a nospec will
still be needed there. However, this patch assumes this other path will
be explored separately and therefore be discovered by the verifier even
if the exploration discussed here stops at the nospec.

This patch furthermore has the unfortunate consequence that Spectre v1
mitigations now only support architectures which implement BPF_NOSPEC.
Before this commit, Spectre v1 mitigations prevented exploits by
rejecting the programs on all architectures. Because some JITs do not
implement BPF_NOSPEC, this patch therefore may regress unpriv BPF's
security to a limited extent:

* The regression is limited to systems vulnerable to Spectre v1, have
  unprivileged BPF enabled, and do NOT emit insns for BPF_NOSPEC. The
  latter is not the case for x86 64- and 32-bit, arm64, and powerpc
  64-bit and they are therefore not affected by the regression.
  According to commit a6f6a95f25 ("LoongArch, bpf: Fix jit to skip
  speculation barrier opcode"), LoongArch is not vulnerable to Spectre
  v1 and therefore also not affected by the regression.

* To the best of my knowledge this regression may therefore only affect
  MIPS. This is deemed acceptable because unpriv BPF is still disabled
  there by default. As stated in a previous commit, BPF_NOSPEC could be
  implemented for MIPS based on GCC's speculation_barrier
  implementation.

* It is unclear which other architectures (besides x86 64- and 32-bit,
  ARM64, PowerPC 64-bit, LoongArch, and MIPS) supported by the kernel
  are vulnerable to Spectre v1. Also, it is not clear if barriers are
  available on these architectures. Implementing BPF_NOSPEC on these
  architectures therefore is non-trivial. Searching GCC and the kernel
  for speculation barrier implementations for these architectures
  yielded no result.

* If any of those regressed systems is also vulnerable to Spectre v4,
  the system was already vulnerable to Spectre v4 attacks based on
  unpriv BPF before this patch and the impact is therefore further
  limited.

As an alternative to regressing security, one could still reject
programs if the architecture does not emit BPF_NOSPEC (e.g., by removing
the empty BPF_NOSPEC-case from all JITs except for LoongArch where it
appears justified). However, this will cause rejections on these archs
that are likely unfounded in the vast majority of cases.

In the tests, some are now successful where we previously had a
false-positive (i.e., rejection). Change them to reflect where the
nospec should be inserted (using __xlated_unpriv) and modify the error
message if the nospec is able to mitigate a problem that previously
shadowed another problem (in that case __xlated_unpriv does not work,
therefore just add a comment).

Define SPEC_V1 to avoid duplicating this ifdef whenever we check for
nospec insns using __xlated_unpriv, define it here once. This also
improves readability. PowerPC can probably also be added here. However,
omit it for now because the BPF CI currently does not include a test.

Limit it to EPERM, EACCES, and EINVAL (and not everything except for
EFAULT and ENOMEM) as it already has the desired effect for most
real-world programs. Briefly went through all the occurrences of EPERM,
EINVAL, and EACCESS in verifier.c to validate that catching them like
this makes sense.

Thanks to Dustin for their help in checking the vendor documentation.

[1] https://lpc.events/event/18/contributions/1954/ ("Mitigating
    Spectre-PHT using Speculation Barriers in Linux eBPF")
[2] https://arxiv.org/pdf/2405.00078 ("VeriFence: Lightweight and
    Precise Spectre Defenses for Untrusted Linux Kernel Extensions")
[3] https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/developer/articles/technical/software-security-guidance/technical-documentation/runtime-speculative-side-channel-mitigations.html
    ("Managed Runtime Speculative Execution Side Channel Mitigations")
[4] https://dl.acm.org/doi/pdf/10.1145/3359789.3359837 ("Speculator: a
    tool to analyze speculative execution attacks and mitigations" -
    Section 4.6 "Stopping Speculative Execution")
[5] https://www.amd.com/content/dam/amd/en/documents/processor-tech-docs/programmer-references/software-techniques-for-managing-speculation.pdf
    ("White Paper - SOFTWARE TECHNIQUES FOR MANAGING SPECULATION ON AMD
    PROCESSORS - REVISION 5.09.23")
[6] https://developer.arm.com/documentation/ddi0597/2020-12/Base-Instructions/SB--Speculation-Barrier-
    ("SB - Speculation Barrier - Arm Armv8-A A32/T32 Instruction Set
    Architecture (2020-12)")
[7] https://wiki.raptorcs.com/w/images/5/5f/OPF_PowerISA_v3.1C.pdf
    ("Power ISA™ - Version 3.1C - May 26, 2024 - Section 9.2.1 of Book
    III")
[8] https://www.amd.com/content/dam/amd/en/documents/processor-tech-docs/programmer-references/40332.pdf
    ("AMD64 Architecture Programmer’s Manual Volumes 1–5 - Revision 4.08
    - April 2024 - 7.6.4 Serializing Instructions")

Signed-off-by: Luis Gerhorst <luis.gerhorst@fau.de>
Acked-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Henriette Herzog <henriette.herzog@rub.de>
Cc: Dustin Nguyen <nguyen@cs.fau.de>
Cc: Maximilian Ott <ott@cs.fau.de>
Cc: Milan Stephan <milan.stephan@fau.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250603212428.338473-1-luis.gerhorst@fau.de
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2025-06-09 20:11:10 -07:00
Luis Gerhorst
9124a45080 bpf: Rename sanitize_stack_spill to nospec_result
This is made to clarify that this flag will cause a nospec to be added
after this insn and can therefore be relied upon to reduce speculative
path analysis.

Signed-off-by: Luis Gerhorst <luis.gerhorst@fau.de>
Acked-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com>
Cc: Henriette Herzog <henriette.herzog@rub.de>
Cc: Maximilian Ott <ott@cs.fau.de>
Cc: Milan Stephan <milan.stephan@fau.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250603212024.338154-1-luis.gerhorst@fau.de
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2025-06-09 20:11:10 -07:00
Luis Gerhorst
dff883d9e9 bpf, arm64, powerpc: Change nospec to include v1 barrier
This changes the semantics of BPF_NOSPEC (previously a v4-only barrier)
to always emit a speculation barrier that works against both Spectre v1
AND v4. If mitigation is not needed on an architecture, the backend
should set bpf_jit_bypass_spec_v4/v1().

As of now, this commit only has the user-visible implication that unpriv
BPF's performance on PowerPC is reduced. This is the case because we
have to emit additional v1 barrier instructions for BPF_NOSPEC now.

This commit is required for a future commit to allow us to rely on
BPF_NOSPEC for Spectre v1 mitigation. As of this commit, the feature
that nospec acts as a v1 barrier is unused.

Commit f5e81d1117 ("bpf: Introduce BPF nospec instruction for
mitigating Spectre v4") noted that mitigation instructions for v1 and v4
might be different on some archs. While this would potentially offer
improved performance on PowerPC, it was dismissed after the following
considerations:

* Only having one barrier simplifies the verifier and allows us to
  easily rely on v4-induced barriers for reducing the complexity of
  v1-induced speculative path verification.

* For the architectures that implemented BPF_NOSPEC, only PowerPC has
  distinct instructions for v1 and v4. Even there, some insns may be
  shared between the barriers for v1 and v4 (e.g., 'ori 31,31,0' and
  'sync'). If this is still found to impact performance in an
  unacceptable way, BPF_NOSPEC can be split into BPF_NOSPEC_V1 and
  BPF_NOSPEC_V4 later. As an optimization, we can already skip v1/v4
  insns from being emitted for PowerPC with this setup if
  bypass_spec_v1/v4 is set.

Vulnerability-status for BPF_NOSPEC-based Spectre mitigations (v4 as of
this commit, v1 in the future) is therefore:

* x86 (32-bit and 64-bit), ARM64, and PowerPC (64-bit): Mitigated - This
  patch implements BPF_NOSPEC for these architectures. The previous
  v4-only version was supported since commit f5e81d1117 ("bpf:
  Introduce BPF nospec instruction for mitigating Spectre v4") and
  commit b7540d6250 ("powerpc/bpf: Emit stf barrier instruction
  sequences for BPF_NOSPEC").

* LoongArch: Not Vulnerable - Commit a6f6a95f25 ("LoongArch, bpf: Fix
  jit to skip speculation barrier opcode") is the only other past commit
  related to BPF_NOSPEC and indicates that the insn is not required
  there.

* MIPS: Vulnerable (if unprivileged BPF is enabled) -
  Commit a6f6a95f2580 ("LoongArch, bpf: Fix jit to skip speculation
  barrier opcode") indicates that it is not vulnerable, but this
  contradicts the kernel and Debian documentation. Therefore, I assume
  that there exist vulnerable MIPS CPUs (but maybe not from Loongson?).
  In the future, BPF_NOSPEC could be implemented for MIPS based on the
  GCC speculation_barrier [1]. For now, we rely on unprivileged BPF
  being disabled by default.

* Other: Unknown - To the best of my knowledge there is no definitive
  information available that indicates that any other arch is
  vulnerable. They are therefore left untouched (BPF_NOSPEC is not
  implemented, but bypass_spec_v1/v4 is also not set).

I did the following testing to ensure the insn encoding is correct:

* ARM64:
  * 'dsb nsh; isb' was successfully tested with the BPF CI in [2]
  * 'sb' locally using QEMU v7.2.15 -cpu max (emitted sb insn is
    executed for example with './test_progs -t verifier_array_access')

* PowerPC: The following configs were tested locally with ppc64le QEMU
  v8.2 '-machine pseries -cpu POWER9':
  * STF_BARRIER_EIEIO + CONFIG_PPC_BOOK32_64
  * STF_BARRIER_SYNC_ORI (forced on) + CONFIG_PPC_BOOK32_64
  * STF_BARRIER_FALLBACK (forced on) + CONFIG_PPC_BOOK32_64
  * CONFIG_PPC_E500 (forced on) + STF_BARRIER_EIEIO
  * CONFIG_PPC_E500 (forced on) + STF_BARRIER_SYNC_ORI (forced on)
  * CONFIG_PPC_E500 (forced on) + STF_BARRIER_FALLBACK (forced on)
  * CONFIG_PPC_E500 (forced on) + STF_BARRIER_NONE (forced on)
  Most of those cobinations should not occur in practice, but I was not
  able to get an PPC e6500 rootfs (for testing PPC_E500 without forcing
  it on). In any case, this should ensure that there are no unexpected
  conflicts between the insns when combined like this. Individual v1/v4
  barriers were already emitted elsewhere.

Hari's ack is for the PowerPC changes only.

[1] https://gcc.gnu.org/git/?p=gcc.git;a=commit;h=29b74545531f6afbee9fc38c267524326dbfbedf
    ("MIPS: Add speculation_barrier support")
[2] https://github.com/kernel-patches/bpf/pull/8576

Signed-off-by: Luis Gerhorst <luis.gerhorst@fau.de>
Acked-by: Hari Bathini <hbathini@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Henriette Herzog <henriette.herzog@rub.de>
Cc: Maximilian Ott <ott@cs.fau.de>
Cc: Milan Stephan <milan.stephan@fau.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250603211703.337860-1-luis.gerhorst@fau.de
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2025-06-09 20:11:09 -07:00
Luis Gerhorst
03c68a0f8c bpf, arm64, powerpc: Add bpf_jit_bypass_spec_v1/v4()
JITs can set bpf_jit_bypass_spec_v1/v4() if they want the verifier to
skip analysis/patching for the respective vulnerability. For v4, this
will reduce the number of barriers the verifier inserts. For v1, it
allows more programs to be accepted.

The primary motivation for this is to not regress unpriv BPF's
performance on ARM64 in a future commit where BPF_NOSPEC is also used
against Spectre v1.

This has the user-visible change that v1-induced rejections on
non-vulnerable PowerPC CPUs are avoided.

For now, this does not change the semantics of BPF_NOSPEC. It is still a
v4-only barrier and must not be implemented if bypass_spec_v4 is always
true for the arch. Changing it to a v1 AND v4-barrier is done in a
future commit.

As an alternative to bypass_spec_v1/v4, one could introduce NOSPEC_V1
AND NOSPEC_V4 instructions and allow backends to skip their lowering as
suggested by commit f5e81d1117 ("bpf: Introduce BPF nospec instruction
for mitigating Spectre v4"). Adding bpf_jit_bypass_spec_v1/v4() was
found to be preferable for the following reason:

* bypass_spec_v1/v4 benefits non-vulnerable CPUs: Always performing the
  same analysis (not taking into account whether the current CPU is
  vulnerable), needlessly restricts users of CPUs that are not
  vulnerable. The only use case for this would be portability-testing,
  but this can later be added easily when needed by allowing users to
  force bypass_spec_v1/v4 to false.

* Portability is still acceptable: Directly disabling the analysis
  instead of skipping the lowering of BPF_NOSPEC(_V1/V4) might allow
  programs on non-vulnerable CPUs to be accepted while the program will
  be rejected on vulnerable CPUs. With the fallback to speculation
  barriers for Spectre v1 implemented in a future commit, this will only
  affect programs that do variable stack-accesses or are very complex.

For PowerPC, the SEC_FTR checking in bpf_jit_bypass_spec_v4() is based
on the check that was previously located in the BPF_NOSPEC case.

For LoongArch, it would likely be safe to set both
bpf_jit_bypass_spec_v1() and _v4() according to
commit a6f6a95f2580 ("LoongArch, bpf: Fix jit to skip speculation
barrier opcode"). This is omitted here as I am unable to do any testing
for LoongArch.

Hari's ack concerns the PowerPC part only.

Signed-off-by: Luis Gerhorst <luis.gerhorst@fau.de>
Acked-by: Hari Bathini <hbathini@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Henriette Herzog <henriette.herzog@rub.de>
Cc: Maximilian Ott <ott@cs.fau.de>
Cc: Milan Stephan <milan.stephan@fau.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250603211318.337474-1-luis.gerhorst@fau.de
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2025-06-09 20:11:09 -07:00
Luis Gerhorst
6b84d7895d bpf: Return -EFAULT on internal errors
This prevents us from trying to recover from these on speculative paths
in the future.

Signed-off-by: Luis Gerhorst <luis.gerhorst@fau.de>
Reviewed-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Henriette Herzog <henriette.herzog@rub.de>
Cc: Maximilian Ott <ott@cs.fau.de>
Cc: Milan Stephan <milan.stephan@fau.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250603205800.334980-4-luis.gerhorst@fau.de
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2025-06-09 20:11:09 -07:00
Luis Gerhorst
fd508bde5d bpf: Return -EFAULT on misconfigurations
Mark these cases as non-recoverable to later prevent them from being
caught when they occur during speculative path verification.

Eduard writes [1]:

  The only pace I'm aware of that might act upon specific error code
  from verifier syscall is libbpf. Looking through libbpf code, it seems
  that this change does not interfere with libbpf.

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/785b4531ce3b44a84059a4feb4ba458c68fce719.camel@gmail.com/

Signed-off-by: Luis Gerhorst <luis.gerhorst@fau.de>
Reviewed-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Henriette Herzog <henriette.herzog@rub.de>
Cc: Maximilian Ott <ott@cs.fau.de>
Cc: Milan Stephan <milan.stephan@fau.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250603205800.334980-3-luis.gerhorst@fau.de
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2025-06-09 20:11:09 -07:00
Luis Gerhorst
8b7df50fd4 bpf: Move insn if/else into do_check_insn()
This is required to catch the errors later and fall back to a nospec if
on a speculative path.

Eliminate the regs variable as it is only used once and insn_idx is not
modified in-between the definition and usage.

Do not pass insn but compute it in the function itself. As Eduard points
out [1], insn is assumed to correspond to env->insn_idx in many places
(e.g, __check_reg_arg()).

Move code into do_check_insn(), replace
* "continue" with "return 0" after modifying insn_idx
* "goto process_bpf_exit" with "return PROCESS_BPF_EXIT"
* "goto process_bpf_exit_full" with "return process_bpf_exit_full()"
* "do_print_state = " with "*do_print_state = "

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/293dbe3950a782b8eb3b87b71d7a967e120191fd.camel@gmail.com/

Signed-off-by: Luis Gerhorst <luis.gerhorst@fau.de>
Acked-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Henriette Herzog <henriette.herzog@rub.de>
Cc: Maximilian Ott <ott@cs.fau.de>
Cc: Milan Stephan <milan.stephan@fau.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250603205800.334980-2-luis.gerhorst@fau.de
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2025-06-09 20:11:09 -07:00
Tao Chen
2bc0575fec bpf: Add cookie in fdinfo for raw_tp
Add cookie in fdinfo for raw_tp, the info as follows:

link_type:	raw_tracepoint
link_id:	31
prog_tag:	9dfdf8ef453843bf
prog_id:	32
tp_name:	sys_enter
cookie:	23925373020405760

Signed-off-by: Tao Chen <chen.dylane@linux.dev>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20250606165818.3394397-5-chen.dylane@linux.dev
2025-06-09 16:45:17 -07:00
Tao Chen
380cb6dfa2 bpf: Add cookie in fdinfo for tracing
Add cookie in fdinfo for tracing, the info as follows:

link_type:	tracing
link_id:	6
prog_tag:	9dfdf8ef453843bf
prog_id:	35
attach_type:	25
target_obj_id:	1
target_btf_id:	60355
cookie:	9007199254740992

Signed-off-by: Tao Chen <chen.dylane@linux.dev>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20250606165818.3394397-4-chen.dylane@linux.dev
2025-06-09 16:45:17 -07:00
Tao Chen
c7beb48344 bpf: Add cookie to tracing bpf_link_info
bpf_tramp_link includes cookie info, we can add it in bpf_link_info.

Signed-off-by: Tao Chen <chen.dylane@linux.dev>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20250606165818.3394397-1-chen.dylane@linux.dev
2025-06-09 16:45:17 -07:00
Ihor Solodrai
5534e58f2e bpf: Make reg_not_null() true for CONST_PTR_TO_MAP
When reg->type is CONST_PTR_TO_MAP, it can not be null. However the
verifier explores the branches under rX == 0 in check_cond_jmp_op()
even if reg->type is CONST_PTR_TO_MAP, because it was not checked for
in reg_not_null().

Fix this by adding CONST_PTR_TO_MAP to the set of types that are
considered non nullable in reg_not_null().

An old "unpriv: cmp map pointer with zero" selftest fails with this
change, because now early out correctly triggers in
check_cond_jmp_op(), making the verification to pass.

In practice verifier may allow pointer to null comparison in unpriv,
since in many cases the relevant branch and comparison op are removed
as dead code. So change the expected test result to __success_unpriv.

Signed-off-by: Ihor Solodrai <isolodrai@meta.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20250609183024.359974-2-isolodrai@meta.com
2025-06-09 16:42:04 -07:00
Tao Chen
97ebac5886 bpf: Add show_fdinfo for perf_event
After commit 1b715e1b0e ("bpf: Support ->fill_link_info for perf_event") add
perf_event info, we can also show the info with the method of cat /proc/[fd]/fdinfo.

kprobe fdinfo:
link_type:	perf
link_id:	10
prog_tag:	bcf7977d3b93787c
prog_id:	20
name:	bpf_fentry_test1
offset:	0x0
missed:	0
addr:	0xffffffffa28a2904
event_type:	kprobe
cookie:	3735928559

uprobe fdinfo:
link_type:	perf
link_id:	13
prog_tag:	bcf7977d3b93787c
prog_id:	21
name:	/proc/self/exe
offset:	0x63dce4
ref_ctr_offset:	0x33eee2a
event_type:	uprobe
cookie:	3735928559

tracepoint fdinfo:
link_type:	perf
link_id:	11
prog_tag:	bcf7977d3b93787c
prog_id:	22
tp_name:	sched_switch
event_type:	tracepoint
cookie:	3735928559

perf_event fdinfo:
link_type:	perf
link_id:	12
prog_tag:	bcf7977d3b93787c
prog_id:	23
type:	1
config:	2
event_type:	event
cookie:	3735928559

Signed-off-by: Tao Chen <chen.dylane@linux.dev>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20250606150258.3385166-1-chen.dylane@linux.dev
2025-06-09 16:40:13 -07:00
Yonghong Song
1209339844 bpf: Implement mprog API on top of existing cgroup progs
Current cgroup prog ordering is appending at attachment time. This is not
ideal. In some cases, users want specific ordering at a particular cgroup
level. To address this, the existing mprog API seems an ideal solution with
supporting BPF_F_BEFORE and BPF_F_AFTER flags.

But there are a few obstacles to directly use kernel mprog interface.
Currently cgroup bpf progs already support prog attach/detach/replace
and link-based attach/detach/replace. For example, in struct
bpf_prog_array_item, the cgroup_storage field needs to be together
with bpf prog. But the mprog API struct bpf_mprog_fp only has bpf_prog
as the member, which makes it difficult to use kernel mprog interface.

In another case, the current cgroup prog detach tries to use the
same flag as in attach. This is different from mprog kernel interface
which uses flags passed from user space.

So to avoid modifying existing behavior, I made the following changes to
support mprog API for cgroup progs:
 - The support is for prog list at cgroup level. Cross-level prog list
   (a.k.a. effective prog list) is not supported.
 - Previously, BPF_F_PREORDER is supported only for prog attach, now
   BPF_F_PREORDER is also supported by link-based attach.
 - For attach, BPF_F_BEFORE/BPF_F_AFTER/BPF_F_ID/BPF_F_LINK is supported
   similar to kernel mprog but with different implementation.
 - For detach and replace, use the existing implementation.
 - For attach, detach and replace, the revision for a particular prog
   list, associated with a particular attach type, will be updated
   by increasing count by 1.

Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20250606163141.2428937-1-yonghong.song@linux.dev
2025-06-09 16:28:28 -07:00
Yonghong Song
9b8367b604 cgroup: Add bpf prog revisions to struct cgroup_bpf
One of key items in mprog API is revision for prog list. The revision
number will be increased if the prog list changed, e.g., attach, detach
or replace.

Add 'revisions' field to struct cgroup_bpf, representing revisions for
all cgroup related attachment types. The initial revision value is
set to 1, the same as kernel mprog implementations.

Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20250606163136.2428732-1-yonghong.song@linux.dev
2025-06-09 16:17:11 -07:00
Luis Gerhorst
97744b4971 bpf: Clarify sanitize_check_bounds()
As is, it appears as if pointer arithmetic is allowed for everything
except PTR_TO_{STACK,MAP_VALUE} if one only looks at
sanitize_check_bounds(). However, this is misleading as the function
only works together with retrieve_ptr_limit() and the two must be kept
in sync. This patch documents the interdependency and adds a check to
ensure they stay in sync.

adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(): Because the preceding switch returns -EACCES
for every opcode except for ADD/SUB, the sanitize_needed() following the
sanitize_check_bounds() call is always true if reached. This means,
unless sanitize_check_bounds() detected that the pointer goes OOB
because of the ADD/SUB and returns -EACCES, sanitize_ptr_alu() always
executes after sanitize_check_bounds().

The following shows that this also implies that retrieve_ptr_limit()
runs in all relevant cases.

Note that there are two calls to sanitize_ptr_alu(), these are simply
needed to easily calculate the correct alu_limit as explained in
commit 7fedb63a8307 ("bpf: Tighten speculative pointer arithmetic
mask"). The truncation-simulation is already performed on the first
call.

In the second sanitize_ptr_alu(commit_window = true), we always run
retrieve_ptr_limit(), unless:

* can_skip_alu_sanititation() is true, notably `BPF_SRC(insn->code) ==
  BPF_K`. BPF_K is fine because it means that there is no scalar
  register (which could be subject to speculative scalar confusion due
  to Spectre v4) that goes into the ALU operation. The pointer register
  can not be subject to v4-based value confusion due to the nospec
  added. Thus, in this case it would have been fine to also skip
  sanitize_check_bounds().

* If we are on a speculative path (`vstate->speculative`) and in the
  second "commit" phase, sanitize_ptr_alu() always just returns 0. This
  makes sense because there are no ALU sanitization limits to be learned
  from speculative paths. Furthermore, because the sanitization will
  ensure that pointer arithmetic stays in (architectural) bounds, the
  sanitize_check_bounds() on the speculative path could also be skipped.

The second case needs more attention: Assume we have some ALU operation
that is used with scalars architecturally, but with a
non-PTR_TO_{STACK,MAP_VALUE} pointer (e.g., PTR_TO_PACKET)
speculatively. It might appear as if this would allow an unsanitized
pointer ALU operations, but this can not happen because one of the
following two always holds:

* The type mismatch stems from Spectre v4, then it is prevented by a
  nospec after the possibly-bypassed store involving the pointer. There
  is no speculative path simulated for this case thus it never happens.

* The type mismatch stems from a Spectre v1 gadget like the following:

    r1 = slow(0)
    r4 = fast(0)
    r3 = SCALAR // Spectre v4 scalar confusion
    if (r1) {
      r2 = PTR_TO_PACKET
    } else {
      r2 = 42
    }
    if (r4) {
      r2 += r3
      *r2
    }

  If `r2 = PTR_TO_PACKET` is indeed dead code, it will be sanitized to
  `goto -1` (as is the case for the r4-if block). If it is not (e.g., if
  `r1 = r4 = 1` is possible), it will also be explored on an
  architectural path and retrieve_ptr_limit() will reject it.

To summarize, the exception for `vstate->speculative` is safe.

Back to retrieve_ptr_limit(): It only allows the ALU operation if the
involved pointer register (can be either source or destination for ADD)
is PTR_TO_STACK or PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE. Otherwise, it returns -EOPNOTSUPP.

Therefore, sanitize_check_bounds() returning 0 for
non-PTR_TO_{STACK,MAP_VALUE} is fine because retrieve_ptr_limit() also
runs for all relevant cases and prevents unsafe operations.

To summarize, we allow unsanitized pointer arithmetic with 64-bit
ADD/SUB for the following instructions if the requirements from
retrieve_ptr_limit() AND sanitize_check_bounds() hold:

* ptr -=/+= imm32 (i.e. `BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K`)

* PTR_TO_{STACK,MAP_VALUE} -= scalar

* PTR_TO_{STACK,MAP_VALUE} += scalar

* scalar += PTR_TO_{STACK,MAP_VALUE}

To document the interdependency between sanitize_check_bounds() and
retrieve_ptr_limit(), add a verifier_bug_if() to make sure they stay in
sync.

Signed-off-by: Luis Gerhorst <luis.gerhorst@fau.de>
Reported-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/CAP01T76HZ+s5h+_REqRFkRjjoKwnZZn9YswpSVinGicah1pGJw@mail.gmail.com/
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/CAP01T75oU0zfZCiymEcH3r-GQ5A6GOc6GmYzJEnMa3=53XuUQQ@mail.gmail.com/
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250603204557.332447-1-luis.gerhorst@fau.de
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2025-06-05 13:20:07 -07:00
Tao Chen
2fe1c59347 bpf: Add cookie to raw_tp bpf_link_info
After commit 68ca5d4eeb ("bpf: support BPF cookie in raw tracepoint
(raw_tp, tp_btf) programs"), we can show the cookie in bpf_link_info
like kprobe etc.

Signed-off-by: Tao Chen <chen.dylane@linux.dev>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20250603154309.3063644-1-chen.dylane@linux.dev
2025-06-05 11:44:52 -07:00
Linus Torvalds
16b70698aa Merge tag 'sched_ext-for-6.16-rc1-fixes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tj/sched_ext
Pull sched_ext fixes from Tejun Heo:
 "Two fixes in the built-in idle selection helpers:

   - Fix prev_cpu handling to guarantee that idle selection never
     returns a CPU that's not allowed

   - Skip cross-node search when !NUMA which could lead to infinite
     looping due to a bug in NUMA iterator"

* tag 'sched_ext-for-6.16-rc1-fixes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tj/sched_ext:
  sched_ext: idle: Skip cross-node search with !CONFIG_NUMA
  sched_ext: idle: Properly handle invalid prev_cpu during idle selection
2025-06-04 12:07:16 -07:00
Linus Torvalds
70087d2200 Merge tag 'trace-v6.16-2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/trace/linux-trace
Pull tracing fixes from Steven Rostedt:

 - Fix UAF in module unload in ftrace when there's a bug in the module

   If a module is buggy and triggers ftrace_disable which is set when an
   anomaly is detected, when it gets unloaded it doesn't free the hooks
   into kallsyms, and when a kallsyms lookup is performed it may access
   the mod->modname field and crash via UAF.

   Fix this by still freeing the mod_maps that are attached to kallsyms
   on module unload regardless if ftrace_disable is set or not.

 - Do not bother allocating mod_maps for kallsyms if ftrace_disable is
   set

 - Remove unused trace events

   When a trace event or tracepoint is created but not used, it still
   creates the code and data structures needed for that trace event.
   This just wastes memory.

   Remove the trace events that are created but not used. This does not
   remove trace events that are created but are not used due configs not
   being set. That will be handled later. This only removes events that
   have no user under any config.

* tag 'trace-v6.16-2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/trace/linux-trace:
  fsdax: Remove unused trace events for dax insert mapping
  genirq/matrix: Remove unused irq_matrix_alloc_reserved tracepoint
  xdp: Remove unused mem_return_failed event
  ftrace: Don't allocate ftrace module map if ftrace is disabled
  ftrace: Fix UAF when lookup kallsym after ftrace disabled
2025-06-03 14:21:31 -07:00
Linus Torvalds
def5b099a6 Merge tag 'cgroup-for-6.16-rc1-fixes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tj/cgroup
Pull cgroup fix from Tejun Heo:
 "The rstat per-subsystem split change skipped per-cpu allocation on UP
  configs; however even on UP, depending on config options, the size of
  the percpu struct may not be zero leading to crashes.

  Fix it by conditionalizing the per-cpu area allocation and usage on
  the size of the per-cpu struct"

* tag 'cgroup-for-6.16-rc1-fixes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tj/cgroup:
  cgroup: adjust criteria for rstat subsystem cpu lock access
2025-06-03 14:12:36 -07:00
Andrea Righi
9960be72a5 sched_ext: idle: Skip cross-node search with !CONFIG_NUMA
In the idle CPU selection logic, attempting cross-node searches adds
unnecessary complexity when CONFIG_NUMA is disabled.

Since there's no meaningful concept of nodes in this case, simplify the
logic by restricting the idle CPU search to the current node only.

Fixes: 48849271e6 ("sched_ext: idle: Per-node idle cpumasks")
Signed-off-by: Andrea Righi <arighi@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
2025-06-03 08:22:27 -10:00
Linus Torvalds
c8be542408 Merge tag 'modules-6.16-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/modules/linux
Pull module updates from Petr Pavlu:

 - Make .static_call_sites in modules read-only after init

   The .static_call_sites sections in modules have been made read-only
   after init to avoid any (non-)accidental modifications, similarly to
   how they are read-only after init in vmlinux

 - The rest are minor cleanups

* tag 'modules-6.16-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/modules/linux:
  module: Remove outdated comment about text_size
  module: Make .static_call_sites read-only after init
  module: Add a separate function to mark sections as read-only after init
  module: Constify parameters of module_enforce_rwx_sections()
2025-06-02 17:35:06 -07:00
Linus Torvalds
fd1f847350 Merge tag 'mm-stable-2025-06-01-14-06' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm
Pull more MM updates from Andrew Morton:

 - "zram: support algorithm-specific parameters" from Sergey Senozhatsky
   adds infrastructure for passing algorithm-specific parameters into
   zram. A single parameter `winbits' is implemented at this time.

 - "memcg: nmi-safe kmem charging" from Shakeel Butt makes memcg
   charging nmi-safe, which is required by BFP, which can operate in NMI
   context.

 - "Some random fixes and cleanup to shmem" from Kemeng Shi implements
   small fixes and cleanups in the shmem code.

 - "Skip mm selftests instead when kernel features are not present" from
   Zi Yan fixes some issues in the MM selftest code.

 - "mm/damon: build-enable essential DAMON components by default" from
   SeongJae Park reworks DAMON Kconfig to make it easier to enable
   CONFIG_DAMON.

 - "sched/numa: add statistics of numa balance task migration" from Libo
   Chen adds more info into sysfs and procfs files to improve visibility
   into the NUMA balancer's task migration activity.

 - "selftests/mm: cow and gup_longterm cleanups" from Mark Brown
   provides various updates to some of the MM selftests to make them
   play better with the overall containing framework.

* tag 'mm-stable-2025-06-01-14-06' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm: (43 commits)
  mm/khugepaged: clean up refcount check using folio_expected_ref_count()
  selftests/mm: fix test result reporting in gup_longterm
  selftests/mm: report unique test names for each cow test
  selftests/mm: add helper for logging test start and results
  selftests/mm: use standard ksft_finished() in cow and gup_longterm
  selftests/damon/_damon_sysfs: skip testcases if CONFIG_DAMON_SYSFS is disabled
  sched/numa: add statistics of numa balance task
  sched/numa: fix task swap by skipping kernel threads
  tools/testing: check correct variable in open_procmap()
  tools/testing/vma: add missing function stub
  mm/gup: update comment explaining why gup_fast() disables IRQs
  selftests/mm: two fixes for the pfnmap test
  mm/khugepaged: fix race with folio split/free using temporary reference
  mm: add CONFIG_PAGE_BLOCK_ORDER to select page block order
  mmu_notifiers: remove leftover stub macros
  selftests/mm: deduplicate test names in madv_populate
  kcov: rust: add flags for KCOV with Rust
  mm: rust: make CONFIG_MMU ifdefs more narrow
  mmu_gather: move tlb flush for VM_PFNMAP/VM_MIXEDMAP vmas into free_pgtables()
  mm/damon/Kconfig: enable CONFIG_DAMON by default
  ...
2025-06-02 16:00:26 -07:00
Linus Torvalds
7f9039c524 Merge tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm
Pull more kvm updates from Paolo Bonzini:
  Generic:

   - Clean up locking of all vCPUs for a VM by using the *_nest_lock()
     family of functions, and move duplicated code to virt/kvm/. kernel/
     patches acked by Peter Zijlstra

   - Add MGLRU support to the access tracking perf test

  ARM fixes:

   - Make the irqbypass hooks resilient to changes in the GSI<->MSI
     routing, avoiding behind stale vLPI mappings being left behind. The
     fix is to resolve the VGIC IRQ using the host IRQ (which is stable)
     and nuking the vLPI mapping upon a routing change

   - Close another VGIC race where vCPU creation races with VGIC
     creation, leading to in-flight vCPUs entering the kernel w/o
     private IRQs allocated

   - Fix a build issue triggered by the recently added workaround for
     Ampere's AC04_CPU_23 erratum

   - Correctly sign-extend the VA when emulating a TLBI instruction
     potentially targeting a VNCR mapping

   - Avoid dereferencing a NULL pointer in the VGIC debug code, which
     can happen if the device doesn't have any mapping yet

  s390:

   - Fix interaction between some filesystems and Secure Execution

   - Some cleanups and refactorings, preparing for an upcoming big
     series

  x86:

   - Wait for target vCPU to ack KVM_REQ_UPDATE_PROTECTED_GUEST_STATE
     to fix a race between AP destroy and VMRUN

   - Decrypt and dump the VMSA in dump_vmcb() if debugging enabled for
     the VM

   - Refine and harden handling of spurious faults

   - Add support for ALLOWED_SEV_FEATURES

   - Add #VMGEXIT to the set of handlers special cased for
     CONFIG_RETPOLINE=y

   - Treat DEBUGCTL[5:2] as reserved to pave the way for virtualizing
     features that utilize those bits

   - Don't account temporary allocations in sev_send_update_data()

   - Add support for KVM_CAP_X86_BUS_LOCK_EXIT on SVM, via Bus Lock
     Threshold

   - Unify virtualization of IBRS on nested VM-Exit, and cross-vCPU
     IBPB, between SVM and VMX

   - Advertise support to userspace for WRMSRNS and PREFETCHI

   - Rescan I/O APIC routes after handling EOI that needed to be
     intercepted due to the old/previous routing, but not the
     new/current routing

   - Add a module param to control and enumerate support for device
     posted interrupts

   - Fix a potential overflow with nested virt on Intel systems running
     32-bit kernels

   - Flush shadow VMCSes on emergency reboot

   - Add support for SNP to the various SEV selftests

   - Add a selftest to verify fastops instructions via forced emulation

   - Refine and optimize KVM's software processing of the posted
     interrupt bitmap, and share the harvesting code between KVM and the
     kernel's Posted MSI handler"

* tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm: (93 commits)
  rtmutex_api: provide correct extern functions
  KVM: arm64: vgic-debug: Avoid dereferencing NULL ITE pointer
  KVM: arm64: vgic-init: Plug vCPU vs. VGIC creation race
  KVM: arm64: Unmap vLPIs affected by changes to GSI routing information
  KVM: arm64: Resolve vLPI by host IRQ in vgic_v4_unset_forwarding()
  KVM: arm64: Protect vLPI translation with vgic_irq::irq_lock
  KVM: arm64: Use lock guard in vgic_v4_set_forwarding()
  KVM: arm64: Mask out non-VA bits from TLBI VA* on VNCR invalidation
  arm64: sysreg: Drag linux/kconfig.h to work around vdso build issue
  KVM: s390: Simplify and move pv code
  KVM: s390: Refactor and split some gmap helpers
  KVM: s390: Remove unneeded srcu lock
  s390: Remove unneeded includes
  s390/uv: Improve splitting of large folios that cannot be split while dirty
  s390/uv: Always return 0 from s390_wiggle_split_folio() if successful
  s390/uv: Don't return 0 from make_hva_secure() if the operation was not successful
  rust: add helper for mutex_trylock
  RISC-V: KVM: use kvm_trylock_all_vcpus when locking all vCPUs
  KVM: arm64: use kvm_trylock_all_vcpus when locking all vCPUs
  x86: KVM: SVM: use kvm_lock_all_vcpus instead of a custom implementation
  ...
2025-06-02 12:24:58 -07:00
Ye Bin
5834a59738 ftrace: Don't allocate ftrace module map if ftrace is disabled
If ftrace is disabled, it is meaningless to allocate a module map.
Add a check in allocate_ftrace_mod_map() to not allocate if ftrace is
disabled.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250529111955.2349189-3-yebin@huaweicloud.com
Signed-off-by: Ye Bin <yebin10@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
2025-06-02 13:12:26 -04:00
Ye Bin
f914b52c37 ftrace: Fix UAF when lookup kallsym after ftrace disabled
The following issue happens with a buggy module:

BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffffffc05d0218
PGD 1bd66f067 P4D 1bd66f067 PUD 1bd671067 PMD 101808067 PTE 0
Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI
Tainted: [O]=OOT_MODULE, [E]=UNSIGNED_MODULE
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS
RIP: 0010:sized_strscpy+0x81/0x2f0
RSP: 0018:ffff88812d76fa08 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffffffc0601010 RCX: dffffc0000000000
RDX: 0000000000000038 RSI: dffffc0000000000 RDI: ffff88812608da2d
RBP: 8080808080808080 R08: ffff88812608da2d R09: ffff88812608da68
R10: ffff88812608d82d R11: ffff88812608d810 R12: 0000000000000038
R13: ffff88812608da2d R14: ffffffffc05d0218 R15: fefefefefefefeff
FS:  00007fef552de740(0000) GS:ffff8884251c7000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: ffffffffc05d0218 CR3: 00000001146f0000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 ftrace_mod_get_kallsym+0x1ac/0x590
 update_iter_mod+0x239/0x5b0
 s_next+0x5b/0xa0
 seq_read_iter+0x8c9/0x1070
 seq_read+0x249/0x3b0
 proc_reg_read+0x1b0/0x280
 vfs_read+0x17f/0x920
 ksys_read+0xf3/0x1c0
 do_syscall_64+0x5f/0x2e0
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e

The above issue may happen as follows:
(1) Add kprobe tracepoint;
(2) insmod test.ko;
(3)  Module triggers ftrace disabled;
(4) rmmod test.ko;
(5) cat /proc/kallsyms; --> Will trigger UAF as test.ko already removed;
ftrace_mod_get_kallsym()
...
strscpy(module_name, mod_map->mod->name, MODULE_NAME_LEN);
...

The problem is when a module triggers an issue with ftrace and
sets ftrace_disable. The ftrace_disable is set when an anomaly is
discovered and to prevent any more damage, ftrace stops all text
modification. The issue that happened was that the ftrace_disable stops
more than just the text modification.

When a module is loaded, its init functions can also be traced. Because
kallsyms deletes the init functions after a module has loaded, ftrace
saves them when the module is loaded and function tracing is enabled. This
allows the output of the function trace to show the init function names
instead of just their raw memory addresses.

When a module is removed, ftrace_release_mod() is called, and if
ftrace_disable is set, it just returns without doing anything more. The
problem here is that it leaves the mod_list still around and if kallsyms
is called, it will call into this code and access the module memory that
has already been freed as it will return:

  strscpy(module_name, mod_map->mod->name, MODULE_NAME_LEN);

Where the "mod" no longer exists and triggers a UAF bug.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250523135452.626d8dcd@gandalf.local.home/

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: aba4b5c22c ("ftrace: Save module init functions kallsyms symbols for tracing")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250529111955.2349189-2-yebin@huaweicloud.com
Signed-off-by: Ye Bin <yebin10@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
2025-06-02 13:09:48 -04:00
Paolo Bonzini
438e22801b rtmutex_api: provide correct extern functions
Commit fb49f07ba1 ("locking/mutex: implement mutex_lock_killable_nest_lock")
changed the set of functions that mutex.c defines when CONFIG_DEBUG_LOCK_ALLOC
is set.

- it removed the "extern" declaration of mutex_lock_killable_nested from
  include/linux/mutex.h, and replaced it with a macro since it could be
  treated as a special case of _mutex_lock_killable.  It also removed a
  definition of the function in kernel/locking/mutex.c.

- likewise, it replaced mutex_trylock() with the more generic
  mutex_trylock_nest_lock() and replaced mutex_trylock() with a macro.

However, it left the old definitions in place in kernel/locking/rtmutex_api.c,
which causes failures when building with CONFIG_RT_MUTEXES=y.  Bring over
the changes.

Fixes: fb49f07ba1 ("locking/mutex: implement mutex_lock_killable_nest_lock")
Reported-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Tested-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2025-06-02 03:05:09 -04:00
Chen Yu
ad6b26b6a0 sched/numa: add statistics of numa balance task
On systems with NUMA balancing enabled, it has been found that tracking
task activities resulting from NUMA balancing is beneficial.  NUMA
balancing employs two mechanisms for task migration: one is to migrate
a task to an idle CPU within its preferred node, and the other is to
swap tasks located on different nodes when they are on each other's
preferred nodes.

The kernel already provides NUMA page migration statistics in
/sys/fs/cgroup/mytest/memory.stat and /proc/{PID}/sched.  However, it
lacks statistics regarding task migration and swapping.  Therefore,
relevant counts for task migration and swapping should be added.

The following two new fields:

numa_task_migrated
numa_task_swapped

will be shown in /sys/fs/cgroup/{GROUP}/memory.stat, /proc/{PID}/sched
and /proc/vmstat.

Introducing both per-task and per-memory cgroup (memcg) NUMA balancing
statistics facilitates a rapid evaluation of the performance and
resource utilization of the target workload.  For instance, users can
first identify the container with high NUMA balancing activity and then
further pinpoint a specific task within that group, and subsequently
adjust the memory policy for that task.  In short, although it is
possible to iterate through /proc/$pid/sched to locate the problematic
task, the introduction of aggregated NUMA balancing activity for tasks
within each memcg can assist users in identifying the task more
efficiently through a divide-and-conquer approach.

As Libo Chen pointed out, the memcg event relies on the text names in
vmstat_text, and /proc/vmstat generates corresponding items based on
vmstat_text.  Thus, the relevant task migration and swapping events
introduced in vmstat_text also need to be populated by
count_vm_numa_event(), otherwise these values are zero in /proc/vmstat.

In theory, task migration and swap events are part of the scheduler's
activities.  The reason for exposing them through the
memory.stat/vmstat interface is that we already have NUMA balancing
statistics in memory.stat/vmstat, and these events are closely related
to each other.  Following Shakeel's suggestion, we describe the
end-to-end flow/story of all these events occurring on a timeline for
future reference:

The goal of NUMA balancing is to co-locate a task and its memory pages
on the same NUMA node.  There are two strategies: migrate the pages to
the task's node, or migrate the task to the node where its pages
reside.

Suppose a task p1 is running on Node 0, but its pages are located on
Node 1.  NUMA page fault statistics for p1 reveal its "page footprint"
across nodes.  If NUMA balancing detects that most of p1's pages are on
Node 1:

1.Page Migration Attempt:
The Numa balance first tries to migrate p1's pages to Node 0.
The numa_page_migrate counter increments.

2.Task Migration Strategies:
After the page migration finishes, Numa balance checks every
1 second to see if p1 can be migrated to Node 1.

Case 2.1: Idle CPU Available

  If Node 1 has an idle CPU, p1 is directly scheduled there.  This
  event is logged as numa_task_migrated.

Case 2.2: No Idle CPU (Task Swap)

  If all CPUs on Node1 are busy, direct migration could cause CPU
  contention or load imbalance.  Instead: The Numa balance selects a
  candidate task p2 on Node 1 that prefers Node 0 (e.g., due to its own
  page footprint).  p1 and p2 are swapped.  This cross-node swap is
  recorded as numa_task_swapped.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/d00edb12ba0f0de3c5222f61487e65f2ac58f5b1.1748493462.git.yu.c.chen@intel.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/7ef90a88602ed536be46eba7152ed0d33bad5790.1748002400.git.yu.c.chen@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Chen Yu <yu.c.chen@intel.com>
Tested-by: K Prateek Nayak <kprateek.nayak@amd.com>
Tested-by: Madadi Vineeth Reddy <vineethr@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Tested-by: Venkat Rao Bagalkote <venkat88@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Aubrey Li <aubrey.li@intel.com>
Cc: Ayush Jain <Ayush.jain3@amd.com>
Cc: "Chen, Tim C" <tim.c.chen@intel.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Libo Chen <libo.chen@oracle.com>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org>
Cc: Michal Koutný <mkoutny@suse.com>
Cc: Muchun Song <muchun.song@linux.dev>
Cc: Roman Gushchin <roman.gushchin@linux.dev>
Cc: Shakeel Butt <shakeel.butt@linux.dev>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2025-05-31 22:46:15 -07:00
Libo Chen
9709eb0f84 sched/numa: fix task swap by skipping kernel threads
Patch series "sched/numa: add statistics of numa balance task migration",
v6.

Introduce task migration and swap statistics in the following places:
/sys/fs/cgroup/{GROUP}/memory.stat
/proc/{PID}/sched
/proc/vmstat

These statistics facilitate a rapid evaluation of the performance and
resource utilization of the target workload.


This patch (of 2):

Task swapping is triggered when there are no idle CPUs in task A's
preferred node.  In this case, the NUMA load balancer chooses a task B
on A's preferred node and swaps B with A.  This helps improve NUMA
locality without introducing load imbalance between nodes.  In the
current implementation, B's NUMA node preference is not mandatory. 
That is to say, a kernel thread might be incorrectly chosen as B. 
However, kernel thread and user space thread that does not have mm are
not supposed to be covered by NUMA balancing because NUMA balancing
only considers user pages via VMAs.

According to Peter's suggestion for fixing this issue, we use
PF_KTHREAD to skip the kernel thread.  curr->mm is also checked because
it is possible that user_mode_thread() might create a user thread
without an mm.  As per Prateek's analysis, after adding the PF_KTHREAD
check, there is no need to further check the PF_IDLE flag:

: - play_idle_precise() already ensures PF_KTHREAD is set before adding
:   PF_IDLE
: 
: - cpu_startup_entry() is only called from the startup thread which
:   should be marked with PF_KTHREAD (based on my understanding looking at
:   commit cff9b2332a ("kernel/sched: Modify initial boot task idle
:   setup"))

In summary, the check in task_numa_compare() now aligns with
task_tick_numa().

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/cover.1748493462.git.yu.c.chen@intel.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/43d68b356b25d124f0d222ebedf3859e86eefb9f.1748493462.git.yu.c.chen@intel.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/cover.1748002400.git.yu.c.chen@intel.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/eaacc9c9bd37bac92d43a671867d85b2fdad3b06.1748002400.git.yu.c.chen@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Chen Yu <yu.c.chen@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Libo Chen <libo.chen@oracle.com>
Suggested-by: Michal Koutný <mkoutny@suse.com>
Tested-by: Ayush Jain <Ayush.jain3@amd.com>
Tested-by: Venkat Rao Bagalkote <venkat88@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Shakeel Butt <shakeel.butt@linux.dev>
Cc: Aubrey Li <aubrey.li@intel.com>
Cc: "Chen, Tim C" <tim.c.chen@intel.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: K Prateek Nayak <kprateek.nayak@amd.com>
Cc: Madadi Vineeth Reddy <vineethr@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org>
Cc: Muchun Song <muchun.song@linux.dev>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Roman Gushchin <roman.gushchin@linux.dev>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2025-05-31 22:46:15 -07:00
Matthew Wilcox (Oracle)
acc53a0b4c mm: rename page->index to page->__folio_index
All users of page->index have been converted to not refer to it any more. 
Update a few pieces of documentation that were missed and prevent new
users from appearing (or at least make them easy to grep for).

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250514181508.3019795-1-willy@infradead.org
Signed-off-by: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2025-05-31 22:46:06 -07:00
Linus Torvalds
7d4e49a77d Merge tag 'mm-nonmm-stable-2025-05-31-15-28' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm
Pull non-MM updates from Andrew Morton:

 - "hung_task: extend blocking task stacktrace dump to semaphore" from
   Lance Yang enhances the hung task detector.

   The detector presently dumps the blocking tasks's stack when it is
   blocked on a mutex. Lance's series extends this to semaphores

 - "nilfs2: improve sanity checks in dirty state propagation" from
   Wentao Liang addresses a couple of minor flaws in nilfs2

 - "scripts/gdb: Fixes related to lx_per_cpu()" from Illia Ostapyshyn
   fixes a couple of issues in the gdb scripts

 - "Support kdump with LUKS encryption by reusing LUKS volume keys" from
   Coiby Xu addresses a usability problem with kdump.

   When the dump device is LUKS-encrypted, the kdump kernel may not have
   the keys to the encrypted filesystem. A full writeup of this is in
   the series [0/N] cover letter

 - "sysfs: add counters for lockups and stalls" from Max Kellermann adds
   /sys/kernel/hardlockup_count and /sys/kernel/hardlockup_count and
   /sys/kernel/rcu_stall_count

 - "fork: Page operation cleanups in the fork code" from Pasha Tatashin
   implements a number of code cleanups in fork.c

 - "scripts/gdb/symbols: determine KASLR offset on s390 during early
   boot" from Ilya Leoshkevich fixes some s390 issues in the gdb
   scripts

* tag 'mm-nonmm-stable-2025-05-31-15-28' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm: (67 commits)
  llist: make llist_add_batch() a static inline
  delayacct: remove redundant code and adjust indentation
  squashfs: add optional full compressed block caching
  crash_dump, nvme: select CONFIGFS_FS as built-in
  scripts/gdb/symbols: determine KASLR offset on s390 during early boot
  scripts/gdb/symbols: factor out pagination_off()
  scripts/gdb/symbols: factor out get_vmlinux()
  kernel/panic.c: format kernel-doc comments
  mailmap: update and consolidate Casey Connolly's name and email
  nilfs2: remove wbc->for_reclaim handling
  fork: define a local GFP_VMAP_STACK
  fork: check charging success before zeroing stack
  fork: clean-up naming of vm_stack/vm_struct variables in vmap stacks code
  fork: clean-up ifdef logic around stack allocation
  kernel/rcu/tree_stall: add /sys/kernel/rcu_stall_count
  kernel/watchdog: add /sys/kernel/{hard,soft}lockup_count
  x86/crash: make the page that stores the dm crypt keys inaccessible
  x86/crash: pass dm crypt keys to kdump kernel
  Revert "x86/mm: Remove unused __set_memory_prot()"
  crash_dump: retrieve dm crypt keys in kdump kernel
  ...
2025-05-31 19:12:53 -07:00
Linus Torvalds
00c010e130 Merge tag 'mm-stable-2025-05-31-14-50' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm
Pull MM updates from Andrew Morton:

 - "Add folio_mk_pte()" from Matthew Wilcox simplifies the act of
   creating a pte which addresses the first page in a folio and reduces
   the amount of plumbing which architecture must implement to provide
   this.

 - "Misc folio patches for 6.16" from Matthew Wilcox is a shower of
   largely unrelated folio infrastructure changes which clean things up
   and better prepare us for future work.

 - "memory,x86,acpi: hotplug memory alignment advisement" from Gregory
   Price adds early-init code to prevent x86 from leaving physical
   memory unused when physical address regions are not aligned to memory
   block size.

 - "mm/compaction: allow more aggressive proactive compaction" from
   Michal Clapinski provides some tuning of the (sadly, hard-coded (more
   sadly, not auto-tuned)) thresholds for our invokation of proactive
   compaction. In a simple test case, the reduction of a guest VM's
   memory consumption was dramatic.

 - "Minor cleanups and improvements to swap freeing code" from Kemeng
   Shi provides some code cleaups and a small efficiency improvement to
   this part of our swap handling code.

 - "ptrace: introduce PTRACE_SET_SYSCALL_INFO API" from Dmitry Levin
   adds the ability for a ptracer to modify syscalls arguments. At this
   time we can alter only "system call information that are used by
   strace system call tampering, namely, syscall number, syscall
   arguments, and syscall return value.

   This series should have been incorporated into mm.git's "non-MM"
   branch, but I goofed.

 - "fs/proc: extend the PAGEMAP_SCAN ioctl to report guard regions" from
   Andrei Vagin extends the info returned by the PAGEMAP_SCAN ioctl
   against /proc/pid/pagemap. This permits CRIU to more efficiently get
   at the info about guard regions.

 - "Fix parameter passed to page_mapcount_is_type()" from Gavin Shan
   implements that fix. No runtime effect is expected because
   validate_page_before_insert() happens to fix up this error.

 - "kernel/events/uprobes: uprobe_write_opcode() rewrite" from David
   Hildenbrand basically brings uprobe text poking into the current
   decade. Remove a bunch of hand-rolled implementation in favor of
   using more current facilities.

 - "mm/ptdump: Drop assumption that pxd_val() is u64" from Anshuman
   Khandual provides enhancements and generalizations to the pte dumping
   code. This might be needed when 128-bit Page Table Descriptors are
   enabled for ARM.

 - "Always call constructor for kernel page tables" from Kevin Brodsky
   ensures that the ctor/dtor is always called for kernel pgtables, as
   it already is for user pgtables.

   This permits the addition of more functionality such as "insert hooks
   to protect page tables". This change does result in various
   architectures performing unnecesary work, but this is fixed up where
   it is anticipated to occur.

 - "Rust support for mm_struct, vm_area_struct, and mmap" from Alice
   Ryhl adds plumbing to permit Rust access to core MM structures.

 - "fix incorrectly disallowed anonymous VMA merges" from Lorenzo
   Stoakes takes advantage of some VMA merging opportunities which we've
   been missing for 15 years.

 - "mm/madvise: batch tlb flushes for MADV_DONTNEED and MADV_FREE" from
   SeongJae Park optimizes process_madvise()'s TLB flushing.

   Instead of flushing each address range in the provided iovec, we
   batch the flushing across all the iovec entries. The syscall's cost
   was approximately halved with a microbenchmark which was designed to
   load this particular operation.

 - "Track node vacancy to reduce worst case allocation counts" from
   Sidhartha Kumar makes the maple tree smarter about its node
   preallocation.

   stress-ng mmap performance increased by single-digit percentages and
   the amount of unnecessarily preallocated memory was dramaticelly
   reduced.

 - "mm/gup: Minor fix, cleanup and improvements" from Baoquan He removes
   a few unnecessary things which Baoquan noted when reading the code.

 - ""Enhance sysfs handling for memory hotplug in weighted interleave"
   from Rakie Kim "enhances the weighted interleave policy in the memory
   management subsystem by improving sysfs handling, fixing memory
   leaks, and introducing dynamic sysfs updates for memory hotplug
   support". Fixes things on error paths which we are unlikely to hit.

 - "mm/damon: auto-tune DAMOS for NUMA setups including tiered memory"
   from SeongJae Park introduces new DAMOS quota goal metrics which
   eliminate the manual tuning which is required when utilizing DAMON
   for memory tiering.

 - "mm/vmalloc.c: code cleanup and improvements" from Baoquan He
   provides cleanups and small efficiency improvements which Baoquan
   found via code inspection.

 - "vmscan: enforce mems_effective during demotion" from Gregory Price
   changes reclaim to respect cpuset.mems_effective during demotion when
   possible. because presently, reclaim explicitly ignores
   cpuset.mems_effective when demoting, which may cause the cpuset
   settings to violated.

   This is useful for isolating workloads on a multi-tenant system from
   certain classes of memory more consistently.

 - "Clean up split_huge_pmd_locked() and remove unnecessary folio
   pointers" from Gavin Guo provides minor cleanups and efficiency gains
   in in the huge page splitting and migrating code.

 - "Use kmem_cache for memcg alloc" from Huan Yang creates a slab cache
   for `struct mem_cgroup', yielding improved memory utilization.

 - "add max arg to swappiness in memory.reclaim and lru_gen" from
   Zhongkun He adds a new "max" argument to the "swappiness=" argument
   for memory.reclaim MGLRU's lru_gen.

   This directs proactive reclaim to reclaim from only anon folios
   rather than file-backed folios.

 - "kexec: introduce Kexec HandOver (KHO)" from Mike Rapoport is the
   first step on the path to permitting the kernel to maintain existing
   VMs while replacing the host kernel via file-based kexec. At this
   time only memblock's reserve_mem is preserved.

 - "mm: Introduce for_each_valid_pfn()" from David Woodhouse provides
   and uses a smarter way of looping over a pfn range. By skipping
   ranges of invalid pfns.

 - "sched/numa: Skip VMA scanning on memory pinned to one NUMA node via
   cpuset.mems" from Libo Chen removes a lot of pointless VMA scanning
   when a task is pinned a single NUMA mode.

   Dramatic performance benefits were seen in some real world cases.

 - "JFS: Implement migrate_folio for jfs_metapage_aops" from Shivank
   Garg addresses a warning which occurs during memory compaction when
   using JFS.

 - "move all VMA allocation, freeing and duplication logic to mm" from
   Lorenzo Stoakes moves some VMA code from kernel/fork.c into the more
   appropriate mm/vma.c.

 - "mm, swap: clean up swap cache mapping helper" from Kairui Song
   provides code consolidation and cleanups related to the folio_index()
   function.

 - "mm/gup: Cleanup memfd_pin_folios()" from Vishal Moola does that.

 - "memcg: Fix test_memcg_min/low test failures" from Waiman Long
   addresses some bogus failures which are being reported by the
   test_memcontrol selftest.

 - "eliminate mmap() retry merge, add .mmap_prepare hook" from Lorenzo
   Stoakes commences the deprecation of file_operations.mmap() in favor
   of the new file_operations.mmap_prepare().

   The latter is more restrictive and prevents drivers from messing with
   things in ways which, amongst other problems, may defeat VMA merging.

 - "memcg: decouple memcg and objcg stocks"" from Shakeel Butt decouples
   the per-cpu memcg charge cache from the objcg's one.

   This is a step along the way to making memcg and objcg charging
   NMI-safe, which is a BPF requirement.

 - "mm/damon: minor fixups and improvements for code, tests, and
   documents" from SeongJae Park is yet another batch of miscellaneous
   DAMON changes. Fix and improve minor problems in code, tests and
   documents.

 - "memcg: make memcg stats irq safe" from Shakeel Butt converts memcg
   stats to be irq safe. Another step along the way to making memcg
   charging and stats updates NMI-safe, a BPF requirement.

 - "Let unmap_hugepage_range() and several related functions take folio
   instead of page" from Fan Ni provides folio conversions in the
   hugetlb code.

* tag 'mm-stable-2025-05-31-14-50' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm: (285 commits)
  mm: pcp: increase pcp->free_count threshold to trigger free_high
  mm/hugetlb: convert use of struct page to folio in __unmap_hugepage_range()
  mm/hugetlb: refactor __unmap_hugepage_range() to take folio instead of page
  mm/hugetlb: refactor unmap_hugepage_range() to take folio instead of page
  mm/hugetlb: pass folio instead of page to unmap_ref_private()
  memcg: objcg stock trylock without irq disabling
  memcg: no stock lock for cpu hot-unplug
  memcg: make __mod_memcg_lruvec_state re-entrant safe against irqs
  memcg: make count_memcg_events re-entrant safe against irqs
  memcg: make mod_memcg_state re-entrant safe against irqs
  memcg: move preempt disable to callers of memcg_rstat_updated
  memcg: memcg_rstat_updated re-entrant safe against irqs
  mm: khugepaged: decouple SHMEM and file folios' collapse
  selftests/eventfd: correct test name and improve messages
  alloc_tag: check mem_profiling_support in alloc_tag_init
  Docs/damon: update titles and brief introductions to explain DAMOS
  selftests/damon/_damon_sysfs: read tried regions directories in order
  mm/damon/tests/core-kunit: add a test for damos_set_filters_default_reject()
  mm/damon/paddr: remove unused variable, folio_list, in damon_pa_stat()
  mm/damon/sysfs-schemes: fix wrong comment on damons_sysfs_quota_goal_metric_strs
  ...
2025-05-31 15:44:16 -07:00
Linus Torvalds
dee264c16a Merge tag 'gcc-minimum-version-6.16' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/arnd/asm-generic
Pull compiler version requirement update from Arnd Bergmann:
 "Require gcc-8 and binutils-2.30

  x86 already uses gcc-8 as the minimum version, this changes all other
  architectures to the same version. gcc-8 is used is Debian 10 and Red
  Hat Enterprise Linux 8, both of which are still supported, and
  binutils 2.30 is the oldest corresponding version on those.

  Ubuntu Pro 18.04 and SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 15 both use gcc-7 as
  the system compiler but additionally include toolchains that remain
  supported.

  With the new minimum toolchain versions, a number of workarounds for
  older versions can be dropped, in particular on x86_64 and arm64.
  Importantly, the updated compiler version allows removing two of the
  five remaining gcc plugins, as support for sancov and structeak
  features is already included in modern compiler versions.

  I tried collecting the known changes that are possible based on the
  new toolchain version, but expect that more cleanups will be possible.

  Since this touches multiple architectures, I merged the patches
  through the asm-generic tree."

* tag 'gcc-minimum-version-6.16' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/arnd/asm-generic:
  Makefile.kcov: apply needed compiler option unconditionally in CFLAGS_KCOV
  Documentation: update binutils-2.30 version reference
  gcc-plugins: remove SANCOV gcc plugin
  Kbuild: remove structleak gcc plugin
  arm64: drop binutils version checks
  raid6: skip avx512 checks
  kbuild: require gcc-8 and binutils-2.30
2025-05-31 08:16:52 -07:00
Linus Torvalds
8bf722c684 Merge tag 'trace-ringbuffer-v6.16' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/trace/linux-trace
Pull ring-buffer updates from Steven Rostedt:

 - Allow the persistent ring buffer to be memory mapped

   In the last merge window there was issues with the implementation of
   mapping the persistent ring buffer because it was assumed that the
   persistent memory was just physical memory without being part of the
   kernel virtual address space. But this was incorrect and the
   persistent ring buffer can be mapped the same way as the allocated
   ring buffer is mapped.

   The metadata for the persistent ring buffer is different than the
   normal ring buffer and the organization of mapping it to user space
   is a little different. Make the updates needed to the meta data to
   allow the persistent ring buffer to be mapped to user space.

 - Fix cpus_read_lock() with buffer->mutex and cpu_buffer->mapping_lock

   Mapping the ring buffer to user space uses the
   cpu_buffer->mapping_lock. The buffer->mutex can be taken when the
   mapping_lock is held, giving the locking order of:
   cpu_buffer->mapping_lock -->> buffer->mutex. But there also exists
   the ordering:

       buffer->mutex -->> cpus_read_lock()
       mm->mmap_lock -->> cpu_buffer->mapping_lock
       cpus_read_lock() -->> mm->mmap_lock

   causing a circular chain of:

       cpu_buffer->mapping_lock -> buffer->mutex -->> cpus_read_lock() -->>
          mm->mmap_lock -->> cpu_buffer->mapping_lock

   By moving the cpus_read_lock() outside the buffer->mutex where:
   cpus_read_lock() -->> buffer->mutex, breaks the deadlock chain.

 - Do not trigger WARN_ON() for commit overrun

   When the ring buffer is user space mapped and there's a "commit
   overrun" (where an interrupt preempted an event, and then added so
   many events it filled the buffer having to drop events when it hit
   the preempted event) a WARN_ON() was triggered if this was read via a
   memory mapped buffer.

   This is due to "missed events" being non zero when the reader page
   ended up with the commit page. The idea was, if the writer is on the
   reader page, there's only one page that has been written to and there
   should be no missed events.

   But if a commit overrun is done where the writer is off the commit
   page and looped around to the commit page causing missed events, it
   is possible that the reader page is the commit page with missed
   events.

   Instead of triggering a WARN_ON() when the reader page is the commit
   page with missed events, trigger it when the reader page is the
   tail_page with missed events. That's because the writer is always on
   the tail_page if an event was interrupted (which holds the commit
   event) and continues off the commit page.

 - Reset the persistent buffer if it is fully consumed

   On boot up, if the user fully consumes the last boot buffer of the
   persistent buffer, if it reboots without enabling it, there will
   still be events in the buffer which can cause confusion. Instead,
   reset the buffer when it is fully consumed, so that the data is not
   read again.

 - Clean up some goto out jumps

   There's a few cases that the code jumps to the "out:" label that
   simply returns a value. There used to be more work done at those
   labels but now that they simply return a value use a return instead
   of jumping to a label.

 - Use guard() to simplify some of the code

   Add guard() around some locking instead of jumping to a label to do
   the unlocking.

 - Use free() to simplify some of the code

   Use free(kfree) on variables that will get freed on error and use
   return_ptr() to return the variable when its not freed. There's one
   instance where free(kfree) simplifies the code on a temp variable
   that was allocated just for the function use.

* tag 'trace-ringbuffer-v6.16' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/trace/linux-trace:
  ring-buffer: Simplify functions with __free(kfree) to free allocations
  ring-buffer: Make ring_buffer_{un}map() simpler with guard(mutex)
  ring-buffer: Simplify ring_buffer_read_page() with guard()
  ring-buffer: Simplify reset_disabled_cpu_buffer() with use of guard()
  ring-buffer: Remove jump to out label in ring_buffer_swap_cpu()
  ring-buffer: Removed unnecessary if() goto out where out is the next line
  tracing: Reset last-boot buffers when reading out all cpu buffers
  ring-buffer: Allow reserve_mem persistent ring buffers to be mmapped
  ring-buffer: Do not trigger WARN_ON() due to a commit_overrun
  ring-buffer: Move cpus_read_lock() outside of buffer->mutex
2025-05-30 21:20:11 -07:00