mirror of
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git
synced 2025-09-04 20:19:47 +08:00
ef3c313119
134 Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Linus Torvalds
|
063a7ce32d |
lsm/stable-6.8 PR 20240105
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQJIBAABCAAyFiEES0KozwfymdVUl37v6iDy2pc3iXMFAmWYKUIUHHBhdWxAcGF1 bC1tb29yZS5jb20ACgkQ6iDy2pc3iXNyHw/+IKnqL1MZ5QS+/HtSzi4jCL47N9yZ OHLol6XswyEGHH9myKPPGnT5lVA93v98v4ty2mws7EJUSGZQQUntYBPbU9Gi40+B XDzYSRocoj96sdlKeOJMgaWo3NBRD9HYSoGPDNWZixy6m+bLPk/Dqhn3FabKf1lo 2qQSmstvChFRmVNkmgaQnBCAtWVqla4EJEL0EKX6cspHbuzRNTeJdTPn6Q/zOUVL O2znOZuEtSVpYS7yg3uJT0hHD8H0GnIciAcDAhyPSBL5Uk5l6gwJiACcdRfLRbgp QM5Z4qUFdKljV5XBCzYnfhhrx1df08h1SG84El8UK8HgTTfOZfYmawByJRWNJSQE TdCmtyyvEbfb61CKBFVwD7Tzb9/y8WgcY5N3Un8uCQqRzFIO+6cghHri5NrVhifp nPFlP4klxLHh3d7ZVekLmCMHbpaacRyJKwLy+f/nwbBEID47jpPkvZFIpbalat+r QaKRBNWdTeV+GZ+Yu0uWsI029aQnpcO1kAnGg09fl6b/dsmxeKOVWebir25AzQ++ a702S8HRmj80X+VnXHU9a64XeGtBH7Nq0vu0lGHQPgwhSx/9P6/qICEPwsIriRjR I9OulWt4OBPDtlsonHFgDs+lbnd0Z0GJUwYT8e9pjRDMxijVO9lhAXyglVRmuNR8 to2ByKP5BO+Vh8Y= =Py+n -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Merge tag 'lsm-pr-20240105' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm Pull security module updates from Paul Moore: - Add three new syscalls: lsm_list_modules(), lsm_get_self_attr(), and lsm_set_self_attr(). The first syscall simply lists the LSMs enabled, while the second and third get and set the current process' LSM attributes. Yes, these syscalls may provide similar functionality to what can be found under /proc or /sys, but they were designed to support multiple, simultaneaous (stacked) LSMs from the start as opposed to the current /proc based solutions which were created at a time when only one LSM was allowed to be active at a given time. We have spent considerable time discussing ways to extend the existing /proc interfaces to support multiple, simultaneaous LSMs and even our best ideas have been far too ugly to support as a kernel API; after +20 years in the kernel, I felt the LSM layer had established itself enough to justify a handful of syscalls. Support amongst the individual LSM developers has been nearly unanimous, with a single objection coming from Tetsuo (TOMOYO) as he is worried that the LSM_ID_XXX token concept will make it more difficult for out-of-tree LSMs to survive. Several members of the LSM community have demonstrated the ability for out-of-tree LSMs to continue to exist by picking high/unused LSM_ID values as well as pointing out that many kernel APIs rely on integer identifiers, e.g. syscalls (!), but unfortunately Tetsuo's objections remain. My personal opinion is that while I have no interest in penalizing out-of-tree LSMs, I'm not going to penalize in-tree development to support out-of-tree development, and I view this as a necessary step forward to support the push for expanded LSM stacking and reduce our reliance on /proc and /sys which has occassionally been problematic for some container users. Finally, we have included the linux-api folks on (all?) recent revisions of the patchset and addressed all of their concerns. - Add a new security_file_ioctl_compat() LSM hook to handle the 32-bit ioctls on 64-bit systems problem. This patch includes support for all of the existing LSMs which provide ioctl hooks, although it turns out only SELinux actually cares about the individual ioctls. It is worth noting that while Casey (Smack) and Tetsuo (TOMOYO) did not give explicit ACKs to this patch, they did both indicate they are okay with the changes. - Fix a potential memory leak in the CALIPSO code when IPv6 is disabled at boot. While it's good that we are fixing this, I doubt this is something users are seeing in the wild as you need to both disable IPv6 and then attempt to configure IPv6 labeled networking via NetLabel/CALIPSO; that just doesn't make much sense. Normally this would go through netdev, but Jakub asked me to take this patch and of all the trees I maintain, the LSM tree seemed like the best fit. - Update the LSM MAINTAINERS entry with additional information about our process docs, patchwork, bug reporting, etc. I also noticed that the Lockdown LSM is missing a dedicated MAINTAINERS entry so I've added that to the pull request. I've been working with one of the major Lockdown authors/contributors to see if they are willing to step up and assume a Lockdown maintainer role; hopefully that will happen soon, but in the meantime I'll continue to look after it. - Add a handful of mailmap entries for Serge Hallyn and myself. * tag 'lsm-pr-20240105' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm: (27 commits) lsm: new security_file_ioctl_compat() hook lsm: Add a __counted_by() annotation to lsm_ctx.ctx calipso: fix memory leak in netlbl_calipso_add_pass() selftests: remove the LSM_ID_IMA check in lsm/lsm_list_modules_test MAINTAINERS: add an entry for the lockdown LSM MAINTAINERS: update the LSM entry mailmap: add entries for Serge Hallyn's dead accounts mailmap: update/replace my old email addresses lsm: mark the lsm_id variables are marked as static lsm: convert security_setselfattr() to use memdup_user() lsm: align based on pointer length in lsm_fill_user_ctx() lsm: consolidate buffer size handling into lsm_fill_user_ctx() lsm: correct error codes in security_getselfattr() lsm: cleanup the size counters in security_getselfattr() lsm: don't yet account for IMA in LSM_CONFIG_COUNT calculation lsm: drop LSM_ID_IMA LSM: selftests for Linux Security Module syscalls SELinux: Add selfattr hooks AppArmor: Add selfattr hooks Smack: implement setselfattr and getselfattr hooks ... |
||
|
Linus Torvalds
|
a4aebe9365 |
posix-timers: Get rid of [COMPAT_]SYS_NI() uses
Only the posix timer system calls use this (when the posix timer support is disabled, which does not actually happen in any normal case), because they had debug code to print out a warning about missing system calls. Get rid of that special case, and just use the standard COND_SYSCALL interface that creates weak system call stubs that return -ENOSYS for when the system call does not exist. This fixes a kCFI issue with the SYS_NI() hackery: CFI failure at int80_emulation+0x67/0xb0 (target: sys_ni_posix_timers+0x0/0x70; expected type: 0xb02b34d9) WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 48 at int80_emulation+0x67/0xb0 Reported-by: kernel test robot <oliver.sang@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com> Tested-by: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |
||
|
Casey Schaufler
|
ad4aff9ec2 |
LSM: Create lsm_list_modules system call
Create a system call to report the list of Linux Security Modules that are active on the system. The list is provided as an array of LSM ID numbers. The calling application can use this list determine what LSM specific actions it might take. That might include choosing an output format, determining required privilege or bypassing security module specific behavior. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Reviewed-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> |
||
|
Casey Schaufler
|
a04a119808 |
LSM: syscalls for current process attributes
Create a system call lsm_get_self_attr() to provide the security
module maintained attributes of the current process.
Create a system call lsm_set_self_attr() to set a security
module maintained attribute of the current process.
Historically these attributes have been exposed to user space via
entries in procfs under /proc/self/attr.
The attribute value is provided in a lsm_ctx structure. The structure
identifies the size of the attribute, and the attribute value. The format
of the attribute value is defined by the security module. A flags field
is included for LSM specific information. It is currently unused and must
be 0. The total size of the data, including the lsm_ctx structure and any
padding, is maintained as well.
struct lsm_ctx {
__u64 id;
__u64 flags;
__u64 len;
__u64 ctx_len;
__u8 ctx[];
};
Two new LSM hooks are used to interface with the LSMs.
security_getselfattr() collects the lsm_ctx values from the
LSMs that support the hook, accounting for space requirements.
security_setselfattr() identifies which LSM the attribute is
intended for and passes it along.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
|
||
|
Linus Torvalds
|
1e0c505e13 |
asm-generic updates for v6.7
The ia64 architecture gets its well-earned retirement as planned, now that there is one last (mostly) working release that will be maintained as an LTS kernel. The architecture specific system call tables are updated for the added map_shadow_stack() syscall and to remove references to the long-gone sys_lookup_dcookie() syscall. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQIzBAABCgAdFiEEiK/NIGsWEZVxh/FrYKtH/8kJUicFAmVC40IACgkQYKtH/8kJ Uidhmw/9EX+aWSXGoObJ3fngaNSMw+PmrEuP8qEKBHxfKHcCdX3hc451Oh4GlhaQ tru91pPwgNvN2/rfoKusxT+V4PemGIzfNni/04rp+P0kvmdw5otQ2yNhsQNsfVmq XGWvkxF4P2GO6bkjjfR/1dDq7GtlyXtwwPDKeLbYb6TnJOZjtx+EAN27kkfSn1Ms R4Sa3zJ+DfHUmHL5S9g+7UD/CZ5GfKNmIskI4Mz5GsfoUz/0iiU+Bge/9sdcdSJQ kmbLy5YnVzfooLZ3TQmBFsO3iAMWb0s/mDdtyhqhTVmTUshLolkPYyKnPFvdupyv shXcpEST2XJNeaDRnL2K4zSCdxdbnCZHDpjfl9wfioBg7I8NfhXKpf1jYZHH1de4 LXq8ndEFEOVQw/zSpYWfQq1sux8Jiqr+UK/ukbVeFWiGGIUs91gEWtPAf8T0AZo9 ujkJvaWGl98O1g5wmBu0/dAR6QcFJMDfVwbmlIFpU8O+MEaz6X8mM+O5/T0IyTcD eMbAUjj4uYcU7ihKzHEv/0SS9Of38kzff67CLN5k8wOP/9NlaGZ78o1bVle9b52A BdhrsAefFiWHp1jT6Y9Rg4HOO/TguQ9e6EWSKOYFulsiLH9LEFaB9RwZLeLytV0W vlAgY9rUW77g1OJcb7DoNv33nRFuxsKqsnz3DEIXtgozo9CzbYI= =H1vH -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Merge tag 'asm-generic-6.7' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/arnd/asm-generic Pull ia64 removal and asm-generic updates from Arnd Bergmann: - The ia64 architecture gets its well-earned retirement as planned, now that there is one last (mostly) working release that will be maintained as an LTS kernel. - The architecture specific system call tables are updated for the added map_shadow_stack() syscall and to remove references to the long-gone sys_lookup_dcookie() syscall. * tag 'asm-generic-6.7' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/arnd/asm-generic: hexagon: Remove unusable symbols from the ptrace.h uapi asm-generic: Fix spelling of architecture arch: Reserve map_shadow_stack() syscall number for all architectures syscalls: Cleanup references to sys_lookup_dcookie() Documentation: Drop or replace remaining mentions of IA64 lib/raid6: Drop IA64 support Documentation: Drop IA64 from feature descriptions kernel: Drop IA64 support from sig_fault handlers arch: Remove Itanium (IA-64) architecture |
||
|
Sohil Mehta
|
ccab211af3 |
syscalls: Cleanup references to sys_lookup_dcookie()
commit 'be65de6b03aa ("fs: Remove dcookies support")' removed the
syscall definition for lookup_dcookie. However, syscall tables still
point to the old sys_lookup_dcookie() definition. Update syscall tables
of all architectures to directly point to sys_ni_syscall() instead.
Signed-off-by: Sohil Mehta <sohil.mehta@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Acked-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> # for perf
Acked-by: Russell King (Oracle) <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
|
||
|
peterz@infradead.org
|
0f4b5f9722 |
futex: Add sys_futex_requeue()
Finish off the 'simple' futex2 syscall group by adding
sys_futex_requeue(). Unlike sys_futex_{wait,wake}() its arguments are
too numerous to fit into a regular syscall. As such, use struct
futex_waitv to pass the 'source' and 'destination' futexes to the
syscall.
This syscall implements what was previously known as FUTEX_CMP_REQUEUE
and uses {val, uaddr, flags} for source and {uaddr, flags} for
destination.
This design explicitly allows requeueing between different types of
futex by having a different flags word per uaddr.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230921105248.511860556@noisy.programming.kicks-ass.net
|
||
|
peterz@infradead.org
|
cb8c4312af |
futex: Add sys_futex_wait()
To complement sys_futex_waitv()/wake(), add sys_futex_wait(). This syscall implements what was previously known as FUTEX_WAIT_BITSET except it uses 'unsigned long' for the value and bitmask arguments, takes timespec and clockid_t arguments for the absolute timeout and uses FUTEX2 flags. The 'unsigned long' allows FUTEX2_SIZE_U64 on 64bit platforms. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230921105248.164324363@noisy.programming.kicks-ass.net |
||
|
peterz@infradead.org
|
9f6c532f59 |
futex: Add sys_futex_wake()
To complement sys_futex_waitv() add sys_futex_wake(). This syscall implements what was previously known as FUTEX_WAKE_BITSET except it uses 'unsigned long' for the bitmask and takes FUTEX2 flags. The 'unsigned long' allows FUTEX2_SIZE_U64 on 64bit platforms. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230921105247.936205525@noisy.programming.kicks-ass.net |
||
|
Rick Edgecombe
|
c35559f94e |
x86/shstk: Introduce map_shadow_stack syscall
When operating with shadow stacks enabled, the kernel will automatically allocate shadow stacks for new threads, however in some cases userspace will need additional shadow stacks. The main example of this is the ucontext family of functions, which require userspace allocating and pivoting to userspace managed stacks. Unlike most other user memory permissions, shadow stacks need to be provisioned with special data in order to be useful. They need to be setup with a restore token so that userspace can pivot to them via the RSTORSSP instruction. But, the security design of shadow stacks is that they should not be written to except in limited circumstances. This presents a problem for userspace, as to how userspace can provision this special data, without allowing for the shadow stack to be generally writable. Previously, a new PROT_SHADOW_STACK was attempted, which could be mprotect()ed from RW permissions after the data was provisioned. This was found to not be secure enough, as other threads could write to the shadow stack during the writable window. The kernel can use a special instruction, WRUSS, to write directly to userspace shadow stacks. So the solution can be that memory can be mapped as shadow stack permissions from the beginning (never generally writable in userspace), and the kernel itself can write the restore token. First, a new madvise() flag was explored, which could operate on the PROT_SHADOW_STACK memory. This had a couple of downsides: 1. Extra checks were needed in mprotect() to prevent writable memory from ever becoming PROT_SHADOW_STACK. 2. Extra checks/vma state were needed in the new madvise() to prevent restore tokens being written into the middle of pre-used shadow stacks. It is ideal to prevent restore tokens being added at arbitrary locations, so the check was to make sure the shadow stack had never been written to. 3. It stood out from the rest of the madvise flags, as more of direct action than a hint at future desired behavior. So rather than repurpose two existing syscalls (mmap, madvise) that don't quite fit, just implement a new map_shadow_stack syscall to allow userspace to map and setup new shadow stacks in one step. While ucontext is the primary motivator, userspace may have other unforeseen reasons to setup its own shadow stacks using the WRSS instruction. Towards this provide a flag so that stacks can be optionally setup securely for the common case of ucontext without enabling WRSS. Or potentially have the kernel set up the shadow stack in some new way. The following example demonstrates how to create a new shadow stack with map_shadow_stack: void *shstk = map_shadow_stack(addr, stack_size, SHADOW_STACK_SET_TOKEN); Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Mike Rapoport (IBM) <rppt@kernel.org> Tested-by: Pengfei Xu <pengfei.xu@intel.com> Tested-by: John Allen <john.allen@amd.com> Tested-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230613001108.3040476-35-rick.p.edgecombe%40intel.com |
||
|
Linus Torvalds
|
7b82e90411 |
asm-generic updates for 6.5
These are cleanups for architecture specific header files:
- the comments in include/linux/syscalls.h have gone out of sync
and are really pointless, so these get removed
- The asm/bitsperlong.h header no longer needs to be architecture
specific on modern compilers, so use a generic version for newer
architectures that use new enough userspace compilers
- A cleanup for virt_to_pfn/virt_to_bus to have proper type
checking, forcing the use of pointers
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----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=S/he
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Merge tag 'asm-generic-6.5' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/arnd/asm-generic
Pull asm-generic updates from Arnd Bergmann:
"These are cleanups for architecture specific header files:
- the comments in include/linux/syscalls.h have gone out of sync and
are really pointless, so these get removed
- The asm/bitsperlong.h header no longer needs to be architecture
specific on modern compilers, so use a generic version for newer
architectures that use new enough userspace compilers
- A cleanup for virt_to_pfn/virt_to_bus to have proper type checking,
forcing the use of pointers"
* tag 'asm-generic-6.5' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/arnd/asm-generic:
syscalls: Remove file path comments from headers
tools arch: Remove uapi bitsperlong.h of hexagon and microblaze
asm-generic: Unify uapi bitsperlong.h for arm64, riscv and loongarch
m68k/mm: Make pfn accessors static inlines
arm64: memory: Make virt_to_pfn() a static inline
ARM: mm: Make virt_to_pfn() a static inline
asm-generic/page.h: Make pfn accessors static inlines
xen/netback: Pass (void *) to virt_to_page()
netfs: Pass a pointer to virt_to_page()
cifs: Pass a pointer to virt_to_page() in cifsglob
cifs: Pass a pointer to virt_to_page()
riscv: mm: init: Pass a pointer to virt_to_page()
ARC: init: Pass a pointer to virt_to_pfn() in init
m68k: Pass a pointer to virt_to_pfn() virt_to_page()
fs/proc/kcore.c: Pass a pointer to virt_addr_valid()
|
||
|
Sohil Mehta
|
4dd595c34c |
syscalls: Remove file path comments from headers
Source file locations for syscall definitions can change over a period of time. File paths in comments get stale and are hard to maintain long term. Also, their usefulness is questionable since it would be easier to locate a syscall definition using the SYSCALL_DEFINEx() macro. Remove all source file path comments from the syscall headers. Also, equalize the uneven line spacing (some of which is introduced due to the deletions). Signed-off-by: Sohil Mehta <sohil.mehta@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> |
||
|
Nhat Pham
|
cf264e1329 |
cachestat: implement cachestat syscall
There is currently no good way to query the page cache state of large file
sets and directory trees. There is mincore(), but it scales poorly: the
kernel writes out a lot of bitmap data that userspace has to aggregate,
when the user really doesn not care about per-page information in that
case. The user also needs to mmap and unmap each file as it goes along,
which can be quite slow as well.
Some use cases where this information could come in handy:
* Allowing database to decide whether to perform an index scan or
direct table queries based on the in-memory cache state of the
index.
* Visibility into the writeback algorithm, for performance issues
diagnostic.
* Workload-aware writeback pacing: estimating IO fulfilled by page
cache (and IO to be done) within a range of a file, allowing for
more frequent syncing when and where there is IO capacity, and
batching when there is not.
* Computing memory usage of large files/directory trees, analogous to
the du tool for disk usage.
More information about these use cases could be found in the following
thread:
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20230315170934.GA97793@cmpxchg.org/
This patch implements a new syscall that queries cache state of a file and
summarizes the number of cached pages, number of dirty pages, number of
pages marked for writeback, number of (recently) evicted pages, etc. in a
given range. Currently, the syscall is only wired in for x86
architecture.
NAME
cachestat - query the page cache statistics of a file.
SYNOPSIS
#include <sys/mman.h>
struct cachestat_range {
__u64 off;
__u64 len;
};
struct cachestat {
__u64 nr_cache;
__u64 nr_dirty;
__u64 nr_writeback;
__u64 nr_evicted;
__u64 nr_recently_evicted;
};
int cachestat(unsigned int fd, struct cachestat_range *cstat_range,
struct cachestat *cstat, unsigned int flags);
DESCRIPTION
cachestat() queries the number of cached pages, number of dirty
pages, number of pages marked for writeback, number of evicted
pages, number of recently evicted pages, in the bytes range given by
`off` and `len`.
An evicted page is a page that is previously in the page cache but
has been evicted since. A page is recently evicted if its last
eviction was recent enough that its reentry to the cache would
indicate that it is actively being used by the system, and that
there is memory pressure on the system.
These values are returned in a cachestat struct, whose address is
given by the `cstat` argument.
The `off` and `len` arguments must be non-negative integers. If
`len` > 0, the queried range is [`off`, `off` + `len`]. If `len` ==
0, we will query in the range from `off` to the end of the file.
The `flags` argument is unused for now, but is included for future
extensibility. User should pass 0 (i.e no flag specified).
Currently, hugetlbfs is not supported.
Because the status of a page can change after cachestat() checks it
but before it returns to the application, the returned values may
contain stale information.
RETURN VALUE
On success, cachestat returns 0. On error, -1 is returned, and errno
is set to indicate the error.
ERRORS
EFAULT cstat or cstat_args points to an invalid address.
EINVAL invalid flags.
EBADF invalid file descriptor.
EOPNOTSUPP file descriptor is of a hugetlbfs file
[nphamcs@gmail.com: replace rounddown logic with the existing helper]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230504022044.3675469-1-nphamcs@gmail.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230503013608.2431726-3-nphamcs@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Nhat Pham <nphamcs@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Brian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
|
||
|
Randy Dunlap
|
a8faed3a02 |
kernel/sys_ni: add compat entry for fadvise64_64
When CONFIG_ADVISE_SYSCALLS is not set/enabled and CONFIG_COMPAT is
set/enabled, the riscv compat_syscall_table references
'compat_sys_fadvise64_64', which is not defined:
riscv64-linux-ld: arch/riscv/kernel/compat_syscall_table.o:(.rodata+0x6f8):
undefined reference to `compat_sys_fadvise64_64'
Add 'fadvise64_64' to kernel/sys_ni.c as a conditional COMPAT function so
that when CONFIG_ADVISE_SYSCALLS is not set, there is a fallback function
available.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220807220934.5689-1-rdunlap@infradead.org
Fixes:
|
||
|
Aneesh Kumar K.V
|
21b084fdf2 |
mm/mempolicy: wire up syscall set_mempolicy_home_node
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211202123810.267175-4-aneesh.kumar@linux.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Ben Widawsky <ben.widawsky@intel.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Feng Tang <feng.tang@intel.com> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net> Cc: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com> Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Cc: Huang Ying <ying.huang@intel.com> Cc: <linux-api@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |
||
|
André Almeida
|
bf69bad38c |
futex: Implement sys_futex_waitv()
Add support to wait on multiple futexes. This is the interface
implemented by this syscall:
futex_waitv(struct futex_waitv *waiters, unsigned int nr_futexes,
unsigned int flags, struct timespec *timeout, clockid_t clockid)
struct futex_waitv {
__u64 val;
__u64 uaddr;
__u32 flags;
__u32 __reserved;
};
Given an array of struct futex_waitv, wait on each uaddr. The thread
wakes if a futex_wake() is performed at any uaddr. The syscall returns
immediately if any waiter has *uaddr != val. *timeout is an optional
absolute timeout value for the operation. This syscall supports only
64bit sized timeout structs. The flags argument of the syscall should be
empty, but it can be used for future extensions. Flags for shared
futexes, sizes, etc. should be used on the individual flags of each
waiter.
__reserved is used for explicit padding and should be 0, but it might be
used for future extensions. If the userspace uses 32-bit pointers, it
should make sure to explicitly cast it when assigning to waitv::uaddr.
Returns the array index of one of the woken futexes. There’s no given
information of how many were woken, or any particular attribute of it
(if it’s the first woken, if it is of the smaller index...).
Signed-off-by: André Almeida <andrealmeid@collabora.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210923171111.300673-17-andrealmeid@collabora.com
|
||
|
Peter Zijlstra
|
af8cc9600b |
futex: Split out syscalls
Put the syscalls in their own little file. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Suggested-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: André Almeida <andrealmeid@collabora.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Reviewed-by: André Almeida <andrealmeid@collabora.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210923171111.300673-3-andrealmeid@collabora.com |
||
|
Arnd Bergmann
|
59ab844eed |
compat: remove some compat entry points
These are all handled correctly when calling the native system call entry point, so remove the special cases. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210727144859.4150043-6-arnd@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Feng Tang <feng.tang@intel.com> Cc: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: "James E.J. Bottomley" <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Cc: Thomas Bogendoerfer <tsbogend@alpha.franken.de> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |
||
|
Linus Torvalds
|
14726903c8 |
Merge branch 'akpm' (patches from Andrew)
Merge misc updates from Andrew Morton: "173 patches. Subsystems affected by this series: ia64, ocfs2, block, and mm (debug, pagecache, gup, swap, shmem, memcg, selftests, pagemap, mremap, bootmem, sparsemem, vmalloc, kasan, pagealloc, memory-failure, hugetlb, userfaultfd, vmscan, compaction, mempolicy, memblock, oom-kill, migration, ksm, percpu, vmstat, and madvise)" * emailed patches from Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>: (173 commits) mm/madvise: add MADV_WILLNEED to process_madvise() mm/vmstat: remove unneeded return value mm/vmstat: simplify the array size calculation mm/vmstat: correct some wrong comments mm/percpu,c: remove obsolete comments of pcpu_chunk_populated() selftests: vm: add COW time test for KSM pages selftests: vm: add KSM merging time test mm: KSM: fix data type selftests: vm: add KSM merging across nodes test selftests: vm: add KSM zero page merging test selftests: vm: add KSM unmerge test selftests: vm: add KSM merge test mm/migrate: correct kernel-doc notation mm: wire up syscall process_mrelease mm: introduce process_mrelease system call memblock: make memblock_find_in_range method private mm/mempolicy.c: use in_task() in mempolicy_slab_node() mm/mempolicy: unify the create() func for bind/interleave/prefer-many policies mm/mempolicy: advertise new MPOL_PREFERRED_MANY mm/hugetlb: add support for mempolicy MPOL_PREFERRED_MANY ... |
||
|
Suren Baghdasaryan
|
dce4910396 |
mm: wire up syscall process_mrelease
Split off from prev patch in the series that implements the syscall. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210809185259.405936-2-surenb@google.com Signed-off-by: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com> Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org> Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com> Cc: Jan Engelhardt <jengelh@inai.de> Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Cc: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@surriel.com> Cc: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com> Cc: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com> Cc: Tim Murray <timmurray@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |
||
|
Eric W. Biederman
|
b48c7236b1 |
exit/bdflush: Remove the deprecated bdflush system call
The bdflush system call has been deprecated for a very long time. Recently Michael Schmitz tested[1] and found that the last known caller of of the bdflush system call is unaffected by it's removal. Since the code is not needed delete it. [1] https://lkml.kernel.org/r/36123b5d-daa0-6c2b-f2d4-a942f069fd54@gmail.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/87sg10quue.fsf_-_@disp2133 Tested-by: Michael Schmitz <schmitzmic@gmail.com> Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org> Reviewed-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Acked-by: Cyril Hrubis <chrubis@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> |
||
|
Mike Rapoport
|
1507f51255 |
mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas
Introduce "memfd_secret" system call with the ability to create memory
areas visible only in the context of the owning process and not mapped not
only to other processes but in the kernel page tables as well.
The secretmem feature is off by default and the user must explicitly
enable it at the boot time.
Once secretmem is enabled, the user will be able to create a file
descriptor using the memfd_secret() system call. The memory areas created
by mmap() calls from this file descriptor will be unmapped from the kernel
direct map and they will be only mapped in the page table of the processes
that have access to the file descriptor.
Secretmem is designed to provide the following protections:
* Enhanced protection (in conjunction with all the other in-kernel
attack prevention systems) against ROP attacks. Seceretmem makes
"simple" ROP insufficient to perform exfiltration, which increases the
required complexity of the attack. Along with other protections like
the kernel stack size limit and address space layout randomization which
make finding gadgets is really hard, absence of any in-kernel primitive
for accessing secret memory means the one gadget ROP attack can't work.
Since the only way to access secret memory is to reconstruct the missing
mapping entry, the attacker has to recover the physical page and insert
a PTE pointing to it in the kernel and then retrieve the contents. That
takes at least three gadgets which is a level of difficulty beyond most
standard attacks.
* Prevent cross-process secret userspace memory exposures. Once the
secret memory is allocated, the user can't accidentally pass it into the
kernel to be transmitted somewhere. The secreremem pages cannot be
accessed via the direct map and they are disallowed in GUP.
* Harden against exploited kernel flaws. In order to access secretmem,
a kernel-side attack would need to either walk the page tables and
create new ones, or spawn a new privileged uiserspace process to perform
secrets exfiltration using ptrace.
The file descriptor based memory has several advantages over the
"traditional" mm interfaces, such as mlock(), mprotect(), madvise(). File
descriptor approach allows explicit and controlled sharing of the memory
areas, it allows to seal the operations. Besides, file descriptor based
memory paves the way for VMMs to remove the secret memory range from the
userspace hipervisor process, for instance QEMU. Andy Lutomirski says:
"Getting fd-backed memory into a guest will take some possibly major
work in the kernel, but getting vma-backed memory into a guest without
mapping it in the host user address space seems much, much worse."
memfd_secret() is made a dedicated system call rather than an extension to
memfd_create() because it's purpose is to allow the user to create more
secure memory mappings rather than to simply allow file based access to
the memory. Nowadays a new system call cost is negligible while it is way
simpler for userspace to deal with a clear-cut system calls than with a
multiplexer or an overloaded syscall. Moreover, the initial
implementation of memfd_secret() is completely distinct from
memfd_create() so there is no much sense in overloading memfd_create() to
begin with. If there will be a need for code sharing between these
implementation it can be easily achieved without a need to adjust user
visible APIs.
The secret memory remains accessible in the process context using uaccess
primitives, but it is not exposed to the kernel otherwise; secret memory
areas are removed from the direct map and functions in the
follow_page()/get_user_page() family will refuse to return a page that
belongs to the secret memory area.
Once there will be a use case that will require exposing secretmem to the
kernel it will be an opt-in request in the system call flags so that user
would have to decide what data can be exposed to the kernel.
Removing of the pages from the direct map may cause its fragmentation on
architectures that use large pages to map the physical memory which
affects the system performance. However, the original Kconfig text for
CONFIG_DIRECT_GBPAGES said that gigabyte pages in the direct map "... can
improve the kernel's performance a tiny bit ..." (commit
|
||
|
Jan Kara
|
64c2c2c62f |
quota: Change quotactl_path() systcall to an fd-based one
Some users have pointed out that path-based syscalls are problematic in some environments and at least directory fd argument and possibly also resolve flags are desirable for such syscalls. Rather than reimplementing all details of pathname lookup and following where it may eventually evolve, let's go for full file descriptor based syscall similar to how ioctl(2) works since the beginning. Managing of quotas isn't performance sensitive so the extra overhead of open does not matter and we are able to consume O_PATH descriptors as well which makes open cheap anyway. Also for frequent operations (such as retrieving usage information for all users) we can reuse single fd and in fact get even better performance as well as avoiding races with possible remounts etc. Tested-by: Sascha Hauer <s.hauer@pengutronix.de> Acked-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> |
||
|
Linus Torvalds
|
17ae69aba8 |
Add Landlock, a new LSM from Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com>
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----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=uCN4
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Merge tag 'landlock_v34' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security
Pull Landlock LSM from James Morris:
"Add Landlock, a new LSM from Mickaël Salaün.
Briefly, Landlock provides for unprivileged application sandboxing.
From Mickaël's cover letter:
"The goal of Landlock is to enable to restrict ambient rights (e.g.
global filesystem access) for a set of processes. Because Landlock
is a stackable LSM [1], it makes possible to create safe security
sandboxes as new security layers in addition to the existing
system-wide access-controls. This kind of sandbox is expected to
help mitigate the security impact of bugs or unexpected/malicious
behaviors in user-space applications. Landlock empowers any
process, including unprivileged ones, to securely restrict
themselves.
Landlock is inspired by seccomp-bpf but instead of filtering
syscalls and their raw arguments, a Landlock rule can restrict the
use of kernel objects like file hierarchies, according to the
kernel semantic. Landlock also takes inspiration from other OS
sandbox mechanisms: XNU Sandbox, FreeBSD Capsicum or OpenBSD
Pledge/Unveil.
In this current form, Landlock misses some access-control features.
This enables to minimize this patch series and ease review. This
series still addresses multiple use cases, especially with the
combined use of seccomp-bpf: applications with built-in sandboxing,
init systems, security sandbox tools and security-oriented APIs [2]"
The cover letter and v34 posting is here:
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-security-module/20210422154123.13086-1-mic@digikod.net/
See also:
https://landlock.io/
This code has had extensive design discussion and review over several
years"
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/50db058a-7dde-441b-a7f9-f6837fe8b69f@schaufler-ca.com/ [1]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/f646e1c7-33cf-333f-070c-0a40ad0468cd@digikod.net/ [2]
* tag 'landlock_v34' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security:
landlock: Enable user space to infer supported features
landlock: Add user and kernel documentation
samples/landlock: Add a sandbox manager example
selftests/landlock: Add user space tests
landlock: Add syscall implementations
arch: Wire up Landlock syscalls
fs,security: Add sb_delete hook
landlock: Support filesystem access-control
LSM: Infrastructure management of the superblock
landlock: Add ptrace restrictions
landlock: Set up the security framework and manage credentials
landlock: Add ruleset and domain management
landlock: Add object management
|
||
|
Mickaël Salaün
|
265885daf3 |
landlock: Add syscall implementations
These 3 system calls are designed to be used by unprivileged processes to sandbox themselves: * landlock_create_ruleset(2): Creates a ruleset and returns its file descriptor. * landlock_add_rule(2): Adds a rule (e.g. file hierarchy access) to a ruleset, identified by the dedicated file descriptor. * landlock_restrict_self(2): Enforces a ruleset on the calling thread and its future children (similar to seccomp). This syscall has the same usage restrictions as seccomp(2): the caller must have the no_new_privs attribute set or have CAP_SYS_ADMIN in the current user namespace. All these syscalls have a "flags" argument (not currently used) to enable extensibility. Here are the motivations for these new syscalls: * A sandboxed process may not have access to file systems, including /dev, /sys or /proc, but it should still be able to add more restrictions to itself. * Neither prctl(2) nor seccomp(2) (which was used in a previous version) fit well with the current definition of a Landlock security policy. All passed structs (attributes) are checked at build time to ensure that they don't contain holes and that they are aligned the same way for each architecture. See the user and kernel documentation for more details (provided by a following commit): * Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst * Documentation/security/landlock.rst Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210422154123.13086-9-mic@digikod.net Signed-off-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com> |
||
|
Sascha Hauer
|
fa8b90070a |
quota: wire up quotactl_path
Wire up the quotactl_path syscall added in the previous patch. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210304123541.30749-3-s.hauer@pengutronix.de Signed-off-by: Sascha Hauer <s.hauer@pengutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> |
||
|
Willem de Bruijn
|
b0a0c2615f |
epoll: wire up syscall epoll_pwait2
Split off from prev patch in the series that implements the syscall. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201121144401.3727659-4-willemdebruijn.kernel@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |
||
|
Minchan Kim
|
ecb8ac8b1f |
mm/madvise: introduce process_madvise() syscall: an external memory hinting API
There is usecase that System Management Software(SMS) want to give a
memory hint like MADV_[COLD|PAGEEOUT] to other processes and in the
case of Android, it is the ActivityManagerService.
The information required to make the reclaim decision is not known to the
app. Instead, it is known to the centralized userspace
daemon(ActivityManagerService), and that daemon must be able to initiate
reclaim on its own without any app involvement.
To solve the issue, this patch introduces a new syscall
process_madvise(2). It uses pidfd of an external process to give the
hint. It also supports vector address range because Android app has
thousands of vmas due to zygote so it's totally waste of CPU and power if
we should call the syscall one by one for each vma.(With testing 2000-vma
syscall vs 1-vector syscall, it showed 15% performance improvement. I
think it would be bigger in real practice because the testing ran very
cache friendly environment).
Another potential use case for the vector range is to amortize the cost
ofTLB shootdowns for multiple ranges when using MADV_DONTNEED; this could
benefit users like TCP receive zerocopy and malloc implementations. In
future, we could find more usecases for other advises so let's make it
happens as API since we introduce a new syscall at this moment. With
that, existing madvise(2) user could replace it with process_madvise(2)
with their own pid if they want to have batch address ranges support
feature.
ince it could affect other process's address range, only privileged
process(PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH_FSCREDS) or something else(e.g., being the same
UID) gives it the right to ptrace the process could use it successfully.
The flag argument is reserved for future use if we need to extend the API.
I think supporting all hints madvise has/will supported/support to
process_madvise is rather risky. Because we are not sure all hints make
sense from external process and implementation for the hint may rely on
the caller being in the current context so it could be error-prone. Thus,
I just limited hints as MADV_[COLD|PAGEOUT] in this patch.
If someone want to add other hints, we could hear the usecase and review
it for each hint. It's safer for maintenance rather than introducing a
buggy syscall but hard to fix it later.
So finally, the API is as follows,
ssize_t process_madvise(int pidfd, const struct iovec *iovec,
unsigned long vlen, int advice, unsigned int flags);
DESCRIPTION
The process_madvise() system call is used to give advice or directions
to the kernel about the address ranges from external process as well as
local process. It provides the advice to address ranges of process
described by iovec and vlen. The goal of such advice is to improve
system or application performance.
The pidfd selects the process referred to by the PID file descriptor
specified in pidfd. (See pidofd_open(2) for further information)
The pointer iovec points to an array of iovec structures, defined in
<sys/uio.h> as:
struct iovec {
void *iov_base; /* starting address */
size_t iov_len; /* number of bytes to be advised */
};
The iovec describes address ranges beginning at address(iov_base)
and with size length of bytes(iov_len).
The vlen represents the number of elements in iovec.
The advice is indicated in the advice argument, which is one of the
following at this moment if the target process specified by pidfd is
external.
MADV_COLD
MADV_PAGEOUT
Permission to provide a hint to external process is governed by a
ptrace access mode PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH_FSCREDS check; see ptrace(2).
The process_madvise supports every advice madvise(2) has if target
process is in same thread group with calling process so user could
use process_madvise(2) to extend existing madvise(2) to support
vector address ranges.
RETURN VALUE
On success, process_madvise() returns the number of bytes advised.
This return value may be less than the total number of requested
bytes, if an error occurred. The caller should check return value
to determine whether a partial advice occurred.
FAQ:
Q.1 - Why does any external entity have better knowledge?
Quote from Sandeep
"For Android, every application (including the special SystemServer)
are forked from Zygote. The reason of course is to share as many
libraries and classes between the two as possible to benefit from the
preloading during boot.
After applications start, (almost) all of the APIs end up calling into
this SystemServer process over IPC (binder) and back to the
application.
In a fully running system, the SystemServer monitors every single
process periodically to calculate their PSS / RSS and also decides
which process is "important" to the user for interactivity.
So, because of how these processes start _and_ the fact that the
SystemServer is looping to monitor each process, it does tend to *know*
which address range of the application is not used / useful.
Besides, we can never rely on applications to clean things up
themselves. We've had the "hey app1, the system is low on memory,
please trim your memory usage down" notifications for a long time[1].
They rely on applications honoring the broadcasts and very few do.
So, if we want to avoid the inevitable killing of the application and
restarting it, some way to be able to tell the OS about unimportant
memory in these applications will be useful.
- ssp
Q.2 - How to guarantee the race(i.e., object validation) between when
giving a hint from an external process and get the hint from the target
process?
process_madvise operates on the target process's address space as it
exists at the instant that process_madvise is called. If the space
target process can run between the time the process_madvise process
inspects the target process address space and the time that
process_madvise is actually called, process_madvise may operate on
memory regions that the calling process does not expect. It's the
responsibility of the process calling process_madvise to close this
race condition. For example, the calling process can suspend the
target process with ptrace, SIGSTOP, or the freezer cgroup so that it
doesn't have an opportunity to change its own address space before
process_madvise is called. Another option is to operate on memory
regions that the caller knows a priori will be unchanged in the target
process. Yet another option is to accept the race for certain
process_madvise calls after reasoning that mistargeting will do no
harm. The suggested API itself does not provide synchronization. It
also apply other APIs like move_pages, process_vm_write.
The race isn't really a problem though. Why is it so wrong to require
that callers do their own synchronization in some manner? Nobody
objects to write(2) merely because it's possible for two processes to
open the same file and clobber each other's writes --- instead, we tell
people to use flock or something. Think about mmap. It never
guarantees newly allocated address space is still valid when the user
tries to access it because other threads could unmap the memory right
before. That's where we need synchronization by using other API or
design from userside. It shouldn't be part of API itself. If someone
needs more fine-grained synchronization rather than process level,
there were two ideas suggested - cookie[2] and anon-fd[3]. Both are
applicable via using last reserved argument of the API but I don't
think it's necessary right now since we have already ways to prevent
the race so don't want to add additional complexity with more
fine-grained optimization model.
To make the API extend, it reserved an unsigned long as last argument
so we could support it in future if someone really needs it.
Q.3 - Why doesn't ptrace work?
Injecting an madvise in the target process using ptrace would not work
for us because such injected madvise would have to be executed by the
target process, which means that process would have to be runnable and
that creates the risk of the abovementioned race and hinting a wrong
VMA. Furthermore, we want to act the hint in caller's context, not the
callee's, because the callee is usually limited in cpuset/cgroups or
even freezed state so they can't act by themselves quick enough, which
causes more thrashing/kill. It doesn't work if the target process are
ptraced(e.g., strace, debugger, minidump) because a process can have at
most one ptracer.
[1] https://developer.android.com/topic/performance/memory"
[2] process_getinfo for getting the cookie which is updated whenever
vma of process address layout are changed - Daniel Colascione -
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190520035254.57579-1-minchan@kernel.org/T/#m7694416fd179b2066a2c62b5b139b14e3894e224
[3] anonymous fd which is used for the object(i.e., address range)
validation - Michal Hocko -
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200120112722.GY18451@dhcp22.suse.cz/
[minchan@kernel.org: fix process_madvise build break for arm64]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200303145756.GA219683@google.com
[minchan@kernel.org: fix build error for mips of process_madvise]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200508052517.GA197378@google.com
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix patch ordering issue]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix arm64 whoops]
[minchan@kernel.org: make process_madvise() vlen arg have type size_t, per Florian]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix i386 build]
[sfr@canb.auug.org.au: fix syscall numbering]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200905142639.49fc3f1a@canb.auug.org.au
[sfr@canb.auug.org.au: madvise.c needs compat.h]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200908204547.285646b4@canb.auug.org.au
[minchan@kernel.org: fix mips build]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200909173655.GC2435453@google.com
[yuehaibing@huawei.com: remove duplicate header which is included twice]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200915121550.30584-1-yuehaibing@huawei.com
[minchan@kernel.org: do not use helper functions for process_madvise]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200921175539.GB387368@google.com
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: pidfd_get_pid() gained an argument]
[sfr@canb.auug.org.au: fix up for "iov_iter: transparently handle compat iovecs in import_iovec"]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200928212542.468e1fef@canb.auug.org.au
Signed-off-by: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Acked-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Alexander Duyck <alexander.h.duyck@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Brian Geffon <bgeffon@google.com>
Cc: Christian Brauner <christian@brauner.io>
Cc: Daniel Colascione <dancol@google.com>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Cc: Joel Fernandes <joel@joelfernandes.org>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: John Dias <joaodias@google.com>
Cc: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Oleksandr Natalenko <oleksandr@redhat.com>
Cc: Sandeep Patil <sspatil@google.com>
Cc: SeongJae Park <sj38.park@gmail.com>
Cc: SeongJae Park <sjpark@amazon.de>
Cc: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com>
Cc: Sonny Rao <sonnyrao@google.com>
Cc: Tim Murray <timmurray@google.com>
Cc: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Cc: Florian Weimer <fw@deneb.enyo.de>
Cc: <linux-man@vger.kernel.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200302193630.68771-3-minchan@kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200508183320.GA125527@google.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200622192900.22757-4-minchan@kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200901000633.1920247-4-minchan@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
||
|
Christoph Hellwig
|
80bdad3d7e |
quota: simplify the quotactl compat handling
Fold the misaligned u64 workarounds into the main quotactl flow instead of implementing a separate compat syscall handler. Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Acked-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> |
||
|
Xiaoming Ni
|
88db0aa242 |
all arch: remove system call sys_sysctl
Since commit
|
||
|
Arnd Bergmann
|
942437c97f |
y2038: allow disabling time32 system calls
At the moment, the compilation of the old time32 system calls depends purely on the architecture. As systems with new libc based on 64-bit time_t are getting deployed, even architectures that previously supported these (notably x86-32 and arm32 but also many others) no longer depend on them, and removing them from a kernel image results in a smaller kernel binary, the same way we can leave out many other optional system calls. More importantly, on an embedded system that needs to keep working beyond year 2038, any user space program calling these system calls is likely a bug, so removing them from the kernel image does provide an extra debugging help for finding broken applications. I've gone back and forth on hiding this option unless CONFIG_EXPERT is set. This version leaves it visible based on the logic that eventually it will be turned off indefinitely. Acked-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com> Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> |
||
|
Christian Brauner
|
d68dbb0c9a
|
arch: handle arches who do not yet define clone3
This cleanly handles arches who do not yet define clone3.
clone3() was initially placed under __ARCH_WANT_SYS_CLONE under the
assumption that this would cleanly handle all architectures. It does
not.
Architectures such as nios2 or h8300 simply take the asm-generic syscall
definitions and generate their syscall table from it. Since they don't
define __ARCH_WANT_SYS_CLONE the build would fail complaining about
sys_clone3 missing. The reason this doesn't happen for legacy clone is
that nios2 and h8300 provide assembly stubs for sys_clone. This seems to
be done for architectural reasons.
The build failures for nios2 and h8300 were caught int -next luckily.
The solution is to define __ARCH_WANT_SYS_CLONE3 that architectures can
add. Additionally, we need a cond_syscall(clone3) for architectures such
as nios2 or h8300 that generate their syscall table in the way I
explained above.
Fixes:
|
||
|
Christian Brauner
|
2151ad1b06
|
signal: support CLONE_PIDFD with pidfd_send_signal
Let pidfd_send_signal() use pidfds retrieved via CLONE_PIDFD. With this patch pidfd_send_signal() becomes independent of procfs. This fullfils the request made when we merged the pidfd_send_signal() patchset. The pidfd_send_signal() syscall is now always available allowing for it to be used by users without procfs mounted or even users without procfs support compiled into the kernel. Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian@brauner.io> Co-developed-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: "Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)" <mtk.manpages@gmail.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirsky <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> |
||
|
Linus Torvalds
|
a9dce6679d |
pidfd patches for v5.1-rc1
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----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=yOWp
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Merge tag 'pidfd-v5.1-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/brauner/linux
Pull pidfd system call from Christian Brauner:
"This introduces the ability to use file descriptors from /proc/<pid>/
as stable handles on struct pid. Even if a pid is recycled the handle
will not change. For a start these fds can be used to send signals to
the processes they refer to.
With the ability to use /proc/<pid> fds as stable handles on struct
pid we can fix a long-standing issue where after a process has exited
its pid can be reused by another process. If a caller sends a signal
to a reused pid it will end up signaling the wrong process.
With this patchset we enable a variety of use cases. One obvious
example is that we can now safely delegate an important part of
process management - sending signals - to processes other than the
parent of a given process by sending file descriptors around via scm
rights and not fearing that the given process will have been recycled
in the meantime. It also allows for easy testing whether a given
process is still alive or not by sending signal 0 to a pidfd which is
quite handy.
There has been some interest in this feature e.g. from systems
management (systemd, glibc) and container managers. I have requested
and gotten comments from glibc to make sure that this syscall is
suitable for their needs as well. In the future I expect it to take on
most other pid-based signal syscalls. But such features are left for
the future once they are needed.
This has been sitting in linux-next for quite a while and has not
caused any issues. It comes with selftests which verify basic
functionality and also test that a recycled pid cannot be signaled via
a pidfd.
Jon has written about a prior version of this patchset. It should
cover the basic functionality since not a lot has changed since then:
https://lwn.net/Articles/773459/
The commit message for the syscall itself is extensively documenting
the syscall, including it's functionality and extensibility"
* tag 'pidfd-v5.1-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/brauner/linux:
selftests: add tests for pidfd_send_signal()
signal: add pidfd_send_signal() syscall
|
||
|
Linus Torvalds
|
38e7571c07 |
io_uring-2019-03-06
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----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=p78E
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Merge tag 'io_uring-2019-03-06' of git://git.kernel.dk/linux-block
Pull io_uring IO interface from Jens Axboe:
"Second attempt at adding the io_uring interface.
Since the first one, we've added basic unit testing of the three
system calls, that resides in liburing like the other unit tests that
we have so far. It'll take a while to get full coverage of it, but
we're working towards it. I've also added two basic test programs to
tools/io_uring. One uses the raw interface and has support for all the
various features that io_uring supports outside of standard IO, like
fixed files, fixed IO buffers, and polled IO. The other uses the
liburing API, and is a simplified version of cp(1).
This adds support for a new IO interface, io_uring.
io_uring allows an application to communicate with the kernel through
two rings, the submission queue (SQ) and completion queue (CQ) ring.
This allows for very efficient handling of IOs, see the v5 posting for
some basic numbers:
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-block/20190116175003.17880-1-axboe@kernel.dk/
Outside of just efficiency, the interface is also flexible and
extendable, and allows for future use cases like the upcoming NVMe
key-value store API, networked IO, and so on. It also supports async
buffered IO, something that we've always failed to support in the
kernel.
Outside of basic IO features, it supports async polled IO as well.
This particular feature has already been tested at Facebook months ago
for flash storage boxes, with 25-33% improvements. It makes polled IO
actually useful for real world use cases, where even basic flash sees
a nice win in terms of efficiency, latency, and performance. These
boxes were IOPS bound before, now they are not.
This series adds three new system calls. One for setting up an
io_uring instance (io_uring_setup(2)), one for submitting/completing
IO (io_uring_enter(2)), and one for aux functions like registrating
file sets, buffers, etc (io_uring_register(2)). Through the help of
Arnd, I've coordinated the syscall numbers so merge on that front
should be painless.
Jon did a writeup of the interface a while back, which (except for
minor details that have been tweaked) is still accurate. Find that
here:
https://lwn.net/Articles/776703/
Huge thanks to Al Viro for helping getting the reference cycle code
correct, and to Jann Horn for his extensive reviews focused on both
security and bugs in general.
There's a userspace library that provides basic functionality for
applications that don't need or want to care about how to fiddle with
the rings directly. It has helpers to allow applications to easily set
up an io_uring instance, and submit/complete IO through it without
knowing about the intricacies of the rings. It also includes man pages
(thanks to Jeff Moyer), and will continue to grow support helper
functions and features as time progresses. Find it here:
git://git.kernel.dk/liburing
Fio has full support for the raw interface, both in the form of an IO
engine (io_uring), but also with a small test application (t/io_uring)
that can exercise and benchmark the interface"
* tag 'io_uring-2019-03-06' of git://git.kernel.dk/linux-block:
io_uring: add a few test tools
io_uring: allow workqueue item to handle multiple buffered requests
io_uring: add support for IORING_OP_POLL
io_uring: add io_kiocb ref count
io_uring: add submission polling
io_uring: add file set registration
net: split out functions related to registering inflight socket files
io_uring: add support for pre-mapped user IO buffers
block: implement bio helper to add iter bvec pages to bio
io_uring: batch io_kiocb allocation
io_uring: use fget/fput_many() for file references
fs: add fget_many() and fput_many()
io_uring: support for IO polling
io_uring: add fsync support
Add io_uring IO interface
|
||
|
Arnd Bergmann
|
7e89a37c47 |
ipc: Fix building compat mode without sysvipc
As John Stultz noticed, my y2038 syscall series caused a link failure when CONFIG_SYSVIPC is disabled but CONFIG_COMPAT is enabled: arch/arm64/kernel/sys32.o:(.rodata+0x960): undefined reference to `__arm64_compat_sys_old_semctl' arch/arm64/kernel/sys32.o:(.rodata+0x980): undefined reference to `__arm64_compat_sys_old_msgctl' arch/arm64/kernel/sys32.o:(.rodata+0x9a0): undefined reference to `__arm64_compat_sys_old_shmctl' Add the missing entries in kernel/sys_ni.c for the new system calls. Cc: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com> Cc: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> |
||
|
Christian Brauner
|
3eb39f4793
|
signal: add pidfd_send_signal() syscall
The kill() syscall operates on process identifiers (pid). After a process
has exited its pid can be reused by another process. If a caller sends a
signal to a reused pid it will end up signaling the wrong process. This
issue has often surfaced and there has been a push to address this problem [1].
This patch uses file descriptors (fd) from proc/<pid> as stable handles on
struct pid. Even if a pid is recycled the handle will not change. The fd
can be used to send signals to the process it refers to.
Thus, the new syscall pidfd_send_signal() is introduced to solve this
problem. Instead of pids it operates on process fds (pidfd).
/* prototype and argument /*
long pidfd_send_signal(int pidfd, int sig, siginfo_t *info, unsigned int flags);
/* syscall number 424 */
The syscall number was chosen to be 424 to align with Arnd's rework in his
y2038 to minimize merge conflicts (cf. [25]).
In addition to the pidfd and signal argument it takes an additional
siginfo_t and flags argument. If the siginfo_t argument is NULL then
pidfd_send_signal() is equivalent to kill(<positive-pid>, <signal>). If it
is not NULL pidfd_send_signal() is equivalent to rt_sigqueueinfo().
The flags argument is added to allow for future extensions of this syscall.
It currently needs to be passed as 0. Failing to do so will cause EINVAL.
/* pidfd_send_signal() replaces multiple pid-based syscalls */
The pidfd_send_signal() syscall currently takes on the job of
rt_sigqueueinfo(2) and parts of the functionality of kill(2), Namely, when a
positive pid is passed to kill(2). It will however be possible to also
replace tgkill(2) and rt_tgsigqueueinfo(2) if this syscall is extended.
/* sending signals to threads (tid) and process groups (pgid) */
Specifically, the pidfd_send_signal() syscall does currently not operate on
process groups or threads. This is left for future extensions.
In order to extend the syscall to allow sending signal to threads and
process groups appropriately named flags (e.g. PIDFD_TYPE_PGID, and
PIDFD_TYPE_TID) should be added. This implies that the flags argument will
determine what is signaled and not the file descriptor itself. Put in other
words, grouping in this api is a property of the flags argument not a
property of the file descriptor (cf. [13]). Clarification for this has been
requested by Eric (cf. [19]).
When appropriate extensions through the flags argument are added then
pidfd_send_signal() can additionally replace the part of kill(2) which
operates on process groups as well as the tgkill(2) and
rt_tgsigqueueinfo(2) syscalls.
How such an extension could be implemented has been very roughly sketched
in [14], [15], and [16]. However, this should not be taken as a commitment
to a particular implementation. There might be better ways to do it.
Right now this is intentionally left out to keep this patchset as simple as
possible (cf. [4]).
/* naming */
The syscall had various names throughout iterations of this patchset:
- procfd_signal()
- procfd_send_signal()
- taskfd_send_signal()
In the last round of reviews it was pointed out that given that if the
flags argument decides the scope of the signal instead of different types
of fds it might make sense to either settle for "procfd_" or "pidfd_" as
prefix. The community was willing to accept either (cf. [17] and [18]).
Given that one developer expressed strong preference for the "pidfd_"
prefix (cf. [13]) and with other developers less opinionated about the name
we should settle for "pidfd_" to avoid further bikeshedding.
The "_send_signal" suffix was chosen to reflect the fact that the syscall
takes on the job of multiple syscalls. It is therefore intentional that the
name is not reminiscent of neither kill(2) nor rt_sigqueueinfo(2). Not the
fomer because it might imply that pidfd_send_signal() is a replacement for
kill(2), and not the latter because it is a hassle to remember the correct
spelling - especially for non-native speakers - and because it is not
descriptive enough of what the syscall actually does. The name
"pidfd_send_signal" makes it very clear that its job is to send signals.
/* zombies */
Zombies can be signaled just as any other process. No special error will be
reported since a zombie state is an unreliable state (cf. [3]). However,
this can be added as an extension through the @flags argument if the need
ever arises.
/* cross-namespace signals */
The patch currently enforces that the signaler and signalee either are in
the same pid namespace or that the signaler's pid namespace is an ancestor
of the signalee's pid namespace. This is done for the sake of simplicity
and because it is unclear to what values certain members of struct
siginfo_t would need to be set to (cf. [5], [6]).
/* compat syscalls */
It became clear that we would like to avoid adding compat syscalls
(cf. [7]). The compat syscall handling is now done in kernel/signal.c
itself by adding __copy_siginfo_from_user_generic() which lets us avoid
compat syscalls (cf. [8]). It should be noted that the addition of
__copy_siginfo_from_user_any() is caused by a bug in the original
implementation of rt_sigqueueinfo(2) (cf. 12).
With upcoming rework for syscall handling things might improve
significantly (cf. [11]) and __copy_siginfo_from_user_any() will not gain
any additional callers.
/* testing */
This patch was tested on x64 and x86.
/* userspace usage */
An asciinema recording for the basic functionality can be found under [9].
With this patch a process can be killed via:
#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include <errno.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <sys/syscall.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <unistd.h>
static inline int do_pidfd_send_signal(int pidfd, int sig, siginfo_t *info,
unsigned int flags)
{
#ifdef __NR_pidfd_send_signal
return syscall(__NR_pidfd_send_signal, pidfd, sig, info, flags);
#else
return -ENOSYS;
#endif
}
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
int fd, ret, saved_errno, sig;
if (argc < 3)
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
fd = open(argv[1], O_DIRECTORY | O_CLOEXEC);
if (fd < 0) {
printf("%s - Failed to open \"%s\"\n", strerror(errno), argv[1]);
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
sig = atoi(argv[2]);
printf("Sending signal %d to process %s\n", sig, argv[1]);
ret = do_pidfd_send_signal(fd, sig, NULL, 0);
saved_errno = errno;
close(fd);
errno = saved_errno;
if (ret < 0) {
printf("%s - Failed to send signal %d to process %s\n",
strerror(errno), sig, argv[1]);
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
exit(EXIT_SUCCESS);
}
/* Q&A
* Given that it seems the same questions get asked again by people who are
* late to the party it makes sense to add a Q&A section to the commit
* message so it's hopefully easier to avoid duplicate threads.
*
* For the sake of progress please consider these arguments settled unless
* there is a new point that desperately needs to be addressed. Please make
* sure to check the links to the threads in this commit message whether
* this has not already been covered.
*/
Q-01: (Florian Weimer [20], Andrew Morton [21])
What happens when the target process has exited?
A-01: Sending the signal will fail with ESRCH (cf. [22]).
Q-02: (Andrew Morton [21])
Is the task_struct pinned by the fd?
A-02: No. A reference to struct pid is kept. struct pid - as far as I
understand - was created exactly for the reason to not require to
pin struct task_struct (cf. [22]).
Q-03: (Andrew Morton [21])
Does the entire procfs directory remain visible? Just one entry
within it?
A-03: The same thing that happens right now when you hold a file descriptor
to /proc/<pid> open (cf. [22]).
Q-04: (Andrew Morton [21])
Does the pid remain reserved?
A-04: No. This patchset guarantees a stable handle not that pids are not
recycled (cf. [22]).
Q-05: (Andrew Morton [21])
Do attempts to signal that fd return errors?
A-05: See {Q,A}-01.
Q-06: (Andrew Morton [22])
Is there a cleaner way of obtaining the fd? Another syscall perhaps.
A-06: Userspace can already trivially retrieve file descriptors from procfs
so this is something that we will need to support anyway. Hence,
there's no immediate need to add another syscalls just to make
pidfd_send_signal() not dependent on the presence of procfs. However,
adding a syscalls to get such file descriptors is planned for a
future patchset (cf. [22]).
Q-07: (Andrew Morton [21] and others)
This fd-for-a-process sounds like a handy thing and people may well
think up other uses for it in the future, probably unrelated to
signals. Are the code and the interface designed to permit such
future applications?
A-07: Yes (cf. [22]).
Q-08: (Andrew Morton [21] and others)
Now I think about it, why a new syscall? This thing is looking
rather like an ioctl?
A-08: This has been extensively discussed. It was agreed that a syscall is
preferred for a variety or reasons. Here are just a few taken from
prior threads. Syscalls are safer than ioctl()s especially when
signaling to fds. Processes are a core kernel concept so a syscall
seems more appropriate. The layout of the syscall with its four
arguments would require the addition of a custom struct for the
ioctl() thereby causing at least the same amount or even more
complexity for userspace than a simple syscall. The new syscall will
replace multiple other pid-based syscalls (see description above).
The file-descriptors-for-processes concept introduced with this
syscall will be extended with other syscalls in the future. See also
[22], [23] and various other threads already linked in here.
Q-09: (Florian Weimer [24])
What happens if you use the new interface with an O_PATH descriptor?
A-09:
pidfds opened as O_PATH fds cannot be used to send signals to a
process (cf. [2]). Signaling processes through pidfds is the
equivalent of writing to a file. Thus, this is not an operation that
operates "purely at the file descriptor level" as required by the
open(2) manpage. See also [4].
/* References */
[1]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20181029221037.87724-1-dancol@google.com/
[2]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/874lbtjvtd.fsf@oldenburg2.str.redhat.com/
[3]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20181204132604.aspfupwjgjx6fhva@brauner.io/
[4]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20181203180224.fkvw4kajtbvru2ku@brauner.io/
[5]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20181121213946.GA10795@mail.hallyn.com/
[6]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20181120103111.etlqp7zop34v6nv4@brauner.io/
[7]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/36323361-90BD-41AF-AB5B-EE0D7BA02C21@amacapital.net/
[8]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/87tvjxp8pc.fsf@xmission.com/
[9]: https://asciinema.org/a/IQjuCHew6bnq1cr78yuMv16cy
[11]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/F53D6D38-3521-4C20-9034-5AF447DF62FF@amacapital.net/
[12]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/87zhtjn8ck.fsf@xmission.com/
[13]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/871s6u9z6u.fsf@xmission.com/
[14]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20181206231742.xxi4ghn24z4h2qki@brauner.io/
[15]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20181207003124.GA11160@mail.hallyn.com/
[16]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20181207015423.4miorx43l3qhppfz@brauner.io/
[17]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAGXu5jL8PciZAXvOvCeCU3wKUEB_dU-O3q0tDw4uB_ojMvDEew@mail.gmail.com/
[18]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20181206222746.GB9224@mail.hallyn.com/
[19]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20181208054059.19813-1-christian@brauner.io/
[20]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/8736rebl9s.fsf@oldenburg.str.redhat.com/
[21]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20181228152012.dbf0508c2508138efc5f2bbe@linux-foundation.org/
[22]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20181228233725.722tdfgijxcssg76@brauner.io/
[23]: https://lwn.net/Articles/773459/
[24]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/8736rebl9s.fsf@oldenburg.str.redhat.com/
[25]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAK8P3a0ej9NcJM8wXNPbcGUyOUZYX+VLoDFdbenW3s3114oQZw@mail.gmail.com/
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirsky <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian@brauner.io>
Reviewed-by: Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Acked-by: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
|
||
|
Jens Axboe
|
edafccee56 |
io_uring: add support for pre-mapped user IO buffers
If we have fixed user buffers, we can map them into the kernel when we setup the io_uring. That avoids the need to do get_user_pages() for each and every IO. To utilize this feature, the application must call io_uring_register() after having setup an io_uring instance, passing in IORING_REGISTER_BUFFERS as the opcode. The argument must be a pointer to an iovec array, and the nr_args should contain how many iovecs the application wishes to map. If successful, these buffers are now mapped into the kernel, eligible for IO. To use these fixed buffers, the application must use the IORING_OP_READ_FIXED and IORING_OP_WRITE_FIXED opcodes, and then set sqe->index to the desired buffer index. sqe->addr..sqe->addr+seq->len must point to somewhere inside the indexed buffer. The application may register buffers throughout the lifetime of the io_uring instance. It can call io_uring_register() with IORING_UNREGISTER_BUFFERS as the opcode to unregister the current set of buffers, and then register a new set. The application need not unregister buffers explicitly before shutting down the io_uring instance. It's perfectly valid to setup a larger buffer, and then sometimes only use parts of it for an IO. As long as the range is within the originally mapped region, it will work just fine. For now, buffers must not be file backed. If file backed buffers are passed in, the registration will fail with -1/EOPNOTSUPP. This restriction may be relaxed in the future. RLIMIT_MEMLOCK is used to check how much memory we can pin. A somewhat arbitrary 1G per buffer size is also imposed. Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> |
||
|
Jens Axboe
|
2b188cc1bb |
Add io_uring IO interface
The submission queue (SQ) and completion queue (CQ) rings are shared between the application and the kernel. This eliminates the need to copy data back and forth to submit and complete IO. IO submissions use the io_uring_sqe data structure, and completions are generated in the form of io_uring_cqe data structures. The SQ ring is an index into the io_uring_sqe array, which makes it possible to submit a batch of IOs without them being contiguous in the ring. The CQ ring is always contiguous, as completion events are inherently unordered, and hence any io_uring_cqe entry can point back to an arbitrary submission. Two new system calls are added for this: io_uring_setup(entries, params) Sets up an io_uring instance for doing async IO. On success, returns a file descriptor that the application can mmap to gain access to the SQ ring, CQ ring, and io_uring_sqes. io_uring_enter(fd, to_submit, min_complete, flags, sigset, sigsetsize) Initiates IO against the rings mapped to this fd, or waits for them to complete, or both. The behavior is controlled by the parameters passed in. If 'to_submit' is non-zero, then we'll try and submit new IO. If IORING_ENTER_GETEVENTS is set, the kernel will wait for 'min_complete' events, if they aren't already available. It's valid to set IORING_ENTER_GETEVENTS and 'min_complete' == 0 at the same time, this allows the kernel to return already completed events without waiting for them. This is useful only for polling, as for IRQ driven IO, the application can just check the CQ ring without entering the kernel. With this setup, it's possible to do async IO with a single system call. Future developments will enable polled IO with this interface, and polled submission as well. The latter will enable an application to do IO without doing ANY system calls at all. For IRQ driven IO, an application only needs to enter the kernel for completions if it wants to wait for them to occur. Each io_uring is backed by a workqueue, to support buffered async IO as well. We will only punt to an async context if the command would need to wait for IO on the device side. Any data that can be accessed directly in the page cache is done inline. This avoids the slowness issue of usual threadpools, since cached data is accessed as quickly as a sync interface. Sample application: http://git.kernel.dk/cgit/fio/plain/t/io_uring.c Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> |
||
|
Arnd Bergmann
|
8dabe7245b |
y2038: syscalls: rename y2038 compat syscalls
A lot of system calls that pass a time_t somewhere have an implementation using a COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINEx() on 64-bit architectures, and have been reworked so that this implementation can now be used on 32-bit architectures as well. The missing step is to redefine them using the regular SYSCALL_DEFINEx() to get them out of the compat namespace and make it possible to build them on 32-bit architectures. Any system call that ends in 'time' gets a '32' suffix on its name for that version, while the others get a '_time32' suffix, to distinguish them from the normal version, which takes a 64-bit time argument in the future. In this step, only 64-bit architectures are changed, doing this rename first lets us avoid touching the 32-bit architectures twice. Acked-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> |
||
|
Arnd Bergmann
|
275f22148e |
ipc: rename old-style shmctl/semctl/msgctl syscalls
The behavior of these system calls is slightly different between architectures, as determined by the CONFIG_ARCH_WANT_IPC_PARSE_VERSION symbol. Most architectures that implement the split IPC syscalls don't set that symbol and only get the modern version, but alpha, arm, microblaze, mips-n32, mips-n64 and xtensa expect the caller to pass the IPC_64 flag. For the architectures that so far only implement sys_ipc(), i.e. m68k, mips-o32, powerpc, s390, sh, sparc, and x86-32, we want the new behavior when adding the split syscalls, so we need to distinguish between the two groups of architectures. The method I picked for this distinction is to have a separate system call entry point: sys_old_*ctl() now uses ipc_parse_version, while sys_*ctl() does not. The system call tables of the five architectures are changed accordingly. As an additional benefit, we no longer need the configuration specific definition for ipc_parse_version(), it always does the same thing now, but simply won't get called on architectures with the modern interface. A small downside is that on architectures that do set ARCH_WANT_IPC_PARSE_VERSION, we now have an extra set of entry points that are never called. They only add a few bytes of bloat, so it seems better to keep them compared to adding yet another Kconfig symbol. I considered adding new syscall numbers for the IPC_64 variants for consistency, but decided against that for now. Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> |
||
|
Arnd Bergmann
|
58fa4a410f |
ipc: introduce ksys_ipc()/compat_ksys_ipc() for s390
The sys_ipc() and compat_ksys_ipc() functions are meant to only be used from the system call table, not called by another function. Introduce ksys_*() interfaces for this purpose, as we have done for many other system calls. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190116131527.2071570-3-arnd@arndb.de Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Reviewed-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> [heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com: compile fix for !CONFIG_COMPAT] Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> |
||
|
Arnd Bergmann
|
e11d4284e2 |
y2038: socket: Add compat_sys_recvmmsg_time64
recvmmsg() takes two arguments to pointers of structures that differ between 32-bit and 64-bit architectures: mmsghdr and timespec. For y2038 compatbility, we are changing the native system call from timespec to __kernel_timespec with a 64-bit time_t (in another patch), and use the existing compat system call on both 32-bit and 64-bit architectures for compatibility with traditional 32-bit user space. As we now have two variants of recvmmsg() for 32-bit tasks that are both different from the variant that we use on 64-bit tasks, this means we also require two compat system calls! The solution I picked is to flip things around: The existing compat_sys_recvmmsg() call gets moved from net/compat.c into net/socket.c and now handles the case for old user space on all architectures that have set CONFIG_COMPAT_32BIT_TIME. A new compat_sys_recvmmsg_time64() call gets added in the old place for 64-bit architectures only, this one handles the case of a compat mmsghdr structure combined with __kernel_timespec. In the indirect sys_socketcall(), we now need to call either do_sys_recvmmsg() or __compat_sys_recvmmsg(), depending on what kind of architecture we are on. For compat_sys_socketcall(), no such change is needed, we always call __compat_sys_recvmmsg(). I decided to not add a new SYS_RECVMMSG_TIME64 socketcall: Any libc implementation for 64-bit time_t will need significant changes including an updated asm/unistd.h, and it seems better to consistently use the separate syscalls that configuration, leaving the socketcall only for backward compatibility with 32-bit time_t based libc. The naming is asymmetric for the moment, so both existing syscalls entry points keep their names, while the new ones are recvmmsg_time32 and compat_recvmmsg_time64 respectively. I expect that we will rename the compat syscalls later as we start using generated syscall tables everywhere and add these entry points. Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> |
||
|
Linus Torvalds
|
d82991a868 |
Merge branch 'core-rseq-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull restartable sequence support from Thomas Gleixner: "The restartable sequences syscall (finally): After a lot of back and forth discussion and massive delays caused by the speculative distraction of maintainers, the core set of restartable sequences has finally reached a consensus. It comes with the basic non disputed core implementation along with support for arm, powerpc and x86 and a full set of selftests It was exposed to linux-next earlier this week, so it does not fully comply with the merge window requirements, but there is really no point to drag it out for yet another cycle" * 'core-rseq-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: rseq/selftests: Provide Makefile, scripts, gitignore rseq/selftests: Provide parametrized tests rseq/selftests: Provide basic percpu ops test rseq/selftests: Provide basic test rseq/selftests: Provide rseq library selftests/lib.mk: Introduce OVERRIDE_TARGETS powerpc: Wire up restartable sequences system call powerpc: Add syscall detection for restartable sequences powerpc: Add support for restartable sequences x86: Wire up restartable sequence system call x86: Add support for restartable sequences arm: Wire up restartable sequences system call arm: Add syscall detection for restartable sequences arm: Add restartable sequences support rseq: Introduce restartable sequences system call uapi/headers: Provide types_32_64.h |
||
|
Linus Torvalds
|
c90fca951e |
powerpc updates for 4.18
Notable changes:
- Support for split PMD page table lock on 64-bit Book3S (Power8/9).
- Add support for HAVE_RELIABLE_STACKTRACE, so we properly support live
patching again.
- Add support for patching barrier_nospec in copy_from_user() and syscall entry.
- A couple of fixes for our data breakpoints on Book3S.
- A series from Nick optimising TLB/mm handling with the Radix MMU.
- Numerous small cleanups to squash sparse/gcc warnings from Mathieu Malaterre.
- Several series optimising various parts of the 32-bit code from Christophe Leroy.
- Removal of support for two old machines, "SBC834xE" and "C2K" ("GEFanuc,C2K"),
which is why the diffstat has so many deletions.
And many other small improvements & fixes.
There's a few out-of-area changes. Some minor ftrace changes OK'ed by Steve, and
a fix to our powernv cpuidle driver. Then there's a series touching mm, x86 and
fs/proc/task_mmu.c, which cleans up some details around pkey support. It was
ack'ed/reviewed by Ingo & Dave and has been in next for several weeks.
Thanks to:
Akshay Adiga, Alastair D'Silva, Alexey Kardashevskiy, Al Viro, Andrew
Donnellan, Aneesh Kumar K.V, Anju T Sudhakar, Arnd Bergmann, Balbir Singh,
Cédric Le Goater, Christophe Leroy, Christophe Lombard, Colin Ian King, Dave
Hansen, Fabio Estevam, Finn Thain, Frederic Barrat, Gautham R. Shenoy, Haren
Myneni, Hari Bathini, Ingo Molnar, Jonathan Neuschäfer, Josh Poimboeuf,
Kamalesh Babulal, Madhavan Srinivasan, Mahesh Salgaonkar, Mark Greer, Mathieu
Malaterre, Matthew Wilcox, Michael Neuling, Michal Suchanek, Naveen N. Rao,
Nicholas Piggin, Nicolai Stange, Olof Johansson, Paul Gortmaker, Paul
Mackerras, Peter Rosin, Pridhiviraj Paidipeddi, Ram Pai, Rashmica Gupta, Ravi
Bangoria, Russell Currey, Sam Bobroff, Samuel Mendoza-Jonas, Segher
Boessenkool, Shilpasri G Bhat, Simon Guo, Souptick Joarder, Stewart Smith,
Thiago Jung Bauermann, Torsten Duwe, Vaibhav Jain, Wei Yongjun, Wolfram Sang,
Yisheng Xie, YueHaibing.
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----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=ZlBf
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Merge tag 'powerpc-4.18-1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/powerpc/linux
Pull powerpc updates from Michael Ellerman:
"Notable changes:
- Support for split PMD page table lock on 64-bit Book3S (Power8/9).
- Add support for HAVE_RELIABLE_STACKTRACE, so we properly support
live patching again.
- Add support for patching barrier_nospec in copy_from_user() and
syscall entry.
- A couple of fixes for our data breakpoints on Book3S.
- A series from Nick optimising TLB/mm handling with the Radix MMU.
- Numerous small cleanups to squash sparse/gcc warnings from Mathieu
Malaterre.
- Several series optimising various parts of the 32-bit code from
Christophe Leroy.
- Removal of support for two old machines, "SBC834xE" and "C2K"
("GEFanuc,C2K"), which is why the diffstat has so many deletions.
And many other small improvements & fixes.
There's a few out-of-area changes. Some minor ftrace changes OK'ed by
Steve, and a fix to our powernv cpuidle driver. Then there's a series
touching mm, x86 and fs/proc/task_mmu.c, which cleans up some details
around pkey support. It was ack'ed/reviewed by Ingo & Dave and has
been in next for several weeks.
Thanks to: Akshay Adiga, Alastair D'Silva, Alexey Kardashevskiy, Al
Viro, Andrew Donnellan, Aneesh Kumar K.V, Anju T Sudhakar, Arnd
Bergmann, Balbir Singh, Cédric Le Goater, Christophe Leroy, Christophe
Lombard, Colin Ian King, Dave Hansen, Fabio Estevam, Finn Thain,
Frederic Barrat, Gautham R. Shenoy, Haren Myneni, Hari Bathini, Ingo
Molnar, Jonathan Neuschäfer, Josh Poimboeuf, Kamalesh Babulal,
Madhavan Srinivasan, Mahesh Salgaonkar, Mark Greer, Mathieu Malaterre,
Matthew Wilcox, Michael Neuling, Michal Suchanek, Naveen N. Rao,
Nicholas Piggin, Nicolai Stange, Olof Johansson, Paul Gortmaker, Paul
Mackerras, Peter Rosin, Pridhiviraj Paidipeddi, Ram Pai, Rashmica
Gupta, Ravi Bangoria, Russell Currey, Sam Bobroff, Samuel
Mendoza-Jonas, Segher Boessenkool, Shilpasri G Bhat, Simon Guo,
Souptick Joarder, Stewart Smith, Thiago Jung Bauermann, Torsten Duwe,
Vaibhav Jain, Wei Yongjun, Wolfram Sang, Yisheng Xie, YueHaibing"
* tag 'powerpc-4.18-1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/powerpc/linux: (251 commits)
powerpc/64s/radix: Fix missing ptesync in flush_cache_vmap
cpuidle: powernv: Fix promotion from snooze if next state disabled
powerpc: fix build failure by disabling attribute-alias warning in pci_32
ocxl: Fix missing unlock on error in afu_ioctl_enable_p9_wait()
powerpc-opal: fix spelling mistake "Uniterrupted" -> "Uninterrupted"
powerpc: fix spelling mistake: "Usupported" -> "Unsupported"
powerpc/pkeys: Detach execute_only key on !PROT_EXEC
powerpc/powernv: copy/paste - Mask SO bit in CR
powerpc: Remove core support for Marvell mv64x60 hostbridges
powerpc/boot: Remove core support for Marvell mv64x60 hostbridges
powerpc/boot: Remove support for Marvell mv64x60 i2c controller
powerpc/boot: Remove support for Marvell MPSC serial controller
powerpc/embedded6xx: Remove C2K board support
powerpc/lib: optimise PPC32 memcmp
powerpc/lib: optimise 32 bits __clear_user()
powerpc/time: inline arch_vtime_task_switch()
powerpc/Makefile: set -mcpu=860 flag for the 8xx
powerpc: Implement csum_ipv6_magic in assembly
powerpc/32: Optimise __csum_partial()
powerpc/lib: Adjust .balign inside string functions for PPC32
...
|
||
|
Mathieu Desnoyers
|
d7822b1e24 |
rseq: Introduce restartable sequences system call
Expose a new system call allowing each thread to register one userspace memory area to be used as an ABI between kernel and user-space for two purposes: user-space restartable sequences and quick access to read the current CPU number value from user-space. * Restartable sequences (per-cpu atomics) Restartables sequences allow user-space to perform update operations on per-cpu data without requiring heavy-weight atomic operations. The restartable critical sections (percpu atomics) work has been started by Paul Turner and Andrew Hunter. It lets the kernel handle restart of critical sections. [1] [2] The re-implementation proposed here brings a few simplifications to the ABI which facilitates porting to other architectures and speeds up the user-space fast path. Here are benchmarks of various rseq use-cases. Test hardware: arm32: ARMv7 Processor rev 4 (v7l) "Cubietruck", 2-core x86-64: Intel E5-2630 v3@2.40GHz, 16-core, hyperthreading The following benchmarks were all performed on a single thread. * Per-CPU statistic counter increment getcpu+atomic (ns/op) rseq (ns/op) speedup arm32: 344.0 31.4 11.0 x86-64: 15.3 2.0 7.7 * LTTng-UST: write event 32-bit header, 32-bit payload into tracer per-cpu buffer getcpu+atomic (ns/op) rseq (ns/op) speedup arm32: 2502.0 2250.0 1.1 x86-64: 117.4 98.0 1.2 * liburcu percpu: lock-unlock pair, dereference, read/compare word getcpu+atomic (ns/op) rseq (ns/op) speedup arm32: 751.0 128.5 5.8 x86-64: 53.4 28.6 1.9 * jemalloc memory allocator adapted to use rseq Using rseq with per-cpu memory pools in jemalloc at Facebook (based on rseq 2016 implementation): The production workload response-time has 1-2% gain avg. latency, and the P99 overall latency drops by 2-3%. * Reading the current CPU number Speeding up reading the current CPU number on which the caller thread is running is done by keeping the current CPU number up do date within the cpu_id field of the memory area registered by the thread. This is done by making scheduler preemption set the TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME flag on the current thread. Upon return to user-space, a notify-resume handler updates the current CPU value within the registered user-space memory area. User-space can then read the current CPU number directly from memory. Keeping the current cpu id in a memory area shared between kernel and user-space is an improvement over current mechanisms available to read the current CPU number, which has the following benefits over alternative approaches: - 35x speedup on ARM vs system call through glibc - 20x speedup on x86 compared to calling glibc, which calls vdso executing a "lsl" instruction, - 14x speedup on x86 compared to inlined "lsl" instruction, - Unlike vdso approaches, this cpu_id value can be read from an inline assembly, which makes it a useful building block for restartable sequences. - The approach of reading the cpu id through memory mapping shared between kernel and user-space is portable (e.g. ARM), which is not the case for the lsl-based x86 vdso. On x86, yet another possible approach would be to use the gs segment selector to point to user-space per-cpu data. This approach performs similarly to the cpu id cache, but it has two disadvantages: it is not portable, and it is incompatible with existing applications already using the gs segment selector for other purposes. Benchmarking various approaches for reading the current CPU number: ARMv7 Processor rev 4 (v7l) Machine model: Cubietruck - Baseline (empty loop): 8.4 ns - Read CPU from rseq cpu_id: 16.7 ns - Read CPU from rseq cpu_id (lazy register): 19.8 ns - glibc 2.19-0ubuntu6.6 getcpu: 301.8 ns - getcpu system call: 234.9 ns x86-64 Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2630 v3 @ 2.40GHz: - Baseline (empty loop): 0.8 ns - Read CPU from rseq cpu_id: 0.8 ns - Read CPU from rseq cpu_id (lazy register): 0.8 ns - Read using gs segment selector: 0.8 ns - "lsl" inline assembly: 13.0 ns - glibc 2.19-0ubuntu6 getcpu: 16.6 ns - getcpu system call: 53.9 ns - Speed (benchmark taken on v8 of patchset) Running 10 runs of hackbench -l 100000 seems to indicate, contrary to expectations, that enabling CONFIG_RSEQ slightly accelerates the scheduler: Configuration: 2 sockets * 8-core Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2630 v3 @ 2.40GHz (directly on hardware, hyperthreading disabled in BIOS, energy saving disabled in BIOS, turboboost disabled in BIOS, cpuidle.off=1 kernel parameter), with a Linux v4.6 defconfig+localyesconfig, restartable sequences series applied. * CONFIG_RSEQ=n avg.: 41.37 s std.dev.: 0.36 s * CONFIG_RSEQ=y avg.: 40.46 s std.dev.: 0.33 s - Size On x86-64, between CONFIG_RSEQ=n/y, the text size increase of vmlinux is 567 bytes, and the data size increase of vmlinux is 5696 bytes. [1] https://lwn.net/Articles/650333/ [2] http://www.linuxplumbersconf.org/2013/ocw/system/presentations/1695/original/LPC%20-%20PerCpu%20Atomics.pdf Signed-off-by: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Joel Fernandes <joelaf@google.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Dave Watson <davejwatson@fb.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org> Cc: "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Chris Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Russell King <linux@arm.linux.org.uk> Cc: Andrew Hunter <ahh@google.com> Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com> Cc: "Paul E . McKenney" <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com> Cc: Boqun Feng <boqun.feng@gmail.com> Cc: Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Ben Maurer <bmaurer@fb.com> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: linux-api@vger.kernel.org Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20151027235635.16059.11630.stgit@pjt-glaptop.roam.corp.google.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20150624222609.6116.86035.stgit@kitami.mtv.corp.google.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180602124408.8430-3-mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com |
||
|
Al Viro
|
4c392e6591 |
powerpc/syscalls: switch rtas(2) to SYSCALL_DEFINE
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> [mpe: Update sys_ni.c for s/ppc_rtas/sys_rtas/] Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> |
||
|
Christoph Hellwig
|
7a074e96de |
aio: implement io_pgetevents
This is the io_getevents equivalent of ppoll/pselect and allows to properly mix signals and aio completions (especially with IOCB_CMD_POLL) and atomically executes the following sequence: sigset_t origmask; pthread_sigmask(SIG_SETMASK, &sigmask, &origmask); ret = io_getevents(ctx, min_nr, nr, events, timeout); pthread_sigmask(SIG_SETMASK, &origmask, NULL); Note that unlike many other signal related calls we do not pass a sigmask size, as that would get us to 7 arguments, which aren't easily supported by the syscall infrastructure. It seems a lot less painful to just add a new syscall variant in the unlikely case we're going to increase the sigset size. Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com> |
||
|
Dominik Brodowski
|
7303e30ec1 |
syscalls/core: Prepare CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_SYSCALL_WRAPPER=y for compat syscalls
It may be useful for an architecture to override the definitions of the COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE0() and __COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINEx() macros in <linux/compat.h>, in particular to use a different calling convention for syscalls. This patch provides a mechanism to do so, based on the previously introduced CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_SYSCALL_WRAPPER. If it is enabled, <asm/sycall_wrapper.h> is included in <linux/compat.h> and may be used to define the macros mentioned above. Moreover, as the syscall calling convention may be different if CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_SYSCALL_WRAPPER is set, the compat syscall function prototypes in <linux/compat.h> are #ifndef'd out in that case. As some of the syscalls and/or compat syscalls may not be present, the COND_SYSCALL() and COND_SYSCALL_COMPAT() macros in kernel/sys_ni.c as well as the SYS_NI() and COMPAT_SYS_NI() macros in kernel/time/posix-stubs.c can be re-defined in <asm/syscall_wrapper.h> iff CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_SYSCALL_WRAPPER is enabled. Signed-off-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net> Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180405095307.3730-5-linux@dominikbrodowski.net Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> |
||
|
Dominik Brodowski
|
67a7acd377 |
kernel/sys_ni: remove {sys_,sys_compat} from cond_syscall definitions
This keeps it in line with the SYSCALL_DEFINEx() / COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINEx() calling convention. Signed-off-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net> |