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Author SHA1 Message Date
Linus Torvalds
6c32978414 Notifications over pipes + Keyring notifications
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Merge tag 'notifications-20200601' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs

Pull notification queue from David Howells:
 "This adds a general notification queue concept and adds an event
  source for keys/keyrings, such as linking and unlinking keys and
  changing their attributes.

  Thanks to Debarshi Ray, we do have a pull request to use this to fix a
  problem with gnome-online-accounts - as mentioned last time:

     https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/gnome-online-accounts/merge_requests/47

  Without this, g-o-a has to constantly poll a keyring-based kerberos
  cache to find out if kinit has changed anything.

  [ There are other notification pending: mount/sb fsinfo notifications
    for libmount that Karel Zak and Ian Kent have been working on, and
    Christian Brauner would like to use them in lxc, but let's see how
    this one works first ]

  LSM hooks are included:

   - A set of hooks are provided that allow an LSM to rule on whether or
     not a watch may be set. Each of these hooks takes a different
     "watched object" parameter, so they're not really shareable. The
     LSM should use current's credentials. [Wanted by SELinux & Smack]

   - A hook is provided to allow an LSM to rule on whether or not a
     particular message may be posted to a particular queue. This is
     given the credentials from the event generator (which may be the
     system) and the watch setter. [Wanted by Smack]

  I've provided SELinux and Smack with implementations of some of these
  hooks.

  WHY
  ===

  Key/keyring notifications are desirable because if you have your
  kerberos tickets in a file/directory, your Gnome desktop will monitor
  that using something like fanotify and tell you if your credentials
  cache changes.

  However, we also have the ability to cache your kerberos tickets in
  the session, user or persistent keyring so that it isn't left around
  on disk across a reboot or logout. Keyrings, however, cannot currently
  be monitored asynchronously, so the desktop has to poll for it - not
  so good on a laptop. This facility will allow the desktop to avoid the
  need to poll.

  DESIGN DECISIONS
  ================

   - The notification queue is built on top of a standard pipe. Messages
     are effectively spliced in. The pipe is opened with a special flag:

        pipe2(fds, O_NOTIFICATION_PIPE);

     The special flag has the same value as O_EXCL (which doesn't seem
     like it will ever be applicable in this context)[?]. It is given up
     front to make it a lot easier to prohibit splice&co from accessing
     the pipe.

     [?] Should this be done some other way?  I'd rather not use up a new
         O_* flag if I can avoid it - should I add a pipe3() system call
         instead?

     The pipe is then configured::

        ioctl(fds[1], IOC_WATCH_QUEUE_SET_SIZE, queue_depth);
        ioctl(fds[1], IOC_WATCH_QUEUE_SET_FILTER, &filter);

     Messages are then read out of the pipe using read().

   - It should be possible to allow write() to insert data into the
     notification pipes too, but this is currently disabled as the
     kernel has to be able to insert messages into the pipe *without*
     holding pipe->mutex and the code to make this work needs careful
     auditing.

   - sendfile(), splice() and vmsplice() are disabled on notification
     pipes because of the pipe->mutex issue and also because they
     sometimes want to revert what they just did - but one or more
     notification messages might've been interleaved in the ring.

   - The kernel inserts messages with the wait queue spinlock held. This
     means that pipe_read() and pipe_write() have to take the spinlock
     to update the queue pointers.

   - Records in the buffer are binary, typed and have a length so that
     they can be of varying size.

     This allows multiple heterogeneous sources to share a common
     buffer; there are 16 million types available, of which I've used
     just a few, so there is scope for others to be used. Tags may be
     specified when a watchpoint is created to help distinguish the
     sources.

   - Records are filterable as types have up to 256 subtypes that can be
     individually filtered. Other filtration is also available.

   - Notification pipes don't interfere with each other; each may be
     bound to a different set of watches. Any particular notification
     will be copied to all the queues that are currently watching for it
     - and only those that are watching for it.

   - When recording a notification, the kernel will not sleep, but will
     rather mark a queue as having lost a message if there's
     insufficient space. read() will fabricate a loss notification
     message at an appropriate point later.

   - The notification pipe is created and then watchpoints are attached
     to it, using one of:

        keyctl_watch_key(KEY_SPEC_SESSION_KEYRING, fds[1], 0x01);
        watch_mount(AT_FDCWD, "/", 0, fd, 0x02);
        watch_sb(AT_FDCWD, "/mnt", 0, fd, 0x03);

     where in both cases, fd indicates the queue and the number after is
     a tag between 0 and 255.

   - Watches are removed if either the notification pipe is destroyed or
     the watched object is destroyed. In the latter case, a message will
     be generated indicating the enforced watch removal.

  Things I want to avoid:

   - Introducing features that make the core VFS dependent on the
     network stack or networking namespaces (ie. usage of netlink).

   - Dumping all this stuff into dmesg and having a daemon that sits
     there parsing the output and distributing it as this then puts the
     responsibility for security into userspace and makes handling
     namespaces tricky. Further, dmesg might not exist or might be
     inaccessible inside a container.

   - Letting users see events they shouldn't be able to see.

  TESTING AND MANPAGES
  ====================

   - The keyutils tree has a pipe-watch branch that has keyctl commands
     for making use of notifications. Proposed manual pages can also be
     found on this branch, though a couple of them really need to go to
     the main manpages repository instead.

     If the kernel supports the watching of keys, then running "make
     test" on that branch will cause the testing infrastructure to spawn
     a monitoring process on the side that monitors a notifications pipe
     for all the key/keyring changes induced by the tests and they'll
     all be checked off to make sure they happened.

        https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/keyutils.git/log/?h=pipe-watch

   - A test program is provided (samples/watch_queue/watch_test) that
     can be used to monitor for keyrings, mount and superblock events.
     Information on the notifications is simply logged to stdout"

* tag 'notifications-20200601' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs:
  smack: Implement the watch_key and post_notification hooks
  selinux: Implement the watch_key security hook
  keys: Make the KEY_NEED_* perms an enum rather than a mask
  pipe: Add notification lossage handling
  pipe: Allow buffers to be marked read-whole-or-error for notifications
  Add sample notification program
  watch_queue: Add a key/keyring notification facility
  security: Add hooks to rule on setting a watch
  pipe: Add general notification queue support
  pipe: Add O_NOTIFICATION_PIPE
  security: Add a hook for the point of notification insertion
  uapi: General notification queue definitions
2020-06-13 09:56:21 -07:00
Linus Torvalds
15a2bc4dbb Merge branch 'exec-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace
Pull execve updates from Eric Biederman:
 "Last cycle for the Nth time I ran into bugs and quality of
  implementation issues related to exec that could not be easily be
  fixed because of the way exec is implemented. So I have been digging
  into exec and cleanup up what I can.

  I don't think I have exec sorted out enough to fix the issues I
  started with but I have made some headway this cycle with 4 sets of
  changes.

   - promised cleanups after introducing exec_update_mutex

   - trivial cleanups for exec

   - control flow simplifications

   - remove the recomputation of bprm->cred

  The net result is code that is a bit easier to understand and work
  with and a decrease in the number of lines of code (if you don't count
  the added tests)"

* 'exec-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace: (24 commits)
  exec: Compute file based creds only once
  exec: Add a per bprm->file version of per_clear
  binfmt_elf_fdpic: fix execfd build regression
  selftests/exec: Add binfmt_script regression test
  exec: Remove recursion from search_binary_handler
  exec: Generic execfd support
  exec/binfmt_script: Don't modify bprm->buf and then return -ENOEXEC
  exec: Move the call of prepare_binprm into search_binary_handler
  exec: Allow load_misc_binary to call prepare_binprm unconditionally
  exec: Convert security_bprm_set_creds into security_bprm_repopulate_creds
  exec: Factor security_bprm_creds_for_exec out of security_bprm_set_creds
  exec: Teach prepare_exec_creds how exec treats uids & gids
  exec: Set the point of no return sooner
  exec: Move handling of the point of no return to the top level
  exec: Run sync_mm_rss before taking exec_update_mutex
  exec: Fix spelling of search_binary_handler in a comment
  exec: Move the comment from above de_thread to above unshare_sighand
  exec: Rename flush_old_exec begin_new_exec
  exec: Move most of setup_new_exec into flush_old_exec
  exec: In setup_new_exec cache current in the local variable me
  ...
2020-06-04 14:07:08 -07:00
Eric W. Biederman
b8bff59926 exec: Factor security_bprm_creds_for_exec out of security_bprm_set_creds
Today security_bprm_set_creds has several implementations:
apparmor_bprm_set_creds, cap_bprm_set_creds, selinux_bprm_set_creds,
smack_bprm_set_creds, and tomoyo_bprm_set_creds.

Except for cap_bprm_set_creds they all test bprm->called_set_creds and
return immediately if it is true.  The function cap_bprm_set_creds
ignores bprm->calld_sed_creds entirely.

Create a new LSM hook security_bprm_creds_for_exec that is called just
before prepare_binprm in __do_execve_file, resulting in a LSM hook
that is called exactly once for the entire of exec.  Modify the bits
of security_bprm_set_creds that only want to be called once per exec
into security_bprm_creds_for_exec, leaving only cap_bprm_set_creds
behind.

Remove bprm->called_set_creds all of it's former users have been moved
to security_bprm_creds_for_exec.

Add or upate comments a appropriate to bring them up to date and
to reflect this change.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/87v9kszrzh.fsf_-_@x220.int.ebiederm.org
Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> # For the LSM and Smack bits
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2020-05-20 14:45:31 -05:00
David Howells
a8478a6029 smack: Implement the watch_key and post_notification hooks
Implement the watch_key security hook in Smack to make sure that a key
grants the caller Read permission in order to set a watch on a key.

Also implement the post_notification security hook to make sure that the
notification source is granted Write permission by the watch queue.

For the moment, the watch_devices security hook is left unimplemented as
it's not obvious what the object should be since the queue is global and
didn't previously exist.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2020-05-19 15:47:38 +01:00
David Howells
8c0637e950 keys: Make the KEY_NEED_* perms an enum rather than a mask
Since the meaning of combining the KEY_NEED_* constants is undefined, make
it so that you can't do that by turning them into an enum.

The enum is also given some extra values to represent special
circumstances, such as:

 (1) The '0' value is reserved and causes a warning to trap the parameter
     being unset.

 (2) The key is to be unlinked and we require no permissions on it, only
     the keyring, (this replaces the KEY_LOOKUP_FOR_UNLINK flag).

 (3) An override due to CAP_SYS_ADMIN.

 (4) An override due to an instantiation token being present.

 (5) The permissions check is being deferred to later key_permission()
     calls.

The extra values give the opportunity for LSMs to audit these situations.

[Note: This really needs overhauling so that lookup_user_key() tells
 key_task_permission() and the LSM what operation is being done and leaves
 it to those functions to decide how to map that onto the available
 permits.  However, I don't really want to make these change in the middle
 of the notifications patchset.]

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
cc: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org
cc: selinux@vger.kernel.org
2020-05-19 15:42:22 +01:00
Casey Schaufler
4ca7528706 Smack:- Remove redundant inode_smack cache
The inode_smack cache is no longer used.
Remove it.

Signed-off-by: Vishal Goel <vishal.goel@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2020-05-06 14:46:26 -07:00
Casey Schaufler
921bb1cbb3 Smack:- Remove mutex lock "smk_lock" from inode_smack
"smk_lock" mutex is used during inode instantiation in
smack_d_instantiate()function. It has been used to avoid
simultaneous access on same inode security structure.
Since smack related initialization is done only once i.e during
inode creation. If the inode has already been instantiated then
smack_d_instantiate() function just returns without doing
anything.

So it means mutex lock is required only during inode creation.
But since 2 processes can't create same inodes or files
simultaneously. Also linking or some other file operation can't
be done simultaneously when the file is getting created since
file lookup will fail before dentry inode linkup which is done
after smack initialization.
So no mutex lock is required in inode_smack structure.

It will save memory as well as improve some performance.
If 40000 inodes are created in system, it will save 1.5 MB on
32-bit systems & 2.8 MB on 64-bit systems.

Signed-off-by: Vishal Goel <vishal.goel@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Amit Sahrawat <a.sahrawat@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2020-05-06 14:46:26 -07:00
Arnd Bergmann
00720f0e7f smack: avoid unused 'sip' variable warning
The mix of IS_ENABLED() and #ifdef checks has left a combination
that causes a warning about an unused variable:

security/smack/smack_lsm.c: In function 'smack_socket_connect':
security/smack/smack_lsm.c:2838:24: error: unused variable 'sip' [-Werror=unused-variable]
 2838 |   struct sockaddr_in6 *sip = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)sap;

Change the code to use C-style checks consistently so the compiler
can handle it correctly.

Fixes: 87fbfffcc8 ("broken ping to ipv6 linklocal addresses on debian buster")
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2020-05-06 14:46:26 -07:00
Linus Torvalds
c9d35ee049 Merge branch 'merge.nfs-fs_parse.1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs
Pull vfs file system parameter updates from Al Viro:
 "Saner fs_parser.c guts and data structures. The system-wide registry
  of syntax types (string/enum/int32/oct32/.../etc.) is gone and so is
  the horror switch() in fs_parse() that would have to grow another case
  every time something got added to that system-wide registry.

  New syntax types can be added by filesystems easily now, and their
  namespace is that of functions - not of system-wide enum members. IOW,
  they can be shared or kept private and if some turn out to be widely
  useful, we can make them common library helpers, etc., without having
  to do anything whatsoever to fs_parse() itself.

  And we already get that kind of requests - the thing that finally
  pushed me into doing that was "oh, and let's add one for timeouts -
  things like 15s or 2h". If some filesystem really wants that, let them
  do it. Without somebody having to play gatekeeper for the variants
  blessed by direct support in fs_parse(), TYVM.

  Quite a bit of boilerplate is gone. And IMO the data structures make a
  lot more sense now. -200LoC, while we are at it"

* 'merge.nfs-fs_parse.1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: (25 commits)
  tmpfs: switch to use of invalfc()
  cgroup1: switch to use of errorfc() et.al.
  procfs: switch to use of invalfc()
  hugetlbfs: switch to use of invalfc()
  cramfs: switch to use of errofc() et.al.
  gfs2: switch to use of errorfc() et.al.
  fuse: switch to use errorfc() et.al.
  ceph: use errorfc() and friends instead of spelling the prefix out
  prefix-handling analogues of errorf() and friends
  turn fs_param_is_... into functions
  fs_parse: handle optional arguments sanely
  fs_parse: fold fs_parameter_desc/fs_parameter_spec
  fs_parser: remove fs_parameter_description name field
  add prefix to fs_context->log
  ceph_parse_param(), ceph_parse_mon_ips(): switch to passing fc_log
  new primitive: __fs_parse()
  switch rbd and libceph to p_log-based primitives
  struct p_log, variants of warnf() et.al. taking that one instead
  teach logfc() to handle prefices, give it saner calling conventions
  get rid of cg_invalf()
  ...
2020-02-08 13:26:41 -08:00
Al Viro
d7167b1499 fs_parse: fold fs_parameter_desc/fs_parameter_spec
The former contains nothing but a pointer to an array of the latter...

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2020-02-07 14:48:37 -05:00
Eric Sandeen
96cafb9ccb fs_parser: remove fs_parameter_description name field
Unused now.

Signed-off-by: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2020-02-07 14:48:36 -05:00
Casey Schaufler
87fbfffcc8
broken ping to ipv6 linklocal addresses on debian buster
I am seeing ping failures to IPv6 linklocal addresses with Debian
buster. Easiest example to reproduce is:

$ ping -c1 -w1 ff02::1%eth1
connect: Invalid argument

$ ping -c1 -w1 ff02::1%eth1
PING ff02::01%eth1(ff02::1%eth1) 56 data bytes
64 bytes from fe80::e0:f9ff:fe0c:37%eth1: icmp_seq=1 ttl=64 time=0.059 ms

git bisect traced the failure to
commit b9ef5513c9 ("smack: Check address length before reading address family")

Arguably ping is being stupid since the buster version is not setting
the address family properly (ping on stretch for example does):

$ strace -e connect ping6 -c1 -w1 ff02::1%eth1
connect(5, {sa_family=AF_UNSPEC,
sa_data="\4\1\0\0\0\0\377\2\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\1\3\0\0\0"}, 28)
= -1 EINVAL (Invalid argument)

but the command works fine on kernels prior to this commit, so this is
breakage which goes against the Linux paradigm of "don't break userspace"

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com>
Suggested-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>

 security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 41 +++++++++++++++++++----------------------
 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)
2020-02-05 14:16:27 -08:00
David Howells
d055b4fb4d pipe: Reduce #inclusion of pipe_fs_i.h
Remove some #inclusions of linux/pipe_fs_i.h that don't seem to be
necessary any more.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2019-10-23 17:02:34 +01:00
Eric Biggers
e5bfad3d7a
smack: use GFP_NOFS while holding inode_smack::smk_lock
inode_smack::smk_lock is taken during smack_d_instantiate(), which is
called during a filesystem transaction when creating a file on ext4.
Therefore to avoid a deadlock, all code that takes this lock must use
GFP_NOFS, to prevent memory reclaim from waiting for the filesystem
transaction to complete.

Reported-by: syzbot+0eefc1e06a77d327a056@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2019-09-04 09:37:07 -07:00
Jia-Ju Bai
3f4287e7d9
security: smack: Fix possible null-pointer dereferences in smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb()
In smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb(), there is an if statement
on line 3920 to check whether skb is NULL:
    if (skb && skb->secmark != 0)

This check indicates skb can be NULL in some cases.

But on lines 3931 and 3932, skb is used:
    ad.a.u.net->netif = skb->skb_iif;
    ipv6_skb_to_auditdata(skb, &ad.a, NULL);

Thus, possible null-pointer dereferences may occur when skb is NULL.

To fix these possible bugs, an if statement is added to check skb.

These bugs are found by a static analysis tool STCheck written by us.

Signed-off-by: Jia-Ju Bai <baijiaju1990@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2019-09-04 09:37:07 -07:00
luanshi
a1a07f2234
smack: fix some kernel-doc notations
Fix/add kernel-doc notation and fix typos in security/smack/.

Signed-off-by: Liguang Zhang <zhangliguang@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2019-09-04 09:37:07 -07:00
Jann Horn
3675f052b4
Smack: Don't ignore other bprm->unsafe flags if LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE is set
There is a logic bug in the current smack_bprm_set_creds():
If LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE is set, but the ptrace state is deemed to be
acceptable (e.g. because the ptracer detached in the meantime), the other
->unsafe flags aren't checked. As far as I can tell, this means that
something like the following could work (but I haven't tested it):

 - task A: create task B with fork()
 - task B: set NO_NEW_PRIVS
 - task B: install a seccomp filter that makes open() return 0 under some
   conditions
 - task B: replace fd 0 with a malicious library
 - task A: attach to task B with PTRACE_ATTACH
 - task B: execve() a file with an SMACK64EXEC extended attribute
 - task A: while task B is still in the middle of execve(), exit (which
   destroys the ptrace relationship)

Make sure that if any flags other than LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE are set in
bprm->unsafe, we reject the execve().

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 5663884caa ("Smack: unify all ptrace accesses in the smack")
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2019-09-04 09:36:57 -07:00
Thomas Gleixner
d2912cb15b treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 500
Based on 2 normalized pattern(s):

  this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify
  it under the terms of the gnu general public license version 2 as
  published by the free software foundation

  this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify
  it under the terms of the gnu general public license version 2 as
  published by the free software foundation #

extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier

  GPL-2.0-only

has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 4122 file(s).

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Enrico Weigelt <info@metux.net>
Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Allison Randal <allison@lohutok.net>
Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190604081206.933168790@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-06-19 17:09:55 +02:00
Casey Schaufler
6e7739fc93 Smack: Restore the smackfsdef mount option and add missing prefixes
The 5.1 mount system rework changed the smackfsdef mount option to
smackfsdefault.  This fixes the regression by making smackfsdef treated
the same way as smackfsdefault.

Also fix the smack_param_specs[] to have "smack" prefixes on all the
names.  This isn't visible to a user unless they either:

 (a) Try to mount a filesystem that's converted to the internal mount API
     and that implements the ->parse_monolithic() context operation - and
     only then if they call security_fs_context_parse_param() rather than
     security_sb_eat_lsm_opts().

     There are no examples of this upstream yet, but nfs will probably want
     to do this for nfs2 or nfs3.

 (b) Use fsconfig() to configure the filesystem - in which case
     security_fs_context_parse_param() will be called.

This issue is that smack_sb_eat_lsm_opts() checks for the "smack" prefix
on the options, but smack_fs_context_parse_param() does not.

Fixes: c3300aaf95 ("smack: get rid of match_token()")
Fixes: 2febd254ad ("smack: Implement filesystem context security hooks")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Jose Bollo <jose.bollo@iot.bzh>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-06-14 14:25:04 -10:00
Casey Schaufler
619ae03e92 Smack: Fix kbuild reported build error
The variable sap is defined under ifdef, but a recently
added use of the variable was not. Put that use under ifdef
as well.

Reported-by: kbuild test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2019-04-30 14:13:32 -07:00
Tetsuo Handa
b9ef5513c9 smack: Check address length before reading address family
KMSAN will complain if valid address length passed to bind()/connect()/
sendmsg() is shorter than sizeof("struct sockaddr"->sa_family) bytes.

Also, since smk_ipv6_port_label()/smack_netlabel_send()/
smack_ipv6host_label()/smk_ipv6_check()/smk_ipv6_port_check() are not
checking valid address length and/or address family, make sure we check
both. The minimal valid length in smack_socket_connect() is changed from
sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6) bytes to SIN6_LEN_RFC2133 bytes, for it seems
that Smack is not using "struct sockaddr_in6"->sin6_scope_id field.

Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2019-04-29 17:32:27 -07:00
Casey Schaufler
f7450bc6e7 Smack: Fix IPv6 handling of 0 secmark
Handle the case where the skb for an IPv6 packet contains
a 0 in the secmark for a packet generated locally. This
can only happen for system packets, so allow the access.

Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2019-04-03 14:28:38 -07:00
Casey Schaufler
4e328b0888 Smack: Create smack_rule cache to optimize memory usage
This patch allows for small memory optimization by creating the
kmem cache for "struct smack_rule" instead of using kzalloc.
For adding new smack rule, kzalloc is used to allocate the memory
for "struct smack_rule". kzalloc will always allocate 32 or 64 bytes
for 1 structure depending upon the kzalloc cache sizes available in
system. Although the size of structure is 20 bytes only, resulting
in memory wastage per object in the default pool.

For e.g., if there are 20000 rules, then it will save 240KB(20000*12)
which is crucial for small memory targets.

Signed-off-by: Vishal Goel <vishal.goel@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Amit Sahrawat <a.sahrawat@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2019-04-02 11:45:41 -07:00
Linus Torvalds
7b47a9e7c8 Merge branch 'work.mount' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs
Pull vfs mount infrastructure updates from Al Viro:
 "The rest of core infrastructure; no new syscalls in that pile, but the
  old parts are switched to new infrastructure. At that point
  conversions of individual filesystems can happen independently; some
  are done here (afs, cgroup, procfs, etc.), there's also a large series
  outside of that pile dealing with NFS (quite a bit of option-parsing
  stuff is getting used there - it's one of the most convoluted
  filesystems in terms of mount-related logics), but NFS bits are the
  next cycle fodder.

  It got seriously simplified since the last cycle; documentation is
  probably the weakest bit at the moment - I considered dropping the
  commit introducing Documentation/filesystems/mount_api.txt (cutting
  the size increase by quarter ;-), but decided that it would be better
  to fix it up after -rc1 instead.

  That pile allows to do followup work in independent branches, which
  should make life much easier for the next cycle. fs/super.c size
  increase is unpleasant; there's a followup series that allows to
  shrink it considerably, but I decided to leave that until the next
  cycle"

* 'work.mount' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: (41 commits)
  afs: Use fs_context to pass parameters over automount
  afs: Add fs_context support
  vfs: Add some logging to the core users of the fs_context log
  vfs: Implement logging through fs_context
  vfs: Provide documentation for new mount API
  vfs: Remove kern_mount_data()
  hugetlbfs: Convert to fs_context
  cpuset: Use fs_context
  kernfs, sysfs, cgroup, intel_rdt: Support fs_context
  cgroup: store a reference to cgroup_ns into cgroup_fs_context
  cgroup1_get_tree(): separate "get cgroup_root to use" into a separate helper
  cgroup_do_mount(): massage calling conventions
  cgroup: stash cgroup_root reference into cgroup_fs_context
  cgroup2: switch to option-by-option parsing
  cgroup1: switch to option-by-option parsing
  cgroup: take options parsing into ->parse_monolithic()
  cgroup: fold cgroup1_mount() into cgroup1_get_tree()
  cgroup: start switching to fs_context
  ipc: Convert mqueue fs to fs_context
  proc: Add fs_context support to procfs
  ...
2019-03-12 14:08:19 -07:00
Linus Torvalds
be37f21a08 audit/stable-5.1 PR 20190305
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Merge tag 'audit-pr-20190305' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/audit

Pull audit updates from Paul Moore:
 "A lucky 13 audit patches for v5.1.

  Despite the rather large diffstat, most of the changes are from two
  bug fix patches that move code from one Kconfig option to another.

  Beyond that bit of churn, the remaining changes are largely cleanups
  and bug-fixes as we slowly march towards container auditing. It isn't
  all boring though, we do have a couple of new things: file
  capabilities v3 support, and expanded support for filtering on
  filesystems to solve problems with remote filesystems.

  All changes pass the audit-testsuite.  Please merge for v5.1"

* tag 'audit-pr-20190305' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/audit:
  audit: mark expected switch fall-through
  audit: hide auditsc_get_stamp and audit_serial prototypes
  audit: join tty records to their syscall
  audit: remove audit_context when CONFIG_ AUDIT and not AUDITSYSCALL
  audit: remove unused actx param from audit_rule_match
  audit: ignore fcaps on umount
  audit: clean up AUDITSYSCALL prototypes and stubs
  audit: more filter PATH records keyed on filesystem magic
  audit: add support for fcaps v3
  audit: move loginuid and sessionid from CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL to CONFIG_AUDIT
  audit: add syscall information to CONFIG_CHANGE records
  audit: hand taken context to audit_kill_trees for syscall logging
  audit: give a clue what CONFIG_CHANGE op was involved
2019-03-07 12:20:11 -08:00
Al Viro
0b52075ee6 introduce cloning of fs_context
new primitive: vfs_dup_fs_context().  Comes with fs_context
method (->dup()) for copying the filesystem-specific parts
of fs_context, along with LSM one (->fs_context_dup()) for
doing the same to LSM parts.

[needs better commit message, and change of Author:, anyway]

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2019-02-28 03:29:27 -05:00
David Howells
2febd254ad smack: Implement filesystem context security hooks
Implement filesystem context security hooks for the smack LSM.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2019-02-28 03:29:25 -05:00
Gustavo A. R. Silva
09186e5034 security: mark expected switch fall-throughs and add a missing break
In preparation to enabling -Wimplicit-fallthrough, mark switch
cases where we are expecting to fall through.

This patch fixes the following warnings:

security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c:85:10: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=]
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c:940:18: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=]
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c:943:7: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=]
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c:972:21: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=]
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c:974:7: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=]
security/smack/smack_lsm.c:3391:9: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=]
security/apparmor/domain.c:569:6: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=]

Warning level 3 was used: -Wimplicit-fallthrough=3

Also, add a missing break statement to fix the following warning:

security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c:116:26: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=]

Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
2019-02-22 09:56:09 -08:00
Richard Guy Briggs
90462a5bd3 audit: remove unused actx param from audit_rule_match
The audit_rule_match() struct audit_context *actx parameter is not used
by any in-tree consumers (selinux, apparmour, integrity, smack).

The audit context is an internal audit structure that should only be
accessed by audit accessor functions.

It was part of commit 03d37d25e0 ("LSM/Audit: Introduce generic
Audit LSM hooks") but appears to have never been used.

Remove it.

Please see the github issue
https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/107

Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
[PM: fixed the referenced commit title]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2019-01-31 23:00:15 -05:00
Tetsuo Handa
1cfb2a512e LSM: Make lsm_early_cred() and lsm_early_task() local functions.
Since current->cred == current->real_cred when ordered_lsm_init()
is called, and lsm_early_cred()/lsm_early_task() need to be called
between the amount of required bytes is determined and module specific
initialization function is called, we can move these calls from
individual modules to ordered_lsm_init().

Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
2019-01-18 11:44:02 -08:00
Casey Schaufler
ecd5f82e05 LSM: Infrastructure management of the ipc security blob
Move management of the kern_ipc_perm->security and
msg_msg->security blobs out of the individual security
modules and into the security infrastructure. Instead
of allocating the blobs from within the modules the modules
tell the infrastructure how much space is required, and
the space is allocated there.

Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
[kees: adjusted for ordered init series]
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2019-01-08 13:18:45 -08:00
Casey Schaufler
019bcca462 Smack: Abstract use of ipc security blobs
Don't use the ipc->security pointer directly.
Don't use the msg_msg->security pointer directly.
Provide helper functions that provides the security blob pointers.

Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2019-01-08 13:18:45 -08:00
Casey Schaufler
afb1cbe374 LSM: Infrastructure management of the inode security
Move management of the inode->i_security blob out
of the individual security modules and into the security
infrastructure. Instead of allocating the blobs from within
the modules the modules tell the infrastructure how much
space is required, and the space is allocated there.

Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
[kees: adjusted for ordered init series]
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2019-01-08 13:18:45 -08:00
Casey Schaufler
fb4021b6fb Smack: Abstract use of inode security blob
Don't use the inode->i_security pointer directly.
Provide a helper function that provides the security blob pointer.

Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2019-01-08 13:18:45 -08:00
Casey Schaufler
33bf60cabc LSM: Infrastructure management of the file security
Move management of the file->f_security blob out of the
individual security modules and into the infrastructure.
The modules no longer allocate or free the data, instead
they tell the infrastructure how much space they require.

Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
[kees: adjusted for ordered init series]
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2019-01-08 13:18:44 -08:00
Casey Schaufler
f28952ac90 Smack: Abstract use of file security blob
Don't use the file->f_security pointer directly.
Provide a helper function that provides the security blob pointer.

Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2019-01-08 13:18:44 -08:00
Casey Schaufler
bbd3662a83 Infrastructure management of the cred security blob
Move management of the cred security blob out of the
security modules and into the security infrastructre.
Instead of allocating and freeing space the security
modules tell the infrastructure how much space they
require.

Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
[kees: adjusted for ordered init series]
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2019-01-08 13:18:44 -08:00
Casey Schaufler
b17103a8b8 Smack: Abstract use of cred security blob
Don't use the cred->security pointer directly.
Provide a helper function that provides the security blob pointer.

Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
[kees: adjusted for ordered init series]
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2019-01-08 13:18:44 -08:00
Kees Cook
14bd99c821 LSM: Separate idea of "major" LSM from "exclusive" LSM
In order to both support old "security=" Legacy Major LSM selection, and
handling real exclusivity, this creates LSM_FLAG_EXCLUSIVE and updates
the selection logic to handle them.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2019-01-08 13:18:43 -08:00
Kees Cook
f4941d75b9 LSM: Lift LSM selection out of individual LSMs
As a prerequisite to adjusting LSM selection logic in the future, this
moves the selection logic up out of the individual major LSMs, making
their init functions only run when actually enabled. This considers all
LSMs enabled by default unless they specified an external "enable"
variable.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2019-01-08 13:18:42 -08:00
Kees Cook
47008e5161 LSM: Introduce LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR
This adds a flag for the current "major" LSMs to distinguish them when
we have a universal method for ordering all LSMs. It's called "legacy"
since the distinction of "major" will go away in the blob-sharing world.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2019-01-08 13:18:42 -08:00
Linus Torvalds
505b050fdf Merge branch 'mount.part1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs
Pull vfs mount API prep from Al Viro:
 "Mount API prereqs.

  Mostly that's LSM mount options cleanups. There are several minor
  fixes in there, but nothing earth-shattering (leaks on failure exits,
  mostly)"

* 'mount.part1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: (27 commits)
  mount_fs: suppress MAC on MS_SUBMOUNT as well as MS_KERNMOUNT
  smack: rewrite smack_sb_eat_lsm_opts()
  smack: get rid of match_token()
  smack: take the guts of smack_parse_opts_str() into a new helper
  LSM: new method: ->sb_add_mnt_opt()
  selinux: rewrite selinux_sb_eat_lsm_opts()
  selinux: regularize Opt_... names a bit
  selinux: switch away from match_token()
  selinux: new helper - selinux_add_opt()
  LSM: bury struct security_mnt_opts
  smack: switch to private smack_mnt_opts
  selinux: switch to private struct selinux_mnt_opts
  LSM: hide struct security_mnt_opts from any generic code
  selinux: kill selinux_sb_get_mnt_opts()
  LSM: turn sb_eat_lsm_opts() into a method
  nfs_remount(): don't leak, don't ignore LSM options quietly
  btrfs: sanitize security_mnt_opts use
  selinux; don't open-code a loop in sb_finish_set_opts()
  LSM: split ->sb_set_mnt_opts() out of ->sb_kern_mount()
  new helper: security_sb_eat_lsm_opts()
  ...
2019-01-05 13:25:58 -08:00
Al Viro
d2497e12e2 smack: rewrite smack_sb_eat_lsm_opts()
make it use smack_add_opt() and avoid separate copies - gather
non-LSM options by memmove() in place

Reviewed-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2018-12-21 11:51:02 -05:00
Al Viro
c3300aaf95 smack: get rid of match_token()
same issue as with selinux...

[fix by Andrei Vagin folded in]

Reviewed-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2018-12-21 11:50:51 -05:00
Al Viro
55c0e5bd07 smack: take the guts of smack_parse_opts_str() into a new helper
smack_add_opt() adds an already matched option to growing smack_mnt_options

Reviewed-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2018-12-21 11:50:30 -05:00
Al Viro
757cbe597f LSM: new method: ->sb_add_mnt_opt()
Adding options to growing mnt_opts.  NFS kludge with passing
context= down into non-text-options mount switched to it, and
with that the last use of ->sb_parse_opts_str() is gone.

Reviewed-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2018-12-21 11:50:02 -05:00
Al Viro
12085b14a4 smack: switch to private smack_mnt_opts
Reviewed-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2018-12-21 11:48:54 -05:00
Al Viro
204cc0ccf1 LSM: hide struct security_mnt_opts from any generic code
Keep void * instead, allocate on demand (in parse_str_opts, at the
moment).  Eventually both selinux and smack will be better off
with private structures with several strings in those, rather than
this "counter and two pointers to dynamically allocated arrays"
ugliness.  This commit allows to do that at leisure, without
disrupting anything outside of given module.

Changes:
	* instead of struct security_mnt_opt use an opaque pointer
initialized to NULL.
	* security_sb_eat_lsm_opts(), security_sb_parse_opts_str() and
security_free_mnt_opts() take it as var argument (i.e. as void **);
call sites are unchanged.
	* security_sb_set_mnt_opts() and security_sb_remount() take
it by value (i.e. as void *).
	* new method: ->sb_free_mnt_opts().  Takes void *, does
whatever freeing that needs to be done.
	* ->sb_set_mnt_opts() and ->sb_remount() might get NULL as
mnt_opts argument, meaning "empty".

Reviewed-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2018-12-21 11:48:34 -05:00
Al Viro
5b40023911 LSM: turn sb_eat_lsm_opts() into a method
Kill ->sb_copy_data() - it's used only in combination with immediately
following ->sb_parse_opts_str().  Turn that combination into a new
method.

This is just a mechanical move - cleanups will be the next step.

Reviewed-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2018-12-21 11:47:41 -05:00
Al Viro
a10d7c22b3 LSM: split ->sb_set_mnt_opts() out of ->sb_kern_mount()
... leaving the "is it kernel-internal" logics in the caller.

Reviewed-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2018-12-21 11:46:42 -05:00
Al Viro
6be8750b4c LSM: lift parsing LSM options into the caller of ->sb_kern_mount()
This paves the way for retaining the LSM options from a common filesystem
mount context during a mount parameter parsing phase to be instituted prior
to actual mount/reconfiguration actions.

Reviewed-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2018-12-21 11:45:30 -05:00
Al Viro
6466f3d193 smack: make smack_parse_opts_str() clean up on failure
fixes e.g. a btrfs leak...

Reviewed-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2018-12-21 11:45:04 -05:00
Zoran Markovic
5b841bfab6 smack: fix access permissions for keyring
Function smack_key_permission() only issues smack requests for the
following operations:
 - KEY_NEED_READ (issues MAY_READ)
 - KEY_NEED_WRITE (issues MAY_WRITE)
 - KEY_NEED_LINK (issues MAY_WRITE)
 - KEY_NEED_SETATTR (issues MAY_WRITE)
A blank smack request is issued in all other cases, resulting in
smack access being granted if there is any rule defined between
subject and object, or denied with -EACCES otherwise.

Request MAY_READ access for KEY_NEED_SEARCH and KEY_NEED_VIEW.
Fix the logic in the unlikely case when both MAY_READ and
MAY_WRITE are needed. Validate access permission field for valid
contents.

Signed-off-by: Zoran Markovic <zmarkovic@sierrawireless.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
2018-12-03 11:57:55 -08:00
Linus Torvalds
e80bc22969 Merge branch 'next-smack' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security
Pull smack updates from James Morris:
 "From Casey: three patches for Smack for 4.20. Two clean up warnings
  and one is a rarely encountered ptrace capability check"

* 'next-smack' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security:
  Smack: Mark expected switch fall-through
  Smack: ptrace capability use fixes
  Smack: remove set but not used variable 'root_inode'
2018-10-25 13:29:51 -07:00
Linus Torvalds
638820d8da Merge branch 'next-general' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security
Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris:
 "In this patchset, there are a couple of minor updates, as well as some
  reworking of the LSM initialization code from Kees Cook (these prepare
  the way for ordered stackable LSMs, but are a valuable cleanup on
  their own)"

* 'next-general' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security:
  LSM: Don't ignore initialization failures
  LSM: Provide init debugging infrastructure
  LSM: Record LSM name in struct lsm_info
  LSM: Convert security_initcall() into DEFINE_LSM()
  vmlinux.lds.h: Move LSM_TABLE into INIT_DATA
  LSM: Convert from initcall to struct lsm_info
  LSM: Remove initcall tracing
  LSM: Rename .security_initcall section to .lsm_info
  vmlinux.lds.h: Avoid copy/paste of security_init section
  LSM: Correctly announce start of LSM initialization
  security: fix LSM description location
  keys: Fix the use of the C++ keyword "private" in uapi/linux/keyctl.h
  seccomp: remove unnecessary unlikely()
  security: tomoyo: Fix obsolete function
  security/capabilities: remove check for -EINVAL
2018-10-24 11:49:35 +01:00
Kees Cook
07aed2f2af LSM: Record LSM name in struct lsm_info
In preparation for making LSM selections outside of the LSMs, include
the name of LSMs in struct lsm_info.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
2018-10-10 20:40:22 -07:00
Kees Cook
3d6e5f6dcf LSM: Convert security_initcall() into DEFINE_LSM()
Instead of using argument-based initializers, switch to defining the
contents of struct lsm_info on a per-LSM basis. This also drops
the final use of the now inaccurate "initcall" naming.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
2018-10-10 20:40:21 -07:00
Eric W. Biederman
ae7795bc61 signal: Distinguish between kernel_siginfo and siginfo
Linus recently observed that if we did not worry about the padding
member in struct siginfo it is only about 48 bytes, and 48 bytes is
much nicer than 128 bytes for allocating on the stack and copying
around in the kernel.

The obvious thing of only adding the padding when userspace is
including siginfo.h won't work as there are sigframe definitions in
the kernel that embed struct siginfo.

So split siginfo in two; kernel_siginfo and siginfo.  Keeping the
traditional name for the userspace definition.  While the version that
is used internally to the kernel and ultimately will not be padded to
128 bytes is called kernel_siginfo.

The definition of struct kernel_siginfo I have put in include/signal_types.h

A set of buildtime checks has been added to verify the two structures have
the same field offsets.

To make it easy to verify the change kernel_siginfo retains the same
size as siginfo.  The reduction in size comes in a following change.

Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2018-10-03 16:47:43 +02:00
Gustavo A. R. Silva
b1fed3edc8 Smack: Mark expected switch fall-through
In preparation to enabling -Wimplicit-fallthrough, mark switch cases
where we are expecting to fall through.

Notice that in this particular case, I replaced "No break" with a
proper "Fall through" annotation, which is what GCC is expecting
to find.

Warning level 2 was used: -Wimplicit-fallthrough=2

Addresses-Coverity-ID: 115051 ("Missing break in switch")
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2018-09-18 16:28:54 -07:00
Casey Schaufler
dcb569cf6a Smack: ptrace capability use fixes
This fixes a pair of problems in the Smack ptrace checks
related to checking capabilities. In both cases, as reported
by Lukasz Pawelczyk, the raw capability calls are used rather
than the Smack wrapper that check addition restrictions.
In one case, as reported by Jann Horn, the wrong task is being
checked for capabilities.

Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2018-09-18 16:09:16 -07:00
Linus Torvalds
04743f89bc Merge branch 'next-smack' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security
Pull smack updates from James Morris:
 "Minor fixes from Piotr Sawicki"

* 'next-smack' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security:
  Smack: Inform peer that IPv6 traffic has been blocked
  Smack: Check UDP-Lite and DCCP protocols during IPv6 handling
  Smack: Fix handling of IPv4 traffic received by PF_INET6 sockets
2018-08-15 22:49:04 -07:00
Linus Torvalds
a66b4cd1e7 Merge branch 'work.open3' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs
Pull vfs open-related updates from Al Viro:

 - "do we need fput() or put_filp()" rules are gone - it's always fput()
   now. We keep track of that state where it belongs - in ->f_mode.

 - int *opened mess killed - in finish_open(), in ->atomic_open()
   instances and in fs/namei.c code around do_last()/lookup_open()/atomic_open().

 - alloc_file() wrappers with saner calling conventions are introduced
   (alloc_file_clone() and alloc_file_pseudo()); callers converted, with
   much simplification.

 - while we are at it, saner calling conventions for path_init() and
   link_path_walk(), simplifying things inside fs/namei.c (both on
   open-related paths and elsewhere).

* 'work.open3' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: (40 commits)
  few more cleanups of link_path_walk() callers
  allow link_path_walk() to take ERR_PTR()
  make path_init() unconditionally paired with terminate_walk()
  document alloc_file() changes
  make alloc_file() static
  do_shmat(): grab shp->shm_file earlier, switch to alloc_file_clone()
  new helper: alloc_file_clone()
  create_pipe_files(): switch the first allocation to alloc_file_pseudo()
  anon_inode_getfile(): switch to alloc_file_pseudo()
  hugetlb_file_setup(): switch to alloc_file_pseudo()
  ocxlflash_getfile(): switch to alloc_file_pseudo()
  cxl_getfile(): switch to alloc_file_pseudo()
  ... and switch shmem_file_setup() to alloc_file_pseudo()
  __shmem_file_setup(): reorder allocations
  new wrapper: alloc_file_pseudo()
  kill FILE_{CREATED,OPENED}
  switch atomic_open() and lookup_open() to returning 0 in all success cases
  document ->atomic_open() changes
  ->atomic_open(): return 0 in all success cases
  get rid of 'opened' in path_openat() and the helpers downstream
  ...
2018-08-13 19:58:36 -07:00
Piotr Sawicki
d66a8acbda Smack: Inform peer that IPv6 traffic has been blocked
In this patch we're sending an ICMPv6 message to a peer to
immediately inform it that making a connection is not possible.
In case of TCP connections, without this change, the peer
will be waiting until a connection timeout is exceeded.

Signed-off-by: Piotr Sawicki <p.sawicki2@partner.samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2018-07-23 13:00:03 -07:00
Piotr Sawicki
a07ef95164 Smack: Check UDP-Lite and DCCP protocols during IPv6 handling
The smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb() function is checking smack labels
only for UDP and TCP frames carried in IPv6 packets. From now on,
it is able also to handle UDP-Lite and DCCP protocols.

Signed-off-by: Piotr Sawicki <p.sawicki2@partner.samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2018-07-23 12:59:51 -07:00
Piotr Sawicki
129a998909 Smack: Fix handling of IPv4 traffic received by PF_INET6 sockets
A socket which has sk_family set to PF_INET6 is able to receive not
only IPv6 but also IPv4 traffic (IPv4-mapped IPv6 addresses).

Prior to this patch, the smk_skb_to_addr_ipv6() could have been
called for socket buffers containing IPv4 packets, in result such
traffic was allowed.

Signed-off-by: Piotr Sawicki <p.sawicki2@partner.samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2018-07-23 12:59:41 -07:00
Al Viro
9481769208 ->file_open(): lose cred argument
Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2018-07-12 10:04:15 -04:00
Casey Schaufler
7b4e88434c Smack: Mark inode instant in smack_task_to_inode
Smack: Mark inode instant in smack_task_to_inode

/proc clean-up in commit 1bbc55131e
resulted in smack_task_to_inode() being called before smack_d_instantiate.
This resulted in the smk_inode value being ignored, even while present
for files in /proc/self. Marking the inode as instant here fixes that.

Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
2018-06-23 10:45:56 +09:00
James Morris
2531a0cd2d Merge branch 'smack-for-4.18' of https://github.com/cschaufler/next-smack into next-smack
"one simple patch that fixes a memory leak in kernfs and labeled NFS"
2018-06-05 13:18:58 -07:00
Casey Schaufler
0f8983cf97 Smack: Fix memory leak in smack_inode_getsecctx
Fix memory leak in smack_inode_getsecctx

The implementation of smack_inode_getsecctx() made
incorrect assumptions about how Smack presents a security
context. Smack does not need to allocate memory to support
security contexts, so "releasing" a Smack context is a no-op.
The code made an unnecessary copy and returned that as a
context, which was never freed. The revised implementation
returns the context correctly.

Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reported-by: CHANDAN VN <chandan.vn@samsung.com>
Tested-by: CHANDAN VN <chandan.vn@samsung.com>
2018-06-05 12:16:01 -07:00
Tom Gundersen
5859cdf550 smack: provide socketpair callback
Make sure to implement the new socketpair callback so the SO_PEERSEC
call on socketpair(2)s will return correct information.

Signed-off-by: Tom Gundersen <teg@jklm.no>
Signed-off-by: David Herrmann <dh.herrmann@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
2018-05-04 12:48:54 -07:00
Davidlohr Bueso
23c8cec8cf ipc/msg: introduce msgctl(MSG_STAT_ANY)
There is a permission discrepancy when consulting msq ipc object
metadata between /proc/sysvipc/msg (0444) and the MSG_STAT shmctl
command.  The later does permission checks for the object vs S_IRUGO.
As such there can be cases where EACCESS is returned via syscall but the
info is displayed anyways in the procfs files.

While this might have security implications via info leaking (albeit no
writing to the msq metadata), this behavior goes way back and showing
all the objects regardless of the permissions was most likely an
overlook - so we are stuck with it.  Furthermore, modifying either the
syscall or the procfs file can cause userspace programs to break (ie
ipcs).  Some applications require getting the procfs info (without root
privileges) and can be rather slow in comparison with a syscall -- up to
500x in some reported cases for shm.

This patch introduces a new MSG_STAT_ANY command such that the msq ipc
object permissions are ignored, and only audited instead.  In addition,
I've left the lsm security hook checks in place, as if some policy can
block the call, then the user has no other choice than just parsing the
procfs file.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180215162458.10059-4-dave@stgolabs.net
Signed-off-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dbueso@suse.de>
Reported-by: Robert Kettler <robert.kettler@outlook.com>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Manfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2018-04-11 10:28:37 -07:00
Davidlohr Bueso
a280d6dc77 ipc/sem: introduce semctl(SEM_STAT_ANY)
There is a permission discrepancy when consulting shm ipc object
metadata between /proc/sysvipc/sem (0444) and the SEM_STAT semctl
command.  The later does permission checks for the object vs S_IRUGO.
As such there can be cases where EACCESS is returned via syscall but the
info is displayed anyways in the procfs files.

While this might have security implications via info leaking (albeit no
writing to the sma metadata), this behavior goes way back and showing
all the objects regardless of the permissions was most likely an
overlook - so we are stuck with it.  Furthermore, modifying either the
syscall or the procfs file can cause userspace programs to break (ie
ipcs).  Some applications require getting the procfs info (without root
privileges) and can be rather slow in comparison with a syscall -- up to
500x in some reported cases for shm.

This patch introduces a new SEM_STAT_ANY command such that the sem ipc
object permissions are ignored, and only audited instead.  In addition,
I've left the lsm security hook checks in place, as if some policy can
block the call, then the user has no other choice than just parsing the
procfs file.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180215162458.10059-3-dave@stgolabs.net
Signed-off-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dbueso@suse.de>
Reported-by: Robert Kettler <robert.kettler@outlook.com>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Manfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2018-04-11 10:28:37 -07:00
Davidlohr Bueso
c21a6970ae ipc/shm: introduce shmctl(SHM_STAT_ANY)
Patch series "sysvipc: introduce STAT_ANY commands", v2.

The following patches adds the discussed (see [1]) new command for shm
as well as for sems and msq as they are subject to the same
discrepancies for ipc object permission checks between the syscall and
via procfs.  These new commands are justified in that (1) we are stuck
with this semantics as changing syscall and procfs can break userland;
and (2) some users can benefit from performance (for large amounts of
shm segments, for example) from not having to parse the procfs
interface.

Once merged, I will submit the necesary manpage updates.  But I'm thinking
something like:

: diff --git a/man2/shmctl.2 b/man2/shmctl.2
: index 7bb503999941..bb00bbe21a57 100644
: --- a/man2/shmctl.2
: +++ b/man2/shmctl.2
: @@ -41,6 +41,7 @@
:  .\" 2005-04-25, mtk -- noted aberrant Linux behavior w.r.t. new
:  .\"	attaches to a segment that has already been marked for deletion.
:  .\" 2005-08-02, mtk: Added IPC_INFO, SHM_INFO, SHM_STAT descriptions.
: +.\" 2018-02-13, dbueso: Added SHM_STAT_ANY description.
:  .\"
:  .TH SHMCTL 2 2017-09-15 "Linux" "Linux Programmer's Manual"
:  .SH NAME
: @@ -242,6 +243,18 @@ However, the
:  argument is not a segment identifier, but instead an index into
:  the kernel's internal array that maintains information about
:  all shared memory segments on the system.
: +.TP
: +.BR SHM_STAT_ANY " (Linux-specific)"
: +Return a
: +.I shmid_ds
: +structure as for
: +.BR SHM_STAT .
: +However, the
: +.I shm_perm.mode
: +is not checked for read access for
: +.IR shmid ,
: +resembing the behaviour of
: +/proc/sysvipc/shm.
:  .PP
:  The caller can prevent or allow swapping of a shared
:  memory segment with the following \fIcmd\fP values:
: @@ -287,7 +300,7 @@ operation returns the index of the highest used entry in the
:  kernel's internal array recording information about all
:  shared memory segments.
:  (This information can be used with repeated
: -.B SHM_STAT
: +.B SHM_STAT/SHM_STAT_ANY
:  operations to obtain information about all shared memory segments
:  on the system.)
:  A successful
: @@ -328,7 +341,7 @@ isn't accessible.
:  \fIshmid\fP is not a valid identifier, or \fIcmd\fP
:  is not a valid command.
:  Or: for a
: -.B SHM_STAT
: +.B SHM_STAT/SHM_STAT_ANY
:  operation, the index value specified in
:  .I shmid
:  referred to an array slot that is currently unused.

This patch (of 3):

There is a permission discrepancy when consulting shm ipc object metadata
between /proc/sysvipc/shm (0444) and the SHM_STAT shmctl command.  The
later does permission checks for the object vs S_IRUGO.  As such there can
be cases where EACCESS is returned via syscall but the info is displayed
anyways in the procfs files.

While this might have security implications via info leaking (albeit no
writing to the shm metadata), this behavior goes way back and showing all
the objects regardless of the permissions was most likely an overlook - so
we are stuck with it.  Furthermore, modifying either the syscall or the
procfs file can cause userspace programs to break (ie ipcs).  Some
applications require getting the procfs info (without root privileges) and
can be rather slow in comparison with a syscall -- up to 500x in some
reported cases.

This patch introduces a new SHM_STAT_ANY command such that the shm ipc
object permissions are ignored, and only audited instead.  In addition,
I've left the lsm security hook checks in place, as if some policy can
block the call, then the user has no other choice than just parsing the
procfs file.

[1] https://lkml.org/lkml/2017/12/19/220

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180215162458.10059-2-dave@stgolabs.net
Signed-off-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dbueso@suse.de>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: Manfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Robert Kettler <robert.kettler@outlook.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2018-04-11 10:28:37 -07:00
Linus Torvalds
f8cf2f16a7 Merge branch 'next-integrity' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security
Pull integrity updates from James Morris:
 "A mixture of bug fixes, code cleanup, and continues to close
  IMA-measurement, IMA-appraisal, and IMA-audit gaps.

  Also note the addition of a new cred_getsecid LSM hook by Matthew
  Garrett:

     For IMA purposes, we want to be able to obtain the prepared secid
     in the bprm structure before the credentials are committed. Add a
     cred_getsecid hook that makes this possible.

  which is used by a new CREDS_CHECK target in IMA:

     In ima_bprm_check(), check with both the existing process
     credentials and the credentials that will be committed when the new
     process is started. This will not change behaviour unless the
     system policy is extended to include CREDS_CHECK targets -
     BPRM_CHECK will continue to check the same credentials that it did
     previously"

* 'next-integrity' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security:
  ima: Fallback to the builtin hash algorithm
  ima: Add smackfs to the default appraise/measure list
  evm: check for remount ro in progress before writing
  ima: Improvements in ima_appraise_measurement()
  ima: Simplify ima_eventsig_init()
  integrity: Remove unused macro IMA_ACTION_RULE_FLAGS
  ima: drop vla in ima_audit_measurement()
  ima: Fix Kconfig to select TPM 2.0 CRB interface
  evm: Constify *integrity_status_msg[]
  evm: Move evm_hmac and evm_hash from evm_main.c to evm_crypto.c
  fuse: define the filesystem as untrusted
  ima: fail signature verification based on policy
  ima: clear IMA_HASH
  ima: re-evaluate files on privileged mounted filesystems
  ima: fail file signature verification on non-init mounted filesystems
  IMA: Support using new creds in appraisal policy
  security: Add a cred_getsecid hook
2018-04-07 16:53:59 -07:00
Linus Torvalds
706ffc8c26 Merge branch 'next-smack' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security
Pull smack update from James Morris:
 "One small change for Automotive Grade Linux"

* 'next-smack' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security:
  Smack: Handle CGROUP2 in the same way that CGROUP
2018-04-07 16:44:33 -07:00
Linus Torvalds
3612605a5a Merge branch 'next-general' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security
Pull general security layer updates from James Morris:

 - Convert security hooks from list to hlist, a nice cleanup, saving
   about 50% of space, from Sargun Dhillon.

 - Only pass the cred, not the secid, to kill_pid_info_as_cred and
   security_task_kill (as the secid can be determined from the cred),
   from Stephen Smalley.

 - Close a potential race in kernel_read_file(), by making the file
   unwritable before calling the LSM check (vs after), from Kees Cook.

* 'next-general' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security:
  security: convert security hooks to use hlist
  exec: Set file unwritable before LSM check
  usb, signal, security: only pass the cred, not the secid, to kill_pid_info_as_cred and security_task_kill
2018-04-07 11:11:41 -07:00
Eric W. Biederman
0d79cbf83b ipc/smack: Tidy up from the change in type of the ipc security hooks
Rename the variables shp, sma, msq to isp. As that is how the code already
refers to those variables.

Collapse smack_of_shm, smack_of_sem, and smack_of_msq into smack_of_ipc,
as the three functions had become completely identical.

Collapse smack_shm_alloc_security, smack_sem_alloc_security and
smack_msg_queue_alloc_security into smack_ipc_alloc_security as the three
functions had become identical.

Collapse smack_shm_free_security, smack_sem_free_security and
smack_msg_queue_free_security into smack_ipc_free_security as the
three functions had become identical.

Requested-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2018-03-27 15:53:57 -05:00
James Morris
d54d27c957 Merge branch 'smack-for-4.17' of git://github.com/cschaufler/next-smack into next-smack
Pull request from Casey.
2018-03-27 09:16:31 +11:00
Matthew Garrett
3ec3011326 security: Add a cred_getsecid hook
For IMA purposes, we want to be able to obtain the prepared secid in the
bprm structure before the credentials are committed. Add a cred_getsecid
hook that makes this possible.

Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2018-03-23 06:31:11 -04:00
Eric W. Biederman
d8c6e85432 msg/security: Pass kern_ipc_perm not msg_queue into the msg_queue security hooks
All of the implementations of security hooks that take msg_queue only
access q_perm the struct kern_ipc_perm member.  This means the
dependencies of the msg_queue security hooks can be simplified by
passing the kern_ipc_perm member of msg_queue.

Making this change will allow struct msg_queue to become private to
ipc/msg.c.

Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2018-03-22 21:22:26 -05:00
Eric W. Biederman
7191adff2a shm/security: Pass kern_ipc_perm not shmid_kernel into the shm security hooks
All of the implementations of security hooks that take shmid_kernel only
access shm_perm the struct kern_ipc_perm member.  This means the
dependencies of the shm security hooks can be simplified by passing
the kern_ipc_perm member of shmid_kernel..

Making this change will allow struct shmid_kernel to become private to ipc/shm.c.

Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2018-03-22 21:08:27 -05:00
Eric W. Biederman
aefad9593e sem/security: Pass kern_ipc_perm not sem_array into the sem security hooks
All of the implementations of security hooks that take sem_array only
access sem_perm the struct kern_ipc_perm member.  This means the
dependencies of the sem security hooks can be simplified by passing
the kern_ipc_perm member of sem_array.

Making this change will allow struct sem and struct sem_array
to become private to ipc/sem.c.

Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2018-03-22 21:07:51 -05:00
Stephen Smalley
6b4f3d0105 usb, signal, security: only pass the cred, not the secid, to kill_pid_info_as_cred and security_task_kill
commit d178bc3a70 ("user namespace: usb:
 make usb urbs user namespace aware (v2)") changed kill_pid_info_as_uid
to kill_pid_info_as_cred, saving and passing a cred structure instead of
uids.  Since the secid can be obtained from the cred, drop the secid fields
from the usb_dev_state and async structures, and drop the secid argument to
kill_pid_info_as_cred.  Replace the secid argument to security_task_kill
with the cred.  Update SELinux, Smack, and AppArmor to use the cred, which
avoids the need for Smack and AppArmor to use a secid at all in this hook.
Further changes to Smack might still be required to take full advantage of
this change, since it should now be possible to perform capability
checking based on the supplied cred.  The changes to Smack and AppArmor
have only been compile-tested.

Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
2018-03-07 09:05:53 +11:00
José Bollo
58c442f34c Smack: Handle CGROUP2 in the same way that CGROUP
The new file system CGROUP2 isn't actually handled
by smack. This changes makes Smack treat equally
CGROUP and CGROUP2 items.

Signed-off-by: José Bollo <jose.bollo@iot.bzh>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2018-02-28 09:27:12 -08:00
Casey Schaufler
d19dfe58b7 Smack: Privilege check on key operations
Smack: Privilege check on key operations

Operations on key objects are subjected to Smack policy
even if the process is privileged. This is inconsistent
with the general behavior of Smack and may cause issues
with authentication by privileged daemons. This patch
allows processes with CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE to access keys
even if the Smack rules indicate otherwise.

Reported-by: Jose Bollo <jobol@nonadev.net>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2018-01-10 09:29:14 -08:00
Vasyl Gomonovych
da49b5dad1 Smack: fix dereferenced before check
This patch fixes the warning reported by smatch:
security/smack/smack_lsm.c:2872 smack_socket_connect() warn:
variable dereferenced before check 'sock->sk' (see line 2869)

Signed-off-by: Vasyl Gomonovych <gomonovych@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2017-12-27 14:43:19 -08:00
Linus Torvalds
55b3a0cb5a Merge branch 'next-general' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security
Pull general security subsystem updates from James Morris:
 "TPM (from Jarkko):
   - essential clean up for tpm_crb so that ARM64 and x86 versions do
     not distract each other as much as before

   - /dev/tpm0 rejects now too short writes (shorter buffer than
     specified in the command header

   - use DMA-safe buffer in tpm_tis_spi

   - otherwise mostly minor fixes.

  Smack:
   - base support for overlafs

  Capabilities:
   - BPRM_FCAPS fixes, from Richard Guy Briggs:

     The audit subsystem is adding a BPRM_FCAPS record when auditing
     setuid application execution (SYSCALL execve). This is not expected
     as it was supposed to be limited to when the file system actually
     had capabilities in an extended attribute. It lists all
     capabilities making the event really ugly to parse what is
     happening. The PATH record correctly records the setuid bit and
     owner. Suppress the BPRM_FCAPS record on set*id.

  TOMOYO:
   - Y2038 timestamping fixes"

* 'next-general' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (28 commits)
  MAINTAINERS: update the IMA, EVM, trusted-keys, encrypted-keys entries
  Smack: Base support for overlayfs
  MAINTAINERS: remove David Safford as maintainer for encrypted+trusted keys
  tomoyo: fix timestamping for y2038
  capabilities: audit log other surprising conditions
  capabilities: fix logic for effective root or real root
  capabilities: invert logic for clarity
  capabilities: remove a layer of conditional logic
  capabilities: move audit log decision to function
  capabilities: use intuitive names for id changes
  capabilities: use root_priveleged inline to clarify logic
  capabilities: rename has_cap to has_fcap
  capabilities: intuitive names for cap gain status
  capabilities: factor out cap_bprm_set_creds privileged root
  tpm, tpm_tis: use ARRAY_SIZE() to define TPM_HID_USR_IDX
  tpm: fix duplicate inline declaration specifier
  tpm: fix type of a local variables in tpm_tis_spi.c
  tpm: fix type of a local variable in tpm2_map_command()
  tpm: fix type of a local variable in tpm2_get_cc_attrs_tbl()
  tpm-dev-common: Reject too short writes
  ...
2017-11-13 10:30:44 -08:00
Casey Schaufler
d6d80cb57b Smack: Base support for overlayfs
Supply the Smack module hooks in support of overlayfs.
Ensure that the Smack label of new files gets the correct
value when a directory is transmuting. Original implementation
by Romanini Daniele, with a few tweaks added.

Signed-off-by: Romanini Daniele <daniele.romanini@aalto.fi>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2017-11-02 11:26:57 +11:00
Casey Schaufler
57e7ba04d4 lsm: fix smack_inode_removexattr and xattr_getsecurity memleak
security_inode_getsecurity() provides the text string value
of a security attribute. It does not provide a "secctx".
The code in xattr_getsecurity() that calls security_inode_getsecurity()
and then calls security_release_secctx() happened to work because
SElinux and Smack treat the attribute and the secctx the same way.
It fails for cap_inode_getsecurity(), because that module has no
secctx that ever needs releasing. It turns out that Smack is the
one that's doing things wrong by not allocating memory when instructed
to do so by the "alloc" parameter.

The fix is simple enough. Change the security_release_secctx() to
kfree() because it isn't a secctx being returned by
security_inode_getsecurity(). Change Smack to allocate the string when
told to do so.

Note: this also fixes memory leaks for LSMs which implement
inode_getsecurity but not release_secctx, such as capabilities.

Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reported-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@yandex-team.ru>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2017-10-04 18:03:15 +11:00
Kees Cook
35b372b76f smack: Remove redundant pdeath_signal clearing
This removes the redundant pdeath_signal clearing in Smack: the check in
smack_bprm_committing_creds() matches the check in smack_bprm_set_creds()
(which used to be in the now-removed smack_bprm_securexec() hook) and
since secureexec is now being checked for clearing pdeath_signal, this
is redundant to the common exec code.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2017-08-01 12:03:12 -07:00
Kees Cook
ccbb6e1065 smack: Refactor to remove bprm_secureexec hook
The Smack bprm_secureexec hook can be merged with the bprm_set_creds
hook since it's dealing with the same information, and all of the details
are finalized during the first call to the bprm_set_creds hook via
prepare_binprm() (subsequent calls due to binfmt_script, etc, are ignored
via bprm->called_set_creds).

Here, the test can just happen at the end of the bprm_set_creds hook,
and the bprm_secureexec hook can be dropped.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2017-08-01 12:03:07 -07:00
Kees Cook
ddb4a1442d exec: Rename bprm->cred_prepared to called_set_creds
The cred_prepared bprm flag has a misleading name. It has nothing to do
with the bprm_prepare_cred hook, and actually tracks if bprm_set_creds has
been called. Rename this flag and improve its comment.

Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
2017-08-01 12:02:48 -07:00
Casey Schaufler
51d59af26f Smack: Safer check for a socket in file_receive
The check of S_ISSOCK() in smack_file_receive() is not
appropriate if the passed descriptor is a socket.

Reported-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tyco.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2017-06-01 09:27:12 -07:00
Tetsuo Handa
c3c8dc9f13 smack: fix double free in smack_parse_opts_str()
smack_parse_opts_str() calls kfree(opts->mnt_opts) when kcalloc() for
opts->mnt_opts_flags failed. But it should not have called it because
security_free_mnt_opts() will call kfree(opts->mnt_opts).

Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
fixes: 3bf2789cad ("smack: allow mount opts setting over filesystems with binary mount data")
Cc: Vivek Trivedi <t.vivek@samsung.com>
Cc: Amit Sahrawat <a.sahrawat@samsung.com>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2017-04-04 15:41:15 -07:00
James Morris
ca97d939db security: mark LSM hooks as __ro_after_init
Mark all of the registration hooks as __ro_after_init (via the
__lsm_ro_after_init macro).

Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Acked-by:  Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2017-03-06 11:00:15 +11:00
Linus Torvalds
f1ef09fde1 Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace
Pull namespace updates from Eric Biederman:
 "There is a lot here. A lot of these changes result in subtle user
  visible differences in kernel behavior. I don't expect anything will
  care but I will revert/fix things immediately if any regressions show
  up.

  From Seth Forshee there is a continuation of the work to make the vfs
  ready for unpriviled mounts. We had thought the previous changes
  prevented the creation of files outside of s_user_ns of a filesystem,
  but it turns we missed the O_CREAT path. Ooops.

  Pavel Tikhomirov and Oleg Nesterov worked together to fix a long
  standing bug in the implemenation of PR_SET_CHILD_SUBREAPER where only
  children that are forked after the prctl are considered and not
  children forked before the prctl. The only known user of this prctl
  systemd forks all children after the prctl. So no userspace
  regressions will occur. Holding earlier forked children to the same
  rules as later forked children creates a semantic that is sane enough
  to allow checkpoing of processes that use this feature.

  There is a long delayed change by Nikolay Borisov to limit inotify
  instances inside a user namespace.

  Michael Kerrisk extends the API for files used to maniuplate
  namespaces with two new trivial ioctls to allow discovery of the
  hierachy and properties of namespaces.

  Konstantin Khlebnikov with the help of Al Viro adds code that when a
  network namespace exits purges it's sysctl entries from the dcache. As
  in some circumstances this could use a lot of memory.

  Vivek Goyal fixed a bug with stacked filesystems where the permissions
  on the wrong inode were being checked.

  I continue previous work on ptracing across exec. Allowing a file to
  be setuid across exec while being ptraced if the tracer has enough
  credentials in the user namespace, and if the process has CAP_SETUID
  in it's own namespace. Proc files for setuid or otherwise undumpable
  executables are now owned by the root in the user namespace of their
  mm. Allowing debugging of setuid applications in containers to work
  better.

  A bug I introduced with permission checking and automount is now
  fixed. The big change is to mark the mounts that the kernel initiates
  as a result of an automount. This allows the permission checks in sget
  to be safely suppressed for this kind of mount. As the permission
  check happened when the original filesystem was mounted.

  Finally a special case in the mount namespace is removed preventing
  unbounded chains in the mount hash table, and making the semantics
  simpler which benefits CRIU.

  The vfs fix along with related work in ima and evm I believe makes us
  ready to finish developing and merge fully unprivileged mounts of the
  fuse filesystem. The cleanups of the mount namespace makes discussing
  how to fix the worst case complexity of umount. The stacked filesystem
  fixes pave the way for adding multiple mappings for the filesystem
  uids so that efficient and safer containers can be implemented"

* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace:
  proc/sysctl: Don't grab i_lock under sysctl_lock.
  vfs: Use upper filesystem inode in bprm_fill_uid()
  proc/sysctl: prune stale dentries during unregistering
  mnt: Tuck mounts under others instead of creating shadow/side mounts.
  prctl: propagate has_child_subreaper flag to every descendant
  introduce the walk_process_tree() helper
  nsfs: Add an ioctl() to return owner UID of a userns
  fs: Better permission checking for submounts
  exit: fix the setns() && PR_SET_CHILD_SUBREAPER interaction
  vfs: open() with O_CREAT should not create inodes with unknown ids
  nsfs: Add an ioctl() to return the namespace type
  proc: Better ownership of files for non-dumpable tasks in user namespaces
  exec: Remove LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP
  exec: Test the ptracer's saved cred to see if the tracee can gain caps
  exec: Don't reset euid and egid when the tracee has CAP_SETUID
  inotify: Convert to using per-namespace limits
2017-02-23 20:33:51 -08:00
James Morris
a2a15479d6 Merge branch 'stable-4.11' of git://git.infradead.org/users/pcmoore/selinux into next 2017-02-10 10:28:49 +11:00
James Morris
710584b9da Merge branch 'smack-for-4.11' of git://github.com/cschaufler/smack-next into next 2017-01-27 09:23:21 +11:00
Eric W. Biederman
9227dd2a84 exec: Remove LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP
With previous changes every location that tests for
LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP also tests for LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE making the
LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP redundant, so remove it.

Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2017-01-24 12:03:08 +13:00
Casey Schaufler
d69dece5f5 LSM: Add /sys/kernel/security/lsm
I am still tired of having to find indirect ways to determine
what security modules are active on a system. I have added
/sys/kernel/security/lsm, which contains a comma separated
list of the active security modules. No more groping around
in /proc/filesystems or other clever hacks.

Unchanged from previous versions except for being updated
to the latest security next branch.

Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2017-01-19 13:18:29 +11:00
Stephen Smalley
3a2f5a59a6 security,selinux,smack: kill security_task_wait hook
As reported by yangshukui, a permission denial from security_task_wait()
can lead to a soft lockup in zap_pid_ns_processes() since it only expects
sys_wait4() to return 0 or -ECHILD. Further, security_task_wait() can
in general lead to zombies; in the absence of some way to automatically
reparent a child process upon a denial, the hook is not useful.  Remove
the security hook and its implementations in SELinux and Smack.  Smack
already removed its check from its hook.

Reported-by: yangshukui <yangshukui@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2017-01-12 11:10:57 -05:00
Seung-Woo Kim
83a1e53f39 Smack: ignore private inode for file functions
The access to fd from anon_inode is always failed because there is
no set xattr operations. So this patch fixes to ignore private
inode including anon_inode for file functions.

It was only ignored for smack_file_receive() to share dma-buf fd,
but dma-buf has other functions like ioctl and mmap.

Reference: https://lkml.org/lkml/2015/4/17/16

Signed-off-by: Seung-Woo Kim <sw0312.kim@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2017-01-10 09:47:20 -08:00
Rafal Krypa
805b65a80b Smack: fix d_instantiate logic for sockfs and pipefs
Since 4b936885a (v2.6.32) all inodes on sockfs and pipefs are disconnected.
It caused filesystem specific code in smack_d_instantiate to be skipped,
because all inodes on those pseudo filesystems were treated as root inodes.
As a result all sockfs inodes had the Smack label set to floor.

In most cases access checks for sockets use socket_smack data so the inode
label is not important. But there are special cases that were broken.
One example would be calling fcntl with F_SETOWN command on a socket fd.

Now smack_d_instantiate expects all pipefs and sockfs inodes to be
disconnected and has the logic in appropriate place.

Signed-off-by: Rafal Krypa <r.krypa@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2017-01-10 09:47:20 -08:00
Himanshu Shukla
c9d238a18b SMACK: Use smk_tskacc() instead of smk_access() for proper logging
smack_file_open() is first checking the capability of calling subject,
this check will skip the SMACK logging for success case. Use smk_tskacc()
for proper logging and SMACK access check.

Signed-off-by: Himanshu Shukla <himanshu.sh@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2017-01-10 09:47:20 -08:00
Vishal Goel
348dc288d4 Smack: Traverse the smack_known_list using list_for_each_entry_rcu macro
In smack_from_secattr function,"smack_known_list" is being traversed
using list_for_each_entry macro, although it is a rcu protected
structure. So it should be traversed using "list_for_each_entry_rcu"
macro to fetch the rcu protected entry.

Signed-off-by: Vishal Goel <vishal.goel@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Himanshu Shukla <himanshu.sh@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2017-01-10 09:47:20 -08:00
Himanshu Shukla
3d4f673a69 SMACK: Free the i_security blob in inode using RCU
There is race condition issue while freeing the i_security blob in SMACK
module. There is existing condition where i_security can be freed while
inode_permission is called from path lookup on second CPU. There has been
observed the page fault with such condition. VFS code and Selinux module
takes care of this condition by freeing the inode and i_security field
using RCU via call_rcu(). But in SMACK directly the i_secuirty blob is
being freed. Use call_rcu() to fix this race condition issue.

Signed-off-by: Himanshu Shukla <himanshu.sh@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Vishal Goel <vishal.goel@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2017-01-10 09:47:20 -08:00
Himanshu Shukla
d54a197964 SMACK: Delete list_head repeated initialization
smk_copy_rules() and smk_copy_relabel() are initializing list_head though
they have been initialized already in new_task_smack() function. Delete
repeated initialization.

Signed-off-by: Himanshu Shukla <himanshu.sh@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2017-01-10 09:47:20 -08:00
Vishal Goel
0c96d1f532 Smack: Fix the issue of wrong SMACK label update in socket bind fail case
Fix the issue of wrong SMACK label (SMACK64IPIN) update when a second bind
call is made to same IP address & port, but with different SMACK label
(SMACK64IPIN) by second instance of server. In this case server returns
with "Bind:Address already in use" error but before returning, SMACK label
is updated in SMACK port-label mapping list inside smack_socket_bind() hook

To fix this issue a new check has been added in smk_ipv6_port_label()
function before updating the existing port entry. It checks whether the
socket for matching port entry is closed or not. If it is closed then it
means port is not bound and it is safe to update the existing port entry
else return if port is still getting used. For checking whether socket is
closed or not, one more field "smk_can_reuse" has been added in the
"smk_port_label" structure. This field will be set to '1' in
"smack_sk_free_security()" function which is called to free the socket
security blob when the socket is being closed. In this function, port entry
is searched in the SMACK port-label mapping list for the closing socket.
If entry is found then "smk_can_reuse" field is set to '1'.Initially
"smk_can_reuse" field is set to '0' in smk_ipv6_port_label() function after
creating a new entry in the list which indicates that socket is in use.

Signed-off-by: Vishal Goel <vishal.goel@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Himanshu Shukla <himanshu.sh@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2017-01-10 09:47:20 -08:00
Vishal Goel
9d44c97384 Smack: Fix the issue of permission denied error in ipv6 hook
Permission denied error comes when 2 IPv6 servers are running and client
tries to connect one of them. Scenario is that both servers are using same
IP and port but different protocols(Udp and tcp). They are using different
SMACK64IPIN labels.Tcp server is using "test" and udp server is using
"test-in". When we try to run tcp client with SMACK64IPOUT label as "test",
then connection denied error comes. It should not happen since both tcp
server and client labels are same.This happens because there is no check
for protocol in smk_ipv6_port_label() function while searching for the
earlier port entry. It checks whether there is an existing port entry on
the basis of port only. So it updates the earlier port entry in the list.
Due to which smack label gets changed for earlier entry in the
"smk_ipv6_port_list" list and permission denied error comes.

Now a check is added for socket type also.Now if 2 processes use same
port  but different protocols (tcp or udp), then 2 different port entries
will be  added in the list. Similarly while checking smack access in
smk_ipv6_port_check() function,  port entry is searched on the basis of
both port and protocol.

Signed-off-by: Vishal Goel <vishal.goel@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Himanshu Shukla <Himanshu.sh@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2017-01-10 09:47:20 -08:00
Vishal Goel
3c7ce34271 SMACK: Add the rcu synchronization mechanism in ipv6 hooks
Add the rcu synchronization mechanism for accessing smk_ipv6_port_list
in smack IPv6 hooks. Access to the port list is vulnerable to a race
condition issue,it does not apply proper synchronization methods while
working on critical section. It is possible that when one thread is
reading the list, at the same time another thread is modifying the
same port list, which can cause the major problems.

To ensure proper synchronization between two threads, rcu mechanism
has been applied while accessing and modifying the port list. RCU will
also not affect the performance, as there are more accesses than
modification where RCU is most effective synchronization mechanism.

Signed-off-by: Vishal Goel <vishal.goel@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Himanshu Shukla <himanshu.sh@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2017-01-10 09:47:20 -08:00
Stephen Smalley
b21507e272 proc,security: move restriction on writing /proc/pid/attr nodes to proc
Processes can only alter their own security attributes via
/proc/pid/attr nodes.  This is presently enforced by each individual
security module and is also imposed by the Linux credentials
implementation, which only allows a task to alter its own credentials.
Move the check enforcing this restriction from the individual
security modules to proc_pid_attr_write() before calling the security hook,
and drop the unnecessary task argument to the security hook since it can
only ever be the current task.

Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2017-01-09 10:07:31 -05:00
Linus Torvalds
9a19a6db37 Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs
Pull vfs updates from Al Viro:

 - more ->d_init() stuff (work.dcache)

 - pathname resolution cleanups (work.namei)

 - a few missing iov_iter primitives - copy_from_iter_full() and
   friends. Either copy the full requested amount, advance the iterator
   and return true, or fail, return false and do _not_ advance the
   iterator. Quite a few open-coded callers converted (and became more
   readable and harder to fuck up that way) (work.iov_iter)

 - several assorted patches, the big one being logfs removal

* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
  logfs: remove from tree
  vfs: fix put_compat_statfs64() does not handle errors
  namei: fold should_follow_link() with the step into not-followed link
  namei: pass both WALK_GET and WALK_MORE to should_follow_link()
  namei: invert WALK_PUT logics
  namei: shift interpretation of LOOKUP_FOLLOW inside should_follow_link()
  namei: saner calling conventions for mountpoint_last()
  namei.c: get rid of user_path_parent()
  switch getfrag callbacks to ..._full() primitives
  make skb_add_data,{_nocache}() and skb_copy_to_page_nocache() advance only on success
  [iov_iter] new primitives - copy_from_iter_full() and friends
  don't open-code file_inode()
  ceph: switch to use of ->d_init()
  ceph: unify dentry_operations instances
  lustre: switch to use of ->d_init()
2016-12-16 10:24:44 -08:00
Al Viro
450630975d don't open-code file_inode()
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2016-12-04 18:29:28 -05:00
Casey Schaufler
152f91d4d1 Smack: Remove unnecessary smack_known_invalid
The invalid Smack label ("") and the Huh ("?") Smack label
serve the same purpose and having both is unnecessary.
While pulling out the invalid label it became clear that
the use of smack_from_secid() was inconsistent, so that
is repaired. The setting of inode labels to the invalid
label could never happen in a functional system, has
never been observed in the wild and is not what you'd
really want for a failure behavior in any case. That is
removed.

Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2016-11-15 09:34:39 -08:00
Tetsuo Handa
8c15d66e42 Smack: Use GFP_KERNEL for smack_parse_opts_str().
Since smack_parse_opts_str() is calling match_strdup() which uses
GFP_KERNEL, it is safe to use GFP_KERNEL from kcalloc() which is
called by smack_parse_opts_str().

Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2016-11-14 12:55:11 -08:00
Casey Schaufler
2e4939f702 Smack: ipv6 label match fix
The check for a deleted entry in the list of IPv6 host
addresses was being performed in the wrong place, leading
to most peculiar results in some cases. This puts the
check into the right place.

Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2016-11-10 11:22:18 -08:00
Himanshu Shukla
b437aba85b SMACK: Fix the memory leak in smack_cred_prepare() hook
Memory leak in smack_cred_prepare()function.
smack_cred_prepare() hook returns error if there is error in allocating
memory in smk_copy_rules() or smk_copy_relabel() function.
If smack_cred_prepare() function returns error then the calling
function should call smack_cred_free() function for cleanup.
In smack_cred_free() function first credential is  extracted and
then all rules are deleted. In smack_cred_prepare() function security
field is assigned in the end when all function return success. But this
function may return before and memory will not be freed.

Signed-off-by: Himanshu Shukla <himanshu.sh@samsung.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2016-11-10 11:22:06 -08:00
Himanshu Shukla
7128ea159d SMACK: Do not apply star label in smack_setprocattr hook
Smack prohibits processes from using the star ("*") and web ("@") labels.
Checks have been added in other functions. In smack_setprocattr()
hook, only check for web ("@") label has been added and restricted
from applying web ("@") label.
Check for star ("*") label should also be added in smack_setprocattr()
hook. Return error should be "-EINVAL" not "-EPERM" as permission
is there for setting label but not the label value as star ("*") or
web ("@").

Signed-off-by: Himanshu Shukla <himanshu.sh@samsung.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2016-11-10 11:21:52 -08:00
Himanshu Shukla
2097f59920 smack: parse mnt opts after privileges check
In smack_set_mnt_opts()first the SMACK mount options are being
parsed and later it is being checked whether the user calling
mount has CAP_MAC_ADMIN capability.
This sequence of operationis will allow unauthorized user to add
SMACK labels in label list and may cause denial of security attack
by adding many labels by allocating kernel memory by unauthorized user.
Superblock smack flag is also being set as initialized though function
may return with EPERM error.
First check the capability of calling user then set the SMACK attributes
and smk_flags.

Signed-off-by: Himanshu Shukla <himanshu.sh@samsung.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2016-11-10 11:21:32 -08:00
jooseong lee
08382c9f6e Smack: Assign smack_known_web label for kernel thread's
Assign smack_known_web label for kernel thread's socket

Creating struct sock by sk_alloc function in various kernel subsystems
like bluetooth doesn't call smack_socket_post_create(). In such case,
received sock label is the floor('_') label and makes access deny.

Signed-off-by: jooseong lee <jooseong.lee@samsung.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2016-11-04 17:42:57 -07:00
Linus Torvalds
97d2116708 Merge branch 'work.xattr' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs
Pull vfs xattr updates from Al Viro:
 "xattr stuff from Andreas

  This completes the switch to xattr_handler ->get()/->set() from
  ->getxattr/->setxattr/->removexattr"

* 'work.xattr' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
  vfs: Remove {get,set,remove}xattr inode operations
  xattr: Stop calling {get,set,remove}xattr inode operations
  vfs: Check for the IOP_XATTR flag in listxattr
  xattr: Add __vfs_{get,set,remove}xattr helpers
  libfs: Use IOP_XATTR flag for empty directory handling
  vfs: Use IOP_XATTR flag for bad-inode handling
  vfs: Add IOP_XATTR inode operations flag
  vfs: Move xattr_resolve_name to the front of fs/xattr.c
  ecryptfs: Switch to generic xattr handlers
  sockfs: Get rid of getxattr iop
  sockfs: getxattr: Fail with -EOPNOTSUPP for invalid attribute names
  kernfs: Switch to generic xattr handlers
  hfs: Switch to generic xattr handlers
  jffs2: Remove jffs2_{get,set,remove}xattr macros
  xattr: Remove unnecessary NULL attribute name check
2016-10-10 17:11:50 -07:00
Andreas Gruenbacher
5d6c31910b xattr: Add __vfs_{get,set,remove}xattr helpers
Right now, various places in the kernel check for the existence of
getxattr, setxattr, and removexattr inode operations and directly call
those operations.  Switch to helper functions and test for the IOP_XATTR
flag instead.

Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2016-10-07 20:10:44 -04:00
Casey Schaufler
c60b906673 Smack: Signal delivery as an append operation
Under a strict subject/object security policy delivering a
signal or delivering network IPC could be considered either
a write or an append operation. The original choice to make
both write operations leads to an issue where IPC delivery
is desired under policy, but delivery of signals is not.
This patch provides the option of making signal delivery
an append operation, allowing Smack rules that deny signal
delivery while allowing IPC. This was requested for Tizen.

Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2016-09-08 13:22:56 -07:00
Linus Torvalds
7a1e8b80fb Merge branch 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security
Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris:
 "Highlights:

   - TPM core and driver updates/fixes
   - IPv6 security labeling (CALIPSO)
   - Lots of Apparmor fixes
   - Seccomp: remove 2-phase API, close hole where ptrace can change
     syscall #"

* 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (156 commits)
  apparmor: fix SECURITY_APPARMOR_HASH_DEFAULT parameter handling
  tpm: Add TPM 2.0 support to the Nuvoton i2c driver (NPCT6xx family)
  tpm: Factor out common startup code
  tpm: use devm_add_action_or_reset
  tpm2_i2c_nuvoton: add irq validity check
  tpm: read burstcount from TPM_STS in one 32-bit transaction
  tpm: fix byte-order for the value read by tpm2_get_tpm_pt
  tpm_tis_core: convert max timeouts from msec to jiffies
  apparmor: fix arg_size computation for when setprocattr is null terminated
  apparmor: fix oops, validate buffer size in apparmor_setprocattr()
  apparmor: do not expose kernel stack
  apparmor: fix module parameters can be changed after policy is locked
  apparmor: fix oops in profile_unpack() when policy_db is not present
  apparmor: don't check for vmalloc_addr if kvzalloc() failed
  apparmor: add missing id bounds check on dfa verification
  apparmor: allow SYS_CAP_RESOURCE to be sufficient to prlimit another task
  apparmor: use list_next_entry instead of list_entry_next
  apparmor: fix refcount race when finding a child profile
  apparmor: fix ref count leak when profile sha1 hash is read
  apparmor: check that xindex is in trans_table bounds
  ...
2016-07-29 17:38:46 -07:00
James Morris
c632809953 Merge branch 'smack-for-4.8' of https://github.com/cschaufler/smack-next into next 2016-07-08 10:41:15 +10:00
James Morris
d011a4d861 Merge branch 'stable-4.8' of git://git.infradead.org/users/pcmoore/selinux into next 2016-07-07 10:15:34 +10:00
Huw Davies
a04e71f631 netlabel: Pass a family parameter to netlbl_skbuff_err().
This makes it possible to route the error to the appropriate
labelling engine.  CALIPSO is far less verbose than CIPSO
when encountering a bogus packet, so there is no need for a
CALIPSO error handler.

Signed-off-by: Huw Davies <huw@codeweavers.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2016-06-27 15:06:16 -04:00
Seth Forshee
809c02e091 Smack: Handle labels consistently in untrusted mounts
The SMACK64, SMACK64EXEC, and SMACK64MMAP labels are all handled
differently in untrusted mounts. This is confusing and
potentically problematic. Change this to handle them all the same
way that SMACK64 is currently handled; that is, read the label
from disk and check it at use time. For SMACK64 and SMACK64MMAP
access is denied if the label does not match smk_root. To be
consistent with suid, a SMACK64EXEC label which does not match
smk_root will still allow execution of the file but will not run
with the label supplied in the xattr.

Signed-off-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2016-06-24 11:02:22 -05:00
Seth Forshee
9f50eda2a9 Smack: Add support for unprivileged mounts from user namespaces
Security labels from unprivileged mounts cannot be trusted.
Ideally for these mounts we would assign the objects in the
filesystem the same label as the inode for the backing device
passed to mount. Unfortunately it's currently impossible to
determine which inode this is from the LSM mount hooks, so we
settle for the label of the process doing the mount.

This label is assigned to s_root, and also to smk_default to
ensure that new inodes receive this label. The transmute property
is also set on s_root to make this behavior more explicit, even
though it is technically not necessary.

If a filesystem has existing security labels, access to inodes is
permitted if the label is the same as smk_root, otherwise access
is denied. The SMACK64EXEC xattr is completely ignored.

Explicit setting of security labels continues to require
CAP_MAC_ADMIN in init_user_ns.

Altogether, this ensures that filesystem objects are not
accessible to subjects which cannot already access the backing
store, that MAC is not violated for any objects in the fileystem
which are already labeled, and that a user cannot use an
unprivileged mount to gain elevated MAC privileges.

sysfs, tmpfs, and ramfs are already mountable from user
namespaces and support security labels. We can't rule out the
possibility that these filesystems may already be used in mounts
from user namespaces with security lables set from the init
namespace, so failing to trust lables in these filesystems may
introduce regressions. It is safe to trust labels from these
filesystems, since the unprivileged user does not control the
backing store and thus cannot supply security labels, so an
explicit exception is made to trust labels from these
filesystems.

Signed-off-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2016-06-24 10:40:42 -05:00
Rafal Krypa
18d872f77c Smack: ignore null signal in smack_task_kill
Kill with signal number 0 is commonly used for checking PID existence.
Smack treated such cases like any other kills, although no signal is
actually delivered when sig == 0.

Checking permissions when sig == 0 didn't prevent an unprivileged caller
from learning whether PID exists or not. When it existed, kernel returned
EPERM, when it didn't - ESRCH. The only effect of policy check in such
case is noise in audit logs.

This change lets Smack silently ignore kill() invocations with sig == 0.

Signed-off-by: Rafal Krypa <r.krypa@samsung.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2016-06-08 13:52:31 -07:00
Al Viro
3767e255b3 switch ->setxattr() to passing dentry and inode separately
smack ->d_instantiate() uses ->setxattr(), so to be able to call it before
we'd hashed the new dentry and attached it to inode, we need ->setxattr()
instances getting the inode as an explicit argument rather than obtaining
it from dentry.

Similar change for ->getxattr() had been done in commit ce23e64.  Unlike
->getxattr() (which is used by both selinux and smack instances of
->d_instantiate()) ->setxattr() is used only by smack one and unfortunately
it got missed back then.

Reported-by: Seung-Woo Kim <sw0312.kim@samsung.com>
Tested-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2016-05-27 20:09:16 -04:00
Al Viro
ce23e64013 ->getxattr(): pass dentry and inode as separate arguments
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2016-04-11 00:48:00 -04:00
Al Viro
fc64005c93 don't bother with ->d_inode->i_sb - it's always equal to ->d_sb
... and neither can ever be NULL

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2016-04-10 17:11:51 -04:00
José Bollo
8012495e17 smack: fix cache of access labels
Before this commit, removing the access property of
a file, aka, the extended attribute security.SMACK64
was not effictive until the cache had been cleaned.

This patch fixes that problem.

Signed-off-by: José Bollo <jobol@nonadev.net>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2016-02-16 09:56:35 -08:00
Casey Schaufler
491a0b08d3 Smack: Remove pointless hooks
Prior to the 4.2 kernel there no no harm in providing
a security module hook that does nothing, as the default
hook would get called if the module did not supply one.
With the list based infrastructure an empty hook adds
overhead. This patch removes the three Smack hooks that
don't actually do anything.

Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2016-02-11 09:14:35 -08:00
Jann Horn
3dfb7d8cdb security: let security modules use PTRACE_MODE_* with bitmasks
It looks like smack and yama weren't aware that the ptrace mode
can have flags ORed into it - PTRACE_MODE_NOAUDIT until now, but
only for /proc/$pid/stat, and with the PTRACE_MODE_*CREDS patch,
all modes have flags ORed into them.

Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Cc: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-01-20 17:09:18 -08:00
Linus Torvalds
5807fcaa9b Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security
Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris:

 - EVM gains support for loading an x509 cert from the kernel
   (EVM_LOAD_X509), into the EVM trusted kernel keyring.

 - Smack implements 'file receive' process-based permission checking for
   sockets, rather than just depending on inode checks.

 - Misc enhancments for TPM & TPM2.

 - Cleanups and bugfixes for SELinux, Keys, and IMA.

* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (41 commits)
  selinux: Inode label revalidation performance fix
  KEYS: refcount bug fix
  ima: ima_write_policy() limit locking
  IMA: policy can be updated zero times
  selinux: rate-limit netlink message warnings in selinux_nlmsg_perm()
  selinux: export validatetrans decisions
  gfs2: Invalid security labels of inodes when they go invalid
  selinux: Revalidate invalid inode security labels
  security: Add hook to invalidate inode security labels
  selinux: Add accessor functions for inode->i_security
  security: Make inode argument of inode_getsecid non-const
  security: Make inode argument of inode_getsecurity non-const
  selinux: Remove unused variable in selinux_inode_init_security
  keys, trusted: seal with a TPM2 authorization policy
  keys, trusted: select hash algorithm for TPM2 chips
  keys, trusted: fix: *do not* allow duplicate key options
  tpm_ibmvtpm: properly handle interrupted packet receptions
  tpm_tis: Tighten IRQ auto-probing
  tpm_tis: Refactor the interrupt setup
  tpm_tis: Get rid of the duplicate IRQ probing code
  ...
2016-01-17 19:13:15 -08:00
James Morris
aa98b942cb Merge branch 'smack-for-4.5' of https://github.com/cschaufler/smack-next into next 2015-12-26 16:11:13 +11:00
Andreas Gruenbacher
d6335d77a7 security: Make inode argument of inode_getsecid non-const
Make the inode argument of the inode_getsecid hook non-const so that we
can use it to revalidate invalid security labels.

Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
Acked-by:  Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
2015-12-24 11:09:39 -05:00
Andreas Gruenbacher
ea861dfd9e security: Make inode argument of inode_getsecurity non-const
Make the inode argument of the inode_getsecurity hook non-const so that
we can use it to revalidate invalid security labels.

Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
Acked-by:  Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
2015-12-24 11:09:39 -05:00
Roman Kubiak
81bd0d5629 Smack: type confusion in smak sendmsg() handler
Smack security handler for sendmsg() syscall
is vulnerable to type confusion issue what
can allow to privilege escalation into root
or cause denial of service.

A malicious attacker can create socket of one
type for example AF_UNIX and pass is into
sendmsg() function ensuring that this is
AF_INET socket.

Remedy
Do not trust user supplied data.
Proposed fix below.

Signed-off-by: Roman Kubiak <r.kubiak@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mateusz Fruba <m.fruba@samsung.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2015-12-17 10:21:56 -08:00
Andreas Gruenbacher
c4803c497f nfs: Move call to security_inode_listsecurity into nfs_listxattr
Add a nfs_listxattr operation.  Move the call to security_inode_listsecurity
from list operation of the "security.*" xattr handler to nfs_listxattr.

Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
Cc: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
Cc: Anna Schumaker <anna.schumaker@netapp.com>
Cc: linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2015-12-13 19:45:47 -05:00
Casey Schaufler
79be093500 Smack: File receive for sockets
The existing file receive hook checks for access on
the file inode even for UDS. This is not right, as
the inode is not used by Smack to make access checks
for sockets. This change checks for an appropriate
access relationship between the receiving (current)
process and the socket. If the process can't write
to the socket's send label or the socket's receive
label can't write to the process fail.

This will allow the legitimate cases, where the
socket sender and socket receiver can freely communicate.
Only strangly set socket labels should cause a problem.

Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2015-12-09 16:10:55 -08:00
Zbigniew Jasinski
38416e5393 Smack: limited capability for changing process label
This feature introduces new kernel interface:

- <smack_fs>/relabel-self - for setting transition labels list

This list is used to control smack label transition mechanism.
List is set by, and per process. Process can transit to new label only if
label is on the list. Only process with CAP_MAC_ADMIN capability can add
labels to this list. With this list, process can change it's label without
CAP_MAC_ADMIN but only once. After label changing, list is unset.

Changes in v2:
* use list_for_each_entry instead of _rcu during label write
* added missing description in security/Smack.txt

Changes in v3:
* squashed into one commit

Changes in v4:
* switch from global list to per-task list
* since the per-task list is accessed only by the task itself
  there is no need to use synchronization mechanisms on it

Changes in v5:
* change smackfs interface of relabel-self to the one used for onlycap
  multiple labels are accepted, separated by space, which
  replace the previous list upon write

Signed-off-by: Zbigniew Jasinski <z.jasinski@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Rafal Krypa <r.krypa@samsung.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2015-10-19 12:06:47 -07:00
Roman Kubiak
8da4aba5bf Smack: pipefs fix in smack_d_instantiate
This fix writes the task label when
smack_d_instantiate is called, before the
label of the superblock was written on the
pipe's inode.

Signed-off-by: Roman Kubiak <r.kubiak@samsung.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2015-10-09 15:13:41 -07:00
José Bollo
d21b7b049c Smack: Minor initialisation improvement
This change has two goals:
 - delay the setting of 'smack_enabled' until
   it will be really effective
 - ensure that smackfs is valid only if 'smack_enabled'
   is set (it is already the case in smack_netfilter.c)

Signed-off-by: José Bollo <jose.bollo@iot.bzh>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2015-10-09 15:13:24 -07:00
Geliang Tang
8b549ef42a smack: smk_ipv6_port_list should be static
Fixes the following sparse warning:

 security/smack/smack_lsm.c:55:1: warning: symbol 'smk_ipv6_port_list'
 was not declared. Should it be static?

Signed-off-by: Geliang Tang <geliangtang@163.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2015-10-09 15:13:08 -07:00
Casey Schaufler
3d04c92403 Smack - Fix build error with bringup unconfigured
The changes for mounting binary filesystems was allied
improperly, with the list of tokens being in an ifdef that
it shouldn't have been. Fix that, and a couple style issues
that were bothering me.

Reported-by: Jim Davis <jim.epost@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2015-08-12 18:10:01 -07:00
Casey Schaufler
1eddfe8edb Smack: Three symbols that should be static
The kbuild test robot reported a couple of these,
and the third showed up by inspection. Making the
symbols static is proper.

Reported-by: Fengguang Wu <fengguang.wu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2015-07-31 12:12:17 -07:00
Casey Schaufler
21abb1ec41 Smack: IPv6 host labeling
IPv6 appears to be (finally) coming of age with the
influx of autonomous devices. In support of this, add
the ability to associate a Smack label with IPv6 addresses.

This patch also cleans up some of the conditional
compilation associated with the introduction of
secmark processing. It's now more obvious which bit
of code goes with which feature.

Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2015-07-28 06:35:21 -07:00