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	x86/xen: Add xenpv_restore_regs_and_return_to_usermode()
In the native case, PER_CPU_VAR(cpu_tss_rw + TSS_sp0) is the
trampoline stack. But XEN pv doesn't use trampoline stack, so
PER_CPU_VAR(cpu_tss_rw + TSS_sp0) is also the kernel stack.
In that case, source and destination stacks are identical, which means
that reusing swapgs_restore_regs_and_return_to_usermode() in XEN pv
would cause %rsp to move up to the top of the kernel stack and leave the
IRET frame below %rsp.
This is dangerous as it can be corrupted if #NMI / #MC hit as either of
these events occurring in the middle of the stack pushing would clobber
data on the (original) stack.
And, with  XEN pv, swapgs_restore_regs_and_return_to_usermode() pushing
the IRET frame on to the original address is useless and error-prone
when there is any future attempt to modify the code.
 [ bp: Massage commit message. ]
Fixes: 7f2590a110 ("x86/entry/64: Use a per-CPU trampoline stack for IDT entries")
Signed-off-by: Lai Jiangshan <laijs@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211126101209.8613-4-jiangshanlai@gmail.com
			
			
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				| @ -574,6 +574,10 @@ SYM_INNER_LABEL(swapgs_restore_regs_and_return_to_usermode, SYM_L_GLOBAL) | ||||
| 	ud2 | ||||
| 1: | ||||
| #endif | ||||
| #ifdef CONFIG_XEN_PV | ||||
| 	ALTERNATIVE "", "jmp xenpv_restore_regs_and_return_to_usermode", X86_FEATURE_XENPV | ||||
| #endif | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| 	POP_REGS pop_rdi=0 | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| 	/* | ||||
|  | ||||
| @ -20,6 +20,7 @@ | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| #include <linux/init.h> | ||||
| #include <linux/linkage.h> | ||||
| #include <../entry/calling.h> | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| .pushsection .noinstr.text, "ax" | ||||
| /* | ||||
| @ -192,6 +193,25 @@ SYM_CODE_START(xen_iret) | ||||
| 	jmp hypercall_iret | ||||
| SYM_CODE_END(xen_iret) | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| /* | ||||
|  * XEN pv doesn't use trampoline stack, PER_CPU_VAR(cpu_tss_rw + TSS_sp0) is | ||||
|  * also the kernel stack.  Reusing swapgs_restore_regs_and_return_to_usermode() | ||||
|  * in XEN pv would cause %rsp to move up to the top of the kernel stack and | ||||
|  * leave the IRET frame below %rsp, which is dangerous to be corrupted if #NMI | ||||
|  * interrupts. And swapgs_restore_regs_and_return_to_usermode() pushing the IRET | ||||
|  * frame at the same address is useless. | ||||
|  */ | ||||
| SYM_CODE_START(xenpv_restore_regs_and_return_to_usermode) | ||||
| 	UNWIND_HINT_REGS | ||||
| 	POP_REGS | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| 	/* stackleak_erase() can work safely on the kernel stack. */ | ||||
| 	STACKLEAK_ERASE_NOCLOBBER | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| 	addq	$8, %rsp	/* skip regs->orig_ax */ | ||||
| 	jmp xen_iret | ||||
| SYM_CODE_END(xenpv_restore_regs_and_return_to_usermode) | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| /* | ||||
|  * Xen handles syscall callbacks much like ordinary exceptions, which | ||||
|  * means we have: | ||||
|  | ||||
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