mirror of
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git
synced 2025-09-04 20:19:47 +08:00
ASoC: Fixes for v6.15
A moderately large batch of fixes for v6.15, many driver specific including cleanups for the enabling of the Cirrus KUnit tests and a fix for a nasty crash on resume on AMD systems. We also have one core fix, for an ordering issue between DAPM and DPCM which could leave things incorrectly unpowered. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQEzBAABCgAdFiEEreZoqmdXGLWf4p/qJNaLcl1Uh9AFAmgTGBAACgkQJNaLcl1U h9BHlgf/b22RCBkg82fhlZkXDRBgygiNmWBVX/TbVXM/diUl6x+4Kq9fSRNo3VRI WPkF9KADvoulu143YXrVqbU8werfY+uUVYSTNJ6QSbIptx/r/1bhYCC5BofpXZ+a fEB1a/yiVdw+T6bWjBPjbyQZqdO6PcCSH3ITYUSV+0hoHxQPMjQpr9RvekQG73Er kg0b59sulspreRI2CqRV7pV3bj62gfUfnscaRARydLVXZXxUsCtyr72NYVnCeg2/ 3UX7mljN88wj6fPTJEmfkSI8ntCcdAFXkqYKoTzPlDv2haHRgh7oBqNEkKPa7vrh qqVL8yFBlra2V9q9m1FWnkX0kRIZKA== =9DpM -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Merge tag 'asoc-fix-v6.15-rc4' of https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/broonie/sound into for-linus ASoC: Fixes for v6.15 A moderately large batch of fixes for v6.15, many driver specific including cleanups for the enabling of the Cirrus KUnit tests and a fix for a nasty crash on resume on AMD systems. We also have one core fix, for an ordering issue between DAPM and DPCM which could leave things incorrectly unpowered.
This commit is contained in:
Takashi Iwai
commit
6e5bea1c93
@ -92,6 +92,7 @@ ForEachMacros:
|
||||
- '__rq_for_each_bio'
|
||||
- '__shost_for_each_device'
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||||
- '__sym_for_each'
|
||||
- '_for_each_counter'
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||||
- 'apei_estatus_for_each_section'
|
||||
- 'ata_for_each_dev'
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||||
- 'ata_for_each_link'
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@ -141,11 +142,14 @@ ForEachMacros:
|
||||
- 'damon_for_each_target_safe'
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||||
- 'damos_for_each_filter'
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||||
- 'damos_for_each_filter_safe'
|
||||
- 'damos_for_each_ops_filter'
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||||
- 'damos_for_each_ops_filter_safe'
|
||||
- 'damos_for_each_quota_goal'
|
||||
- 'damos_for_each_quota_goal_safe'
|
||||
- 'data__for_each_file'
|
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- 'data__for_each_file_new'
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||||
- 'data__for_each_file_start'
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- 'def_for_each_cpu'
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- 'device_for_each_child_node'
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- 'device_for_each_child_node_scoped'
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- 'dma_fence_array_for_each'
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@ -176,6 +180,7 @@ ForEachMacros:
|
||||
- 'drm_for_each_privobj'
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- 'drm_gem_for_each_gpuvm_bo'
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- 'drm_gem_for_each_gpuvm_bo_safe'
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- 'drm_gpusvm_for_each_range'
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- 'drm_gpuva_for_each_op'
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- 'drm_gpuva_for_each_op_from_reverse'
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- 'drm_gpuva_for_each_op_reverse'
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@ -216,8 +221,10 @@ ForEachMacros:
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- 'for_each_active_dev_scope'
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- 'for_each_active_drhd_unit'
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- 'for_each_active_iommu'
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- 'for_each_active_irq'
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- 'for_each_active_route'
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- 'for_each_aggr_pgid'
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- 'for_each_alloc_capable_rdt_resource'
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- 'for_each_and_bit'
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- 'for_each_andnot_bit'
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- 'for_each_available_child_of_node'
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@ -228,6 +235,7 @@ ForEachMacros:
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- 'for_each_btf_ext_rec'
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- 'for_each_btf_ext_sec'
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- 'for_each_bvec'
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- 'for_each_capable_rdt_resource'
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- 'for_each_card_auxs'
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- 'for_each_card_auxs_safe'
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- 'for_each_card_components'
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@ -241,6 +249,7 @@ ForEachMacros:
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- 'for_each_cgroup_storage_type'
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- 'for_each_child_of_node'
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- 'for_each_child_of_node_scoped'
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- 'for_each_child_of_node_with_prefix'
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- 'for_each_clear_bit'
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- 'for_each_clear_bit_from'
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- 'for_each_clear_bitrange'
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@ -296,6 +305,7 @@ ForEachMacros:
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- 'for_each_group_member_head'
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- 'for_each_hstate'
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- 'for_each_hwgpio'
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- 'for_each_hwgpio_in_range'
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- 'for_each_if'
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- 'for_each_inject_fn'
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- 'for_each_insn'
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@ -304,6 +314,7 @@ ForEachMacros:
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- 'for_each_intid'
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- 'for_each_iommu'
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- 'for_each_ip_tunnel_rcu'
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- 'for_each_irq_desc'
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- 'for_each_irq_nr'
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- 'for_each_lang'
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- 'for_each_link_ch_maps'
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@ -324,6 +335,8 @@ ForEachMacros:
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- 'for_each_missing_reg'
|
||||
- 'for_each_mle_subelement'
|
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- 'for_each_mod_mem_type'
|
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- 'for_each_mon_capable_rdt_resource'
|
||||
- 'for_each_mp_bvec'
|
||||
- 'for_each_net'
|
||||
- 'for_each_net_continue_reverse'
|
||||
- 'for_each_net_rcu'
|
||||
@ -351,6 +364,7 @@ ForEachMacros:
|
||||
- 'for_each_node_by_name'
|
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- 'for_each_node_by_type'
|
||||
- 'for_each_node_mask'
|
||||
- 'for_each_node_numadist'
|
||||
- 'for_each_node_state'
|
||||
- 'for_each_node_with_cpus'
|
||||
- 'for_each_node_with_property'
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@ -359,6 +373,8 @@ ForEachMacros:
|
||||
- 'for_each_of_allnodes'
|
||||
- 'for_each_of_allnodes_from'
|
||||
- 'for_each_of_cpu_node'
|
||||
- 'for_each_of_graph_port'
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||||
- 'for_each_of_graph_port_endpoint'
|
||||
- 'for_each_of_pci_range'
|
||||
- 'for_each_old_connector_in_state'
|
||||
- 'for_each_old_crtc_in_state'
|
||||
@ -372,9 +388,11 @@ ForEachMacros:
|
||||
- 'for_each_oldnew_plane_in_state_reverse'
|
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- 'for_each_oldnew_private_obj_in_state'
|
||||
- 'for_each_online_cpu'
|
||||
- 'for_each_online_cpu_wrap'
|
||||
- 'for_each_online_node'
|
||||
- 'for_each_online_pgdat'
|
||||
- 'for_each_or_bit'
|
||||
- 'for_each_page_ext'
|
||||
- 'for_each_path'
|
||||
- 'for_each_pci_bridge'
|
||||
- 'for_each_pci_dev'
|
||||
@ -382,8 +400,10 @@ ForEachMacros:
|
||||
- 'for_each_physmem_range'
|
||||
- 'for_each_populated_zone'
|
||||
- 'for_each_possible_cpu'
|
||||
- 'for_each_possible_cpu_wrap'
|
||||
- 'for_each_present_blessed_reg'
|
||||
- 'for_each_present_cpu'
|
||||
- 'for_each_present_section_nr'
|
||||
- 'for_each_prime_number'
|
||||
- 'for_each_prime_number_from'
|
||||
- 'for_each_probe_cache_entry'
|
||||
@ -396,6 +416,7 @@ ForEachMacros:
|
||||
- 'for_each_prop_dlc_cpus'
|
||||
- 'for_each_prop_dlc_platforms'
|
||||
- 'for_each_property_of_node'
|
||||
- 'for_each_rdt_resource'
|
||||
- 'for_each_reg'
|
||||
- 'for_each_reg_filtered'
|
||||
- 'for_each_reloc'
|
||||
@ -434,10 +455,10 @@ ForEachMacros:
|
||||
- 'for_each_subelement_id'
|
||||
- 'for_each_sublist'
|
||||
- 'for_each_subsystem'
|
||||
- 'for_each_suite'
|
||||
- 'for_each_supported_activate_fn'
|
||||
- 'for_each_supported_inject_fn'
|
||||
- 'for_each_sym'
|
||||
- 'for_each_test'
|
||||
- 'for_each_thread'
|
||||
- 'for_each_token'
|
||||
- 'for_each_unicast_dest_pgid'
|
||||
@ -499,8 +520,10 @@ ForEachMacros:
|
||||
- 'idr_for_each_entry_continue'
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||||
- 'idr_for_each_entry_continue_ul'
|
||||
- 'idr_for_each_entry_ul'
|
||||
- 'iio_for_each_active_channel'
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||||
- 'in_dev_for_each_ifa_rcu'
|
||||
- 'in_dev_for_each_ifa_rtnl'
|
||||
- 'in_dev_for_each_ifa_rtnl_net'
|
||||
- 'inet_bind_bucket_for_each'
|
||||
- 'interval_tree_for_each_span'
|
||||
- 'intlist__for_each_entry'
|
||||
@ -542,7 +565,6 @@ ForEachMacros:
|
||||
- 'list_for_each_prev'
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- 'list_for_each_prev_safe'
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||||
- 'list_for_each_rcu'
|
||||
- 'list_for_each_reverse'
|
||||
- 'list_for_each_safe'
|
||||
- 'llist_for_each'
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||||
- 'llist_for_each_entry'
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||||
@ -552,6 +574,7 @@ ForEachMacros:
|
||||
- 'map__for_each_symbol'
|
||||
- 'map__for_each_symbol_by_name'
|
||||
- 'mas_for_each'
|
||||
- 'mas_for_each_rev'
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||||
- 'mci_for_each_dimm'
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||||
- 'media_device_for_each_entity'
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||||
- 'media_device_for_each_intf'
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@ -561,10 +584,15 @@ ForEachMacros:
|
||||
- 'media_pipeline_for_each_entity'
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||||
- 'media_pipeline_for_each_pad'
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||||
- 'mlx5_lag_for_each_peer_mdev'
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||||
- 'mptcp_for_each_subflow'
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||||
- 'msi_domain_for_each_desc'
|
||||
- 'msi_for_each_desc'
|
||||
- 'mt_for_each'
|
||||
- 'nanddev_io_for_each_block'
|
||||
- 'nanddev_io_for_each_page'
|
||||
- 'neigh_for_each_in_bucket'
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||||
- 'neigh_for_each_in_bucket_rcu'
|
||||
- 'neigh_for_each_in_bucket_safe'
|
||||
- 'netdev_for_each_lower_dev'
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||||
- 'netdev_for_each_lower_private'
|
||||
- 'netdev_for_each_lower_private_rcu'
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||||
@ -604,11 +632,11 @@ ForEachMacros:
|
||||
- 'perf_evlist__for_each_entry_safe'
|
||||
- 'perf_evlist__for_each_evsel'
|
||||
- 'perf_evlist__for_each_mmap'
|
||||
- 'perf_evsel_for_each_per_thread_period_safe'
|
||||
- 'perf_hpp_list__for_each_format'
|
||||
- 'perf_hpp_list__for_each_format_safe'
|
||||
- 'perf_hpp_list__for_each_sort_list'
|
||||
- 'perf_hpp_list__for_each_sort_list_safe'
|
||||
- 'perf_tool_event__for_each_event'
|
||||
- 'plist_for_each'
|
||||
- 'plist_for_each_continue'
|
||||
- 'plist_for_each_entry'
|
||||
@ -627,7 +655,6 @@ ForEachMacros:
|
||||
- 'rdma_for_each_block'
|
||||
- 'rdma_for_each_port'
|
||||
- 'rdma_umem_for_each_dma_block'
|
||||
- 'resort_rb__for_each_entry'
|
||||
- 'resource_list_for_each_entry'
|
||||
- 'resource_list_for_each_entry_safe'
|
||||
- 'rhl_for_each_entry_rcu'
|
||||
@ -658,6 +685,7 @@ ForEachMacros:
|
||||
- 'shost_for_each_device'
|
||||
- 'sk_for_each'
|
||||
- 'sk_for_each_bound'
|
||||
- 'sk_for_each_bound_safe'
|
||||
- 'sk_for_each_entry_offset_rcu'
|
||||
- 'sk_for_each_from'
|
||||
- 'sk_for_each_rcu'
|
||||
@ -680,7 +708,11 @@ ForEachMacros:
|
||||
- 'tb_property_for_each'
|
||||
- 'tcf_act_for_each_action'
|
||||
- 'tcf_exts_for_each_action'
|
||||
- 'test_suite__for_each_test_case'
|
||||
- 'tool_pmu__for_each_event'
|
||||
- 'ttm_bo_lru_for_each_reserved_guarded'
|
||||
- 'ttm_resource_manager_for_each_res'
|
||||
- 'udp_lrpa_for_each_entry_rcu'
|
||||
- 'udp_portaddr_for_each_entry'
|
||||
- 'udp_portaddr_for_each_entry_rcu'
|
||||
- 'usb_hub_for_each_child'
|
||||
@ -691,6 +723,7 @@ ForEachMacros:
|
||||
- 'v4l2_m2m_for_each_src_buf_safe'
|
||||
- 'virtio_device_for_each_vq'
|
||||
- 'while_for_each_ftrace_op'
|
||||
- 'workloads__for_each'
|
||||
- 'xa_for_each'
|
||||
- 'xa_for_each_marked'
|
||||
- 'xa_for_each_range'
|
||||
|
||||
3
.mailmap
3
.mailmap
@ -322,6 +322,7 @@ Jayachandran C <c.jayachandran@gmail.com> <jchandra@broadcom.com>
|
||||
Jayachandran C <c.jayachandran@gmail.com> <jchandra@digeo.com>
|
||||
Jayachandran C <c.jayachandran@gmail.com> <jnair@caviumnetworks.com>
|
||||
<jean-philippe@linaro.org> <jean-philippe.brucker@arm.com>
|
||||
Jean-Michel Hautbois <jeanmichel.hautbois@yoseli.org> <jeanmichel.hautbois@ideasonboard.com>
|
||||
Jean Tourrilhes <jt@hpl.hp.com>
|
||||
Jeevan Shriram <quic_jshriram@quicinc.com> <jshriram@codeaurora.org>
|
||||
Jeff Garzik <jgarzik@pretzel.yyz.us>
|
||||
@ -438,6 +439,8 @@ Linus Lüssing <linus.luessing@c0d3.blue> <ll@simonwunderlich.de>
|
||||
Li Yang <leoyang.li@nxp.com> <leoli@freescale.com>
|
||||
Li Yang <leoyang.li@nxp.com> <leo@zh-kernel.org>
|
||||
Lior David <quic_liord@quicinc.com> <liord@codeaurora.org>
|
||||
Loic Poulain <loic.poulain@oss.qualcomm.com> <loic.poulain@linaro.org>
|
||||
Loic Poulain <loic.poulain@oss.qualcomm.com> <loic.poulain@intel.com>
|
||||
Lorenzo Pieralisi <lpieralisi@kernel.org> <lorenzo.pieralisi@arm.com>
|
||||
Lorenzo Stoakes <lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com> <lstoakes@gmail.com>
|
||||
Luca Ceresoli <luca.ceresoli@bootlin.com> <luca@lucaceresoli.net>
|
||||
|
||||
4
CREDITS
4
CREDITS
@ -2071,6 +2071,10 @@ S: 660 Harvard Ave. #7
|
||||
S: Santa Clara, CA 95051
|
||||
S: USA
|
||||
|
||||
N: Joonsoo Kim
|
||||
E: iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com
|
||||
D: Slab allocators
|
||||
|
||||
N: Kukjin Kim
|
||||
E: kgene@kernel.org
|
||||
D: Samsung S3C, S5P and Exynos ARM architectures
|
||||
|
||||
@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ Description:
|
||||
|
||||
What: /sys/block/<disk>/diskseq
|
||||
Date: February 2021
|
||||
Contact: Matteo Croce <mcroce@microsoft.com>
|
||||
Contact: Matteo Croce <teknoraver@meta.com>
|
||||
Description:
|
||||
The /sys/block/<disk>/diskseq files reports the disk
|
||||
sequence number, which is a monotonically increasing
|
||||
|
||||
@ -1604,3 +1604,35 @@ Description:
|
||||
prevent the UFS from frequently performing clock gating/ungating.
|
||||
|
||||
The attribute is read/write.
|
||||
|
||||
What: /sys/bus/platform/drivers/ufshcd/*/device_lvl_exception_count
|
||||
What: /sys/bus/platform/devices/*.ufs/device_lvl_exception_count
|
||||
Date: March 2025
|
||||
Contact: Bao D. Nguyen <quic_nguyenb@quicinc.com>
|
||||
Description:
|
||||
This attribute is applicable to ufs devices compliant to the
|
||||
JEDEC specifications version 4.1 or later. The
|
||||
device_lvl_exception_count is a counter indicating the number of
|
||||
times the device level exceptions have occurred since the last
|
||||
time this variable is reset. Writing a 0 value to this
|
||||
attribute will reset the device_lvl_exception_count. If the
|
||||
device_lvl_exception_count reads a positive value, the user
|
||||
application should read the device_lvl_exception_id attribute to
|
||||
know more information about the exception.
|
||||
|
||||
The attribute is read/write.
|
||||
|
||||
What: /sys/bus/platform/drivers/ufshcd/*/device_lvl_exception_id
|
||||
What: /sys/bus/platform/devices/*.ufs/device_lvl_exception_id
|
||||
Date: March 2025
|
||||
Contact: Bao D. Nguyen <quic_nguyenb@quicinc.com>
|
||||
Description:
|
||||
Reading the device_lvl_exception_id returns the
|
||||
qDeviceLevelExceptionID attribute of the ufs device JEDEC
|
||||
specification version 4.1. The definition of the
|
||||
qDeviceLevelExceptionID is the ufs device vendor specific
|
||||
implementation. Refer to the device manufacturer datasheet for
|
||||
more information on the meaning of the qDeviceLevelExceptionID
|
||||
attribute value.
|
||||
|
||||
The attribute is read only.
|
||||
|
||||
@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
|
||||
What: /sys/kernel/reboot
|
||||
Date: November 2020
|
||||
KernelVersion: 5.11
|
||||
Contact: Matteo Croce <mcroce@microsoft.com>
|
||||
Contact: Matteo Croce <teknoraver@meta.com>
|
||||
Description: Interface to set the kernel reboot behavior, similarly to
|
||||
what can be done via the reboot= cmdline option.
|
||||
(see Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt)
|
||||
@ -9,25 +9,25 @@ Description: Interface to set the kernel reboot behavior, similarly to
|
||||
What: /sys/kernel/reboot/mode
|
||||
Date: November 2020
|
||||
KernelVersion: 5.11
|
||||
Contact: Matteo Croce <mcroce@microsoft.com>
|
||||
Contact: Matteo Croce <teknoraver@meta.com>
|
||||
Description: Reboot mode. Valid values are: cold warm hard soft gpio
|
||||
|
||||
What: /sys/kernel/reboot/type
|
||||
Date: November 2020
|
||||
KernelVersion: 5.11
|
||||
Contact: Matteo Croce <mcroce@microsoft.com>
|
||||
Contact: Matteo Croce <teknoraver@meta.com>
|
||||
Description: Reboot type. Valid values are: bios acpi kbd triple efi pci
|
||||
|
||||
What: /sys/kernel/reboot/cpu
|
||||
Date: November 2020
|
||||
KernelVersion: 5.11
|
||||
Contact: Matteo Croce <mcroce@microsoft.com>
|
||||
Contact: Matteo Croce <teknoraver@meta.com>
|
||||
Description: CPU number to use to reboot.
|
||||
|
||||
What: /sys/kernel/reboot/force
|
||||
Date: November 2020
|
||||
KernelVersion: 5.11
|
||||
Contact: Matteo Croce <mcroce@microsoft.com>
|
||||
Contact: Matteo Croce <teknoraver@meta.com>
|
||||
Description: Don't wait for any other CPUs on reboot and
|
||||
avoid anything that could hang.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@ -22,3 +22,4 @@ are configurable at compile, boot or run time.
|
||||
srso
|
||||
gather_data_sampling
|
||||
reg-file-data-sampling
|
||||
rsb
|
||||
|
||||
268
Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/rsb.rst
Normal file
268
Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/rsb.rst
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,268 @@
|
||||
.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
|
||||
|
||||
=======================
|
||||
RSB-related mitigations
|
||||
=======================
|
||||
|
||||
.. warning::
|
||||
Please keep this document up-to-date, otherwise you will be
|
||||
volunteered to update it and convert it to a very long comment in
|
||||
bugs.c!
|
||||
|
||||
Since 2018 there have been many Spectre CVEs related to the Return Stack
|
||||
Buffer (RSB) (sometimes referred to as the Return Address Stack (RAS) or
|
||||
Return Address Predictor (RAP) on AMD).
|
||||
|
||||
Information about these CVEs and how to mitigate them is scattered
|
||||
amongst a myriad of microarchitecture-specific documents.
|
||||
|
||||
This document attempts to consolidate all the relevant information in
|
||||
once place and clarify the reasoning behind the current RSB-related
|
||||
mitigations. It's meant to be as concise as possible, focused only on
|
||||
the current kernel mitigations: what are the RSB-related attack vectors
|
||||
and how are they currently being mitigated?
|
||||
|
||||
It's *not* meant to describe how the RSB mechanism operates or how the
|
||||
exploits work. More details about those can be found in the references
|
||||
below.
|
||||
|
||||
Rather, this is basically a glorified comment, but too long to actually
|
||||
be one. So when the next CVE comes along, a kernel developer can
|
||||
quickly refer to this as a refresher to see what we're actually doing
|
||||
and why.
|
||||
|
||||
At a high level, there are two classes of RSB attacks: RSB poisoning
|
||||
(Intel and AMD) and RSB underflow (Intel only). They must each be
|
||||
considered individually for each attack vector (and microarchitecture
|
||||
where applicable).
|
||||
|
||||
----
|
||||
|
||||
RSB poisoning (Intel and AMD)
|
||||
=============================
|
||||
|
||||
SpectreRSB
|
||||
~~~~~~~~~~
|
||||
|
||||
RSB poisoning is a technique used by SpectreRSB [#spectre-rsb]_ where
|
||||
an attacker poisons an RSB entry to cause a victim's return instruction
|
||||
to speculate to an attacker-controlled address. This can happen when
|
||||
there are unbalanced CALLs/RETs after a context switch or VMEXIT.
|
||||
|
||||
* All attack vectors can potentially be mitigated by flushing out any
|
||||
poisoned RSB entries using an RSB filling sequence
|
||||
[#intel-rsb-filling]_ [#amd-rsb-filling]_ when transitioning between
|
||||
untrusted and trusted domains. But this has a performance impact and
|
||||
should be avoided whenever possible.
|
||||
|
||||
.. DANGER::
|
||||
**FIXME**: Currently we're flushing 32 entries. However, some CPU
|
||||
models have more than 32 entries. The loop count needs to be
|
||||
increased for those. More detailed information is needed about RSB
|
||||
sizes.
|
||||
|
||||
* On context switch, the user->user mitigation requires ensuring the
|
||||
RSB gets filled or cleared whenever IBPB gets written [#cond-ibpb]_
|
||||
during a context switch:
|
||||
|
||||
* AMD:
|
||||
On Zen 4+, IBPB (or SBPB [#amd-sbpb]_ if used) clears the RSB.
|
||||
This is indicated by IBPB_RET in CPUID [#amd-ibpb-rsb]_.
|
||||
|
||||
On Zen < 4, the RSB filling sequence [#amd-rsb-filling]_ must be
|
||||
always be done in addition to IBPB [#amd-ibpb-no-rsb]_. This is
|
||||
indicated by X86_BUG_IBPB_NO_RET.
|
||||
|
||||
* Intel:
|
||||
IBPB always clears the RSB:
|
||||
|
||||
"Software that executed before the IBPB command cannot control
|
||||
the predicted targets of indirect branches executed after the
|
||||
command on the same logical processor. The term indirect branch
|
||||
in this context includes near return instructions, so these
|
||||
predicted targets may come from the RSB." [#intel-ibpb-rsb]_
|
||||
|
||||
* On context switch, user->kernel attacks are prevented by SMEP. User
|
||||
space can only insert user space addresses into the RSB. Even
|
||||
non-canonical addresses can't be inserted due to the page gap at the
|
||||
end of the user canonical address space reserved by TASK_SIZE_MAX.
|
||||
A SMEP #PF at instruction fetch prevents the kernel from speculatively
|
||||
executing user space.
|
||||
|
||||
* AMD:
|
||||
"Finally, branches that are predicted as 'ret' instructions get
|
||||
their predicted targets from the Return Address Predictor (RAP).
|
||||
AMD recommends software use a RAP stuffing sequence (mitigation
|
||||
V2-3 in [2]) and/or Supervisor Mode Execution Protection (SMEP)
|
||||
to ensure that the addresses in the RAP are safe for
|
||||
speculation. Collectively, we refer to these mitigations as "RAP
|
||||
Protection"." [#amd-smep-rsb]_
|
||||
|
||||
* Intel:
|
||||
"On processors with enhanced IBRS, an RSB overwrite sequence may
|
||||
not suffice to prevent the predicted target of a near return
|
||||
from using an RSB entry created in a less privileged predictor
|
||||
mode. Software can prevent this by enabling SMEP (for
|
||||
transitions from user mode to supervisor mode) and by having
|
||||
IA32_SPEC_CTRL.IBRS set during VM exits." [#intel-smep-rsb]_
|
||||
|
||||
* On VMEXIT, guest->host attacks are mitigated by eIBRS (and PBRSB
|
||||
mitigation if needed):
|
||||
|
||||
* AMD:
|
||||
"When Automatic IBRS is enabled, the internal return address
|
||||
stack used for return address predictions is cleared on VMEXIT."
|
||||
[#amd-eibrs-vmexit]_
|
||||
|
||||
* Intel:
|
||||
"On processors with enhanced IBRS, an RSB overwrite sequence may
|
||||
not suffice to prevent the predicted target of a near return
|
||||
from using an RSB entry created in a less privileged predictor
|
||||
mode. Software can prevent this by enabling SMEP (for
|
||||
transitions from user mode to supervisor mode) and by having
|
||||
IA32_SPEC_CTRL.IBRS set during VM exits. Processors with
|
||||
enhanced IBRS still support the usage model where IBRS is set
|
||||
only in the OS/VMM for OSes that enable SMEP. To do this, such
|
||||
processors will ensure that guest behavior cannot control the
|
||||
RSB after a VM exit once IBRS is set, even if IBRS was not set
|
||||
at the time of the VM exit." [#intel-eibrs-vmexit]_
|
||||
|
||||
Note that some Intel CPUs are susceptible to Post-barrier Return
|
||||
Stack Buffer Predictions (PBRSB) [#intel-pbrsb]_, where the last
|
||||
CALL from the guest can be used to predict the first unbalanced RET.
|
||||
In this case the PBRSB mitigation is needed in addition to eIBRS.
|
||||
|
||||
AMD RETBleed / SRSO / Branch Type Confusion
|
||||
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
||||
|
||||
On AMD, poisoned RSB entries can also be created by the AMD RETBleed
|
||||
variant [#retbleed-paper]_ [#amd-btc]_ or by Speculative Return Stack
|
||||
Overflow [#amd-srso]_ (Inception [#inception-paper]_). The kernel
|
||||
protects itself by replacing every RET in the kernel with a branch to a
|
||||
single safe RET.
|
||||
|
||||
----
|
||||
|
||||
RSB underflow (Intel only)
|
||||
==========================
|
||||
|
||||
RSB Alternate (RSBA) ("Intel Retbleed")
|
||||
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
||||
|
||||
Some Intel Skylake-generation CPUs are susceptible to the Intel variant
|
||||
of RETBleed [#retbleed-paper]_ (Return Stack Buffer Underflow
|
||||
[#intel-rsbu]_). If a RET is executed when the RSB buffer is empty due
|
||||
to mismatched CALLs/RETs or returning from a deep call stack, the branch
|
||||
predictor can fall back to using the Branch Target Buffer (BTB). If a
|
||||
user forces a BTB collision then the RET can speculatively branch to a
|
||||
user-controlled address.
|
||||
|
||||
* Note that RSB filling doesn't fully mitigate this issue. If there
|
||||
are enough unbalanced RETs, the RSB may still underflow and fall back
|
||||
to using a poisoned BTB entry.
|
||||
|
||||
* On context switch, user->user underflow attacks are mitigated by the
|
||||
conditional IBPB [#cond-ibpb]_ on context switch which effectively
|
||||
clears the BTB:
|
||||
|
||||
* "The indirect branch predictor barrier (IBPB) is an indirect branch
|
||||
control mechanism that establishes a barrier, preventing software
|
||||
that executed before the barrier from controlling the predicted
|
||||
targets of indirect branches executed after the barrier on the same
|
||||
logical processor." [#intel-ibpb-btb]_
|
||||
|
||||
* On context switch and VMEXIT, user->kernel and guest->host RSB
|
||||
underflows are mitigated by IBRS or eIBRS:
|
||||
|
||||
* "Enabling IBRS (including enhanced IBRS) will mitigate the "RSBU"
|
||||
attack demonstrated by the researchers. As previously documented,
|
||||
Intel recommends the use of enhanced IBRS, where supported. This
|
||||
includes any processor that enumerates RRSBA but not RRSBA_DIS_S."
|
||||
[#intel-rsbu]_
|
||||
|
||||
However, note that eIBRS and IBRS do not mitigate intra-mode attacks.
|
||||
Like RRSBA below, this is mitigated by clearing the BHB on kernel
|
||||
entry.
|
||||
|
||||
As an alternative to classic IBRS, call depth tracking (combined with
|
||||
retpolines) can be used to track kernel returns and fill the RSB when
|
||||
it gets close to being empty.
|
||||
|
||||
Restricted RSB Alternate (RRSBA)
|
||||
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
||||
|
||||
Some newer Intel CPUs have Restricted RSB Alternate (RRSBA) behavior,
|
||||
which, similar to RSBA described above, also falls back to using the BTB
|
||||
on RSB underflow. The only difference is that the predicted targets are
|
||||
restricted to the current domain when eIBRS is enabled:
|
||||
|
||||
* "Restricted RSB Alternate (RRSBA) behavior allows alternate branch
|
||||
predictors to be used by near RET instructions when the RSB is
|
||||
empty. When eIBRS is enabled, the predicted targets of these
|
||||
alternate predictors are restricted to those belonging to the
|
||||
indirect branch predictor entries of the current prediction domain.
|
||||
[#intel-eibrs-rrsba]_
|
||||
|
||||
When a CPU with RRSBA is vulnerable to Branch History Injection
|
||||
[#bhi-paper]_ [#intel-bhi]_, an RSB underflow could be used for an
|
||||
intra-mode BTI attack. This is mitigated by clearing the BHB on
|
||||
kernel entry.
|
||||
|
||||
However if the kernel uses retpolines instead of eIBRS, it needs to
|
||||
disable RRSBA:
|
||||
|
||||
* "Where software is using retpoline as a mitigation for BHI or
|
||||
intra-mode BTI, and the processor both enumerates RRSBA and
|
||||
enumerates RRSBA_DIS controls, it should disable this behavior."
|
||||
[#intel-retpoline-rrsba]_
|
||||
|
||||
----
|
||||
|
||||
References
|
||||
==========
|
||||
|
||||
.. [#spectre-rsb] `Spectre Returns! Speculation Attacks using the Return Stack Buffer <https://arxiv.org/pdf/1807.07940.pdf>`_
|
||||
|
||||
.. [#intel-rsb-filling] "Empty RSB Mitigation on Skylake-generation" in `Retpoline: A Branch Target Injection Mitigation <https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/developer/articles/technical/software-security-guidance/technical-documentation/retpoline-branch-target-injection-mitigation.html#inpage-nav-5-1>`_
|
||||
|
||||
.. [#amd-rsb-filling] "Mitigation V2-3" in `Software Techniques for Managing Speculation <https://www.amd.com/content/dam/amd/en/documents/processor-tech-docs/programmer-references/software-techniques-for-managing-speculation.pdf>`_
|
||||
|
||||
.. [#cond-ibpb] Whether IBPB is written depends on whether the prev and/or next task is protected from Spectre attacks. It typically requires opting in per task or system-wide. For more details see the documentation for the ``spectre_v2_user`` cmdline option in Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt.
|
||||
|
||||
.. [#amd-sbpb] IBPB without flushing of branch type predictions. Only exists for AMD.
|
||||
|
||||
.. [#amd-ibpb-rsb] "Function 8000_0008h -- Processor Capacity Parameters and Extended Feature Identification" in `AMD64 Architecture Programmer's Manual Volume 3: General-Purpose and System Instructions <https://www.amd.com/content/dam/amd/en/documents/processor-tech-docs/programmer-references/24594.pdf>`_. SBPB behaves the same way according to `this email <https://lore.kernel.org/5175b163a3736ca5fd01cedf406735636c99a>`_.
|
||||
|
||||
.. [#amd-ibpb-no-rsb] `Spectre Attacks: Exploiting Speculative Execution <https://comsec.ethz.ch/wp-content/files/ibpb_sp25.pdf>`_
|
||||
|
||||
.. [#intel-ibpb-rsb] "Introduction" in `Post-barrier Return Stack Buffer Predictions / CVE-2022-26373 / INTEL-SA-00706 <https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/developer/articles/technical/software-security-guidance/advisory-guidance/post-barrier-return-stack-buffer-predictions.html>`_
|
||||
|
||||
.. [#amd-smep-rsb] "Existing Mitigations" in `Technical Guidance for Mitigating Branch Type Confusion <https://www.amd.com/content/dam/amd/en/documents/resources/technical-guidance-for-mitigating-branch-type-confusion.pdf>`_
|
||||
|
||||
.. [#intel-smep-rsb] "Enhanced IBRS" in `Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation <https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/developer/articles/technical/software-security-guidance/technical-documentation/indirect-branch-restricted-speculation.html>`_
|
||||
|
||||
.. [#amd-eibrs-vmexit] "Extended Feature Enable Register (EFER)" in `AMD64 Architecture Programmer's Manual Volume 2: System Programming <https://www.amd.com/content/dam/amd/en/documents/processor-tech-docs/programmer-references/24593.pdf>`_
|
||||
|
||||
.. [#intel-eibrs-vmexit] "Enhanced IBRS" in `Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation <https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/developer/articles/technical/software-security-guidance/technical-documentation/indirect-branch-restricted-speculation.html>`_
|
||||
|
||||
.. [#intel-pbrsb] `Post-barrier Return Stack Buffer Predictions / CVE-2022-26373 / INTEL-SA-00706 <https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/developer/articles/technical/software-security-guidance/advisory-guidance/post-barrier-return-stack-buffer-predictions.html>`_
|
||||
|
||||
.. [#retbleed-paper] `RETBleed: Arbitrary Speculative Code Execution with Return Instruction <https://comsec.ethz.ch/wp-content/files/retbleed_sec22.pdf>`_
|
||||
|
||||
.. [#amd-btc] `Technical Guidance for Mitigating Branch Type Confusion <https://www.amd.com/content/dam/amd/en/documents/resources/technical-guidance-for-mitigating-branch-type-confusion.pdf>`_
|
||||
|
||||
.. [#amd-srso] `Technical Update Regarding Speculative Return Stack Overflow <https://www.amd.com/content/dam/amd/en/documents/corporate/cr/speculative-return-stack-overflow-whitepaper.pdf>`_
|
||||
|
||||
.. [#inception-paper] `Inception: Exposing New Attack Surfaces with Training in Transient Execution <https://comsec.ethz.ch/wp-content/files/inception_sec23.pdf>`_
|
||||
|
||||
.. [#intel-rsbu] `Return Stack Buffer Underflow / Return Stack Buffer Underflow / CVE-2022-29901, CVE-2022-28693 / INTEL-SA-00702 <https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/developer/articles/technical/software-security-guidance/advisory-guidance/return-stack-buffer-underflow.html>`_
|
||||
|
||||
.. [#intel-ibpb-btb] `Indirect Branch Predictor Barrier' <https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/developer/articles/technical/software-security-guidance/technical-documentation/indirect-branch-predictor-barrier.html>`_
|
||||
|
||||
.. [#intel-eibrs-rrsba] "Guidance for RSBU" in `Return Stack Buffer Underflow / Return Stack Buffer Underflow / CVE-2022-29901, CVE-2022-28693 / INTEL-SA-00702 <https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/developer/articles/technical/software-security-guidance/advisory-guidance/return-stack-buffer-underflow.html>`_
|
||||
|
||||
.. [#bhi-paper] `Branch History Injection: On the Effectiveness of Hardware Mitigations Against Cross-Privilege Spectre-v2 Attacks <http://download.vusec.net/papers/bhi-spectre-bhb_sec22.pdf>`_
|
||||
|
||||
.. [#intel-bhi] `Branch History Injection and Intra-mode Branch Target Injection / CVE-2022-0001, CVE-2022-0002 / INTEL-SA-00598 <https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/developer/articles/technical/software-security-guidance/technical-documentation/branch-history-injection.html>`_
|
||||
|
||||
.. [#intel-retpoline-rrsba] "Retpoline" in `Branch History Injection and Intra-mode Branch Target Injection / CVE-2022-0001, CVE-2022-0002 / INTEL-SA-00598 <https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/developer/articles/technical/software-security-guidance/technical-documentation/branch-history-injection.html>`_
|
||||
@ -1407,18 +1407,15 @@
|
||||
earlyprintk=serial[,0x...[,baudrate]]
|
||||
earlyprintk=ttySn[,baudrate]
|
||||
earlyprintk=dbgp[debugController#]
|
||||
earlyprintk=mmio32,membase[,{nocfg|baudrate}]
|
||||
earlyprintk=pciserial[,force],bus:device.function[,{nocfg|baudrate}]
|
||||
earlyprintk=xdbc[xhciController#]
|
||||
earlyprintk=bios
|
||||
earlyprintk=mmio,membase[,{nocfg|baudrate}]
|
||||
|
||||
earlyprintk is useful when the kernel crashes before
|
||||
the normal console is initialized. It is not enabled by
|
||||
default because it has some cosmetic problems.
|
||||
|
||||
Only 32-bit memory addresses are supported for "mmio"
|
||||
and "pciserial" devices.
|
||||
|
||||
Use "nocfg" to skip UART configuration, assume
|
||||
BIOS/firmware has configured UART correctly.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@ -124,6 +124,14 @@ When mounting an XFS filesystem, the following options are accepted.
|
||||
controls the size of each buffer and so is also relevant to
|
||||
this case.
|
||||
|
||||
lifetime (default) or nolifetime
|
||||
Enable data placement based on write life time hints provided
|
||||
by the user. This turns on co-allocation of data of similar
|
||||
life times when statistically favorable to reduce garbage
|
||||
collection cost.
|
||||
|
||||
These options are only available for zoned rt file systems.
|
||||
|
||||
logbsize=value
|
||||
Set the size of each in-memory log buffer. The size may be
|
||||
specified in bytes, or in kilobytes with a "k" suffix.
|
||||
@ -143,6 +151,14 @@ When mounting an XFS filesystem, the following options are accepted.
|
||||
optional, and the log section can be separate from the data
|
||||
section or contained within it.
|
||||
|
||||
max_open_zones=value
|
||||
Specify the max number of zones to keep open for writing on a
|
||||
zoned rt device. Many open zones aids file data separation
|
||||
but may impact performance on HDDs.
|
||||
|
||||
If ``max_open_zones`` is not specified, the value is determined
|
||||
by the capabilities and the size of the zoned rt device.
|
||||
|
||||
noalign
|
||||
Data allocations will not be aligned at stripe unit
|
||||
boundaries. This is only relevant to filesystems created
|
||||
@ -542,3 +558,24 @@ The interesting knobs for XFS workqueues are as follows:
|
||||
nice Relative priority of scheduling the threads. These are the
|
||||
same nice levels that can be applied to userspace processes.
|
||||
============ ===========
|
||||
|
||||
Zoned Filesystems
|
||||
=================
|
||||
|
||||
For zoned file systems, the following attributes are exposed in:
|
||||
|
||||
/sys/fs/xfs/<dev>/zoned/
|
||||
|
||||
max_open_zones (Min: 1 Default: Varies Max: UINTMAX)
|
||||
This read-only attribute exposes the maximum number of open zones
|
||||
available for data placement. The value is determined at mount time and
|
||||
is limited by the capabilities of the backing zoned device, file system
|
||||
size and the max_open_zones mount option.
|
||||
|
||||
zonegc_low_space (Min: 0 Default: 0 Max: 100)
|
||||
Define a percentage for how much of the unused space that GC should keep
|
||||
available for writing. A high value will reclaim more of the space
|
||||
occupied by unused blocks, creating a larger buffer against write
|
||||
bursts at the cost of increased write amplification. Regardless
|
||||
of this value, garbage collection will always aim to free a minimum
|
||||
amount of blocks to keep max_open_zones open for data placement purposes.
|
||||
|
||||
@ -7,10 +7,10 @@ target architecture, specifically, is the 32-bit OpenRISC 1000 family (or1k).
|
||||
|
||||
For information about OpenRISC processors and ongoing development:
|
||||
|
||||
======= =============================
|
||||
======= ==============================
|
||||
website https://openrisc.io
|
||||
email openrisc@lists.librecores.org
|
||||
======= =============================
|
||||
email linux-openrisc@vger.kernel.org
|
||||
======= ==============================
|
||||
|
||||
---------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
@ -27,11 +27,11 @@ Toolchain binaries can be obtained from openrisc.io or our github releases page.
|
||||
Instructions for building the different toolchains can be found on openrisc.io
|
||||
or Stafford's toolchain build and release scripts.
|
||||
|
||||
========== =================================================
|
||||
binaries https://github.com/openrisc/or1k-gcc/releases
|
||||
========== ==========================================================
|
||||
binaries https://github.com/stffrdhrn/or1k-toolchain-build/releases
|
||||
toolchains https://openrisc.io/software
|
||||
building https://github.com/stffrdhrn/or1k-toolchain-build
|
||||
========== =================================================
|
||||
========== ==========================================================
|
||||
|
||||
2) Building
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ The following keys are defined:
|
||||
* :c:macro:`RISCV_HWPROBE_KEY_MARCHID`: Contains the value of ``marchid``, as
|
||||
defined by the RISC-V privileged architecture specification.
|
||||
|
||||
* :c:macro:`RISCV_HWPROBE_KEY_MIMPLID`: Contains the value of ``mimplid``, as
|
||||
* :c:macro:`RISCV_HWPROBE_KEY_MIMPID`: Contains the value of ``mimpid``, as
|
||||
defined by the RISC-V privileged architecture specification.
|
||||
|
||||
* :c:macro:`RISCV_HWPROBE_KEY_BASE_BEHAVIOR`: A bitmask containing the base
|
||||
|
||||
@ -79,8 +79,9 @@ feature flags.
|
||||
How are feature flags created?
|
||||
==============================
|
||||
|
||||
a: Feature flags can be derived from the contents of CPUID leaves.
|
||||
------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
Feature flags can be derived from the contents of CPUID leaves
|
||||
--------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
These feature definitions are organized mirroring the layout of CPUID
|
||||
leaves and grouped in words with offsets as mapped in enum cpuid_leafs
|
||||
in cpufeatures.h (see arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h for details).
|
||||
@ -89,8 +90,9 @@ cpufeatures.h, and if it is detected at run time, the flags will be
|
||||
displayed accordingly in /proc/cpuinfo. For example, the flag "avx2"
|
||||
comes from X86_FEATURE_AVX2 in cpufeatures.h.
|
||||
|
||||
b: Flags can be from scattered CPUID-based features.
|
||||
----------------------------------------------------
|
||||
Flags can be from scattered CPUID-based features
|
||||
------------------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
Hardware features enumerated in sparsely populated CPUID leaves get
|
||||
software-defined values. Still, CPUID needs to be queried to determine
|
||||
if a given feature is present. This is done in init_scattered_cpuid_features().
|
||||
@ -104,8 +106,9 @@ has only one feature and would waste 31 bits of space in the x86_capability[]
|
||||
array. Since there is a struct cpuinfo_x86 for each possible CPU, the wasted
|
||||
memory is not trivial.
|
||||
|
||||
c: Flags can be created synthetically under certain conditions for hardware features.
|
||||
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
Flags can be created synthetically under certain conditions for hardware features
|
||||
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
Examples of conditions include whether certain features are present in
|
||||
MSR_IA32_CORE_CAPS or specific CPU models are identified. If the needed
|
||||
conditions are met, the features are enabled by the set_cpu_cap or
|
||||
@ -114,8 +117,8 @@ the feature X86_FEATURE_SPLIT_LOCK_DETECT will be enabled and
|
||||
"split_lock_detect" will be displayed. The flag "ring3mwait" will be
|
||||
displayed only when running on INTEL_XEON_PHI_[KNL|KNM] processors.
|
||||
|
||||
d: Flags can represent purely software features.
|
||||
------------------------------------------------
|
||||
Flags can represent purely software features
|
||||
--------------------------------------------
|
||||
These flags do not represent hardware features. Instead, they represent a
|
||||
software feature implemented in the kernel. For example, Kernel Page Table
|
||||
Isolation is purely software feature and its feature flag X86_FEATURE_PTI is
|
||||
@ -130,14 +133,18 @@ x86_cap/bug_flags[] arrays in kernel/cpu/capflags.c. The names in the
|
||||
resulting x86_cap/bug_flags[] are used to populate /proc/cpuinfo. The naming
|
||||
of flags in the x86_cap/bug_flags[] are as follows:
|
||||
|
||||
a: The name of the flag is from the string in X86_FEATURE_<name> by default.
|
||||
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
By default, the flag <name> in /proc/cpuinfo is extracted from the respective
|
||||
X86_FEATURE_<name> in cpufeatures.h. For example, the flag "avx2" is from
|
||||
X86_FEATURE_AVX2.
|
||||
Flags do not appear by default in /proc/cpuinfo
|
||||
-----------------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
Feature flags are omitted by default from /proc/cpuinfo as it does not make
|
||||
sense for the feature to be exposed to userspace in most cases. For example,
|
||||
X86_FEATURE_ALWAYS is defined in cpufeatures.h but that flag is an internal
|
||||
kernel feature used in the alternative runtime patching functionality. So the
|
||||
flag does not appear in /proc/cpuinfo.
|
||||
|
||||
Specify a flag name if absolutely needed
|
||||
----------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
b: The naming can be overridden.
|
||||
--------------------------------
|
||||
If the comment on the line for the #define X86_FEATURE_* starts with a
|
||||
double-quote character (""), the string inside the double-quote characters
|
||||
will be the name of the flags. For example, the flag "sse4_1" comes from
|
||||
@ -148,36 +155,31 @@ needed. For instance, /proc/cpuinfo is a userspace interface and must remain
|
||||
constant. If, for some reason, the naming of X86_FEATURE_<name> changes, one
|
||||
shall override the new naming with the name already used in /proc/cpuinfo.
|
||||
|
||||
c: The naming override can be "", which means it will not appear in /proc/cpuinfo.
|
||||
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
The feature shall be omitted from /proc/cpuinfo if it does not make sense for
|
||||
the feature to be exposed to userspace. For example, X86_FEATURE_ALWAYS is
|
||||
defined in cpufeatures.h but that flag is an internal kernel feature used
|
||||
in the alternative runtime patching functionality. So, its name is overridden
|
||||
with "". Its flag will not appear in /proc/cpuinfo.
|
||||
|
||||
Flags are missing when one or more of these happen
|
||||
==================================================
|
||||
|
||||
a: The hardware does not enumerate support for it.
|
||||
--------------------------------------------------
|
||||
The hardware does not enumerate support for it
|
||||
----------------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
For example, when a new kernel is running on old hardware or the feature is
|
||||
not enabled by boot firmware. Even if the hardware is new, there might be a
|
||||
problem enabling the feature at run time, the flag will not be displayed.
|
||||
|
||||
b: The kernel does not know about the flag.
|
||||
-------------------------------------------
|
||||
The kernel does not know about the flag
|
||||
---------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
For example, when an old kernel is running on new hardware.
|
||||
|
||||
c: The kernel disabled support for it at compile-time.
|
||||
------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
The kernel disabled support for it at compile-time
|
||||
--------------------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
For example, if 5-level-paging is not enabled when building (i.e.,
|
||||
CONFIG_X86_5LEVEL is not selected) the flag "la57" will not show up [#f1]_.
|
||||
Even though the feature will still be detected via CPUID, the kernel disables
|
||||
it by clearing via setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_LA57).
|
||||
|
||||
d: The feature is disabled at boot-time.
|
||||
----------------------------------------
|
||||
The feature is disabled at boot-time
|
||||
------------------------------------
|
||||
A feature can be disabled either using a command-line parameter or because
|
||||
it failed to be enabled. The command-line parameter clearcpuid= can be used
|
||||
to disable features using the feature number as defined in
|
||||
@ -190,8 +192,9 @@ disable specific features. The list of parameters includes, but is not limited
|
||||
to, nofsgsbase, nosgx, noxsave, etc. 5-level paging can also be disabled using
|
||||
"no5lvl".
|
||||
|
||||
e: The feature was known to be non-functional.
|
||||
----------------------------------------------
|
||||
The feature was known to be non-functional
|
||||
------------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
The feature was known to be non-functional because a dependency was
|
||||
missing at runtime. For example, AVX flags will not show up if XSAVE feature
|
||||
is disabled since they depend on XSAVE feature. Another example would be broken
|
||||
|
||||
@ -382,6 +382,14 @@ In case of new BPF instructions, once the changes have been accepted
|
||||
into the Linux kernel, please implement support into LLVM's BPF back
|
||||
end. See LLVM_ section below for further information.
|
||||
|
||||
Q: What "BPF_INTERNAL" symbol namespace is for?
|
||||
-----------------------------------------------
|
||||
A: Symbols exported as BPF_INTERNAL can only be used by BPF infrastructure
|
||||
like preload kernel modules with light skeleton. Most symbols outside
|
||||
of BPF_INTERNAL are not expected to be used by code outside of BPF either.
|
||||
Symbols may lack the designation because they predate the namespaces,
|
||||
or due to an oversight.
|
||||
|
||||
Stable submission
|
||||
=================
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@ -7,7 +7,6 @@ $schema: http://devicetree.org/meta-schemas/core.yaml#
|
||||
title: Ceva AHCI SATA Controller
|
||||
|
||||
maintainers:
|
||||
- Mubin Sayyed <mubin.sayyed@amd.com>
|
||||
- Radhey Shyam Pandey <radhey.shyam.pandey@amd.com>
|
||||
|
||||
description: |
|
||||
|
||||
@ -111,11 +111,27 @@ properties:
|
||||
unevaluatedProperties: false
|
||||
|
||||
port@1:
|
||||
$ref: /schemas/graph.yaml#/properties/port
|
||||
$ref: /schemas/graph.yaml#/$defs/port-base
|
||||
unevaluatedProperties: false
|
||||
description:
|
||||
DSI output port node to the panel or the next bridge
|
||||
in the chain
|
||||
|
||||
properties:
|
||||
endpoint:
|
||||
$ref: /schemas/media/video-interfaces.yaml#
|
||||
unevaluatedProperties: false
|
||||
|
||||
properties:
|
||||
data-lanes:
|
||||
description: array of physical DSI data lane indexes.
|
||||
minItems: 1
|
||||
items:
|
||||
- const: 1
|
||||
- const: 2
|
||||
- const: 3
|
||||
- const: 4
|
||||
|
||||
required:
|
||||
- port@0
|
||||
- port@1
|
||||
|
||||
@ -12,7 +12,6 @@ description:
|
||||
PS_MODE). Every pin can be configured as input/output.
|
||||
|
||||
maintainers:
|
||||
- Mubin Sayyed <mubin.sayyed@amd.com>
|
||||
- Radhey Shyam Pandey <radhey.shyam.pandey@amd.com>
|
||||
|
||||
properties:
|
||||
|
||||
@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ properties:
|
||||
- fsl,imx8mp-irqsteer
|
||||
- fsl,imx8qm-irqsteer
|
||||
- fsl,imx8qxp-irqsteer
|
||||
- fsl,imx94-irqsteer
|
||||
- const: fsl,imx-irqsteer
|
||||
|
||||
reg:
|
||||
|
||||
@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ properties:
|
||||
$ref: /schemas/types.yaml#/definitions/uint32-array
|
||||
items:
|
||||
- minimum: 0
|
||||
maximum: 7
|
||||
maximum: 31
|
||||
description:
|
||||
Offset in bit within the address range specified by reg.
|
||||
- minimum: 1
|
||||
|
||||
@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ properties:
|
||||
- enum:
|
||||
- qcom,apq8064-qfprom
|
||||
- qcom,apq8084-qfprom
|
||||
- qcom,ipq5018-qfprom
|
||||
- qcom,ipq5332-qfprom
|
||||
- qcom,ipq5424-qfprom
|
||||
- qcom,ipq6018-qfprom
|
||||
@ -28,6 +29,8 @@ properties:
|
||||
- qcom,msm8226-qfprom
|
||||
- qcom,msm8916-qfprom
|
||||
- qcom,msm8917-qfprom
|
||||
- qcom,msm8937-qfprom
|
||||
- qcom,msm8960-qfprom
|
||||
- qcom,msm8974-qfprom
|
||||
- qcom,msm8976-qfprom
|
||||
- qcom,msm8996-qfprom
|
||||
@ -51,6 +54,7 @@ properties:
|
||||
- qcom,sm8450-qfprom
|
||||
- qcom,sm8550-qfprom
|
||||
- qcom,sm8650-qfprom
|
||||
- qcom,x1e80100-qfprom
|
||||
- const: qcom,qfprom
|
||||
|
||||
reg:
|
||||
|
||||
@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ properties:
|
||||
enum:
|
||||
- rockchip,px30-otp
|
||||
- rockchip,rk3308-otp
|
||||
- rockchip,rk3576-otp
|
||||
- rockchip,rk3588-otp
|
||||
|
||||
reg:
|
||||
@ -62,12 +63,34 @@ allOf:
|
||||
properties:
|
||||
clocks:
|
||||
maxItems: 3
|
||||
clock-names:
|
||||
maxItems: 3
|
||||
resets:
|
||||
maxItems: 1
|
||||
reset-names:
|
||||
items:
|
||||
- const: phy
|
||||
|
||||
- if:
|
||||
properties:
|
||||
compatible:
|
||||
contains:
|
||||
enum:
|
||||
- rockchip,rk3576-otp
|
||||
then:
|
||||
properties:
|
||||
clocks:
|
||||
maxItems: 3
|
||||
clock-names:
|
||||
maxItems: 3
|
||||
resets:
|
||||
minItems: 2
|
||||
maxItems: 2
|
||||
reset-names:
|
||||
items:
|
||||
- const: otp
|
||||
- const: apb
|
||||
|
||||
- if:
|
||||
properties:
|
||||
compatible:
|
||||
@ -78,6 +101,8 @@ allOf:
|
||||
properties:
|
||||
clocks:
|
||||
minItems: 4
|
||||
clock-names:
|
||||
minItems: 4
|
||||
resets:
|
||||
minItems: 3
|
||||
reset-names:
|
||||
|
||||
@ -9,15 +9,6 @@ title: Renesas R-Car Timer Pulse Unit PWM Controller
|
||||
maintainers:
|
||||
- Laurent Pinchart <laurent.pinchart+renesas@ideasonboard.com>
|
||||
|
||||
select:
|
||||
properties:
|
||||
compatible:
|
||||
contains:
|
||||
const: renesas,tpu
|
||||
required:
|
||||
- compatible
|
||||
- '#pwm-cells'
|
||||
|
||||
properties:
|
||||
compatible:
|
||||
items:
|
||||
|
||||
@ -7,7 +7,6 @@ $schema: http://devicetree.org/meta-schemas/core.yaml#
|
||||
title: Zynq UltraScale+ MPSoC and Versal reset
|
||||
|
||||
maintainers:
|
||||
- Mubin Sayyed <mubin.sayyed@amd.com>
|
||||
- Radhey Shyam Pandey <radhey.shyam.pandey@amd.com>
|
||||
|
||||
description: |
|
||||
|
||||
@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ $schema: http://devicetree.org/meta-schemas/core.yaml#
|
||||
title: Freescale Layerscape Reset Registers Module
|
||||
|
||||
maintainers:
|
||||
- Frank Li
|
||||
- Frank Li <Frank.Li@nxp.com>
|
||||
|
||||
description:
|
||||
Reset Module includes chip reset, service processor control and Reset Control
|
||||
|
||||
@ -18,9 +18,14 @@ description: |
|
||||
|
||||
properties:
|
||||
compatible:
|
||||
enum:
|
||||
oneOf:
|
||||
- enum:
|
||||
- nxp,imx95-sysctr-timer
|
||||
- nxp,sysctr-timer
|
||||
- items:
|
||||
- enum:
|
||||
- nxp,imx94-sysctr-timer
|
||||
- const: nxp,imx95-sysctr-timer
|
||||
|
||||
reg:
|
||||
maxItems: 1
|
||||
|
||||
@ -1,56 +0,0 @@
|
||||
# SPDX-License-Identifier: (GPL-2.0-only OR BSD-2-Clause)
|
||||
%YAML 1.2
|
||||
---
|
||||
$id: http://devicetree.org/schemas/timer/renesas,tpu.yaml#
|
||||
$schema: http://devicetree.org/meta-schemas/core.yaml#
|
||||
|
||||
title: Renesas H8/300 Timer Pulse Unit
|
||||
|
||||
maintainers:
|
||||
- Yoshinori Sato <ysato@users.sourceforge.jp>
|
||||
|
||||
description:
|
||||
The TPU is a 16bit timer/counter with configurable clock inputs and
|
||||
programmable compare match.
|
||||
This implementation supports only cascade mode.
|
||||
|
||||
select:
|
||||
properties:
|
||||
compatible:
|
||||
contains:
|
||||
const: renesas,tpu
|
||||
'#pwm-cells': false
|
||||
required:
|
||||
- compatible
|
||||
|
||||
properties:
|
||||
compatible:
|
||||
const: renesas,tpu
|
||||
|
||||
reg:
|
||||
items:
|
||||
- description: First channel
|
||||
- description: Second channel
|
||||
|
||||
clocks:
|
||||
maxItems: 1
|
||||
|
||||
clock-names:
|
||||
const: fck
|
||||
|
||||
required:
|
||||
- compatible
|
||||
- reg
|
||||
- clocks
|
||||
- clock-names
|
||||
|
||||
additionalProperties: false
|
||||
|
||||
examples:
|
||||
- |
|
||||
tpu: tpu@ffffe0 {
|
||||
compatible = "renesas,tpu";
|
||||
reg = <0xffffe0 16>, <0xfffff0 12>;
|
||||
clocks = <&pclk>;
|
||||
clock-names = "fck";
|
||||
};
|
||||
@ -7,7 +7,6 @@ $schema: http://devicetree.org/meta-schemas/core.yaml#
|
||||
title: Xilinx SuperSpeed DWC3 USB SoC controller
|
||||
|
||||
maintainers:
|
||||
- Mubin Sayyed <mubin.sayyed@amd.com>
|
||||
- Radhey Shyam Pandey <radhey.shyam.pandey@amd.com>
|
||||
|
||||
properties:
|
||||
|
||||
@ -17,7 +17,6 @@ description:
|
||||
|
||||
maintainers:
|
||||
- Michal Simek <michal.simek@amd.com>
|
||||
- Mubin Sayyed <mubin.sayyed@amd.com>
|
||||
- Radhey Shyam Pandey <radhey.shyam.pandey@amd.com>
|
||||
|
||||
properties:
|
||||
|
||||
@ -7,7 +7,6 @@ $schema: http://devicetree.org/meta-schemas/core.yaml#
|
||||
title: Xilinx udc controller
|
||||
|
||||
maintainers:
|
||||
- Mubin Sayyed <mubin.sayyed@amd.com>
|
||||
- Radhey Shyam Pandey <radhey.shyam.pandey@amd.com>
|
||||
|
||||
properties:
|
||||
|
||||
@ -328,9 +328,13 @@ The ext4 superblock is laid out as follows in
|
||||
- s_checksum_type
|
||||
- Metadata checksum algorithm type. The only valid value is 1 (crc32c).
|
||||
* - 0x176
|
||||
- __le16
|
||||
- s_reserved_pad
|
||||
-
|
||||
- \_\_u8
|
||||
- s\_encryption\_level
|
||||
- Versioning level for encryption.
|
||||
* - 0x177
|
||||
- \_\_u8
|
||||
- s\_reserved\_pad
|
||||
- Padding to next 32bits.
|
||||
* - 0x178
|
||||
- __le64
|
||||
- s_kbytes_written
|
||||
@ -466,9 +470,13 @@ The ext4 superblock is laid out as follows in
|
||||
- s_last_error_time_hi
|
||||
- Upper 8 bits of the s_last_error_time field.
|
||||
* - 0x27A
|
||||
- __u8
|
||||
- s_pad[2]
|
||||
- Zero padding.
|
||||
- \_\_u8
|
||||
- s\_first\_error\_errcode
|
||||
-
|
||||
* - 0x27B
|
||||
- \_\_u8
|
||||
- s\_last\_error\_errcode
|
||||
-
|
||||
* - 0x27C
|
||||
- __le16
|
||||
- s_encoding
|
||||
|
||||
@ -123,12 +123,12 @@ attribute-sets:
|
||||
|
||||
operations:
|
||||
name-prefix: ovs-vport-cmd-
|
||||
fixed-header: ovs-header
|
||||
list:
|
||||
-
|
||||
name: new
|
||||
doc: Create a new OVS vport
|
||||
attribute-set: vport
|
||||
fixed-header: ovs-header
|
||||
do:
|
||||
request:
|
||||
attributes:
|
||||
@ -141,7 +141,6 @@ operations:
|
||||
name: del
|
||||
doc: Delete existing OVS vport from a data path
|
||||
attribute-set: vport
|
||||
fixed-header: ovs-header
|
||||
do:
|
||||
request:
|
||||
attributes:
|
||||
@ -152,7 +151,6 @@ operations:
|
||||
name: get
|
||||
doc: Get / dump OVS vport configuration and state
|
||||
attribute-set: vport
|
||||
fixed-header: ovs-header
|
||||
do: &vport-get-op
|
||||
request:
|
||||
attributes:
|
||||
|
||||
@ -1113,11 +1113,10 @@ attribute-sets:
|
||||
-
|
||||
name: prop-list
|
||||
type: nest
|
||||
nested-attributes: link-attrs
|
||||
nested-attributes: prop-list-link-attrs
|
||||
-
|
||||
name: alt-ifname
|
||||
type: string
|
||||
multi-attr: true
|
||||
-
|
||||
name: perm-address
|
||||
type: binary
|
||||
@ -1163,6 +1162,13 @@ attribute-sets:
|
||||
-
|
||||
name: netns-immutable
|
||||
type: u8
|
||||
-
|
||||
name: prop-list-link-attrs
|
||||
subset-of: link-attrs
|
||||
attributes:
|
||||
-
|
||||
name: alt-ifname
|
||||
multi-attr: true
|
||||
-
|
||||
name: af-spec-attrs
|
||||
attributes:
|
||||
@ -1585,7 +1591,7 @@ attribute-sets:
|
||||
name: nf-call-iptables
|
||||
type: u8
|
||||
-
|
||||
name: nf-call-ip6-tables
|
||||
name: nf-call-ip6tables
|
||||
type: u8
|
||||
-
|
||||
name: nf-call-arptables
|
||||
@ -2077,7 +2083,7 @@ attribute-sets:
|
||||
name: id
|
||||
type: u16
|
||||
-
|
||||
name: flag
|
||||
name: flags
|
||||
type: binary
|
||||
struct: ifla-vlan-flags
|
||||
-
|
||||
@ -2165,7 +2171,7 @@ attribute-sets:
|
||||
type: binary
|
||||
struct: ifla-cacheinfo
|
||||
-
|
||||
name: icmp6-stats
|
||||
name: icmp6stats
|
||||
type: binary
|
||||
struct: ifla-icmp6-stats
|
||||
-
|
||||
@ -2179,9 +2185,10 @@ attribute-sets:
|
||||
type: u32
|
||||
-
|
||||
name: mctp-attrs
|
||||
name-prefix: ifla-mctp-
|
||||
attributes:
|
||||
-
|
||||
name: mctp-net
|
||||
name: net
|
||||
type: u32
|
||||
-
|
||||
name: phys-binding
|
||||
@ -2453,7 +2460,6 @@ operations:
|
||||
- min-mtu
|
||||
- max-mtu
|
||||
- prop-list
|
||||
- alt-ifname
|
||||
- perm-address
|
||||
- proto-down-reason
|
||||
- parent-dev-name
|
||||
|
||||
@ -13,25 +13,25 @@ definitions:
|
||||
type: struct
|
||||
members:
|
||||
-
|
||||
name: family
|
||||
name: ndm-family
|
||||
type: u8
|
||||
-
|
||||
name: pad
|
||||
name: ndm-pad
|
||||
type: pad
|
||||
len: 3
|
||||
-
|
||||
name: ifindex
|
||||
name: ndm-ifindex
|
||||
type: s32
|
||||
-
|
||||
name: state
|
||||
name: ndm-state
|
||||
type: u16
|
||||
enum: nud-state
|
||||
-
|
||||
name: flags
|
||||
name: ndm-flags
|
||||
type: u8
|
||||
enum: ntf-flags
|
||||
-
|
||||
name: type
|
||||
name: ndm-type
|
||||
type: u8
|
||||
enum: rtm-type
|
||||
-
|
||||
@ -189,7 +189,7 @@ attribute-sets:
|
||||
type: binary
|
||||
display-hint: ipv4
|
||||
-
|
||||
name: lladr
|
||||
name: lladdr
|
||||
type: binary
|
||||
display-hint: mac
|
||||
-
|
||||
|
||||
@ -338,10 +338,11 @@ operations directly under the netdev instance lock.
|
||||
Devices drivers are encouraged to rely on the instance lock where possible.
|
||||
|
||||
For the (mostly software) drivers that need to interact with the core stack,
|
||||
there are two sets of interfaces: ``dev_xxx`` and ``netif_xxx`` (e.g.,
|
||||
``dev_set_mtu`` and ``netif_set_mtu``). The ``dev_xxx`` functions handle
|
||||
acquiring the instance lock themselves, while the ``netif_xxx`` functions
|
||||
assume that the driver has already acquired the instance lock.
|
||||
there are two sets of interfaces: ``dev_xxx``/``netdev_xxx`` and ``netif_xxx``
|
||||
(e.g., ``dev_set_mtu`` and ``netif_set_mtu``). The ``dev_xxx``/``netdev_xxx``
|
||||
functions handle acquiring the instance lock themselves, while the
|
||||
``netif_xxx`` functions assume that the driver has already acquired
|
||||
the instance lock.
|
||||
|
||||
Notifiers and netdev instance lock
|
||||
==================================
|
||||
@ -354,6 +355,7 @@ For devices with locked ops, currently only the following notifiers are
|
||||
running under the lock:
|
||||
* ``NETDEV_REGISTER``
|
||||
* ``NETDEV_UP``
|
||||
* ``NETDEV_CHANGE``
|
||||
|
||||
The following notifiers are running without the lock:
|
||||
* ``NETDEV_UNREGISTER``
|
||||
|
||||
@ -154,7 +154,7 @@ suspending the device are satisfied) and to queue up a suspend request for the
|
||||
device in that case. If there is no idle callback, or if the callback returns
|
||||
0, then the PM core will attempt to carry out a runtime suspend of the device,
|
||||
also respecting devices configured for autosuspend. In essence this means a
|
||||
call to __pm_runtime_autosuspend() (do note that drivers needs to update the
|
||||
call to pm_runtime_autosuspend() (do note that drivers needs to update the
|
||||
device last busy mark, pm_runtime_mark_last_busy(), to control the delay under
|
||||
this circumstance). To prevent this (for example, if the callback routine has
|
||||
started a delayed suspend), the routine must return a non-zero value. Negative
|
||||
|
||||
@ -17,10 +17,10 @@ OpenRISC 1000系列（或1k）。
|
||||
|
||||
关于OpenRISC处理器和正在进行中的开发的信息:
|
||||
|
||||
======= =============================
|
||||
======= ==============================
|
||||
网站 https://openrisc.io
|
||||
邮箱 openrisc@lists.librecores.org
|
||||
======= =============================
|
||||
邮箱 linux-openrisc@vger.kernel.org
|
||||
======= ==============================
|
||||
|
||||
---------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
@ -36,11 +36,11 @@ OpenRISC工具链和Linux的构建指南
|
||||
工具链的构建指南可以在openrisc.io或Stafford的工具链构建和发布脚本
|
||||
中找到。
|
||||
|
||||
====== =================================================
|
||||
二进制 https://github.com/openrisc/or1k-gcc/releases
|
||||
====== ==========================================================
|
||||
二进制 https://github.com/stffrdhrn/or1k-toolchain-build/releases
|
||||
工具链 https://openrisc.io/software
|
||||
构建 https://github.com/stffrdhrn/or1k-toolchain-build
|
||||
====== =================================================
|
||||
====== ==========================================================
|
||||
|
||||
2) 构建
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@ -17,10 +17,10 @@ OpenRISC 1000系列（或1k）。
|
||||
|
||||
關於OpenRISC處理器和正在進行中的開發的信息:
|
||||
|
||||
======= =============================
|
||||
======= ==============================
|
||||
網站 https://openrisc.io
|
||||
郵箱 openrisc@lists.librecores.org
|
||||
======= =============================
|
||||
郵箱 linux-openrisc@vger.kernel.org
|
||||
======= ==============================
|
||||
|
||||
---------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
@ -36,11 +36,11 @@ OpenRISC工具鏈和Linux的構建指南
|
||||
工具鏈的構建指南可以在openrisc.io或Stafford的工具鏈構建和發佈腳本
|
||||
中找到。
|
||||
|
||||
====== =================================================
|
||||
二進制 https://github.com/openrisc/or1k-gcc/releases
|
||||
====== ==========================================================
|
||||
二進制 https://github.com/stffrdhrn/or1k-toolchain-build/releases
|
||||
工具鏈 https://openrisc.io/software
|
||||
構建 https://github.com/stffrdhrn/or1k-toolchain-build
|
||||
====== =================================================
|
||||
====== ==========================================================
|
||||
|
||||
2) 構建
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ SYSCALL
|
||||
=======
|
||||
mseal syscall signature
|
||||
-----------------------
|
||||
``int mseal(void \* addr, size_t len, unsigned long flags)``
|
||||
``int mseal(void *addr, size_t len, unsigned long flags)``
|
||||
|
||||
**addr**/**len**: virtual memory address range.
|
||||
The address range set by **addr**/**len** must meet:
|
||||
|
||||
File diff suppressed because it is too large
Load Diff
@ -138,6 +138,10 @@ input data, the meaning of which depends on the subfeature being accessed.
|
||||
The output buffer contains a single byte which signals success or failure (``0x00`` on failure)
|
||||
and 31 bytes of output data, the meaning if which depends on the subfeature being accessed.
|
||||
|
||||
.. note::
|
||||
The ACPI control method responsible for handling the WMI method calls is not thread-safe.
|
||||
This is a firmware bug that needs to be handled inside the driver itself.
|
||||
|
||||
WMI method Get_EC()
|
||||
-------------------
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
114
MAINTAINERS
114
MAINTAINERS
@ -3191,6 +3191,12 @@ M: Dinh Nguyen <dinguyen@kernel.org>
|
||||
S: Maintained
|
||||
F: drivers/clk/socfpga/
|
||||
|
||||
ARM/SOCFPGA DWMAC GLUE LAYER
|
||||
M: Maxime Chevallier <maxime.chevallier@bootlin.com>
|
||||
S: Maintained
|
||||
F: Documentation/devicetree/bindings/net/socfpga-dwmac.txt
|
||||
F: drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/dwmac-socfpga.c
|
||||
|
||||
ARM/SOCFPGA EDAC BINDINGS
|
||||
M: Matthew Gerlach <matthew.gerlach@altera.com>
|
||||
S: Maintained
|
||||
@ -3867,8 +3873,9 @@ AUXILIARY BUS DRIVER
|
||||
M: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
||||
R: Dave Ertman <david.m.ertman@intel.com>
|
||||
R: Ira Weiny <ira.weiny@intel.com>
|
||||
R: Leon Romanovsky <leon@kernel.org>
|
||||
S: Supported
|
||||
T: git git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/driver-core.git
|
||||
T: git git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/driver-core/driver-core.git
|
||||
F: Documentation/driver-api/auxiliary_bus.rst
|
||||
F: drivers/base/auxiliary.c
|
||||
F: include/linux/auxiliary_bus.h
|
||||
@ -6335,6 +6342,7 @@ F: Documentation/process/cve.rst
|
||||
|
||||
CW1200 WLAN driver
|
||||
S: Orphan
|
||||
L: linux-wireless@vger.kernel.org
|
||||
F: drivers/net/wireless/st/
|
||||
F: include/linux/platform_data/net-cw1200.h
|
||||
|
||||
@ -7020,6 +7028,7 @@ L: rust-for-linux@vger.kernel.org
|
||||
S: Supported
|
||||
W: https://rust-for-linux.com
|
||||
T: git https://github.com/Rust-for-Linux/linux.git alloc-next
|
||||
F: rust/helpers/dma.c
|
||||
F: rust/kernel/dma.rs
|
||||
F: samples/rust/rust_dma.rs
|
||||
|
||||
@ -7225,7 +7234,7 @@ M: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
||||
M: "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rafael@kernel.org>
|
||||
M: Danilo Krummrich <dakr@kernel.org>
|
||||
S: Supported
|
||||
T: git git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/driver-core.git
|
||||
T: git git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/driver-core/driver-core.git
|
||||
F: Documentation/core-api/kobject.rst
|
||||
F: drivers/base/
|
||||
F: fs/debugfs/
|
||||
@ -10151,6 +10160,8 @@ F: include/linux/gpio.h
|
||||
F: include/linux/gpio/
|
||||
F: include/linux/of_gpio.h
|
||||
K: (devm_)?gpio_(request|free|direction|get|set)
|
||||
K: GPIOD_FLAGS_BIT_NONEXCLUSIVE
|
||||
K: devm_gpiod_unhinge
|
||||
|
||||
GPIO UAPI
|
||||
M: Bartosz Golaszewski <brgl@bgdev.pl>
|
||||
@ -10453,14 +10464,20 @@ S: Supported
|
||||
F: drivers/infiniband/hw/hfi1
|
||||
|
||||
HFS FILESYSTEM
|
||||
M: Viacheslav Dubeyko <slava@dubeyko.com>
|
||||
M: John Paul Adrian Glaubitz <glaubitz@physik.fu-berlin.de>
|
||||
M: Yangtao Li <frank.li@vivo.com>
|
||||
L: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
|
||||
S: Orphan
|
||||
S: Maintained
|
||||
F: Documentation/filesystems/hfs.rst
|
||||
F: fs/hfs/
|
||||
|
||||
HFSPLUS FILESYSTEM
|
||||
M: Viacheslav Dubeyko <slava@dubeyko.com>
|
||||
M: John Paul Adrian Glaubitz <glaubitz@physik.fu-berlin.de>
|
||||
M: Yangtao Li <frank.li@vivo.com>
|
||||
L: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
|
||||
S: Orphan
|
||||
S: Maintained
|
||||
F: Documentation/filesystems/hfsplus.rst
|
||||
F: fs/hfsplus/
|
||||
|
||||
@ -10954,6 +10971,7 @@ F: include/linux/platform_data/huawei-gaokun-ec.h
|
||||
|
||||
HUGETLB SUBSYSTEM
|
||||
M: Muchun Song <muchun.song@linux.dev>
|
||||
R: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de>
|
||||
L: linux-mm@kvack.org
|
||||
S: Maintained
|
||||
F: Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-kernel-mm-hugepages
|
||||
@ -12810,6 +12828,7 @@ F: lib/Kconfig.kcsan
|
||||
F: scripts/Makefile.kcsan
|
||||
|
||||
KDUMP
|
||||
M: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
|
||||
M: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
|
||||
R: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
|
||||
R: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
|
||||
@ -13106,11 +13125,13 @@ KERNFS
|
||||
M: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
||||
M: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
|
||||
S: Supported
|
||||
T: git git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/driver-core.git
|
||||
T: git git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/driver-core/driver-core.git
|
||||
F: fs/kernfs/
|
||||
F: include/linux/kernfs.h
|
||||
|
||||
KEXEC
|
||||
M: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
|
||||
M: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
|
||||
L: kexec@lists.infradead.org
|
||||
W: http://kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/kernel/kexec/
|
||||
F: include/linux/kexec.h
|
||||
@ -14283,6 +14304,7 @@ S: Odd fixes
|
||||
F: drivers/net/ethernet/marvell/sk*
|
||||
|
||||
MARVELL LIBERTAS WIRELESS DRIVER
|
||||
L: linux-wireless@vger.kernel.org
|
||||
L: libertas-dev@lists.infradead.org
|
||||
S: Orphan
|
||||
F: drivers/net/wireless/marvell/libertas/
|
||||
@ -15508,6 +15530,21 @@ F: mm/numa.c
|
||||
F: mm/numa_emulation.c
|
||||
F: mm/numa_memblks.c
|
||||
|
||||
MEMORY MANAGEMENT - PAGE ALLOCATOR
|
||||
M: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
|
||||
R: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
|
||||
R: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>
|
||||
R: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
|
||||
R: Brendan Jackman <jackmanb@google.com>
|
||||
R: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
|
||||
R: Zi Yan <ziy@nvidia.com>
|
||||
L: linux-mm@kvack.org
|
||||
S: Maintained
|
||||
F: mm/compaction.c
|
||||
F: mm/page_alloc.c
|
||||
F: include/linux/gfp.h
|
||||
F: include/linux/compaction.h
|
||||
|
||||
MEMORY MANAGEMENT - SECRETMEM
|
||||
M: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
|
||||
M: Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org>
|
||||
@ -15535,10 +15572,12 @@ M: Liam R. Howlett <Liam.Howlett@oracle.com>
|
||||
M: Lorenzo Stoakes <lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com>
|
||||
R: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
|
||||
R: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
|
||||
R: Pedro Falcato <pfalcato@suse.de>
|
||||
L: linux-mm@kvack.org
|
||||
S: Maintained
|
||||
W: http://www.linux-mm.org
|
||||
T: git git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm
|
||||
F: include/trace/events/mmap.h
|
||||
F: mm/mlock.c
|
||||
F: mm/mmap.c
|
||||
F: mm/mprotect.c
|
||||
@ -15549,6 +15588,36 @@ F: mm/vma.h
|
||||
F: mm/vma_internal.h
|
||||
F: tools/testing/vma/
|
||||
|
||||
MEMORY MAPPING - LOCKING
|
||||
M: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
|
||||
M: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>
|
||||
M: Liam R. Howlett <Liam.Howlett@oracle.com>
|
||||
M: Lorenzo Stoakes <lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com>
|
||||
R: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
|
||||
R: Shakeel Butt <shakeel.butt@linux.dev>
|
||||
L: linux-mm@kvack.org
|
||||
S: Maintained
|
||||
W: http://www.linux-mm.org
|
||||
T: git git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm
|
||||
F: Documentation/mm/process_addrs.rst
|
||||
F: include/linux/mmap_lock.h
|
||||
F: include/trace/events/mmap_lock.h
|
||||
F: mm/mmap_lock.c
|
||||
|
||||
MEMORY MAPPING - MADVISE (MEMORY ADVICE)
|
||||
M: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
|
||||
M: Liam R. Howlett <Liam.Howlett@oracle.com>
|
||||
M: Lorenzo Stoakes <lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com>
|
||||
M: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
|
||||
R: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
|
||||
R: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
|
||||
L: linux-mm@kvack.org
|
||||
S: Maintained
|
||||
W: http://www.linux-mm.org
|
||||
T: git git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm
|
||||
F: include/uapi/asm-generic/mman-common.h
|
||||
F: mm/madvise.c
|
||||
|
||||
MEMORY TECHNOLOGY DEVICES (MTD)
|
||||
M: Miquel Raynal <miquel.raynal@bootlin.com>
|
||||
M: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
|
||||
@ -16756,6 +16825,7 @@ F: Documentation/networking/net_cachelines/net_device.rst
|
||||
F: drivers/connector/
|
||||
F: drivers/net/
|
||||
F: drivers/ptp/
|
||||
F: drivers/s390/net/
|
||||
F: include/dt-bindings/net/
|
||||
F: include/linux/cn_proc.h
|
||||
F: include/linux/etherdevice.h
|
||||
@ -16765,6 +16835,7 @@ F: include/linux/fddidevice.h
|
||||
F: include/linux/hippidevice.h
|
||||
F: include/linux/if_*
|
||||
F: include/linux/inetdevice.h
|
||||
F: include/linux/ism.h
|
||||
F: include/linux/netdev*
|
||||
F: include/linux/platform_data/wiznet.h
|
||||
F: include/uapi/linux/cn_proc.h
|
||||
@ -18633,7 +18704,7 @@ F: drivers/pci/controller/pci-xgene-msi.c
|
||||
PCI NATIVE HOST BRIDGE AND ENDPOINT DRIVERS
|
||||
M: Lorenzo Pieralisi <lpieralisi@kernel.org>
|
||||
M: Krzysztof Wilczyński <kw@linux.com>
|
||||
R: Manivannan Sadhasivam <manivannan.sadhasivam@linaro.org>
|
||||
M: Manivannan Sadhasivam <manivannan.sadhasivam@linaro.org>
|
||||
R: Rob Herring <robh@kernel.org>
|
||||
L: linux-pci@vger.kernel.org
|
||||
S: Supported
|
||||
@ -18686,6 +18757,16 @@ F: include/asm-generic/pci*
|
||||
F: include/linux/of_pci.h
|
||||
F: include/linux/pci*
|
||||
F: include/uapi/linux/pci*
|
||||
|
||||
PCI SUBSYSTEM [RUST]
|
||||
M: Danilo Krummrich <dakr@kernel.org>
|
||||
R: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
|
||||
R: Krzysztof Wilczyński <kwilczynski@kernel.org>
|
||||
L: linux-pci@vger.kernel.org
|
||||
S: Maintained
|
||||
C: irc://irc.oftc.net/linux-pci
|
||||
T: git git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pci/pci.git
|
||||
F: rust/helpers/pci.c
|
||||
F: rust/kernel/pci.rs
|
||||
F: samples/rust/rust_driver_pci.rs
|
||||
|
||||
@ -19746,6 +19827,7 @@ F: drivers/media/tuners/qt1010*
|
||||
|
||||
QUALCOMM ATH12K WIRELESS DRIVER
|
||||
M: Jeff Johnson <jjohnson@kernel.org>
|
||||
L: linux-wireless@vger.kernel.org
|
||||
L: ath12k@lists.infradead.org
|
||||
S: Supported
|
||||
W: https://wireless.wiki.kernel.org/en/users/Drivers/ath12k
|
||||
@ -19755,6 +19837,7 @@ N: ath12k
|
||||
|
||||
QUALCOMM ATHEROS ATH10K WIRELESS DRIVER
|
||||
M: Jeff Johnson <jjohnson@kernel.org>
|
||||
L: linux-wireless@vger.kernel.org
|
||||
L: ath10k@lists.infradead.org
|
||||
S: Supported
|
||||
W: https://wireless.wiki.kernel.org/en/users/Drivers/ath10k
|
||||
@ -19764,6 +19847,7 @@ N: ath10k
|
||||
|
||||
QUALCOMM ATHEROS ATH11K WIRELESS DRIVER
|
||||
M: Jeff Johnson <jjohnson@kernel.org>
|
||||
L: linux-wireless@vger.kernel.org
|
||||
L: ath11k@lists.infradead.org
|
||||
S: Supported
|
||||
W: https://wireless.wiki.kernel.org/en/users/Drivers/ath11k
|
||||
@ -21253,6 +21337,7 @@ L: linux-s390@vger.kernel.org
|
||||
L: netdev@vger.kernel.org
|
||||
S: Supported
|
||||
F: drivers/s390/net/
|
||||
F: include/linux/ism.h
|
||||
|
||||
S390 PCI SUBSYSTEM
|
||||
M: Niklas Schnelle <schnelle@linux.ibm.com>
|
||||
@ -22137,6 +22222,7 @@ F: drivers/platform/x86/touchscreen_dmi.c
|
||||
|
||||
SILICON LABS WIRELESS DRIVERS (for WFxxx series)
|
||||
M: Jérôme Pouiller <jerome.pouiller@silabs.com>
|
||||
L: linux-wireless@vger.kernel.org
|
||||
S: Supported
|
||||
F: Documentation/devicetree/bindings/net/wireless/silabs,wfx.yaml
|
||||
F: drivers/net/wireless/silabs/
|
||||
@ -22237,9 +22323,7 @@ F: drivers/nvmem/layouts/sl28vpd.c
|
||||
|
||||
SLAB ALLOCATOR
|
||||
M: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
|
||||
M: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
|
||||
M: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
|
||||
M: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
|
||||
M: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
|
||||
M: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
|
||||
R: Roman Gushchin <roman.gushchin@linux.dev>
|
||||
@ -22654,9 +22738,15 @@ T: git git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/broonie/sound.git
|
||||
F: Documentation/devicetree/bindings/sound/
|
||||
F: Documentation/sound/soc/
|
||||
F: include/dt-bindings/sound/
|
||||
F: include/sound/cs-amp-lib.h
|
||||
F: include/sound/cs35l*
|
||||
F: include/sound/cs4271.h
|
||||
F: include/sound/cs42l*
|
||||
F: include/sound/madera-pdata.h
|
||||
F: include/sound/soc*
|
||||
F: include/sound/sof.h
|
||||
F: include/sound/sof/
|
||||
F: include/sound/wm*.h
|
||||
F: include/trace/events/sof*.h
|
||||
F: include/uapi/sound/asoc.h
|
||||
F: sound/soc/
|
||||
@ -25126,9 +25216,13 @@ S: Maintained
|
||||
F: drivers/usb/typec/mux/pi3usb30532.c
|
||||
|
||||
USB TYPEC PORT CONTROLLER DRIVERS
|
||||
M: Badhri Jagan Sridharan <badhri@google.com>
|
||||
L: linux-usb@vger.kernel.org
|
||||
S: Orphan
|
||||
F: drivers/usb/typec/tcpm/
|
||||
S: Maintained
|
||||
F: drivers/usb/typec/tcpm/tcpci.c
|
||||
F: drivers/usb/typec/tcpm/tcpm.c
|
||||
F: include/linux/usb/tcpci.h
|
||||
F: include/linux/usb/tcpm.h
|
||||
|
||||
USB TYPEC TUSB1046 MUX DRIVER
|
||||
M: Romain Gantois <romain.gantois@bootlin.com>
|
||||
|
||||
11
Makefile
11
Makefile
@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
|
||||
VERSION = 6
|
||||
PATCHLEVEL = 15
|
||||
SUBLEVEL = 0
|
||||
EXTRAVERSION = -rc1
|
||||
EXTRAVERSION = -rc4
|
||||
NAME = Baby Opossum Posse
|
||||
|
||||
# *DOCUMENTATION*
|
||||
@ -477,7 +477,6 @@ export rust_common_flags := --edition=2021 \
|
||||
-Wclippy::ignored_unit_patterns \
|
||||
-Wclippy::mut_mut \
|
||||
-Wclippy::needless_bitwise_bool \
|
||||
-Wclippy::needless_continue \
|
||||
-Aclippy::needless_lifetimes \
|
||||
-Wclippy::no_mangle_with_rust_abi \
|
||||
-Wclippy::undocumented_unsafe_blocks \
|
||||
@ -1054,9 +1053,12 @@ NOSTDINC_FLAGS += -nostdinc
|
||||
KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(call cc-option, -fstrict-flex-arrays=3)
|
||||
|
||||
#Currently, disable -Wstringop-overflow for GCC 11, globally.
|
||||
KBUILD_CFLAGS-$(CONFIG_CC_NO_STRINGOP_OVERFLOW) += $(call cc-option, -Wno-stringop-overflow)
|
||||
KBUILD_CFLAGS-$(CONFIG_CC_NO_STRINGOP_OVERFLOW) += $(call cc-disable-warning, stringop-overflow)
|
||||
KBUILD_CFLAGS-$(CONFIG_CC_STRINGOP_OVERFLOW) += $(call cc-option, -Wstringop-overflow)
|
||||
|
||||
#Currently, disable -Wunterminated-string-initialization as broken
|
||||
KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(call cc-disable-warning, unterminated-string-initialization)
|
||||
|
||||
# disable invalid "can't wrap" optimizations for signed / pointers
|
||||
KBUILD_CFLAGS += -fno-strict-overflow
|
||||
|
||||
@ -1068,6 +1070,9 @@ ifdef CONFIG_CC_IS_GCC
|
||||
KBUILD_CFLAGS += -fconserve-stack
|
||||
endif
|
||||
|
||||
# Ensure compilers do not transform certain loops into calls to wcslen()
|
||||
KBUILD_CFLAGS += -fno-builtin-wcslen
|
||||
|
||||
# change __FILE__ to the relative path to the source directory
|
||||
ifdef building_out_of_srctree
|
||||
KBUILD_CPPFLAGS += $(call cc-option,-ffile-prefix-map=$(srcroot)/=)
|
||||
|
||||
@ -232,7 +232,6 @@ CONFIG_CRYPTO_USER_API_SKCIPHER=m
|
||||
CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_ATMEL_AES=y
|
||||
CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_ATMEL_TDES=y
|
||||
CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_ATMEL_SHA=y
|
||||
CONFIG_CRC_CCITT=y
|
||||
CONFIG_FONTS=y
|
||||
CONFIG_FONT_8x8=y
|
||||
CONFIG_FONT_ACORN_8x8=y
|
||||
|
||||
@ -78,7 +78,6 @@ CONFIG_ROMFS_FS=y
|
||||
CONFIG_NLS_DEFAULT="cp437"
|
||||
CONFIG_NLS_CODEPAGE_437=y
|
||||
CONFIG_NLS_ISO8859_1=y
|
||||
CONFIG_CRC_CCITT=y
|
||||
CONFIG_FONTS=y
|
||||
CONFIG_FONT_MINI_4x6=y
|
||||
# CONFIG_DEBUG_BUGVERBOSE is not set
|
||||
|
||||
@ -249,7 +249,6 @@ CONFIG_NLS_ASCII=m
|
||||
CONFIG_NLS_ISO8859_1=y
|
||||
CONFIG_NLS_UTF8=m
|
||||
# CONFIG_CRYPTO_HW is not set
|
||||
CONFIG_CRC_T10DIF=m
|
||||
CONFIG_DMA_CMA=y
|
||||
CONFIG_DEBUG_FS=y
|
||||
CONFIG_DEBUG_RT_MUTEXES=y
|
||||
|
||||
@ -128,7 +128,6 @@ CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEFLATE=y
|
||||
CONFIG_CRYPTO_LZO=y
|
||||
# CONFIG_CRYPTO_ANSI_CPRNG is not set
|
||||
CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_MARVELL_CESA=y
|
||||
CONFIG_CRC_CCITT=y
|
||||
CONFIG_PRINTK_TIME=y
|
||||
# CONFIG_DEBUG_BUGVERBOSE is not set
|
||||
CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO_DWARF_TOOLCHAIN_DEFAULT=y
|
||||
|
||||
@ -370,7 +370,6 @@ CONFIG_CRYPTO_AES_ARM_BS=m
|
||||
CONFIG_CRYPTO_CHACHA20_NEON=m
|
||||
CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_EXYNOS_RNG=y
|
||||
CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_S5P=y
|
||||
CONFIG_CRC_CCITT=y
|
||||
CONFIG_DMA_CMA=y
|
||||
CONFIG_CMA_SIZE_MBYTES=96
|
||||
CONFIG_FONTS=y
|
||||
|
||||
@ -481,8 +481,6 @@ CONFIG_SECURITYFS=y
|
||||
CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_FSL_CAAM=y
|
||||
CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_SAHARA=y
|
||||
CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_MXS_DCP=y
|
||||
CONFIG_CRC_CCITT=m
|
||||
CONFIG_CRC_T10DIF=y
|
||||
CONFIG_CMA_SIZE_MBYTES=64
|
||||
CONFIG_FONTS=y
|
||||
CONFIG_FONT_8x8=y
|
||||
|
||||
@ -147,7 +147,6 @@ CONFIG_EXT2_FS=y
|
||||
# CONFIG_INOTIFY_USER is not set
|
||||
CONFIG_JFFS2_FS=y
|
||||
# CONFIG_NETWORK_FILESYSTEMS is not set
|
||||
CONFIG_CRC_ITU_T=y
|
||||
CONFIG_PRINTK_TIME=y
|
||||
# CONFIG_ENABLE_MUST_CHECK is not set
|
||||
# CONFIG_DEBUG_BUGVERBOSE is not set
|
||||
|
||||
@ -179,7 +179,6 @@ CONFIG_NLS_ISO8859_1=y
|
||||
CONFIG_NLS_UTF8=y
|
||||
CONFIG_CRYPTO_ANSI_CPRNG=y
|
||||
# CONFIG_CRYPTO_HW is not set
|
||||
CONFIG_CRC_CCITT=y
|
||||
CONFIG_PRINTK_TIME=y
|
||||
CONFIG_DYNAMIC_DEBUG=y
|
||||
CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO_DWARF_TOOLCHAIN_DEFAULT=y
|
||||
|
||||
@ -108,8 +108,6 @@ CONFIG_CRYPTO_AES_ARM_BS=m
|
||||
CONFIG_CRYPTO_AES_ARM_CE=m
|
||||
CONFIG_CRYPTO_CHACHA20_NEON=m
|
||||
# CONFIG_CRYPTO_HW is not set
|
||||
CONFIG_CRC_CCITT=m
|
||||
CONFIG_CRC_ITU_T=m
|
||||
CONFIG_DMA_CMA=y
|
||||
CONFIG_CMA_SIZE_MBYTES=64
|
||||
CONFIG_PRINTK_TIME=y
|
||||
|
||||
@ -67,7 +67,6 @@ CONFIG_NFS_V3=y
|
||||
CONFIG_NFS_V3_ACL=y
|
||||
CONFIG_NFS_V4=y
|
||||
CONFIG_ROOT_NFS=y
|
||||
CONFIG_CRC_CCITT=y
|
||||
CONFIG_PRINTK_TIME=y
|
||||
CONFIG_DEBUG_KERNEL=y
|
||||
CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO_DWARF_TOOLCHAIN_DEFAULT=y
|
||||
|
||||
@ -91,6 +91,5 @@ CONFIG_MSDOS_FS=y
|
||||
CONFIG_VFAT_FS=y
|
||||
CONFIG_CRAMFS=y
|
||||
CONFIG_MINIX_FS=y
|
||||
CONFIG_CRC_CCITT=y
|
||||
# CONFIG_FTRACE is not set
|
||||
CONFIG_DEBUG_USER=y
|
||||
|
||||
@ -289,7 +289,6 @@ CONFIG_NLS_UTF8=y
|
||||
CONFIG_CRYPTO_CBC=m
|
||||
CONFIG_CRYPTO_PCBC=m
|
||||
CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_MARVELL_CESA=y
|
||||
CONFIG_CRC_CCITT=y
|
||||
CONFIG_DEBUG_KERNEL=y
|
||||
CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO_DWARF_TOOLCHAIN_DEFAULT=y
|
||||
CONFIG_MAGIC_SYSRQ=y
|
||||
|
||||
@ -187,7 +187,6 @@ CONFIG_NLS_UTF8=y
|
||||
CONFIG_CRYPTO_CBC=m
|
||||
CONFIG_CRYPTO_PCBC=m
|
||||
CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_MARVELL_CESA=y
|
||||
CONFIG_CRC_CCITT=y
|
||||
CONFIG_DEBUG_KERNEL=y
|
||||
CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO_DWARF_TOOLCHAIN_DEFAULT=y
|
||||
CONFIG_MAGIC_SYSRQ=y
|
||||
|
||||
@ -160,7 +160,6 @@ CONFIG_NLS_CODEPAGE_850=y
|
||||
CONFIG_NLS_ISO8859_1=y
|
||||
CONFIG_NLS_ISO8859_15=y
|
||||
CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_MXS_DCP=y
|
||||
CONFIG_CRC_ITU_T=m
|
||||
CONFIG_FONTS=y
|
||||
CONFIG_PRINTK_TIME=y
|
||||
CONFIG_DEBUG_KERNEL=y
|
||||
|
||||
@ -706,9 +706,6 @@ CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_OMAP=m
|
||||
CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_OMAP_SHAM=m
|
||||
CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_OMAP_AES=m
|
||||
CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_OMAP_DES=m
|
||||
CONFIG_CRC_CCITT=y
|
||||
CONFIG_CRC_T10DIF=y
|
||||
CONFIG_CRC_ITU_T=y
|
||||
CONFIG_DMA_CMA=y
|
||||
CONFIG_FONTS=y
|
||||
CONFIG_FONT_8x8=y
|
||||
|
||||
@ -136,7 +136,6 @@ CONFIG_CRYPTO_CBC=m
|
||||
CONFIG_CRYPTO_ECB=m
|
||||
CONFIG_CRYPTO_PCBC=m
|
||||
CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_MARVELL_CESA=y
|
||||
CONFIG_CRC_T10DIF=y
|
||||
# CONFIG_DEBUG_BUGVERBOSE is not set
|
||||
CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO_DWARF_TOOLCHAIN_DEFAULT=y
|
||||
CONFIG_MAGIC_SYSRQ=y
|
||||
|
||||
@ -41,7 +41,6 @@ CONFIG_NFS_V3=y
|
||||
CONFIG_NFS_V3_ACL=y
|
||||
CONFIG_NFS_V4=y
|
||||
CONFIG_ROOT_NFS=y
|
||||
CONFIG_CRC_CCITT=y
|
||||
CONFIG_PRINTK_TIME=y
|
||||
CONFIG_DEBUG_KERNEL=y
|
||||
CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO_DWARF_TOOLCHAIN_DEFAULT=y
|
||||
|
||||
@ -50,7 +50,6 @@ CONFIG_NFS_V3=y
|
||||
CONFIG_NFS_V3_ACL=y
|
||||
CONFIG_NFS_V4=y
|
||||
CONFIG_ROOT_NFS=y
|
||||
CONFIG_CRC_CCITT=y
|
||||
CONFIG_PRINTK_TIME=y
|
||||
CONFIG_DEBUG_KERNEL=y
|
||||
CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO_DWARF_TOOLCHAIN_DEFAULT=y
|
||||
|
||||
@ -663,8 +663,6 @@ CONFIG_CRYPTO_SHA1_ARM=m
|
||||
CONFIG_CRYPTO_SHA256_ARM=m
|
||||
CONFIG_CRYPTO_SHA512_ARM=m
|
||||
CONFIG_CRYPTO_AES_ARM=m
|
||||
CONFIG_CRC_CCITT=y
|
||||
CONFIG_CRC_T10DIF=m
|
||||
CONFIG_FONTS=y
|
||||
CONFIG_FONT_8x8=y
|
||||
CONFIG_FONT_8x16=y
|
||||
|
||||
@ -113,7 +113,6 @@ CONFIG_NLS_CODEPAGE_437=y
|
||||
CONFIG_NLS_ASCII=y
|
||||
CONFIG_NLS_ISO8859_1=y
|
||||
CONFIG_NLS_UTF8=y
|
||||
CONFIG_CRC_CCITT=y
|
||||
CONFIG_DEBUG_KERNEL=y
|
||||
CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO_DWARF_TOOLCHAIN_DEFAULT=y
|
||||
CONFIG_MAGIC_SYSRQ=y
|
||||
|
||||
@ -227,8 +227,6 @@ CONFIG_CRYPTO_USER_API_SKCIPHER=m
|
||||
CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_ATMEL_AES=y
|
||||
CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_ATMEL_TDES=y
|
||||
CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_ATMEL_SHA=y
|
||||
CONFIG_CRC_CCITT=y
|
||||
CONFIG_CRC_ITU_T=y
|
||||
CONFIG_DMA_CMA=y
|
||||
CONFIG_CMA_SIZE_MBYTES=32
|
||||
CONFIG_CMA_ALIGNMENT=9
|
||||
|
||||
@ -234,7 +234,6 @@ CONFIG_CRYPTO_MD4=m
|
||||
CONFIG_CRYPTO_MICHAEL_MIC=m
|
||||
CONFIG_CRYPTO_SHA512=m
|
||||
CONFIG_CRYPTO_WP512=m
|
||||
CONFIG_CRC_CCITT=y
|
||||
CONFIG_FONTS=y
|
||||
CONFIG_FONT_8x8=y
|
||||
CONFIG_FONT_8x16=y
|
||||
|
||||
@ -74,7 +74,6 @@ CONFIG_EXT3_FS=y
|
||||
# CONFIG_DNOTIFY is not set
|
||||
# CONFIG_INOTIFY_USER is not set
|
||||
CONFIG_NLS=y
|
||||
CONFIG_CRC_ITU_T=y
|
||||
CONFIG_PRINTK_TIME=y
|
||||
# CONFIG_DEBUG_BUGVERBOSE is not set
|
||||
CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO_DWARF_TOOLCHAIN_DEFAULT=y
|
||||
|
||||
@ -191,8 +191,6 @@ CONFIG_ASYMMETRIC_PUBLIC_KEY_SUBTYPE=y
|
||||
CONFIG_X509_CERTIFICATE_PARSER=y
|
||||
CONFIG_PKCS7_MESSAGE_PARSER=y
|
||||
CONFIG_SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING=y
|
||||
CONFIG_CRC_CCITT=y
|
||||
CONFIG_CRC_ITU_T=m
|
||||
CONFIG_PRINTK_TIME=y
|
||||
CONFIG_DEBUG_KERNEL=y
|
||||
CONFIG_MAGIC_SYSRQ=y
|
||||
|
||||
@ -121,6 +121,15 @@
|
||||
#define ESR_ELx_FSC_SEA_TTW(n) (0x14 + (n))
|
||||
#define ESR_ELx_FSC_SECC (0x18)
|
||||
#define ESR_ELx_FSC_SECC_TTW(n) (0x1c + (n))
|
||||
#define ESR_ELx_FSC_ADDRSZ (0x00)
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Annoyingly, the negative levels for Address size faults aren't laid out
|
||||
* contiguously (or in the desired order)
|
||||
*/
|
||||
#define ESR_ELx_FSC_ADDRSZ_nL(n) ((n) == -1 ? 0x25 : 0x2C)
|
||||
#define ESR_ELx_FSC_ADDRSZ_L(n) ((n) < 0 ? ESR_ELx_FSC_ADDRSZ_nL(n) : \
|
||||
(ESR_ELx_FSC_ADDRSZ + (n)))
|
||||
|
||||
/* Status codes for individual page table levels */
|
||||
#define ESR_ELx_FSC_ACCESS_L(n) (ESR_ELx_FSC_ACCESS + (n))
|
||||
@ -161,8 +170,6 @@
|
||||
#define ESR_ELx_Xs_MASK (GENMASK_ULL(4, 0))
|
||||
|
||||
/* ISS field definitions for exceptions taken in to Hyp */
|
||||
#define ESR_ELx_FSC_ADDRSZ (0x00)
|
||||
#define ESR_ELx_FSC_ADDRSZ_L(n) (ESR_ELx_FSC_ADDRSZ + (n))
|
||||
#define ESR_ELx_CV (UL(1) << 24)
|
||||
#define ESR_ELx_COND_SHIFT (20)
|
||||
#define ESR_ELx_COND_MASK (UL(0xF) << ESR_ELx_COND_SHIFT)
|
||||
@ -464,6 +471,39 @@ static inline bool esr_fsc_is_access_flag_fault(unsigned long esr)
|
||||
(esr == ESR_ELx_FSC_ACCESS_L(0));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static inline bool esr_fsc_is_addr_sz_fault(unsigned long esr)
|
||||
{
|
||||
esr &= ESR_ELx_FSC;
|
||||
|
||||
return (esr == ESR_ELx_FSC_ADDRSZ_L(3)) ||
|
||||
(esr == ESR_ELx_FSC_ADDRSZ_L(2)) ||
|
||||
(esr == ESR_ELx_FSC_ADDRSZ_L(1)) ||
|
||||
(esr == ESR_ELx_FSC_ADDRSZ_L(0)) ||
|
||||
(esr == ESR_ELx_FSC_ADDRSZ_L(-1));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static inline bool esr_fsc_is_sea_ttw(unsigned long esr)
|
||||
{
|
||||
esr = esr & ESR_ELx_FSC;
|
||||
|
||||
return (esr == ESR_ELx_FSC_SEA_TTW(3)) ||
|
||||
(esr == ESR_ELx_FSC_SEA_TTW(2)) ||
|
||||
(esr == ESR_ELx_FSC_SEA_TTW(1)) ||
|
||||
(esr == ESR_ELx_FSC_SEA_TTW(0)) ||
|
||||
(esr == ESR_ELx_FSC_SEA_TTW(-1));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static inline bool esr_fsc_is_secc_ttw(unsigned long esr)
|
||||
{
|
||||
esr = esr & ESR_ELx_FSC;
|
||||
|
||||
return (esr == ESR_ELx_FSC_SECC_TTW(3)) ||
|
||||
(esr == ESR_ELx_FSC_SECC_TTW(2)) ||
|
||||
(esr == ESR_ELx_FSC_SECC_TTW(1)) ||
|
||||
(esr == ESR_ELx_FSC_SECC_TTW(0)) ||
|
||||
(esr == ESR_ELx_FSC_SECC_TTW(-1));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* Indicate whether ESR.EC==0x1A is for an ERETAx instruction */
|
||||
static inline bool esr_iss_is_eretax(unsigned long esr)
|
||||
{
|
||||
|
||||
@ -305,7 +305,12 @@ static __always_inline unsigned long kvm_vcpu_get_hfar(const struct kvm_vcpu *vc
|
||||
|
||||
static __always_inline phys_addr_t kvm_vcpu_get_fault_ipa(const struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
|
||||
{
|
||||
return ((phys_addr_t)vcpu->arch.fault.hpfar_el2 & HPFAR_MASK) << 8;
|
||||
u64 hpfar = vcpu->arch.fault.hpfar_el2;
|
||||
|
||||
if (unlikely(!(hpfar & HPFAR_EL2_NS)))
|
||||
return INVALID_GPA;
|
||||
|
||||
return FIELD_GET(HPFAR_EL2_FIPA, hpfar) << 12;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static inline u64 kvm_vcpu_get_disr(const struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
|
||||
|
||||
@ -1588,4 +1588,9 @@ void kvm_set_vm_id_reg(struct kvm *kvm, u32 reg, u64 val);
|
||||
#define kvm_has_s1poe(k) \
|
||||
(kvm_has_feat((k), ID_AA64MMFR3_EL1, S1POE, IMP))
|
||||
|
||||
static inline bool kvm_arch_has_irq_bypass(void)
|
||||
{
|
||||
return true;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#endif /* __ARM64_KVM_HOST_H__ */
|
||||
|
||||
@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
|
||||
* Was this synchronous external abort a RAS notification?
|
||||
* Returns '0' for errors handled by some RAS subsystem, or -ENOENT.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
static inline int kvm_handle_guest_sea(phys_addr_t addr, u64 esr)
|
||||
static inline int kvm_handle_guest_sea(void)
|
||||
{
|
||||
/* apei_claim_sea(NULL) expects to mask interrupts itself */
|
||||
lockdep_assert_irqs_enabled();
|
||||
|
||||
@ -94,17 +94,6 @@ static inline bool kaslr_requires_kpti(void)
|
||||
return false;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Systems affected by Cavium erratum 24756 are incompatible
|
||||
* with KPTI.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CAVIUM_ERRATUM_27456)) {
|
||||
extern const struct midr_range cavium_erratum_27456_cpus[];
|
||||
|
||||
if (is_midr_in_range_list(cavium_erratum_27456_cpus))
|
||||
return false;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return true;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@ -86,7 +86,7 @@
|
||||
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
|
||||
#define res_smp_cond_load_acquire_timewait(v, c) smp_cond_load_acquire_timewait(v, c, 0, 1)
|
||||
#define res_smp_cond_load_acquire(v, c) smp_cond_load_acquire_timewait(v, c, 0, 1)
|
||||
|
||||
#include <asm-generic/rqspinlock.h>
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@ -335,7 +335,7 @@ static const struct midr_range cavium_erratum_23154_cpus[] = {
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
|
||||
#ifdef CONFIG_CAVIUM_ERRATUM_27456
|
||||
const struct midr_range cavium_erratum_27456_cpus[] = {
|
||||
static const struct midr_range cavium_erratum_27456_cpus[] = {
|
||||
/* Cavium ThunderX, T88 pass 1.x - 2.1 */
|
||||
MIDR_RANGE(MIDR_THUNDERX, 0, 0, 1, 1),
|
||||
/* Cavium ThunderX, T81 pass 1.0 */
|
||||
|
||||
@ -47,10 +47,6 @@ PROVIDE(__pi_id_aa64smfr0_override = id_aa64smfr0_override);
|
||||
PROVIDE(__pi_id_aa64zfr0_override = id_aa64zfr0_override);
|
||||
PROVIDE(__pi_arm64_sw_feature_override = arm64_sw_feature_override);
|
||||
PROVIDE(__pi_arm64_use_ng_mappings = arm64_use_ng_mappings);
|
||||
#ifdef CONFIG_CAVIUM_ERRATUM_27456
|
||||
PROVIDE(__pi_cavium_erratum_27456_cpus = cavium_erratum_27456_cpus);
|
||||
PROVIDE(__pi_is_midr_in_range_list = is_midr_in_range_list);
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
PROVIDE(__pi__ctype = _ctype);
|
||||
PROVIDE(__pi_memstart_offset_seed = memstart_offset_seed);
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@ -207,6 +207,29 @@ static void __init map_fdt(u64 fdt)
|
||||
dsb(ishst);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* PI version of the Cavium Eratum 27456 detection, which makes it
|
||||
* impossible to use non-global mappings.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
static bool __init ng_mappings_allowed(void)
|
||||
{
|
||||
static const struct midr_range cavium_erratum_27456_cpus[] __initconst = {
|
||||
/* Cavium ThunderX, T88 pass 1.x - 2.1 */
|
||||
MIDR_RANGE(MIDR_THUNDERX, 0, 0, 1, 1),
|
||||
/* Cavium ThunderX, T81 pass 1.0 */
|
||||
MIDR_REV(MIDR_THUNDERX_81XX, 0, 0),
|
||||
{},
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
for (const struct midr_range *r = cavium_erratum_27456_cpus; r->model; r++) {
|
||||
if (midr_is_cpu_model_range(read_cpuid_id(), r->model,
|
||||
r->rv_min, r->rv_max))
|
||||
return false;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return true;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
asmlinkage void __init early_map_kernel(u64 boot_status, void *fdt)
|
||||
{
|
||||
static char const chosen_str[] __initconst = "/chosen";
|
||||
@ -246,7 +269,7 @@ asmlinkage void __init early_map_kernel(u64 boot_status, void *fdt)
|
||||
u64 kaslr_seed = kaslr_early_init(fdt, chosen);
|
||||
|
||||
if (kaslr_seed && kaslr_requires_kpti())
|
||||
arm64_use_ng_mappings = true;
|
||||
arm64_use_ng_mappings = ng_mappings_allowed();
|
||||
|
||||
kaslr_offset |= kaslr_seed & ~(MIN_KIMG_ALIGN - 1);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@ -2743,11 +2743,6 @@ bool kvm_arch_irqchip_in_kernel(struct kvm *kvm)
|
||||
return irqchip_in_kernel(kvm);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
bool kvm_arch_has_irq_bypass(void)
|
||||
{
|
||||
return true;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
int kvm_arch_irq_bypass_add_producer(struct irq_bypass_consumer *cons,
|
||||
struct irq_bypass_producer *prod)
|
||||
{
|
||||
|
||||
@ -12,6 +12,16 @@
|
||||
#include <asm/kvm_hyp.h>
|
||||
#include <asm/kvm_mmu.h>
|
||||
|
||||
static inline bool __fault_safe_to_translate(u64 esr)
|
||||
{
|
||||
u64 fsc = esr & ESR_ELx_FSC;
|
||||
|
||||
if (esr_fsc_is_sea_ttw(esr) || esr_fsc_is_secc_ttw(esr))
|
||||
return false;
|
||||
|
||||
return !(fsc == ESR_ELx_FSC_EXTABT && (esr & ESR_ELx_FnV));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static inline bool __translate_far_to_hpfar(u64 far, u64 *hpfar)
|
||||
{
|
||||
int ret;
|
||||
@ -44,34 +54,50 @@ static inline bool __translate_far_to_hpfar(u64 far, u64 *hpfar)
|
||||
return true;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static inline bool __get_fault_info(u64 esr, struct kvm_vcpu_fault_info *fault)
|
||||
{
|
||||
u64 hpfar, far;
|
||||
|
||||
far = read_sysreg_el2(SYS_FAR);
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* The HPFAR can be invalid if the stage 2 fault did not
|
||||
* happen during a stage 1 page table walk (the ESR_EL2.S1PTW
|
||||
* bit is clear) and one of the two following cases are true:
|
||||
* 1. The fault was due to a permission fault
|
||||
* 2. The processor carries errata 834220
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Therefore, for all non S1PTW faults where we either have a
|
||||
* permission fault or the errata workaround is enabled, we
|
||||
* resolve the IPA using the AT instruction.
|
||||
* Checks for the conditions when HPFAR_EL2 is written, per ARM ARM R_FKLWR.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
if (!(esr & ESR_ELx_S1PTW) &&
|
||||
(cpus_have_final_cap(ARM64_WORKAROUND_834220) ||
|
||||
esr_fsc_is_permission_fault(esr))) {
|
||||
if (!__translate_far_to_hpfar(far, &hpfar))
|
||||
static inline bool __hpfar_valid(u64 esr)
|
||||
{
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* CPUs affected by ARM erratum #834220 may incorrectly report a
|
||||
* stage-2 translation fault when a stage-1 permission fault occurs.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Re-walk the page tables to determine if a stage-1 fault actually
|
||||
* occurred.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
if (cpus_have_final_cap(ARM64_WORKAROUND_834220) &&
|
||||
esr_fsc_is_translation_fault(esr))
|
||||
return false;
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
hpfar = read_sysreg(hpfar_el2);
|
||||
|
||||
if (esr_fsc_is_translation_fault(esr) || esr_fsc_is_access_flag_fault(esr))
|
||||
return true;
|
||||
|
||||
if ((esr & ESR_ELx_S1PTW) && esr_fsc_is_permission_fault(esr))
|
||||
return true;
|
||||
|
||||
return esr_fsc_is_addr_sz_fault(esr);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fault->far_el2 = far;
|
||||
fault->hpfar_el2 = hpfar;
|
||||
static inline bool __get_fault_info(u64 esr, struct kvm_vcpu_fault_info *fault)
|
||||
{
|
||||
u64 hpfar;
|
||||
|
||||
fault->far_el2 = read_sysreg_el2(SYS_FAR);
|
||||
fault->hpfar_el2 = 0;
|
||||
|
||||
if (__hpfar_valid(esr))
|
||||
hpfar = read_sysreg(hpfar_el2);
|
||||
else if (unlikely(!__fault_safe_to_translate(esr)))
|
||||
return true;
|
||||
else if (!__translate_far_to_hpfar(fault->far_el2, &hpfar))
|
||||
return false;
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Hijack HPFAR_EL2.NS (RES0 in Non-secure) to indicate a valid
|
||||
* HPFAR value.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
fault->hpfar_el2 = hpfar | HPFAR_EL2_NS;
|
||||
return true;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@ -730,10 +730,10 @@ static void do_ffa_version(struct arm_smccc_res *res,
|
||||
hyp_ffa_version = ffa_req_version;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (hyp_ffa_post_init())
|
||||
if (hyp_ffa_post_init()) {
|
||||
res->a0 = FFA_RET_NOT_SUPPORTED;
|
||||
else {
|
||||
has_version_negotiated = true;
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
smp_store_release(&has_version_negotiated, true);
|
||||
res->a0 = hyp_ffa_version;
|
||||
}
|
||||
unlock:
|
||||
@ -809,7 +809,8 @@ bool kvm_host_ffa_handler(struct kvm_cpu_context *host_ctxt, u32 func_id)
|
||||
if (!is_ffa_call(func_id))
|
||||
return false;
|
||||
|
||||
if (!has_version_negotiated && func_id != FFA_VERSION) {
|
||||
if (func_id != FFA_VERSION &&
|
||||
!smp_load_acquire(&has_version_negotiated)) {
|
||||
ffa_to_smccc_error(&res, FFA_RET_INVALID_PARAMETERS);
|
||||
goto out_handled;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@ -578,7 +578,14 @@ void handle_host_mem_abort(struct kvm_cpu_context *host_ctxt)
|
||||
return;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
addr = (fault.hpfar_el2 & HPFAR_MASK) << 8;
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Yikes, we couldn't resolve the fault IPA. This should reinject an
|
||||
* abort into the host when we figure out how to do that.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
BUG_ON(!(fault.hpfar_el2 & HPFAR_EL2_NS));
|
||||
addr = FIELD_GET(HPFAR_EL2_FIPA, fault.hpfar_el2) << 12;
|
||||
|
||||
ret = host_stage2_idmap(addr);
|
||||
BUG_ON(ret && ret != -EAGAIN);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@ -1794,9 +1794,28 @@ int kvm_handle_guest_abort(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
|
||||
gfn_t gfn;
|
||||
int ret, idx;
|
||||
|
||||
/* Synchronous External Abort? */
|
||||
if (kvm_vcpu_abt_issea(vcpu)) {
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* For RAS the host kernel may handle this abort.
|
||||
* There is no need to pass the error into the guest.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
if (kvm_handle_guest_sea())
|
||||
kvm_inject_vabt(vcpu);
|
||||
|
||||
return 1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
esr = kvm_vcpu_get_esr(vcpu);
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* The fault IPA should be reliable at this point as we're not dealing
|
||||
* with an SEA.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
ipa = fault_ipa = kvm_vcpu_get_fault_ipa(vcpu);
|
||||
if (KVM_BUG_ON(ipa == INVALID_GPA, vcpu->kvm))
|
||||
return -EFAULT;
|
||||
|
||||
is_iabt = kvm_vcpu_trap_is_iabt(vcpu);
|
||||
|
||||
if (esr_fsc_is_translation_fault(esr)) {
|
||||
@ -1818,18 +1837,6 @@ int kvm_handle_guest_abort(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* Synchronous External Abort? */
|
||||
if (kvm_vcpu_abt_issea(vcpu)) {
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* For RAS the host kernel may handle this abort.
|
||||
* There is no need to pass the error into the guest.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
if (kvm_handle_guest_sea(fault_ipa, kvm_vcpu_get_esr(vcpu)))
|
||||
kvm_inject_vabt(vcpu);
|
||||
|
||||
return 1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
trace_kvm_guest_fault(*vcpu_pc(vcpu), kvm_vcpu_get_esr(vcpu),
|
||||
kvm_vcpu_get_hfar(vcpu), fault_ipa);
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@ -3536,3 +3536,10 @@ Field 5 F
|
||||
Field 4 P
|
||||
Field 3:0 Align
|
||||
EndSysreg
|
||||
|
||||
Sysreg HPFAR_EL2 3 4 6 0 4
|
||||
Field 63 NS
|
||||
Res0 62:48
|
||||
Field 47:4 FIPA
|
||||
Res0 3:0
|
||||
EndSysreg
|
||||
|
||||
@ -72,9 +72,6 @@ CONFIG_INET=y
|
||||
CONFIG_CRYPTO_MD5=y
|
||||
# CONFIG_CRYPTO_ANSI_CPRNG is not set
|
||||
# CONFIG_CRYPTO_HW is not set
|
||||
CONFIG_CRC_CCITT=y
|
||||
CONFIG_CRC16=y
|
||||
CONFIG_CRC_T10DIF=y
|
||||
CONFIG_FRAME_WARN=0
|
||||
CONFIG_MAGIC_SYSRQ=y
|
||||
CONFIG_DEBUG_FS=y
|
||||
|
||||
@ -73,6 +73,7 @@ config LOONGARCH
|
||||
select ARCH_SUPPORTS_RT
|
||||
select ARCH_USE_BUILTIN_BSWAP
|
||||
select ARCH_USE_CMPXCHG_LOCKREF
|
||||
select ARCH_USE_MEMTEST
|
||||
select ARCH_USE_QUEUED_RWLOCKS
|
||||
select ARCH_USE_QUEUED_SPINLOCKS
|
||||
select ARCH_WANT_DEFAULT_BPF_JIT
|
||||
|
||||
@ -22,22 +22,29 @@
|
||||
struct sigcontext;
|
||||
|
||||
#define kernel_fpu_available() cpu_has_fpu
|
||||
extern void kernel_fpu_begin(void);
|
||||
extern void kernel_fpu_end(void);
|
||||
|
||||
extern void _init_fpu(unsigned int);
|
||||
extern void _save_fp(struct loongarch_fpu *);
|
||||
extern void _restore_fp(struct loongarch_fpu *);
|
||||
void kernel_fpu_begin(void);
|
||||
void kernel_fpu_end(void);
|
||||
|
||||
extern void _save_lsx(struct loongarch_fpu *fpu);
|
||||
extern void _restore_lsx(struct loongarch_fpu *fpu);
|
||||
extern void _init_lsx_upper(void);
|
||||
extern void _restore_lsx_upper(struct loongarch_fpu *fpu);
|
||||
asmlinkage void _init_fpu(unsigned int);
|
||||
asmlinkage void _save_fp(struct loongarch_fpu *);
|
||||
asmlinkage void _restore_fp(struct loongarch_fpu *);
|
||||
asmlinkage int _save_fp_context(void __user *fpregs, void __user *fcc, void __user *csr);
|
||||
asmlinkage int _restore_fp_context(void __user *fpregs, void __user *fcc, void __user *csr);
|
||||
|
||||
extern void _save_lasx(struct loongarch_fpu *fpu);
|
||||
extern void _restore_lasx(struct loongarch_fpu *fpu);
|
||||
extern void _init_lasx_upper(void);
|
||||
extern void _restore_lasx_upper(struct loongarch_fpu *fpu);
|
||||
asmlinkage void _save_lsx(struct loongarch_fpu *fpu);
|
||||
asmlinkage void _restore_lsx(struct loongarch_fpu *fpu);
|
||||
asmlinkage void _init_lsx_upper(void);
|
||||
asmlinkage void _restore_lsx_upper(struct loongarch_fpu *fpu);
|
||||
asmlinkage int _save_lsx_context(void __user *fpregs, void __user *fcc, void __user *fcsr);
|
||||
asmlinkage int _restore_lsx_context(void __user *fpregs, void __user *fcc, void __user *fcsr);
|
||||
|
||||
asmlinkage void _save_lasx(struct loongarch_fpu *fpu);
|
||||
asmlinkage void _restore_lasx(struct loongarch_fpu *fpu);
|
||||
asmlinkage void _init_lasx_upper(void);
|
||||
asmlinkage void _restore_lasx_upper(struct loongarch_fpu *fpu);
|
||||
asmlinkage int _save_lasx_context(void __user *fpregs, void __user *fcc, void __user *fcsr);
|
||||
asmlinkage int _restore_lasx_context(void __user *fpregs, void __user *fcc, void __user *fcsr);
|
||||
|
||||
static inline void enable_lsx(void);
|
||||
static inline void disable_lsx(void);
|
||||
|
||||
@ -12,9 +12,13 @@
|
||||
#include <asm/loongarch.h>
|
||||
#include <asm/processor.h>
|
||||
|
||||
extern void _init_lbt(void);
|
||||
extern void _save_lbt(struct loongarch_lbt *);
|
||||
extern void _restore_lbt(struct loongarch_lbt *);
|
||||
asmlinkage void _init_lbt(void);
|
||||
asmlinkage void _save_lbt(struct loongarch_lbt *);
|
||||
asmlinkage void _restore_lbt(struct loongarch_lbt *);
|
||||
asmlinkage int _save_lbt_context(void __user *regs, void __user *eflags);
|
||||
asmlinkage int _restore_lbt_context(void __user *regs, void __user *eflags);
|
||||
asmlinkage int _save_ftop_context(void __user *ftop);
|
||||
asmlinkage int _restore_ftop_context(void __user *ftop);
|
||||
|
||||
static inline int is_lbt_enabled(void)
|
||||
{
|
||||
|
||||
@ -33,9 +33,9 @@ struct pt_regs {
|
||||
unsigned long __last[];
|
||||
} __aligned(8);
|
||||
|
||||
static inline int regs_irqs_disabled(struct pt_regs *regs)
|
||||
static __always_inline bool regs_irqs_disabled(struct pt_regs *regs)
|
||||
{
|
||||
return arch_irqs_disabled_flags(regs->csr_prmd);
|
||||
return !(regs->csr_prmd & CSR_PRMD_PIE);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static inline unsigned long kernel_stack_pointer(struct pt_regs *regs)
|
||||
|
||||
@ -21,10 +21,10 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_CPU_HAS_LBT) += lbt.o
|
||||
|
||||
obj-$(CONFIG_ARCH_STRICT_ALIGN) += unaligned.o
|
||||
|
||||
CFLAGS_module.o += $(call cc-option,-Wno-override-init,)
|
||||
CFLAGS_syscall.o += $(call cc-option,-Wno-override-init,)
|
||||
CFLAGS_traps.o += $(call cc-option,-Wno-override-init,)
|
||||
CFLAGS_perf_event.o += $(call cc-option,-Wno-override-init,)
|
||||
CFLAGS_module.o += $(call cc-disable-warning, override-init)
|
||||
CFLAGS_syscall.o += $(call cc-disable-warning, override-init)
|
||||
CFLAGS_traps.o += $(call cc-disable-warning, override-init)
|
||||
CFLAGS_perf_event.o += $(call cc-disable-warning, override-init)
|
||||
|
||||
ifdef CONFIG_FUNCTION_TRACER
|
||||
ifndef CONFIG_DYNAMIC_FTRACE
|
||||
|
||||
@ -458,6 +458,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(_save_fp_context)
|
||||
li.w a0, 0 # success
|
||||
jr ra
|
||||
SYM_FUNC_END(_save_fp_context)
|
||||
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(_save_fp_context)
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* a0: fpregs
|
||||
@ -471,6 +472,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(_restore_fp_context)
|
||||
li.w a0, 0 # success
|
||||
jr ra
|
||||
SYM_FUNC_END(_restore_fp_context)
|
||||
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(_restore_fp_context)
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* a0: fpregs
|
||||
@ -484,6 +486,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(_save_lsx_context)
|
||||
li.w a0, 0 # success
|
||||
jr ra
|
||||
SYM_FUNC_END(_save_lsx_context)
|
||||
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(_save_lsx_context)
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* a0: fpregs
|
||||
@ -497,6 +500,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(_restore_lsx_context)
|
||||
li.w a0, 0 # success
|
||||
jr ra
|
||||
SYM_FUNC_END(_restore_lsx_context)
|
||||
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(_restore_lsx_context)
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* a0: fpregs
|
||||
@ -510,6 +514,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(_save_lasx_context)
|
||||
li.w a0, 0 # success
|
||||
jr ra
|
||||
SYM_FUNC_END(_save_lasx_context)
|
||||
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(_save_lasx_context)
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* a0: fpregs
|
||||
@ -523,6 +528,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(_restore_lasx_context)
|
||||
li.w a0, 0 # success
|
||||
jr ra
|
||||
SYM_FUNC_END(_restore_lasx_context)
|
||||
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(_restore_lasx_context)
|
||||
|
||||
.L_fpu_fault:
|
||||
li.w a0, -EFAULT # failure
|
||||
|
||||
@ -90,6 +90,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(_save_lbt_context)
|
||||
li.w a0, 0 # success
|
||||
jr ra
|
||||
SYM_FUNC_END(_save_lbt_context)
|
||||
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(_save_lbt_context)
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* a0: scr
|
||||
@ -110,6 +111,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(_restore_lbt_context)
|
||||
li.w a0, 0 # success
|
||||
jr ra
|
||||
SYM_FUNC_END(_restore_lbt_context)
|
||||
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(_restore_lbt_context)
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* a0: ftop
|
||||
@ -120,6 +122,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(_save_ftop_context)
|
||||
li.w a0, 0 # success
|
||||
jr ra
|
||||
SYM_FUNC_END(_save_ftop_context)
|
||||
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(_save_ftop_context)
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* a0: ftop
|
||||
@ -150,6 +153,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(_restore_ftop_context)
|
||||
li.w a0, 0 # success
|
||||
jr ra
|
||||
SYM_FUNC_END(_restore_ftop_context)
|
||||
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(_restore_ftop_context)
|
||||
|
||||
.L_lbt_fault:
|
||||
li.w a0, -EFAULT # failure
|
||||
|
||||
@ -51,27 +51,6 @@
|
||||
#define lock_lbt_owner() ({ preempt_disable(); pagefault_disable(); })
|
||||
#define unlock_lbt_owner() ({ pagefault_enable(); preempt_enable(); })
|
||||
|
||||
/* Assembly functions to move context to/from the FPU */
|
||||
extern asmlinkage int
|
||||
_save_fp_context(void __user *fpregs, void __user *fcc, void __user *csr);
|
||||
extern asmlinkage int
|
||||
_restore_fp_context(void __user *fpregs, void __user *fcc, void __user *csr);
|
||||
extern asmlinkage int
|
||||
_save_lsx_context(void __user *fpregs, void __user *fcc, void __user *fcsr);
|
||||
extern asmlinkage int
|
||||
_restore_lsx_context(void __user *fpregs, void __user *fcc, void __user *fcsr);
|
||||
extern asmlinkage int
|
||||
_save_lasx_context(void __user *fpregs, void __user *fcc, void __user *fcsr);
|
||||
extern asmlinkage int
|
||||
_restore_lasx_context(void __user *fpregs, void __user *fcc, void __user *fcsr);
|
||||
|
||||
#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_HAS_LBT
|
||||
extern asmlinkage int _save_lbt_context(void __user *regs, void __user *eflags);
|
||||
extern asmlinkage int _restore_lbt_context(void __user *regs, void __user *eflags);
|
||||
extern asmlinkage int _save_ftop_context(void __user *ftop);
|
||||
extern asmlinkage int _restore_ftop_context(void __user *ftop);
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
|
||||
struct rt_sigframe {
|
||||
struct siginfo rs_info;
|
||||
struct ucontext rs_uctx;
|
||||
|
||||
@ -553,9 +553,10 @@ asmlinkage void noinstr do_ale(struct pt_regs *regs)
|
||||
die_if_kernel("Kernel ale access", regs);
|
||||
force_sig_fault(SIGBUS, BUS_ADRALN, (void __user *)regs->csr_badvaddr);
|
||||
#else
|
||||
bool pie = regs_irqs_disabled(regs);
|
||||
unsigned int *pc;
|
||||
|
||||
if (regs->csr_prmd & CSR_PRMD_PIE)
|
||||
if (!pie)
|
||||
local_irq_enable();
|
||||
|
||||
perf_sw_event(PERF_COUNT_SW_ALIGNMENT_FAULTS, 1, regs, regs->csr_badvaddr);
|
||||
@ -582,7 +583,7 @@ sigbus:
|
||||
die_if_kernel("Kernel ale access", regs);
|
||||
force_sig_fault(SIGBUS, BUS_ADRALN, (void __user *)regs->csr_badvaddr);
|
||||
out:
|
||||
if (regs->csr_prmd & CSR_PRMD_PIE)
|
||||
if (!pie)
|
||||
local_irq_disable();
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
irqentry_exit(regs, state);
|
||||
@ -621,12 +622,13 @@ static void bug_handler(struct pt_regs *regs)
|
||||
asmlinkage void noinstr do_bce(struct pt_regs *regs)
|
||||
{
|
||||
bool user = user_mode(regs);
|
||||
bool pie = regs_irqs_disabled(regs);
|
||||
unsigned long era = exception_era(regs);
|
||||
u64 badv = 0, lower = 0, upper = ULONG_MAX;
|
||||
union loongarch_instruction insn;
|
||||
irqentry_state_t state = irqentry_enter(regs);
|
||||
|
||||
if (regs->csr_prmd & CSR_PRMD_PIE)
|
||||
if (!pie)
|
||||
local_irq_enable();
|
||||
|
||||
current->thread.trap_nr = read_csr_excode();
|
||||
@ -692,7 +694,7 @@ asmlinkage void noinstr do_bce(struct pt_regs *regs)
|
||||
force_sig_bnderr((void __user *)badv, (void __user *)lower, (void __user *)upper);
|
||||
|
||||
out:
|
||||
if (regs->csr_prmd & CSR_PRMD_PIE)
|
||||
if (!pie)
|
||||
local_irq_disable();
|
||||
|
||||
irqentry_exit(regs, state);
|
||||
@ -710,11 +712,12 @@ bad_era:
|
||||
asmlinkage void noinstr do_bp(struct pt_regs *regs)
|
||||
{
|
||||
bool user = user_mode(regs);
|
||||
bool pie = regs_irqs_disabled(regs);
|
||||
unsigned int opcode, bcode;
|
||||
unsigned long era = exception_era(regs);
|
||||
irqentry_state_t state = irqentry_enter(regs);
|
||||
|
||||
if (regs->csr_prmd & CSR_PRMD_PIE)
|
||||
if (!pie)
|
||||
local_irq_enable();
|
||||
|
||||
if (__get_inst(&opcode, (u32 *)era, user))
|
||||
@ -780,7 +783,7 @@ asmlinkage void noinstr do_bp(struct pt_regs *regs)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
out:
|
||||
if (regs->csr_prmd & CSR_PRMD_PIE)
|
||||
if (!pie)
|
||||
local_irq_disable();
|
||||
|
||||
irqentry_exit(regs, state);
|
||||
@ -1015,6 +1018,7 @@ static void init_restore_lbt(void)
|
||||
|
||||
asmlinkage void noinstr do_lbt(struct pt_regs *regs)
|
||||
{
|
||||
bool pie = regs_irqs_disabled(regs);
|
||||
irqentry_state_t state = irqentry_enter(regs);
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
@ -1024,7 +1028,7 @@ asmlinkage void noinstr do_lbt(struct pt_regs *regs)
|
||||
* (including the user using 'MOVGR2GCSR' to turn on TM, which
|
||||
* will not trigger the BTE), we need to check PRMD first.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
if (regs->csr_prmd & CSR_PRMD_PIE)
|
||||
if (!pie)
|
||||
local_irq_enable();
|
||||
|
||||
if (!cpu_has_lbt) {
|
||||
@ -1038,7 +1042,7 @@ asmlinkage void noinstr do_lbt(struct pt_regs *regs)
|
||||
preempt_enable();
|
||||
|
||||
out:
|
||||
if (regs->csr_prmd & CSR_PRMD_PIE)
|
||||
if (!pie)
|
||||
local_irq_disable();
|
||||
|
||||
irqentry_exit(regs, state);
|
||||
|
||||
@ -21,4 +21,4 @@ kvm-y += intc/eiointc.o
|
||||
kvm-y += intc/pch_pic.o
|
||||
kvm-y += irqfd.o
|
||||
|
||||
CFLAGS_exit.o += $(call cc-option,-Wno-override-init,)
|
||||
CFLAGS_exit.o += $(call cc-disable-warning, override-init)
|
||||
|
||||
@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ static int send_ipi_data(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t addr, uint64_t data)
|
||||
ret = kvm_io_bus_read(vcpu, KVM_IOCSR_BUS, addr, sizeof(val), &val);
|
||||
srcu_read_unlock(&vcpu->kvm->srcu, idx);
|
||||
if (unlikely(ret)) {
|
||||
kvm_err("%s: : read date from addr %llx failed\n", __func__, addr);
|
||||
kvm_err("%s: : read data from addr %llx failed\n", __func__, addr);
|
||||
return ret;
|
||||
}
|
||||
/* Construct the mask by scanning the bit 27-30 */
|
||||
@ -127,7 +127,7 @@ static int send_ipi_data(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t addr, uint64_t data)
|
||||
ret = kvm_io_bus_write(vcpu, KVM_IOCSR_BUS, addr, sizeof(val), &val);
|
||||
srcu_read_unlock(&vcpu->kvm->srcu, idx);
|
||||
if (unlikely(ret))
|
||||
kvm_err("%s: : write date to addr %llx failed\n", __func__, addr);
|
||||
kvm_err("%s: : write data to addr %llx failed\n", __func__, addr);
|
||||
|
||||
return ret;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@ -296,10 +296,10 @@ int kvm_arch_enable_virtualization_cpu(void)
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Enable virtualization features granting guest direct control of
|
||||
* certain features:
|
||||
* GCI=2: Trap on init or unimplement cache instruction.
|
||||
* GCI=2: Trap on init or unimplemented cache instruction.
|
||||
* TORU=0: Trap on Root Unimplement.
|
||||
* CACTRL=1: Root control cache.
|
||||
* TOP=0: Trap on Previlege.
|
||||
* TOP=0: Trap on Privilege.
|
||||
* TOE=0: Trap on Exception.
|
||||
* TIT=0: Trap on Timer.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
||||
@ -294,6 +294,7 @@ static int kvm_pre_enter_guest(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
|
||||
vcpu->arch.aux_inuse &= ~KVM_LARCH_SWCSR_LATEST;
|
||||
|
||||
if (kvm_request_pending(vcpu) || xfer_to_guest_mode_work_pending()) {
|
||||
kvm_lose_pmu(vcpu);
|
||||
/* make sure the vcpu mode has been written */
|
||||
smp_store_mb(vcpu->mode, OUTSIDE_GUEST_MODE);
|
||||
local_irq_enable();
|
||||
@ -902,6 +903,13 @@ static int kvm_set_one_reg(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
|
||||
vcpu->arch.st.guest_addr = 0;
|
||||
memset(&vcpu->arch.irq_pending, 0, sizeof(vcpu->arch.irq_pending));
|
||||
memset(&vcpu->arch.irq_clear, 0, sizeof(vcpu->arch.irq_clear));
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* When vCPU reset, clear the ESTAT and GINTC registers
|
||||
* Other CSR registers are cleared with function _kvm_setcsr().
|
||||
*/
|
||||
kvm_write_sw_gcsr(vcpu->arch.csr, LOONGARCH_CSR_GINTC, 0);
|
||||
kvm_write_sw_gcsr(vcpu->arch.csr, LOONGARCH_CSR_ESTAT, 0);
|
||||
break;
|
||||
default:
|
||||
ret = -EINVAL;
|
||||
|
||||
@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ pte_t *huge_pte_offset(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long addr,
|
||||
pmd = pmd_offset(pud, addr);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
return (pte_t *) pmd;
|
||||
return pmd_none(pmdp_get(pmd)) ? NULL : (pte_t *) pmd;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
uint64_t pmd_to_entrylo(unsigned long pmd_val)
|
||||
|
||||
@ -65,9 +65,6 @@ void __init paging_init(void)
|
||||
{
|
||||
unsigned long max_zone_pfns[MAX_NR_ZONES];
|
||||
|
||||
#ifdef CONFIG_ZONE_DMA
|
||||
max_zone_pfns[ZONE_DMA] = MAX_DMA_PFN;
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
#ifdef CONFIG_ZONE_DMA32
|
||||
max_zone_pfns[ZONE_DMA32] = MAX_DMA32_PFN;
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
|
||||
@ -89,4 +89,3 @@ CONFIG_PANIC_ON_OOPS=y
|
||||
# CONFIG_CRYPTO_ECHAINIV is not set
|
||||
CONFIG_CRYPTO_ANSI_CPRNG=y
|
||||
# CONFIG_CRYPTO_HW is not set
|
||||
CONFIG_CRC16=y
|
||||
|
||||
@ -82,7 +82,6 @@ CONFIG_LEDS_GPIO=y
|
||||
# CONFIG_IOMMU_SUPPORT is not set
|
||||
# CONFIG_DNOTIFY is not set
|
||||
# CONFIG_PROC_PAGE_MONITOR is not set
|
||||
CONFIG_CRC_ITU_T=m
|
||||
CONFIG_STRIP_ASM_SYMS=y
|
||||
CONFIG_DEBUG_FS=y
|
||||
# CONFIG_SCHED_DEBUG is not set
|
||||
|
||||
@ -238,7 +238,6 @@ CONFIG_CRYPTO_SERPENT=m
|
||||
CONFIG_CRYPTO_TEA=m
|
||||
CONFIG_CRYPTO_TWOFISH=m
|
||||
CONFIG_CRYPTO_LZO=m
|
||||
CONFIG_CRC_T10DIF=m
|
||||
CONFIG_MAGIC_SYSRQ=y
|
||||
CONFIG_DEBUG_MEMORY_INIT=y
|
||||
CONFIG_DETECT_HUNG_TASK=y
|
||||
|
||||
Some files were not shown because too many files have changed in this diff Show More
Loading…
Reference in New Issue
Block a user